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FOREWORD 
As instruments of financing and restructuring, equity carve-outs (ECOs) continue to attract 
significant interest among corporate practitioners. This observation holds despite the low 
number of ECOs during the 2002/2003 period, which can be put down to the overall climate 
on capital markets rather than to the nature of ECOs. In parallel to the activities in the 
corporate sector, academia has discovered ECOs as intriguing subjects for its studies. 
Although researchers have turned to these transactions for some twenty years now, there is 
not yet full agreement on the results of these studies. On the one hand, researchers have 
detected a positive short-term effect, which is consistent across different studies and 
countries, whereas on the other hand it was unclear if this effect is durable in the long-run. 
Based on this lack of agreement on the long-term effects, a study around how ECOs affect 
company value is promising. To this, the dual character of ECOs as instruments of financing 
and restructuring adds a dimension of practical relevance. Taken together, this explains the 
strong attention that ECOs continue to attract. What is more, requisite data for the study of 
ECOs has become more and better in the recent past: The relevant databases now contain a 
large and growing body of statistical information that opens a range of possibilities to 
researchers. 
Matthias Baltin has taken these developments as a reason to study 174 US ECOs, thereby 
building on prior work at the chair for Wirtschaftswissenschaften für Ingenieure und 
Naturwissenschaftler at RWTH Aachen. He articulates his objective as follows: “There has 
been some consensus, both in academic literature and among practitioners, that an ECO tends 
to create economic value. The present study aims to reevaluate this assertion from a 
theoretical and an empirical perspective.” 
Matthias Baltin meets this objective in impressive fashion. Applying a theoretically founded 
approach to this practically relevant topic, he derives interesting insight through his empirical 
research. By combining these two dimensions, his work goes beyond the contributions by 
earlier articles. Yet this combination of the theoretical and the empirical is not the only 
distinctive mark of the present work. The analyses it contains equally stand out: For example, 
Matthias Baltin discusses the market timing of ECOs – a point which will certainly be 
recognized by future research. 
With this and its numerous other highly insightful results, the present work by Matthias Baltin 
is a remarkable contribution, not only for researchers but also for managers and other 
practitioners. For example, executives can build on the present work to derive information 
about the suitable timing of an ECO. For all it has offer, I wish this work the broad audience 
that it clearly deserves. 
Malte Brettel 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 A study of equity carve-outs 
1.1.1 Problem statement and overall approach 
In natural science, the Law of Conservation of Matter states that the amount of substance in a 
closed system is constant. Economic value, in contrast, is subject to much different laws: 
Very unlike physical matter, it may arise from zero under successful production or vanish 
after any ill-fated decision. More often than not, the whole is not equal to the sum of its parts. 
This work builds on this notion and compares the economic value of two separated pieces to 
its former total, or – more to the point – it aspires to answer if the separation of a business unit 
from its parent firm can create economic value. 
There are several ways to effect such separation: The company may be divided among its 
existing owners, or the business unit in question may be put up for sale, either privately or in a 
public offering. This last variant, in which a business unit attains independence through an 
initial public offering (IPO), forms the subject of this document. Such a transaction, 
commonly referred to as an equity carve-out (ECO), splits a formerly consolidated entity into 
two parts: the earlier business unit, here referred to as the subsidiary, and the parent company, 
comprised of all remaining parts of the firm. An ECO changes not only the ownership of the 
subsidiary, and with it its control structure, but has also far-reaching financial, reporting, and 
organizational implications for both subsidiary and parent firm. 
There has been some consensus, both in academic literature and among practitioners, that an 
ECO tends to create economic value. The present study aims to reevaluate this assertion from 
a theoretical and an empirical perspective. The theoretical account builds on the argument that 
an ECO affects the agency costs of a firm, the detriment brought about by the separation of 
ownership and control. An ECO may alleviate these costs through increased transparency and 
closer alignment of incentives, but it may also exacerbate the situation through 
overinvestment or the expropriation of minority shareholders. As theoretical reasoning alone 
is insufficient to arrive at a unanimous appraisal, this work resorts to empirical analysis to 
assess the actual performance of ECOs. 
The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 174 US ECOs. The reaction of the capital 
market to these transactions, both in the short- and in the long-term, serves as the yardstick 
against which ECOs are evaluated. And since an observation of performance says little about 
its determinants, the second part of this work turns from a study of effects to the study of its 
causes: If ECOs indeed engender changes in economic value, this work aims to discover the 
precise sources from which this value has emanated (or the cracks through which it has 
evaporated). The study concludes with several robustness checks, an overall assessment of 
ECOs, and a review of its theoretical and practical implications. 
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1.1.2 Relevance 
Section 10 will conclude this work with a discussion of its relevance. Yet rather than adjourn 
the question of this study’s relevance entirely to the end, it will be fitting to provide an up-
front snapshot of its bearing to demonstrate the motivation for this effort before it begins. 
Two aspects stand out: From an economic point of view, the size and prominence of ECOs 
deserve attention, while their multifaceted characteristics render these transactions intriguing 
subjects for an academic study. These aspects are separately expounded. 
1.1.2.1 Economic relevance 
With regard to the economic relevance of ECOs, Table 1 provides a first impression of the 
prominence of ECOs as capital market phenomena. The list presents the ten largest ECOs that 
have taken place in the US during the 1995-2002 period. The first observation concerns the 
companies that have conducted an ECO: Among these are some of the largest US companies, 
well known even to the public at large. This is accentuated by the fact that some of the 
remaining 164 ECOs of that period (a total of 174 ECOs have occurred in the US between 
1995 and 2002) have been conducted by equally renowned companies, including e.g., Ford, 
General Motors, IBM, Time Warner, and Microsoft. One US conglomerate, Thermo Electron, 
through ECOs at various levels of its structure, has been involved in nine such transactions 
during the eight years covered by this study1. 
Table 1: The ten largest US ECOs (1995-2002)2 
Parent Subsidiary Gross offer volume Year
USD million
Philip Morris Kraft 8,680 2001
Du Pont de Nemours Conoco 4,403 1998
Citigroup Travelers Property Casualty 4,274 2002
Lucent Agere Systems 4,140 2001
CBS Infinity Broadcasting 3,183 1998
AT&T Lucent Technologies 3,025 1996
News Corp Fox Entertainment 2,808 1998
Pepsi Pepsi Bottling Group 2,300 1999
Tyco TyCom 2,250 2000
Hewlett-Packard Agilent Technologies 2,160 1999  
The second observation on the economic relevance of ECOs relates to their size. By far the 
largest ECO has been conducted by Philip Morris through its separation of Kraft, resulting in 
                                                 
1  A case study of the ECOs of Thermo Electron is provided by Allen (1998). Holmström/Roberts 
(1998) comment on Thermo Electron’s strategy. 
2  Gross offer volume, as all monetary values in this document, is expressed in nominal terms. 
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gross offer proceeds of over eight billion dollars. To put these figures into perspective, two of 
the three largest IPOs in the US in 2001 were ECOs (Kraft and Agere Systems), as was the 
fifth largest IPO in the following year (Travelers). All top 10 ECOs attain gross offer volumes 
of more than USD two billion. ECOs have accounted for 16% of the volume of all IPOs in the 
US during 1995-2002 (see Table 5 on p. 26 for a more detailed comparison of ECO and IPO 
activity). Given this economic importance, ECOs constitute an enormous footing for the 
creation of economic value. Comprising such large transactions, even small changes in 
performance will have substantial effects for the involved stakeholders. 
1.1.2.2 Academic relevance 
From an academic point of view, ECOs represent absorbing subjects because of the breadth of 
topics that these transactions encompass. As instruments of both financing and restructuring, 
ECOs exhibit a dual character. While details on this duality are provided later on in this 
section, the observation may be advanced that researchers commonly draw on IPOs or 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) to study related aspects of financing, and on divestitures 
such as spin-offs or sell-offs to study the effects of restructuring. While there may be a benefit 
to analyzing these phenomena in isolation, ECOs provide the unique opportunity to examine 
the interaction of these effects. 
The complex nature of the subject has invited a host of approaches to its study. The 
combination of cash-inflow through offer proceeds with changes in ownership provides a fine 
setting for a theoretical and empirical review of agency theory (as e.g., applied by Junker 
(2005)). Furthermore, ECOs have been viewed from the vantage point of adverse selection 
and signaling effects (e.g., Nanda (1991), Slovin et al. (1995)). A study of ECOs may also 
shed light onto the optimal boundaries of the firm – a topic that has garnered sufficient 
academic interest to form the basis of an independent stream of transaction costs economics. 
On the subject of ECOs, the question of vertical integration has frequently been addressed by 
studying potential benefits of focus (e.g., Vijh (2002)). 
In summary, ECOs are economically highly relevant and academically intriguing. This study 
aims to do both aspects justice by providing insight that is practically relevant, theoretically 
founded, and that rests on methodology that accounts for the intricacy of the subject. 
1.1.3 Section outline 
The remainder of this introductory section contains a list of relevant definitions (Chapter 1.2), 
before the characteristics of ECOs are more closely presented (Chapter 1.3). An overview of 
the existing academic literature on ECOs follows (Chapter 1.4), which is used to identify the 
research gaps that this study aims to close. The objectives as well as the scope and limitations 
of this work are presented (Chapter 1.5) before this section concludes with an outline of the 
overall document structure (Chapter 1.6). 
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1.2 Definitions 
1.2.1 Equity carve-out 
An ECO represents the initial public sale of shares in a previously wholly-owned subsidiary 
(e.g., Schipper/Smith (1986)). This strict definition is usually supplemented by two conditions 
to facilitate the study of this phenomenon, which have also been adopted by the present study. 
The first requires that the parent company be itself publicly listed, as this allows to study the 
share price reaction to these transactions (e.g., when the ECO is announced before the actual 
offer). The second condition relaxes the requirement that the subsidiary be wholly owned 
before the offer. It is instead required that the subsidiary be controlled by the parent firm. 
Control is assumed if the parent company owns more than 50% of the voting shares of the 
subsidiary (which are, of course, not yet publicly listed before the offer; compare e.g., Vijh 
(1999), Junker (2005))3. 
Several consequences follow from this definition. First, no reference is made to the 
percentage of ownership sold in the transaction. Parent companies usually retain majority 
control over the subsidiary immediately after the offer, while a full divestiture of the 
subsidiary will equally meet the criteria of an ECO. Second, in order to qualify for a public 
offering, the subsidiary needs to be separated into a legally independent entity before its 
listing (Kaserer/Ahlers (2000)). And third and last, through its public listing, a new group of 
subsidiary shareholders is created, from which offer proceeds are collected by the group of 
companies4. Further characteristics of ECOs are presented in Chapter 1.3 below. 
1.2.2 Delineations 
Regular IPOs. A regular IPO, sometimes referred to as flotation, denotes the initial sale of a 
company’s shares to the public. IPOs are conducted to raise equity capital and/or to afford 
existing investors with an opportunity to realize their investment. The IPO represents the first 
time that a market value for the firm is publicly established, which reflects investors’ 
expectations of its future earnings potential. Both before and after an IPO, statements need to 
be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In order to prepare an IPO, the 
Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 require companies to file a registration statement with 
general information about the firm, financial data, details on the security to be offered, and 
information about underwriter(s). The public version of this registration statement is offered 
in the form of a prospectus (Grinblatt/Titman (1998)). After an IPO, the listed firm needs to 
adhere to all public disclosure requirements, most prominently the filing of quarterly and 
                                                 
3  In order to increase sample size, samples of some German studies (e.g., Kaserer/Ahlers (2000), 
Junker (2005)) also contain non-IPO ECOs, in which a small fraction of subsidiary shares 
(generally < 4%) are publicly traded before the offer. This follows the intent to alleviate the 
small-sample problem of German ECO studies and is deemed neither necessary nor 
methodologically advantageous in the present study. The gain of added data points may come at 
the cost of potential sample contamination with cases that do not exhibit true IPO characteristics. 
4  For details on who (i.e., parent company or subsidiary) collects these proceeds, see next chapter. 
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annual reports. A notable aspect of IPOs is their high cost: Lee et al. (1996) report that the 
average total direct costs of an IPO attain 11% of its proceeds. These are primarily comprised 
of underwriting fees and commissions and, to a lesser extent, of the direct costs of attorneys 
or accountants. IPOs are generally underpriced, which represents an additional cost of the 
issue (see Chapter 2.3.2.4 on p. 28 for further details on underpricing). Contrasting IPOs and 
ECOs, each ECO also is an IPO, albeit a special form that entails the sale of (a part of) a 
larger firm. ECOs therefore encompass all IPO characteristics discussed above, in addition to 
a range of restructuring features that set them apart from regular IPOs (see next chapter for 
ECO restructuring aspects). Prominent literature on IPOs is provided by Allen/Faulhaber 
(1989) and Ritter/Welch (2002), who study underpricing. Aggarwarl/Rivoli (1990) present a 
broad overview of IPO characteristics, Ritter (1991) and Loughran/Ritter (1995) document 
the long-term performance of these transaction, and Jain/Kini (1994) shows the operating 
characteristics of firms that conduct an IPO (compare e.g., Chapter 7.2.3.2 on p. 240)5. 
Seasoned equity offering. An SEO, sometimes referred to as an add-on offer, denotes the sale 
of a class of shares already listed on a public exchange, which is conducted to raise additional 
equity capital (Grinblatt/Titman (1998)). Lee et al. (1996) document that the cost of an SEO 
lies at 7% of its total proceeds. That the cost of an SEO is thus substantially lower than that of 
an IPO reflects the advantage of adding shares to an already-listed security. An ECO shares 
the financing aspects of an SEO if the parent company sells secondary shares in the offer (see 
next chapter for primary and secondary offerings), but a fundamental difference follows from 
the fact that the security being offered in an ECO is listed for the first time. Prominent 
literature on SEOs is provided by Masulis/Korwar (1986), Mikkelson/Partch (1986), and 
Kalay/Shimrat (1987), who study the effect of their announcement on firm value. 
Asquith/Mullins (1986) study the valuation effect as well as the market environment of SEOs, 
and Spiess/Affleck-Graves (1995), Loughran/Ritter (1995), Teoh et al. (1998), and Eckbo et 
al. (2000) focus on their long-term performance. McLaughlin et al. (1996) and 
Loughran/Ritter (1997) document the operating characteristics of firms that conduct an SEO 
(compare e.g., Chapter 4.6.2.1 on p. 98). 
Spin-off. Through the restructuring it entails, an ECO is related to other types of divestiture 
(Löffler (2001)). Most akin, a spin-off, like an ECO, also results in a separate class of 
subsidiary shares that are publicly traded after the transaction. Spin-offs are generally 
conducted through a pro-rata (special dividend) distribution of subsidiary shares to the 
existing shareholders of the parent firm (Schipper/Smith (1986)). Three major implications of 
this procedure set spin-offs apart from ECOs. First, a spin-off does not involve an IPO and, as 
such, no additional capital is raised. Second, while parent shareholders may opt to sell their 
allotted subsidiary shares subsequent to the spin-off, the initial group of shareholders is the 
same as before. And last, a spin-off always includes a full divestiture, precluding the parent 
from retaining any sort of legal or economic control over the subsidiary (Méndez (2003)). 
Prominent literature on spin-offs is provided by Miles/Rosenfeld (1983), Hite/Owers (1983), 
                                                 
5  The article by Ritter (2003b) is suggested as an overview of regular variants of equity financing. 
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and Schipper/Smith (1983), who study the capital market reaction to the announcement of 
spin-offs (compare Chapter 4.6.2.1 on p. 98). Woo et al. (1992), Cusatis et al. (1993), and 
Desai/Jain (1999) present longer-term effects of these transactions. Seward/Walsh (1996), 
Daley et al. (1997), and Krishnaswami/Subramaniam (1999) study the implications of spin-
offs with regard to control, focus, and information (compare e.g., Chapter 5.6.3 on p. 140)6. 
Sell-off. A sell-off denotes the partial or complete sale of assets and does not involve the 
public listing of stock. A sell-off shares the restructuring characteristics of an ECO or a spin-
off if an entire business unit is sold, but without the subjection of the respective firm to a 
public securities market. Pertinent literature is provided by Montgomery et al. (1984) and 
Alexander et al. (1984) on the capital market reaction to the announcement of a sell-off. 
John/Ofek (1995) study the focus-increasing effect of such transactions on operating 
performance, and Lang et al. (1995) evaluate sell-offs in an agency-inspired treatment. 
Finally, Slovin et al. (1995) compare asset sell-offs with ECOs and spin-offs. 
Tracking stock. Another share structure often mentioned in the context of ECOs is tracking 
stock, which denotes a separate category of common stock that pays dividends based on the 
performance of a particular part of the overall company. It is traded separately and in addition 
to the regular parent stock, but, in contrast to the latter, its voting power is usually restricted 
as it does not represent a legal claim on assets (Downes/Goodman (1998)). No restructuring 
takes place, i.e., the overall group of companies remains intact. Tracking stock can be issued 
on a pro-rata distribution to existing shareholders, as in a spin-off, or through public 
placement, similar to an SEO (Bühner (2004)). 
1.3 ECO characteristics 
ECOs combine aspects of financing and restructuring. Hence, they can be described as having 
a dual character (Nick (1994), Junker (2005)), which equips them with a unique mix of 
features from IPOs and SEOs (financing attributes) and spin-offs and sell-offs (restructuring 
attributes). These two characteristics of an ECO are separately addressed in the following 
subchapters. 
1.3.1 The financing aspects of an ECO 
As IPOs and SEOs, ECOs entail the collection of offer proceeds from new shareholders, a 
phenomenon from which the financing aspects of these transactions follow. Besides the 
general attributes of IPOs and SEOs, two particularities of ECOs deserve mention: its rank in 
the pecking order of financing options, and its reliance on primary and/or secondary shares. 
                                                 
6  To delineate terminologically similar transactions, a split-up describes the liquidation of a 
company, in which all parts of the enterprise are sold and the original company ceases to exist 
(Löffler (2001)). A split-off denotes a spin-off that entails a split of ownership (i.e., in which, as 
Amaro de Matos (2001) notes, only some stockholders receive shares in the new company for 
parent stock). 
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1.3.1.1 ECOs in the pecking order 
The formulation of the pecking order of financing (attributed to Donaldson (1961), also see 
Myers (1984)) states that firms generally prefer to finance investments with internal cash flow 
(i.e., earnings) rather than outside funds. If these internal funds are insufficient, firms prefer to 
issue debt before equity. While the pecking order has been described as an “old-fashioned” 
framework (Myers (1984)), on which the literature on capital theory has focused much less 
than on Modigliani/Miller-inspired approaches (see Chapter 3.2.1.1 on p. 41 for details), it 
provides a useful concept to delineate the ECO choice from other financing options. 
Furthermore, it has been supported by empirical evidence, if not with regard to optimal capital 
structure, at least in terms of the debt/equity choice (Shyam-Suner/Myers (1994))7. 
Several explanations have been offered to explain the pecking order phenomenon, most 
notably the tax and transaction cost implications of debt and equity issues, the requirement of 
board approval for equity issues in contrast to debt issues, and the signaling effect of an 
equity issue as laid out by Myers/Majluf (1984). According to this categorization, ECOs 
constitute a method of financing that is considered only after other options have been 
exhausted, as they not only represent a form of equity financing as a regular IPO or an SEO, 
but a complex form that involves concurrent restructuring. This fact is reflected by the 
relatively low frequency with which ECOs have been conducted (compare Table 5 on p. 26)8. 
1.3.1.2 Primary versus secondary placements 
The sales of shares in an ECO can be structured in different ways. First, the subsidiary can 
offer its own shares to the public, retaining the entire proceeds from the transaction. Parent 
cash flow remains unaffected under this scenario, which is termed a primary placement (i.e., a 
placement of shares that have not existed before). Parent shareholding in the subsidiary is 
diluted through the issue of new shares (e.g., Weiser et al. (2005)). After a primary placement, 
the parent company holds a reduced share of a larger subsidiary, equivalent in value to its 
initial holding. 
An alternative method is a secondary placement, in which the parent sells all or a part of its 
shares in the subsidiary to the public. A secondary placement therefore constitutes a 
placement of existing shares that have not been publicly traded. In such scenario, the parent 
company receives all proceeds from the transaction as a cash inflow, and consequently holds 
a reduced share (or none) in a subsidiary that has not changed in size. With regard to the size 
of total parent assets, the two methods are equivalent, as a secondary placement merely 
represents a swap between share holdings and cash. For the subsidiary, the creation of new 
shares in a primary placement implies the collection of funds in addition to existing assets – 
                                                 
7  For an overview of different theories of capital structure, the survey by Harris/Raviv (1991) is 
recommended. 
8  This is also reflected by the smaller sample sizes of ECO studies relative to studies on SEOs or 
debt offerings. Compare e.g., Table 2 in Mikkelson/Partch (1986) for differences in the frequency 
of different financing options. 
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the subsidiary becomes larger. Finally, a mixed version of both methods is frequently applied: 
The subsidiary sells new (primary) shares while the parent simultaneously sells some or all of 
its existing (secondary) shares (Kaserer/Ahlers (2000)). Figure 1 presents a categorization of 
possible placements with regard to the recipient of offer proceeds9. 
Figure 1: Types of placement 
Mixed
placement
Secondary
placement
Cashless
divestiture
(e.g. spin-off)
Primary
placement
Subsidiary
Cash flow > 0 Cash flow = 0
Parent
Cash
flow
 > 0
ECO
Source: Based on
Kaserer/Ahlers 2000
Cash
flow
 = 0
 
1.3.2 The restructuring aspects of an ECO 
Restructuring is the second fundamental attribute of an ECO and relates to the implications of 
the parent/subsidiary separation. Löffler (2001) groups corporate restructuring along four 
dimensions: the first affects the business segment architecture, the second a firm’s control 
structure, the third financing, and the last the organizational arrangement. As such, corporate 
restructuring can be delineated from business process reengineering because it represents 
changes that are more fundamental10. Different restructuring instruments, either divisive (e.g., 
ECOs, spin-offs, or sell-offs), combining (e.g., mergers, acquisitions, or joint ventures), or 
financial (e.g., leveraged buy-out or management buy-out), can affect one or more of the four 
restructuring dimensions outlined by Löffler. 
Business segment architecture. An ECO is per definition an instrument to restructure the 
business architecture because it separates one or more segments from the rest of the firm. This 
                                                 
9  As Méndez (2003) points out, common ECO terminology might warrant caution. Reference to an 
equity carve-out may be misleading since the amount of equity for the parent company remains 
the same in all cases, and none is parted with or carved-out, as its name might imply. From a 
terminological point of view, Subsidiary IPO represents vocabulary that is more suitable, but 
ingrained as it is, the present work adopts the common term equity carve-out. 
10  In contrast to restructuring, reengineering primarily aims to improve process measures such as 
cost, quality, service, or speed. For a practitioner’s contribution, see Champy/Hammer (1993). 
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engenders consequences for the operations as well as for the width and/or depth of the 
product mix. This, in turn, leads to changes with regard to the markets in which the firm 
operates, most notably upstream, downstream, and with regard to labor. Regarding changes to 
the set of business segments, an ECO has identical restructuring effects as a spin-off or sell-
off. 
Control structure. Along this second of the four dimensions, an ECO may but does not need 
to be an instrument of restructuring. If the parent retains only minority control over the 
subsidiary after the offer, then the ECO passes subsidiary control from the parent firm to 
public shareholders. This control restructuring has identical effects as a spin-off or a complete 
sell-off if the parent company sells all its secondary shares (i.e., relinquishes even minority 
control over the subsidiary). Such ECOs, however, are rare, whereas a spin-off always leads 
to an entire divestiture. In a sell-off, the divested operations can be integrated into the 
acquirer’s organization, which may adopt existing control structures and thereby preclude any 
restructuring of control. Another aspect of control restructuring through an ECO concerns the 
group of key executives. A new CEO leads the subsidiary, and the same applies to the board 
of directors. While the executives in these positions have frequently been with the firm before 
the ECO, these individuals assume new positions and responsibilities. Associated with these 
changes are often changes to the incentive and monitoring systems (e.g., through the 
introduction of stock-based compensation for subsidiary management), which can be 
interpreted as a further aspect of control restructuring that often goes hand-in-hand with an 
ECO. 
Financing. An ECO can be used as a tool of financial restructuring because it affects the 
capital structure of the subsidiary (through the sale of primary shares) and of the parent 
company (through the sale of secondary shares). Aspects of financial restructuring go beyond 
the financing attributes of an ECO discussed above. While financing aspects relate mainly to 
the collection of funds, financial restructuring may pursue changes to the composition and 
characteristics of financial resources (such as capital structure optimization, utilization of 
formerly unavailable financial instruments for the subsidiary, alignment of overall the 
financing strategy). In this regard, ECOs offer broader restructuring opportunities than spin-
offs or sell-offs. 
Organizational structure. Along the fourth and last dimension, an ECO offers an opportunity 
to restructure the organizational configuration of the parent firm and the subsidiary. While 
fundamental alignments (e.g., functional vs. divisional) are likely not affected by the 
transaction, the disbanding of a business unit may entail modifications to the decision 
structure and – since the corporate center oversees fewer operations after the ECO – possibly 
to the degree of centralization. In this regard, an ECO is very similar to spin-offs or sell-offs. 
Overall, ECOs invariably lead to restructuring of the business architecture, while they present 
ample supplementary restructuring opportunities for control, financing, and organizational 
structure. The restructuring possibilities offered by an ECO are similar to but frequently larger 
than those of spin-offs or sell-offs. 
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1.4 Existing research on ECOs 
The following presentation of existing ECO research pursues two goals. First, it provides an 
overview of the aspects of ECOs that have been studied in the past to show how subsequent 
sections of this work fit into the overall research effort on the topic. And second, it prepares 
the identification of several research gaps that this work sets out to close (see Chapter 1.5 on 
p. 16). Since later sections of this document contain more details about existing ECO 
research, the following overview is succinct11. Existing research on ECOs can be grouped into 
three parts: the study of their short-term performance, the study of their long-term 
performance, and the analysis of the determinants of their performance. The following 
subchapters are grouped accordingly. 
1.4.1 Short-term ECO performance 
The short-term performance of ECOs has been studied since the mid-1980s and has received 
heightened attention after short-term effects have been studied for related events. The 
popularity of performance studies of corporate events during that period is linked to the rise 
of a novel event study methodology, which examines the stock market reaction to the 
announcement of an event (for details on this methodology, see Section 4). Early studies of 
short-term ECO effects are thus embedded in research such as Alexander et al. (1984) on sell-
offs, Miles/Rosenfeld (1983) on spin-offs, and Masulis/Korwar (1986) on SEOs. The first 
study of the effect of ECOs on stock prices has been conducted by Schipper/Smith (1986), 
who have identified a positive share price effect of the announcement of an ECO. Their result 
has insofar been surprising as studies on all other types of equity financing (e.g., SEOs or 
convertible debt offerings) have detected a negative stock market reaction to their 
announcement (compare Figure 10 on p. 99). Other ECO studies have relied on a similar 
research design and generally confirm the positive ECO announcement effect (see Chapter 4.2 
on p. 64 and Table 10 on p. 66 for details). 
Several studies have provided noteworthy variants of the study of ECO announcement return. 
Klein et al. (1991) show that ECOs are frequently followed by a second event, which consists 
of a subsequent full divestiture (through a sell-off or spin-off) in the majority of cases or of a 
reacquisition for a smaller number of ECOs. The authors show that the stock market reacts 
positively only if the subsidiary is subsequently divested. Gleason et al. (2006) study this 
effect more closely and show that the announcement of subsequent reacquisition by the parent 
firm prompts a negative capital market reaction. Bühner (2004) shows that ECOs that are 
announced but later cancelled evoke a less vehement initial reaction by the stock market. 
Some studies have analyzed the short-term ECO performance in other geographies. The 
positive announcement effect has been confirmed by several studies for German ECOs (e.g., 
Kaserer/Ahlers (2000), Langenbach (2001), Wagner (2005)). Junker (2005), building on 
                                                 
11  Sections 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 contain separate chapters that review the existing ECO research on the 
respective subjects that are studied at those points. 
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earlier work by Brettel et al. (2004), confirms the existence of positive ECO announcement 
return in Germany and documents its robustness to more advanced statistical methods. 
In rare studies spanning several geographies, Fucks (2003) and Bühner (2004) explore the 
short-term effects of ECOs on a European level and thus shed light onto potential differences 
of ECOs across countries. Both studies confirm the positive announcement effect for this 
class of transaction. Fucks (2003) shows that the nature of abnormal announcement return 
varies by country. While positive throughout, abnormal return in common-law countries is 
about 2.5 times as large as in civil law countries (4.2% vs. 1.7% for the [–1 +1] day event 
window)12. Fucks also studies the underpricing of German ECOs relative to general IPOs and 
finds that the latter are subject to higher underpricing, which he puts down to reputational 
effects13. In summary for the short-term ECO performance, the positive reaction by the capital 
market to its announcement has been consistently confirmed and shown to be robust to 
methodological extensions and geographic focus. 
1.4.2 Long-term ECO performance 
Just as for the study of short-term effects, the study of the long-term performance of ECOs 
has only been taken on after this phenomenon had been studied for related transactions. Ritter 
(1991) and Loughran/Ritter (1995) show the long-term underperformance of IPOs and SEOs, 
and this insight has sparked the study of the long-term effects of ECOs, which, as has been 
shown above, comprise characteristics of both transactions. Focusing on post-offer (as 
opposed to post-announcement) performance, this research needs to consider separately the 
performance of the ECO parent company and its subsidiary. 
These long-term efforts are less numerous and their results above all less consistent than the 
finding of positive ECO announcement returns. These studies generally examine the 
aftermarket performance of newly listed subsidiaries for several (usually up to three) years 
after the offer, as well as the parallel performance of their parent companies. Most studies 
measure benchmark-adjusted share performance (see Chapter 5.4 on p. 112 for details). 
Regarding the parent company, most studies show mild underperformance, but only few with 
statistical significance (e.g., Madura/Nixon (2002), Junker (2005)). The picture for the 
subsidiary is even less clear: Some studies find significant positive performance (e.g., 
Miles/Woolridge (1999)) and some significant negative performance (e.g., Michaely/Shaw 
(1995))14. Studies of long-term ECO performance outside of the US are sparse, and the work 
by Wagner (2005) and Junker (2005), the latter again building on earlier work by Brettel et al. 
(2004), are examples of long-term ECO studies in Germany. 
                                                 
12  A discussion of the international context of the present work is separately provided in Section 9. 
13  The author concludes that “… highly scrutinized parents seem to prefer leaving a good taste in 
(new) investors’ mouth instead of reducing the amount of money-left-on-the-table” (Fucks (2003) 
p. 67). 
14  Besides quantitative analyses, the publication by Miles/Woolridge (1999) contains a number of 
case study descriptions of ECOs (e.g., on AT&T and Lucent). 
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1.4.3 Determinants of ECO performance 
Two suggestions have been offered by the existing ECO literature as potential causes of ECO 
performance. The first builds on the argument that ECOs exhibit positive short-term 
performance because of the signal it sends to the market, while the second argues that ECOs 
engender efficiency gains. These two suggestions are separately appreciated.  
1.4.3.1 Signaling effects 
The signaling explanation for superior ECO performance has been introduced in a theoretical 
treatment by Nanda (1991), who relates the positive returns to signaling effects about the 
relative value of parent and subsidiary assets. In his theoretical work, the author builds on the 
thought that, whenever possible, a company offers shares in an overvalued subsidiary when 
the stock of the consolidated entity is undervalued by the market. Otherwise, existing 
shareholders of the parent company would have to part with an excessively high proportion of 
ownership rights in exchange for a given volume of capital to be raised. Thus extending the 
model by Myers/Majluf (1984), which predicts adverse selection of firms that conduct equity 
offers15, Nanda (1991) shows that a stable equilibrium for ECOs entails positive 
announcement returns for the parent firm since the offer constitutes a credible signal of its 
undervaluation. 
Since in contrast to ECO performance and efficiency effects, this work does not contain a 
separate section on signaling effects, the suggestions of this research are presented here in 
detail. Nanda’s model assumes that a firm consists of nonsubsidiary assets with value VH
par  or 
VL
par  and subsidiary assets with value VH
sub  or VL
sub , where subscripts denote H for high and L 
for low value. Managers know the true value of the assets, while investors only know that 
each occurs with equal probability. Thus, states HH, HL, LH, and LL are equally likely from 
an investor’s perspective, where the first letter denotes the value of nonsubsidiary assets and 
the second the value of subsidiary assets. Managers can conduct a positive net present value 
(NPV) project, for which they require outside equity financing. Their set of alternatives 
includes O (do nothing), E (conduct an ECO), and S (conduct an SEO). As in the work by 
Myers/Majluf (1984), it is assumed that managers will offer equity if it benefits existing 
shareholders. Equilibria are expressed as WXYZ, where the letters correspond to the actions 
taken by firms of the states HH, HL, LH, and LL, respectively. Nanda shows that of the 
34 = 81 possible outcomes, only five constitute stable equilibria: SESS, EESE, OESS, OEOS, 
and OEOE16. While the project is always financed in the first two cases, it is foregone in some 
cases in the last three equilibria, reflecting situations in which project NPV is small relative to 
the value of existing assets. 
                                                 
15  For further details on the model by Myers/Majluf (1984) see Chapter 7.2.3.1 on p. 239. 
16  In eliminating the remaining 76 alternatives, Nanda mainly relies on the Cho/Kreps (1987) 
criterion, which presents a variant of Nash equilibrium that is extended for the possibility of out-
of-equilibrium moves. A candidate equilibrium satisfies the criterion only if it is robust to such 
moves and is then included in the set of possible alternatives under which an ECO is conducted. 
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As in Vijh (2002), the EESE equilibrium shall be used to demonstrate the arguments. In this 
case, investors know that firm types HH, HL, and LL are equally likely under that ECO 
scenario. Thus, the expected market value (2VH
par + VLpar) /3 exceeds the ex-ante value of 
(VH
par + VLpar ) /2. Similarly, the implied subsidiary value when an ECO has been conducted 
amounts to (VH
sub + 2VLsub ) /3, which falls short of its ex-ante value of (VHsub + VLsub ) /2. 
Therefore, an ECO signals that nonsubsidiary assets are worth more and subsidiary assets 
worth less than initially expected. The net effect depends on the relative size of nonsubsidiary 
assets to subsidiary assets, and should be more positive if the nonsubsidiary portion is large. 
Nanda shows that in the remaining equilibria, with one exception negligible on realistic 
ground, ECOs convey identical signals of firm value to the market. 
Slovin et al. (1995) build on this signaling model and examine the effects of ECOs, spin-offs, 
and asset sell-offs on industry peers. The study confirms the positive announcement return for 
parent firms in ECOs found in Schipper/Smith (1986), and also finds significant negative 
announcement returns for rivals of carved-out subsidiaries. The authors reach the conclusion 
that an ECO signals overvaluation of assets in the industry of the subsidiary. While this result 
seems to support the signaling hypothesis, the study suffers from its small sample size of 32 
cases and from inconclusive results of the share price reactions of parent rivals. The findings 
have been further explored by Slovin/Sushka (1997), who make a point for the parent-
subsidiary governance structure: Observing differential valuation effects on the issuance of 
either parent or subsidiary stock for the other company segments, the authors argue that a 
multi-layer governance structure increases financing flexibility and thus reduces the risk of 
underinvestment. 
Since parent size, excluding claims on the subsidiary, is on average larger than the subsidiary, 
the signaling model by Nanda (1991) predicts that the signal of parent undervaluation will 
outweigh the signal of subsidiary overvaluation. This reasoning has later been refuted by 
empirical evidence in Vijh (2002): Announcement-period excess returns have been found to 
increase with the ratio of subsidiary to parent assets, which contradicts the predictions made 
by Nanda (1991), who postulates that the degree by which the parent’s undervaluation signal 
outweighs the subsidiary’s overvaluation signal is expected to decrease with relatively larger 
subsidiaries. Hulburt et al. (2002) have extended this analysis to rivals of the parent firm and 
contend that according to signaling theory, parent rival reaction to the ECO announcement 
should be positive as the ECO signal implies that firms in the parent industry are overall 
undervalued. On the other hand, rival reaction should be negative if efficiency arguments 
apply, since the realization of efficiency gains by ECO parent companies would be to the 
detriment of their rivals. Based on an empirical analysis that goes beyond the approach by 
Slovin et al. (1995), and using a sample comprised of 185 cases originating from a 14-year 
period, the authors find empirical evidence that supports efficiency arguments, while 
signaling effects are again refuted. In a recent reexamination of the topic, Vijh (2006) studies 
SEOs in parent/subsidiary structures and also reaches the conclusion that the announcement-
period excess returns of these transactions do not support signaling arguments, but that firms 
issue equity to meet actual financing needs.  
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To conclude, the advocacy of signaling effects by Nanda (1991) and Slovin et al. (1995) as an 
explanation of the positive ECO announcement returns has found little support in subsequent 
research, which has predominantly focused on the various sources of efficiency effects. 
Coupled with evidence from the present study, which is consistent with findings by Vijh 
(2002)17, it can be concluded that the signaling model by Nanda (1991) does not appear to be 
an accurate descriptor of reality. 
Endeavoring to point at the cause of the frequent rebuttal of Nanda’s signaling model, his 
model design may be overly simplistic. In his reliance on VH
par , VL
par , VH
sub , and VL
sub , Nanda 
implies that both subsidiary and nonsubsidiary assets are either over- or undervalued. It is an 
additional realistic scenario that only one of the two components, subsidiary or nonsubsidiary 
assets, is subject to misguided investor expectations, while the remaining assets are correctly 
valued. In such a case, an ECO may still signal overvaluation of the subsidiary (just as any 
SEO in Myers/Majluf-inspired interpretations), but this does not imply undervaluation of the 
parent. Consequently, the ECO cannot be seen as a relevant signal for nonsubsidiary valuation 
under all scenarios, with far reaching implications for the applicability of Nanda’s model. 
1.4.3.2 Efficiency effects 
Besides signaling effects, the positive announcement returns of ECOs have been put down to 
the expectation of efficiency gains18, whose introduction is kept brief at this point since a 
detailed discussion is contained in Chapter 6.2 on p. 152. Where signaling effects build on the 
notion that an ECO indicates over- or undervaluation, efficiency arguments posit that the 
value of the separately traded companies truly differs from their combined value. In contrast 
to signaling of valuation, efficiency gains represent changes in the fundamental value of the 
firm. 
The study of the determinants of ECO performance goes back similarly long as the detection 
of the positive announcement effect of these transaction, as studies have set out to provide 
explanations of its cause. In that vein, in their influential paper, Schipper/Smith (1986) argue 
that ECOs can improve efficiency through enhanced interest alignment between shareholders 
and management, increased transparency, and concurrent restructuring, particularly of 
management incentive schemes. Subsequent research has generally confirmed the hypothesis 
that ECOs engender efficiency gains, which has also weathered the challenge of signaling 
effects (see above). A frequently referenced contribution in this regard is Allen/McConnell 
(1998), who have introduced the managerial discretion hypothesis to the study of ECOs, 
according to which such a transaction reduces the discretionary assets controlled by 
management and increases shareholder control over the investment process. 
                                                 
17  See Chapter 4.6.2.2 on p. 99 for a test of Nanda’s signaling model in the present document. 
18  At the ECO announcement, no efficiency effects have yet materialized. An ECO announcement 
could therefore also be understood as a signal (of likely future efficiency improvements). See e.g., 
Akerlof (1970) or Spence (1973) for classic papers on signaling theory. 
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A range of additional efficiency hypotheses has been offered to account for the positive ECO 
announcement effect, such as beneficial blockholder control (Junker (2005)), focus and pure-
play stocks (Vijh (2002)), or increase of transparency (Elsas/Löffler (2004)). While evidence 
on individual hypotheses is mixed19, all applicable studies separately conclude that ECOs are 
in some form or other related to increases in efficiency. Analyses on the long-term 
performance of ECOs (Vijh (1999), Junker (2005)) confirm this conclusion, as they do not 
deliver evidence that the ECO announcement effect represents an incorrect assessment of the 
efficiency potential of these transactions: Both authors find that the association between long-
term ECO performance and efficiency effects is low.  
1.4.4 Other ECO research 
In some cases, aspects of ECOs have been studied that are unrelated to their (stock market) 
performance. Frank/Harden (2001) study the likelihood that a an ECO is chosen over a spin-
off and find that ECO parent companies, while comparable in size and profitability, are 
generally more cash-constrained than firms that choose a spin-off. This finding is consistent 
with the fact that spin-offs, as discussed above, represent transactions in which no additional 
cash is collected from investors. The finding by Frank/Harden (2001) is furthermore 
supported by results from Allen/McConnell (1998), whose sample descriptive statistics 
indicate that parent firms exhibit significantly higher leverage than their industry peers. 
Consistent with pecking-order predictions, this could be seen as evidence that these 
companies choose to raise capital in the equity market when they have exhausted their 
available lines of credit. Frank/Harden (2001) further document that ECO subsidiaries tend to 
be more profitable and exhibit higher growth than those that are spun-off. Michaely/Shaw 
(1995), in an earlier study on the ECO/spin-off decision, contend that ECOs are undertaken 
by those firms that better withstand the scrutiny of the capital market, e.g., because of low 
leverage risk or high profitability. The findings of these studies are not fully compatible, and a 
clear picture of the decision between ECOs and spin-offs does not emerge from the literature. 
Several studies have examined the extent of ECO underpricing. Prezas et al. (2000) conclude 
that at an average initial-day return of 5.8%, ECOs are less severely underpriced than IPOs20. 
Additionally, the authors find that underpricing is lower if high prestige investment bankers 
underwrite the offer and if the offer price is lower. Hogan/Olson (2004) find that ECOs during 
the 1990s are on average underpriced at 8.8%, while ECOs during the bubble period of 1990 
                                                 
19  For example, Allen/McConnell (1998) finds that payout of proceeds is associated with increases 
in firm value, which Wagner (2005) fails to confirm. Elsas/Löffler (2004) show that reduction of 
informational opaqueness is related to strong ECO performance, a hypothesis which Junker 
(2005) rejects. As research on the topic reaches the same overall conclusion, it is here conjectured 
that this variable-level variation may be attributable to different samples sizes, geographies, 
sampling periods, variable definitions, operationalization, statistical techniques, control variables, 
and different specifications of cross-sectional regression frameworks. 
20  As an example for a representative benchmark for regular US IPOs, Ritter/Welch (2002) find that 
these are on average underpriced at 18.8%. Further details on the underpricing phenomenon are 
discussed in Chapter 2.3.2.4 on p. 28. 
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to 2000 are underpriced at a mean of 47.8%. Also related to pricing, Lamont/Thaler (2003) 
study pricing irregularities in ECOs that are followed by spin-offs. The authors show that 
there are some cases in their 1998-2000 sample for which the price for a share of parent stock 
is lower than the value of the amount of subsidiary stock each holder of a parent share is 
entitled to in the spin-off. In other words, the implied equity value of the parent company is 
negative, constituting an apparent violation of the fundamental rule that equity has a floor 
value of zero. They explain this phenomenon of negative stubs21 by breakdown of arbitrage 
due to extremely high shorting costs22. Schill/Zhou (2001) confirm the results by 
Lamont/Thaler (2003) in a parallel study. Finally, control structure implications brought about 
by an ECO are reviewed in a part of the analysis by Pagano et al. (1998), who examine the 
characteristics of firms that go public in Italy. 
Besides Nanda (1991), theoretical treatments of ECOs are generally scarce, particularly in the 
US, while several German doctoral theses contain more elaborate theoretical expositions. As 
an example, Nick (1994) turns to ECOs to build a theoretical foundation for an integrated 
analysis of financing, restructuring, and legal aspects of groups of companies. The author 
bases his discussion on neoinstitutional economic theory and recognizes the multifaceted 
character of ECOs as an opportunity to explore various theoretical propositions. In the 
theoretical part of his discussion, Langenbach (2001) addresses the question if ECOs can 
enhance rationality within a group of companies, following the line of reasoning that an ECO 
opens a group of companies to the influences of external capital markets. Greater reliance on 
market authority, he argues, may positively affect the incentive structure within the 
parent/subsidiary hierarchy23. 
1.5 Objectives and scope 
1.5.1 Objectives of the study 
The overall objective of this study is an evaluation of ECOs. More precisely, this study 
addresses the question if ECOs constitute a source of economic value. Against the backdrop 
of existing ECO literature, this objective can be broken down into several subordinate 
objectives, each of which aims to fill a specific gap in the overview presented above. The 
                                                 
21  Stub assets represent the market value of equity less any measurable net assets (see also Mitchell 
et al. (2002) for a definition). With regard to ECOs, stub assets can be negative if the market 
value of the parent’s equity stake in the subsidiary is greater than the parent’s overall market 
capitalization. 
22  In its most basic form, arbitrage refers to the simultaneous buying and selling of identical 
securities at different prices, thus allowing certain profit at zero risk requiring zero capital. As a 
real-world phenomenon, arbitrageurs are faced with uncertainty and market frictions, making 
arbitrage costly and risky (Mitchell et al. (2002)). As an opportunity to realize profits at lower 
levels of risk and cost, however, the corrective influence of arbitrage toward higher levels of 
rationality on (capital) markets remains unaffected. Shleifer/Vishny (1997a) provide an applicable 
overview. 
23  Another study on ECOs is given by Hand/Skantz (1998a), who use these transaction to study 
accounting choices, such as the treatment of gains and tax implications. 
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present study addresses five subordinate objectives, which are individually presented in the 
following paragraphs. 
Immediate performance. The first subordinate objective relates to the immediate value 
created by an ECO. Since prior research has already made ample progress on this topic, the 
gap that this work aims to close relates to the robustness of existing findings to 
methodological variations. Similar to Junker (2005) in a German context, existing event study 
results are supplemented by statistical refinements in the calculation of expected return, and 
by an extension of the sample to recent years, which have not yet been analyzed in an ECO 
context. 
Durability of performance. The immediate performance of an ECO will only be the true 
yardstick of the contribution of an ECO if it is durable. Hence, the second subordinate 
objective of this study is an assessment of the long-term effects of an ECO. Existing research 
has not yet come to a unanimous conclusion on this topic. This apparent contrast to the study 
of the short-term ECO effects follows from the younger age of long-term performance studies 
in general and the ensuing variability in methodological aspects, as well as from the small 
sample size of several prior studies (see Chapter 5.2 on p. 106). In the current study, several 
recognized long-term techniques are applied to a sizeable sample of ECOs to address the 
issue. 
Relative performance of parent and subsidiary. The third subordinate objective consists of a 
separate assessment of parent company and subsidiary. Most of the existing performance 
research related to ECOs has focused on the announcement effect, which, by definition, 
precludes an analysis of the relative performance of subsidiary and parent company, as the 
subsidiary does not yet exist as a separate entity at the time of announcement. Of the long-
term studies that allow a relative assessment, some studies focus on the performance of only 
one of the two entities. The remaining studies that allow a parent/subsidiary comparison do 
not deliver a unanimous answer24. The present work addresses this gap by subjecting the 
long-term performance of both parent company and subsidiary to equally detailed 
examination. 
Determinants of performance. The fourth objective relates to the determinants of ECO 
performance. To assess the relevance of efficiency effects, this study follows a theoretically 
derived map of the agency costs affected by an ECO, as developed by Junker (2005). Since 
this approach has so far only been applied to a sample of German ECOs, its application to a 
US sample attends to two questions. First, it permits an analysis of efficiency effects of US 
ECOs based on a broad theoretical fundament, since much of the existing literature has so far 
only examined separate aspects of efficiency (compare Chapter 6.2 on p. 152). Second, 
applying this map of agency costs to a sample of US ECOs allows its application to a sample 
                                                 
24  A long-term analysis of parent company and subsidiary of an ECO is contained in 
Miles/Woolridge (1999), Vijh (1999), Madura/Nixon (2002), and Junker (2005). See Chapter 5.2 
on p. 106 for details. 
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that is more than three times as large as the one studied by Junker. It also allows the use of 
more precise proxies of agency costs through greater data availability in the US. The study of 
efficiency effects in the present study therefore also addresses a methodological research gap 
by putting the approach proposed by Junker (2005) to the test. 
Geographic elements of performance. The fifth and last subordinate objective concerns the 
geographic element of ECO performance. While the primary focus of this work lies on US 
ECOs, the question of the international validity of the findings is nonetheless addressed. This 
objective follows from – but is not limited to – the application of Junker’s agency cost map to 
a US sample of ECOs. To adequately appreciate the present findings in comparison to those 
obtained by Junker, geographic influence factors need to be taken into consideration. This 
study therefore includes a discussion of the capital market characteristics of Germany and the 
US to answer the novel question of how geographic idiosyncrasies are likely to affect the 
performance of ECOs in these two countries. 
1.5.2 Scope and limitations 
After the objectives of the present study have been established, it is fitting to delineate its 
scope in greater precision. Five areas are separately considered. 
Sample size. A considerable part of this work consists of an empirical assessment of ECO 
performance. Sample composition consequently imposes a limitation to this analysis. 
Specifically, for data availability and study design reasons discussed in Section 2, the sample 
contains only those ECOs that have taken place between 1995 and 2002. This procedure is 
consistent with the existing studies on US ECOs, which all limit sample size by focusing on a 
number of years (compare Table 10 and Table 20). The high frequency and long history with 
which ECOs have occurred in the US render an inclusion of all cases practically infeasible. 
As such, this research stands in contrast to ECO studies in which a stricter geographic focus 
has allowed the inclusion of all cases (e.g., Junker (2005) or Wagner (2005) for German 
ECOs). It is, however, a general limitation of empirical research that samples that have once 
included all cases may no longer be exhaustive as time passes on. The present study accounts 
for this limitation by ensuring an overall sufficiently large sample and by applying various 
statistical significance tests and robustness checks to ensure the validity of results. This work 
furthermore includes a subsample analysis to capture the potential influence of changes in 
market condition over time. 
Empirical design. The current sample for the empirical analysis contains only cases in which 
an ECO has been conducted25, and omitted variable approaches are not applied. As noted by 
Junker (2005), this can induce an endogeneity bias that may hamper the generalization of 
results. This bias may arise if the decision to conduct an ECO is no longer independent from 
relevant aspects (e.g., an ECO may be conducted if and only if its expected benefit is high). 
                                                 
25  In contrast to several related publications (e.g., Slovin et al. (1995), Michaely/Shaw (1995), 
Frank/Harden (2001)), the current study does not include a quantitative comparison to other forms 
of (equity) financing or divestiture, in particular not to SEOs or spin-offs 
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While light is shed onto characteristics that are potentially associated with higher value 
creation through the introduction of control variables to the cross-sectional regression 
analyses in Section 6, endogeneity remains an issue that needs to be taken into consideration 
for the interpretation of results (see Chapter 7.1.2 on p. 229 for a discussion of endogeneity). 
Theoretical foundation. The discussion of the theoretical foundations of this work (Section 3) 
presents positive agency theory as the unifying framework of the study. ECO performance is 
therefore assumed to follow directly from changes in the costs of agency for the involved 
companies. While several theoretical foundations are contrasted to identify the one most 
suitable for the present purpose, this review restricts itself to theories of corporate finance, 
and other approaches (e.g., stakeholder theory or resource-based view) are expressly not 
considered. Furthermore, as the course of the analysis will show, agency costs may be 
insufficient to account for all effects after an ECO, and Sections 7 and 8 explore such 
consequences. In contrast to the more detailed exposition of agency theory, the theoretical 
foundations of those sections are not included in a separate section but rather provided ad hoc. 
Data quality. The empirical part of this study relies heavily on financial data, and the validity 
of these analyses is consequently limited by the quality of the ingoing records. As an example 
for data concerns, Villalonga (2004a) reports that an empirical study of the diversification 
effect may lead to materially different results if segment data is obtained from different 
sources (compare Chapter 6.3.1.1 on p. 156). Furthermore, IPO samples are subject to 
constant revision to correct inaccuracies of raw data (as e.g., documented in sources listed in 
the introductory footnote in Ritter/Welch (2002)). The present work aims to counter this 
limitation by reliance on data sources that are well accepted for research in corporate finance 
(an overview of data sources is provided in Table 4 on p. 24). Furthermore, the prospectus for 
each ECO in the sample has been inspected to ensure that the present compilation only 
contains valid entries. Regarding individual items of financial data, the considerable size of 
the present sample helps to mitigate the potential influence of sporadic miscoding in the data 
sources. 
Geographic focus. This work focuses on an analysis of ECOs that have taken place in the 
US. Section 9 nonetheless contains an assessment of the geographic elements of ECO 
performance by building on insight from international comparative research. The research on 
the influence of geographic parameters on equity financing is still in its early stage, and 
empirical comparisons of equity offers – let alone ECOs – across countries are rare26. This is 
reflected by the exposition in Section 9, which aims to answer the broad question if country-
specific elements can be detected for ECOs at all. More elaborate quantitative approaches 
with country effects as moderating variables are not applied: At this stage, such analyses may 
benefit from subjects-of-study that are characterized by lower complexity and allow a larger 
                                                 
26  Fucks (2003) and Bühner (2004) are two rare exceptions, as they analyze the performance of 
ECOs on samples collected across several European countries. The primary focus of these studies, 
however, lies on the ECO performance rather than on the moderating effects of country 
characteristics. 
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sample size than ECOs do. General IPOs or SEOs may represent beachheads that are more 
suitable for this purpose. 
1.6 Document structure 
After this, the current document contains nine sections, each of which includes several 
chapters and subchapters. The following Section 2 contains a descriptive overview of the 
ECO activity in the US during the 1995-2002 period. The 174 ECOs that have taken place 
during that period also form the sample that underlies the quantitative analyses in later parts 
of this document. In preparation for these analyses, the theoretical foundations of the 
economic value of an ECO are introduced and discussed in Section 3. 
The short-term performance of ECOs is the subject of Section 4, the durability of which is 
examined in a long-term analysis in Section 5. Jointly, these two sections provide an 
assessment of the performance of firms that have conducted an ECO. To uncover the 
determinants of this performance, the argument that the performance of an ECO depends on 
the efficiency effects of such transactions is tested in Section 6. In Section 7 a different 
vantage point is assumed by arguing that ECO performance may be driven by market timing. 
In that section, a theoretical basis for this proposition is derived and empirically reviewed on 
the present sample. 
After the performance analysis, two alternative views are taken on. In Section 8, a perspective 
into the sample is taken on by forming two subsamples based on periods when market 
conditions have likely been different, while a perspective beyond the sample is assumed in 
Section 9 by putting the results into international perspective. Finally, this work concludes in 
Section 10 with a discussion of its practical and theoretical implications. Figure 2 summarizes 
the structure of the document. 
Figure 2: Structure of the document and key questions by section 
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2 Sample attributes 
2.1 Section introduction 
2.1.1 Descriptive exposition 
The introductory section has provided an indication of the economic relevance of ECOs. This 
section expands on this topic and introduces the ECO activity in the US during the years 
1995-2002. Besides offer characteristics, this section presents the attributes of parent and 
subsidiary firms that have been involved in an ECO during that period. Jointly, the presented 
firms comprise the sample that is used throughout the remainder of this study to evaluate the 
performance of ECOs. The current section therefore provides an important preparation of 
examinations in later parts of this document, and findings from subsequent chapters are 
frequently assessed against the sample descriptive statistics laid out in this section. 
2.1.2 Section outline 
After this, the current section contains four chapters. In the first, sample design and data 
sources are introduced (Chapter 2.2). This chapter includes a discussion of why the years 
1995-2002 have been chosen as the period of study and presents the process how ECOs have 
been identified. Chapter 2.3 contains a presentation of descriptive statistics of the sample. 
This review begins with the frequency and size of ECOs and continues with offer details, size 
of the involved firms, industry concentration, and financial ratios. It follows a comparison of 
the current findings with related studies to determine more universally the features of firms 
that undertake an ECO (Chapter 2.4). In Chapter 2.5, this section concludes with a brief 
summary of the salient characteristics of firms that engage in an ECO. 
2.2 Sample construction and data collection 
2.2.1 Sample design 
The sample is comprised of all ECOs with an offer on a US stock exchange27 between 1995 
and 2002. ECOs after 2002 have been excluded since an analysis of the long-term 
performance for three post-offer years would have been infeasible. Cases before 1995 have 
not been included since EDGAR, the SEC’s online database, only contains documents filed 
for 1995 or later. Consequently, the collection of offer details and financial data for earlier 
cases would have been severely complicated28. Moreover, the present study frequently relies 
on manual data collection, particularly to study the determinants of ECO performance, and 
limiting the overall sample size helps to keep the required effort manageable. 
                                                 
27  All US stock exchanges have been considered for the construction of the sample, however, ECOs 
have only taken place on the three major exchanges (NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq) during the 
relevant period. 
28  Ways to obtain earlier financial data could rely on contacting each sample firm individually, 
many of which no longer exist, or on searching hardcopy filings onsite at the SEC. 
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In the spectrum of possible trade-offs between sample size, data depth, length of the period 
from which ECOs are drawn, and coverage during that period, the focus on all ECOs during 
the 1995-2002 presents an approach that opts for maximum data depth and 100% coverage 
during the years under consideration. A reduction in the depth of data could have increased 
sample size as well as the number of years under consideration. This, however, would have 
obstructed an in-depth study of the determinants of ECO performance and would have 
hindered the comparison with Junker (2005) in Section 9 of this work. Equally, an extension 
of the relevant period by reducing coverage to only a (random) subsample of all ECOs during 
a longer period would have implied a reduction in the depth of data for all cases with an offer 
before 1995. 
The applied approach leads to a sample size of 174 ECOs. This number exceeds the average 
of existing US ECO studies, where short-term research is based on an average of 139, and 
long-term research on an average of 169 ECOs (compare Table 10 on p. 66 and Table 20 on 
p. 108). Another advantage of the present sample is its inclusion of recent ECOs, fully 
spanning the hot-market period of 1998-2000. This allows a separate analysis of the 
performance of ECOs under varying market conditions, namely the hot-market period on the 
one hand and all other years on the other hand (see Section 8). Besides additional insight on 
the differences in ECO performance, such analysis will serve as a robustness check. A 
summary of the sample design issues is presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Sample design 
Design parameter Value Rationale
Size 174 - Above the average of other US ECO studies
  (139 short-term, 169 long-term)
Length of period 1995-2002
(8 yrs)
- Trade-off with data depth (pre-1995)
- Sample size sufficiently large (see above)
- Shortfall to average of other US ECO studies (13 yrs short-
  term, 11 yrs long-term) mitigated by sub-sample analysis
Coverage in period 100% - Follows dominant approach in existing ECO research
Targeted data depth maximum - Allows detailed analysis of determinants of ECO performance
- Direct comparison to Junker (2005) possible
 
2.2.2 ECO identification 
To build the sample of ECOs, the studies by Vijh (2002) and Allen/McConnell (1998), the 
samples of which have been made available to the author, have served as a starting point29. 
For the relevant period, a combination of the two studies has yielded 119 ECOs. In order to 
                                                 
29  While published work in Allen/McConnell (1998) only includes ECOs until 1993, the 
identification of ECOs for the present study is based on ongoing research by Professor McConnell 
after the above publication, which tracks ECOs until 1999. 
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ensure the exhaustiveness of the combined set of ECOs from the above two studies, data on 
all US public offerings has been inspected for select periods using GSIonline and Thomson 
Financial’s SDC database, which led to the inclusion of an additional 23 ECOs. In the next 
step, the above sources, along with industry reports30, have been used to identify all ECOs 
during the period of 2000 to 2002, the years not covered by the two studies mentioned above. 
52 ECOs have been added in this process, leading to a gross sample of 194 ECOs. As a 
robustness check, other ECO studies (Prezas et al. (2000), Frank/Harden (2001), 
Lamont/Thaler (2003), Powers (2003), and Hogan/Olson (2004)) have been used to validate 
the sample size of the present study by comparing the number of ECOs per year, which are 
usually published. In nearly all cases, the sample size of the present study exceeds that of 
other studies. 
Table 3: Sample size 
IPOs on US stock exchanges 1995-2002 3,715
ECOs from combination of Vijh (2002) and Allen/McConnell (1998) for 1995-1999 119
Additional ECOs 1995-1999 (GSIonline, Thomson Financial, industry reports) 23
Additional ECOs 2000-2002 (GSIonline, Thomson Financial, industry reports) 52
Elimination of cases because characteristics do not correspond to ECO definition -20
Final sample size (for long-term analysis) 174
Confounding event, missing daily price data -2
Sample size for short-term analysis 172
 
To ensure that the 194 cases thus identified correctly represent ECOs per the definition in 
Chapter 1.2.1, public information on file with the SEC has been inspected for all sample 
firms. Specifically, IPO prospectuses, annual and quarterly reports, and proxy statements have 
been used to ensure that all theoretical requirements are met. This procedure led to the 
elimination of 20 ECOs for which the parent company was not publicly listed, not listed on a 
US stock exchange, or for which the subsidiary was not a true business unit of the parent31. 
The final sample thus derived contains 174 ECOs. Two cases had to be excluded from the 
analysis of short-term ECO performance: one because of missing daily price data and one 
because of a confounding restructuring announcement on the same day that the ECO was 
announced. Finally, sample size for the analysis of the determinants of ECO performance 
depends on data availability by variable and is reported separately in the corresponding 
section (compare Chapter 6.4.1.1 on p. 167). Table 3 provides an overview of the sample 
derivation process. 
                                                 
30  For example, industry reports are published by Spin-off Advisors, an investment advisory firm. 
31  Cases in which a subsidiary did not constitute a true business unit of the parent include 50/50 joint 
ventures with other firms, which have later been transformed into stand-alone public companies. 
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2.2.3 Data collection 
Offer details, such as the offer date, the number of primary and secondary shares, the offer 
price, and parent ownership before and after the transaction have been collected from IPO 
prospectuses, annual and quarterly reports, and proxy statements, in this order of availability. 
ECO announcement dates have been identified by the examination of news reports, using 
Factiva32. If an ECO announcement has been found, press reports have been examined for up 
to one year before the identified date to check for potential earlier announcements. The results 
of this process have further been crosschecked against the announcement dates from the 
samples of Vijh (2002) and Allen/McConnell (1998). Announcement dates have also been 
checked for contamination, and one case has been excluded from the short-term analysis due 
to a confounding announcement of the restructuring of the firm’s international operations on 
the same day as the ECO announcement. 
Table 4: Data sources 
Data Sources
Offer details IPO prospectuses, annual/quarterly reports, proxy statements
Stock prices CRSP
Financial statement data Compustat North America
Business segment information Compustat Segments
ECO announcement dates Factiva
IPO information GSIonline, Thomson Financial SDC
Industry classification codes NAICS via Compustat
Analyst EPS forecasts I/B/E/S
Ownership information Annual reports, proxy statements
Board of directors composition Proxy statements
Stock option plans Annual reports
 
Stock prices, adjusted for dividends and stock splits, have been obtained from CRSP. 
Financial statement data, mainly balance sheet and income statement items, as well as 
information on industry classification codes were taken from Compustat North America. 
Furthermore, Compustat’s Segment database was used to access financial statement 
information on a business segment level, while data on analyst earnings-per-share forecasts 
has been collected from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Finally, 
ownership data, the composition of the subsidiary board of directors, and information on 
stock option plans were hand-collected from annual reports and proxy statements. Table 4 
summarizes the data sources used in the present study. 
                                                 
32  The author appreciates the help of Mr. Creanga, formerly INSEAD, for the identification of ECO 
announcement dates. 
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2.3 Sample descriptive statistics 
2.3.1 Frequency and overall size 
Figure 3 presents a graphical overview of the yearly number of US ECOs for the 1995-2002 
period. At an average of 22 per year, the number of ECOs reached its maximum of 35 cases in 
1999, dropping into the single digits after the end of the hot-market period in 2000. 
Figure 3: Number of US ECOs by year 
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A comparison of ECOs and IPOs, as contained in Table 5, helps to underline the importance 
of ECOs. While relatively small in number, representing only 4.7% of all US IPOs during 
1995-2002, at almost half a billion dollars, the average ECO is about 3.5 times as large as the 
average IPO. Accordingly, the ECO share in all US IPOs during that timeframe amounts to 
16%. The total gross (net) proceeds represented by the ECOs in the sample amount to USD 
78.2 (73.5) billion. 
With regard to offer volume, 1998 and 2001 were the strongest years for ECOs, as in each of 
both years more than USD 13.5 billion in proceeds were collected from the markets. With 
regard to average size, 2001 leads the list. This results from the fact that two of the largest 
four ECOs took place during that year: Philip Morris/Kraft and Lucent/Agere Systems. The 
separation of Philip Morris and Kraft represents the largest ECO in the sample and is, at an 
offer volume of USD 8.6 billion, almost twice as big as Du Pont/Conoco, the second largest 
ECO in the sample at USD 4.4 billion. The offer of Agere Systems, a former business unit of 
Lucent, represents the fourth largest ECO at an offer volume of USD 4.1 billion. A 
particularly poor year for ECOs was 1997: Not only did the number of ECOs drop by almost 
one half compared to the preceding year, but average size also shrunk to about 40% of the 
overall average ECO size during 1995-2002. As IPOs in general did not exhibit such sharp 
decline, the ECO share in the overall IPO volume dropped to 5% that year. 
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Table 5: Frequency and size of IPOs and ECOs 
IPOs (including ECOs) ECOs
Year No.
Gross 
volume
Average 
volume No.
Gross 
volume
Average 
volume
ECO share in 
IPO volume
1995 578 39,204 68 31 8,521 275 22%
1996 874 72,249 83 32 10,451 327 14%
1997 630 64,350 102 17 3,012 177 5%
1998 391 55,466 142 18 13,757 764 25%
1999 542 87,525 161 35 11,629 332 13%
2000 389 66,209 170 24 11,377 474 17%
2001 137 48,666 355 8 13,577 1,697 28%
2002 174 45,835 263 9 5,913 657 13%
Total 3,715 479,505 129 174 78,236 450 16%
         USD million          USD million
 
2.3.2 Offer details 
2.3.2.1 Offer size 
As Table 6 shows, gross ECO proceeds amount to a median (average) of USD 118 (450) 
million dollars33. The significantly larger average indicates that with regard to size, the 
sample is right-skewed, i.e., it exhibits a number of positive outliers (compare Table 1 on p. 
2) for an overview of the ten largest ECOs). The cost of an ECO lies at a median of ten 
million dollars (8% of gross proceeds), and, according to the respective prospectuses, consist 
mainly of underwriting discounts and commissions, which are collected by the advising 
financial partners. Other expenditures include legal fees, accounting and administrative 
expenses, the cost of registration with the SEC, and fees related to blue-sky requirements, 
which assure compliance of the issue with regulation in the individual states of the US. 
                                                 
33  The reported offer volume includes shares offered in relation to over-allotment rights (sometimes 
referred to as greenshoe), which grant the underwriters the option to sell an additional number of 
shares, the maximum of which is announced in the IPO prospectus, in order to correspond to 
unforeseen market demand and engage in transactions that stabilize the price of the new listing. 
The inclusion of these over-allotment shares in total offer volume in the present study is 
consistent since these shares pertain to the initial offering (i.e., are sold at the offer price) and are 
offered only on the actual offer day or immediately thereafter. 
  
27
Table 6: Offer details 
Median Average
Gross offer volume, including over-allotment (USD million) 118 450
Cost of offering (USD million) 10 27
Net proceeds (USD million) 108 423
Parent ownership pre-ECO 100% 95%
Parent ownership post-ECO 72% 67%
Free-float post-ECO (held by owners of <5% of all shares) 22% 30%
Waiting time between announcement and offer (days) 92 129
Listing day return 11% 33%
Proportion of primary shares 100% 89%
 
2.3.2.2 Ownership 
122 of the 174 subsidiaries were fully owned by the parent before the offer. While this leads 
to a median of 100% pre-offer parent ownership, the average across all ECOs lies at 95%, 
resulting from the remaining 51 cases in which the parent owned less than 100% (but more 
than 50%) of the subsidiary’s pre-offer shares34. In these 51 cases, the parent owned a median 
(average) of 87% (84%) of the subsidiary, with the remaining ownership stakes divided 
between management (32 cases), minority blockholders (12 cases), and other minority holders 
(35 cases). In none of these cases, however, have shares been publicly traded before the offer, 
so that the ECO each time represents a true IPO. 
After the offer, the parent company retained a median (average) of 72% (67%) in the 
subsidiary, implying that on average, parents do not relinquish control of the segments they 
part with. Only in two of the 174 ECOs have the parent companies sold all of their secondary 
shares. Most of the shares not controlled by the parent after the offer are held as free float, i.e., 
owned by non-blockholding shareholders with less than 5% of all outstanding shares: Median 
free float attains 22%, and its average lies at 30%. The remaining shares are held by 
management or blockholders with at least 5% of the outstanding stock. 
2.3.2.3 Waiting time 
The median delay between the announcement of an ECO and the actual offer, sometimes 
referred to as waiting time, is 92 days. Average waiting time amounts to 129 days, indicating 
that a number of ECOs have been subjected to substantially longer delay until the offer has 
actually taken place. Further analyses have revealed that waiting time does not vary 
substantially over time or by size of the offer. In the shortest case, the ECO was announced a 
mere month before the offer (28 days). 
                                                 
34  Per the definition provided in Chapter 1.2.1 on p. 4, the subsidiary must be fully controlled, but 
not necessarily fully owned by the parent before the ECO. 
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2.3.2.4 Underpricing 
Listing-day return has been calculated by dividing the closing stock price at the end of the 
first trading day by the offer price. If the closing price is not available for the offer day, the 
first available closing price is used, based on the procedure applied in the study of listing-day 
returns by Ritter/Welch (2002)35. The median (average) listing-day return for the present 
sample lies at 11% (33%) and is, not surprisingly, significantly larger during the 1999-2000 
period at a median (average) of 27% (62%), falling to a median (average) of 9% (17%) after 
the exclusion of the hot-market years. The listing-day return is smaller than zero for 19 ECOs, 
equal to zero for another 19 ECOs, and greater than zero for the remaining cases, allowing the 
conclusion that in the majority of cases, the offer price lies clearly below the first day closing 
price and that the offer of ECO shares is thus on average underpriced36. 
2.3.2.5 Share types 
137 of the 174 ECOs in the sample have offered only primary shares. While this results in a 
median of 100% for primary shares, the (ECO equal-weighted) average of 89% is driven by 
the remaining 37 cases in which secondary shares were involved. Of these, six ECOs have 
been financed exclusively with secondary shares and 31 cases with a mixture of both primary 
and secondary shares. In these latter 31 cases, parent and subsidiary captured on average 
approximately equal amounts of the proceeds, as mixed offerings have included an average of 
55% primary shares. Overall, the offer proceeds have generally been captured by the 
subsidiary: Of the USD 73.5 billion net proceeds for all sample firms, the subsidiaries have 
captured 93% or USD 68.2 billion, and the parent companies the remaining USD 5.3 billion. 
                                                 
35  Of the 174 ECOs, the closing price on the actual offer day is available for 50 cases, for the 
following day for 120 of the remaining cases, and of the second post-offer day for one of the 
remaining cases. The three ECOs ultimately remaining have not been included in the calculation 
of listing-day returns to avoid distortion through excessively large windows between offer and 
first quote. 
36  The average IPO leaves USD 9.1 million on the table through underpricing, twice the average 
amount paid as fee to investment bankers (Loughran/Ritter (2002)). Ritter/Welch (2002) offer an 
overview of the reasons for underpricing, broadly grouping these into asymmetric information 
(e.g., signaling effects of high-quality issuers, bookbuilding, and marketing), legal liability, 
increased liquidity, the allocation of shares to preferred investors, and valuation effects. 
Additional research on underpricing is provided by Beatty/Ritter (1986) on the effect of 
investment banker reputation, Allen/Faulhaber (1989), Welch (1989), and Grinblatt/Hwang 
(1989) on information and signaling, and Chemmanur (1993), who explains underpricing as a 
compensation for information gathering costs. Without reference to the term, winner’s curse 
arguments are laid out in Rock (1986). Benveniste/Spindt (1989) argue that underpricing 
compensates informed investors for truthful disclosure of their private information. Aggarwarl et 
al. (2002) propose that managers may underprice IPOs because this generates an information 
momentum that allows managers to maximize personal wealth when they sell shares at lockup 
expiration. 
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2.3.3 Firm size 
Table 7 provides an overview of the size of parent and subsidiary firms. For each measure, 
subsidiary size is also reported as a percentage of parent size. The median firm conducting an 
ECO has a market value of USD 2.5 billion, while median sales amount to USD 1.7 billion. 
For both asset and sales medians, the subsidiary-to-parent ratio is about one to ten. Regarding 
the equity positions, this ratio increases to about one to five for both book and market values. 
The fact that the subsidiary-to-parent ratio is larger for book value than that for total assets 
reflects the fact that parent companies are, on average, leveraged substantially higher than 
subsidiaries (see below). Finally, the fact that all size measures are substantially right-skewed 
for both parents and subsidiaries shows that the sample contains a number of very large firms, 
which are – particularly with regard to parent companies – drawn from the top size tier of all 
US firms and include cases such as Ford, GM, Citigroup, AT&T, and Microsoft.  
Table 7: Firm size 
Median Average Median Average
Assets (USD million) 2,541 23,773 290 3,280
subsidiary as % of parent 11% 14%
Sales (USD million) 1,674 10,085 154 1,409
subsidiary as % of parent 9% 14%
Market value (USD million) 2,464 15,046 624 2,574
subsidiary as % of parent 25% 17%
Book value (USD million) 803 3,575 195 796
subsidiary as % of parent 24% 22%
Parent Subsidiary
 
2.3.4 Industry clustering 
Table 8 provides an overview of the industry distribution of parent firms, subsidiaries, and the 
universe of US exchange-listed firms37. Parent firms mainly stem from the manufacturing, 
information, or finance and insurance industry. While the portion of manufacturing 
companies is representative of all US firms, the information sector is over- and the finance 
and insurance sector underrepresented for parent companies at 19% vs. 11% and 10% vs. 
20%, respectively. While the number of remaining sample companies within any industry 
sector is generally small, there is indication of clustering in the trade sectors. 
Regarding the sample of subsidiary firms, the overrepresentation in the information sector is 
even more pronounced than for parent firms (24% in the sample vs. 11% in the US universe), 
while an offsetting effect can be detected for the manufacturing sector, which is mildly 
underrepresented at 29% vs. 36%. The remainder of the subsidiary sample exhibits slight 
                                                 
37  The universe of US exchange-listed firms is based on 2004. 
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clustering in the real estate and waste management sectors, but as for the parent sample, this 
applies to small absolute numbers. 
Table 8: Industry sectors 
Industry sector (2-digit NAICS code) No. % No. % No. %
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting 19 0%
Mining 5 3% 4 2% 258 4%
Utilities 4 2% 5 3% 272 4%
Construction 1 1% 73 1%
Manufacturing 60 34% 51 29% 2,395 36%
Wholesale Trade 15 9% 7 4% 204 3%
Retail Trade 12 7% 13 7% 259 4%
Transportation and Warehousing 7 4% 6 3% 164 2%
Information 33 19% 41 24% 760 11%
Finance and Insurance 18 10% 16 9% 1,330 20%
Real Estate, Rental, Leasing 1 1% 7 4% 134 2%
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 11 6% 11 6% 300 5%
Waste Management and Remediation Services 4 2% 7 4% 139 2%
Educational Services 24 0%
Health Care and Social Assistance 2 1% 2 1% 113 2%
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation 40 1%
Accommodation and Food Services 1 1% 2 1% 120 2%
Other Services (except Public Administration) 26 0%
Unclassifiable 1 1% 1 1% 16 0%
Total 174 174 6,646
Parent Subsidiary US universe
 
2.3.5 Financial ratios 
Financial measures are listed separately for parent companies and subsidiaries. To avoid 
event-induced distortion, all measures for the parent company are based on year-end data of 
the year before the offer, and thus reflect the characteristics of companies that are about to 
undertake an ECO. Subsidiary values, in contrast, are reported as first available, i.e., at the 
end of the year when the ECO occurred. 
2.3.5.1 Industry adjustment 
Table 9 exhibits an overview of the financial ratios of ECO parents and subsidiaries. In 
addition to raw values, all financial ratios are adjusted for industry averages38. The benchmark 
used in this procedure is the arithmetic average of all US firms that operate within the same 
industry, given by the 6-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code. 
                                                 
38  Adjusted value is derived as sample value minus benchmark value. 
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If there are less than five firms in the respective benchmark group, the 5-digit code (the next 
broader industry measure) is used. If there are still less than five firms, the respective 4-digit 
industry code is applied, and so on, until at least five peer firms can be identified. There are 
on average 105 firms for each of the 330 unique sample firms against which performance is 
assessed39. 
2.3.5.2 Profitability 
As a first profitability measure, EBITDA margin is calculated as the ratio of EBITDA to 
sales. Results show that at a median of 14%, parents are slightly more profitable than 
subsidiaries, and that the subsidiary sample includes a number of substantial negative outliers, 
as reflected by the left skew of the distribution. While the median parent EBITDA margin 
equals that of industry peers, its average falls short of the benchmark. Subsidiaries lag their 
industry peers with regard to both medians and averages. A second profitability measure is 
given by ROA, the ratio of EBITDA to assets, where assets are averaged with the preceding 
period to account for the comparison of a cumulative income statement item to a snapshot 
balance sheet item. Results confirm the EBITDA margin profitability profile. 
Table 9: Financial ratios 
Median Average Median Average
EBITDA margin (%) 14.3 10.8 12.9 -23.5
industry-adjusted 0.0 -6.7 -1.5 -39.7
ROA (%) 10.9 9.9 10.7 2.4
industry-adjusted -0.1 -2.1 -0.7 -8.5
Tobin's q 1.3 2.1 1.8 5.3
industry-adjusted 0.0 0.1 0.3 2.8
Leverage (%) 65 64 38 42
industry-adjusted 29 28 -3 1
CapEx-to-sales (%) 4.8 10.6 6.4 23.6
industry-adjusted -0.4 1.9 -0.3 10.6
Market-to-book ratio 2.7 4.5 3.3 6.6
industry-adjusted -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 1.1
Parent Subsidiary
 
Concluding on profitability, neither parents nor subsidiaries exceed industry peers, and 
particularly subsidiaries fall short of this benchmark. This finding is consistent with pecking 
order predictions, according to which firms will first use internally generated funds, then 
access debt markets, and only ultimately consider equity issues (see Chapter 1.3.1.1 on p. 7). 
                                                 
39  Of the 174 cases in the sample, 15 companies were involved twice in an ECO, and one company 
four times, leading to a total of 174*2 – 15*(2-1) – 1*(4-1) = 330 unique sample firms. Of the 
firms involved multiple times, one company (Lucent) was involved both as a subsidiary (of 
AT&T) and at a later point as a parent company (of Agere Systems). 
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At below-average profitability, parent and subsidiary firms may not generate sufficient 
internal funds to fuel their investment program, and seek external capital with the ECO.  
2.3.5.3 Investment opportunities 
Investment opportunities are generally expressed in terms of Tobin’s q. In the following, its 
foundations and derivation will be discussed in greater depth, not only since q may appear 
less intuitive than other financial ratios, but also because of the role it will play in Section 6, 
where the determinants of ECO performance are discussed. 
The introduction of Tobin’s q to the econometric literature is associated with two 
publications. The first is Tobin/Brainard (1968), who built an early computer simulation of 
the economy that relied on the assumption “that the market value of equities, relative to the 
replacement cost of the physical assets they represent, is the major determinant of new 
investment” (p. 103f). The second publication is Tobin (1969), who presents a monetary 
equilibrium model in macroeconomic IS-LM spirit, stating that for a long-run equilibrium in 
the money-capital model, it is required “that capital be valued at its reproduction cost” (p. 23). 
Consequently, q denotes the ratio of a firm’s market value to the replacement cost of its 
assets. The interpretation of this ratio is based on the argument that if the utilization of assets 
is valued by the market at less than the cost of reproducing them, these assets would be better 
employed elsewhere (Lewellen/Baldrinath (1997)). Ratios of q in excess of one indicate that 
firms put their resources to productive use, while the reverse case is an indication of poor 
resource productivity. 
A practical complication in determining q arises from the fact that the replacement value of 
assets is not readily observable and needs to be estimated. A central and continuously 
referenced research contribution to the calculation of q is the article by Lindenberg/Ross 
(1981), who propose a theoretically very comprehensive, yet costly-to-compute approach. 
Their ratio requires the construction of an acquisition schedule for plant and equipment, 
which accounts for depreciation and amortization, in order to derive the replacement value of 
assets. Smirlock et al. (1984) present an extension to the Lindenberg/Ross (1981) q, and the 
combination of the two studies underlies a series of important research that focuses on 
Tobin’s q (e.g., Wernerfelt/Montgomery (1988) on corporate focus, Brous/Kini (1992) on 
equity issues, and Lang/Stulz (1994) on corporate diversification). Several recent articles have 
further scrutinized and commented on the derivation of q, which includes the contributions by 
Perfect/Wiles (1994), Lewellen/Baldrinath (1997), and Lee/Tompkins (1999). 
The calculation of Tobin’s q in the present study follows a simplified approach developed by 
Chung/Pruitt (1994), who claim that their version can explain 96.6% of the variability of the 
supposedly theoretically correct measure of Lindenberg/Ross (1981)40. DaDalt et al. (2002) 
                                                 
40  The reliance on a simplified version of q may further be warranted in the present study by the fact 
that q does not constitute a central input parameter for the evaluation of ECOs, and that hence the 
potential additional accuracy may not offset computational costs of more complex approaches. 
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also conclude that a simpler version of q may be preferable since it avoids selection bias by 
keeping observations rather than dropping them for data unavailability. 
Formally, q in this study is calculated as 
(2.1)   q = MVE + PS + LTD + STL − STA
AT
 
where MVE  represents the end-of-period market value of equity (the period’s last daily 
closing price per share times the number of shares outstanding), PS  the liquidating value of 
preferred stock, LTD  the book value of long-term debt, STL  the book value of short-term 
liabilities, STA  the book value of short-term assets, and AT  the end-of-period book value of 
total assets. 
Results indicate that with regard to q, subsidiaries and parent companies are structurally 
different. First, subsidiaries have stronger investment opportunities than parent companies, 
represented by their larger median and average q values. And second, while parent q is largely 
consistent with that of industry peers, adjusted subsidiary q indicates that the investment 
opportunities of carved-out subsidiaries lie above those for industry peers. 
2.3.5.4 Leverage 
To ensure comparability to other ECO studies (e.g., Junker (2005)), leverage is defined 
broadly and calculated as the ratio of total non-equity positions to assets: 
(2.2)   Leverage = Total assets − Book value
Total assets
 
Parent companies are leveraged at an average of 64%. Two noteworthy observations can be 
made: First, parent companies rely substantially more on debt than their industry peers do. 
And second, parent companies are leveraged about 1.5 times as strongly as subsidiaries. 
The first observation could be interpreted in the context of pecking order predictions. Parent 
companies may have already exhausted their lines of credit and need to rely on the proceeds 
from secondary placements to fuel further investment. The second observation indicates that 
in an ECO, on average, parents do not unload this debt onto subsidiaries, possibly since this 
burden would otherwise slow the growth opportunities of the subsidiary if substantial funds 
had to be committed to interest payments. This difference in leverage between parent 
company and subsidiary is also likely to persist, as parent firms may have a larger capacity to 
borrow: Parent companies, as more established and potentially more favorably-rated firms, 
can likely tap the bond market at more favorable terms than can subsidiaries. 
2.3.5.5 Other ratios 
The ratio of capital expenditures to sales is based on end-of-period values and provides an 
indication of investment intensity. While this ratio is smaller for parent companies, as their 
higher age and stronger sales would lead one to expect, a comparison of median values to 
  
34 
industry peers shows that both parent companies and subsidiaries invest slightly less than 
their industry peers. Coupled with the fact that sample firms have above-average investment 
opportunities, this result fits the picture that internally generated funds and debt capital 
together may be insufficient to undertake all profitable projects. 
Finally, book-to-market ratio is calculated as the end-of-period market value of equity, 
determined as for Tobin’s q, divided by the book value of equity. Parent and subsidiary values 
are largely equivalent, and their medians fall slightly below those of industry peers. 
2.4 Comparison to existing research 
In an effort to put the descriptive characteristics presented above into perspective, these 
findings will be briefly compared to those from other ECO studies41. The objective is a more-
universal assessment of the salient features of companies that are involved in an ECO. 
2.4.1 Comparison of profitability 
Evidence from other ECO studies mildly supports the finding of low profitability of firms that 
conduct an ECO. Junker (2005) reports that EBITDA margin and ROA fall short of industry 
benchmarks for both parent companies and subsidiaries – a phenomenon particularly 
pronounced for subsidiary average values. Powers (2003) documents median parent ROA at 
10.1%, very close to the value of the present sample, and reports that this falls 2.6% short of 
its industry average. On the other hand, he documents that subsidiary profitability exceeds 
that of industry peers in the year of the ECO. Other studies only document parent 
profitability. Frank/Harden (2001), again only contrasting ECO parent firms to spin-off 
parents, show some, but only weak evidence that the former are less profitable than the latter: 
Average ROA is lower, while medians are identical. Allen/McConnell (1998) show that 
parent EBITDA margin and ROA, at median values of 7.8% and 6.9%, respectively, both fall 
short of industry peers by 1.6 percentage points. 
2.4.2 Comparison of investment opportunities 
Second, the detection of above average subsidiary Tobin’s q is also reflected by other studies. 
Powers (2003) shows that both average and median values exceed that of industry peers (2.3 
vs. 2.0, and 1.8 vs. 1.4, respectively), while parent q is largely commensurate with industry 
benchmarks. Findings in Junker (2005) lead to the same conclusion: Parent firm q lies at 
industry levels, and subsidiary q exceeds industry benchmarks. Instead of Tobin’s q, other 
studies report price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio as an indicator of the expected future growth of the 
involved firms. Frank/Harden (2001) show that the P/E ratio is substantially higher for ECO 
subsidiaries relative to spun-off units. Schipper/Smith (1986) document that the P/E ratio is 
higher for subsidiaries than for parent firms for 74% of their sample, and the difference 
                                                 
41  The comparison proceeds by assessing the most prominent traits of the present sample in light of 
other studies on the subject. In addition, a reverse review has been conducted and no other 
consistent characteristics have been found that are absent in the sample of this study. 
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between the P/E ratios of the two types of firms is significant at the 1% level. Schipper/Smith 
also add the important analysis that high subsidiary P/E ratios are not the result of lower risk: 
For the years after the offer, volatility of subsidiary stock lies above the average of other 
firms, indicating that higher P/E ratios follow from higher expected earnings. Powers (2003), 
also documenting P/E, equally finds that its level exceeds that of industry peers for parent 
companies, and especially for subsidiaries. The expectation of strong expected growth of 
ECO subsidiaries is overall supported by other studies. 
2.4.3 Comparison of leverage 
The third prominent characteristic of the current sample, high parent leverage, is also affirmed 
by related research. Allen/McConnell (1998) report that the average leverage of ECO parent 
firms is about 15% higher than for their industry peers. This difference is significant at the 1% 
level. The authors interpret this finding as consistent with the managerial discretion 
hypothesis, according to which managers are reluctant to conduct an ECO, since such a 
transaction reduces the assets under their control. This, the authors argue, induces a selection 
process whereby those companies undertake an ECO that cannot otherwise obtain capital (i.e., 
firms that have already exhausted their leverage capacity)42. Powers (2003) reports two 
different figures of leverage, both of which lie above the parent companies’ industry average. 
Frank/Harden (2001) report that ECO parents exhibit higher leverage than spin-off parents do, 
while they also document that subsidiary leverage exceeds parent leverage, in contrast to 
characteristics of the present sample. Junker (2005), in a sample of 55 German ECOs, does 
not report industry-adjusted leverage, but median unadjusted parent leverage is substantial at 
74%. The finding of high leverage of ECO parent firms is overall supported by the related 
literature. 
2.4.4 Comparison of underpricing 
The degree of underpricing of the present sample corresponds to that of stand-alone IPOs, on 
which Ritter/Welch (2002) comment that to their knowledge there are “no exceptions to the 
rule that the IPOs of operating companies are underpriced, on average, in all countries” (p. 
1802). The authors find that the average listing-day return of US stand-alone IPOs is 19%, 
measured across a sample of 6,249 IPOs from 1980 to 2001. While the average listing-day 
return in the present study lies above that at 33%, its level lies with 17% slightly below that 
mark if ECOs from 1999-2000 are excluded. Regarding the 1999-2000 period, the mean 
                                                 
42  While the concurrence of payout and announcement return in Allen/McConnell (1998) is 
consistent with their theoretical proposition, the cause-and-effect relationship remains largely 
unclear. One could take argument with the idea that managerial discretion leads to ECO samples 
with elevated average leverage since an ECO does not automatically reduce managers’ control 
over assets (compare Chapter 1.3.1.2 on p. 7). This fact is accentuated by the finding that parent 
firms generally maintain majority control of (larger) subsidiaries, which, in contrast, could be 
interpreted as a levered increase in control. Arguments that ECO firms self-select along the 
pecking order are therefore at least equally applicable. 
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listing-day return reported by Ritter/Welch (2002) lies at 65%, compared to 62% in the 
present study. 
With regard to ECOs, Schipper/Smith (1986) are unable to detect underpricing in their 
sample, while Prezas et al. (2000) and Hogan/Olson (2004) find clear evidence in their 
research. The results of these last-mentioned two studies differ from the present sample with 
regard to magnitude: Listing-day return in Prezas et al. (2000) and Hogan/Olson (2004) is 
about half that of the present study. Careful reading of the results of these reference studies, 
however, indicates that ECO listing-day return appears to have constantly grown over time. 
Underpricing is absent in the first ECO study by Schipper/Smith (1986), attains 5.8% in the 
sample studied by Prezas et al. (2000), and is documented at 13.0% by Hogan/Olson (2004). 
Therefore, higher listing-day returns in the present study may be explained by the fact that the 
samples used in the reference studies predate the current one (1965-1983, 1986-1995, and 
1990-2000, respectively, compared to 1995-2002). Taken together, evidence indicates that 
ECOs, just like stand-alone IPOs, are subject to underpricing, and that – although 
substantially lower some 20 years ago – its magnitude has approached the level of regular 
IPOs over time. 
2.4.5 Comparison of industry clustering and waiting time 
Related evidence on industry clustering and waiting time is sparse and therefore grouped into 
one subchapter. Industry concentration is reported by Junker (2005), even if results are not 
directly comparable to this study due to a different categorization scheme in Germany. At the 
highest level of aggregation, however, the finding of clustering is confirmed by his results: 
For ECO parents, particularly the “Engineering and Machinery” sector is overrepresented, 
followed by some overrepresentation of the “Diversified Industry” and “Chemicals” sectors, 
while the “Software and Services” sector is underrepresented. ECO subsidiaries also 
overrepresent the “Engineering and Machinery” sector, as well as the “Electronics & Electric” 
sector, whereas the “Software and Services” sector fairly represents the universe of firms. 
This finding is consistent with the results by Mulherin/Boone (2000), who document that 
restructuring transactions have generally been highly industry-clustered throughout the 1990s. 
The median waiting time in the present sample is 92 days. While waiting time is generally not 
reported by other studies, Wagner (2005), for a sample of German ECOs, finds a median 
waiting period of 136 days. If systematic, the shorter waiting period in the present sample, 
compared to Wagner (2005), could relate to differences in sampling approach, sample period, 
or geographic differences. Overall, it appears that ECOs are announced sometime between 
three to five months before the actual offer. 
2.5 Summary of ECO firm attributes 
This section has presented the sample of 174 firms that have undergone an ECO between 
1995 and 2002. Reviewing the descriptive characteristics of these firms, a consistent picture 
emerges of firms that undertake an ECO: Such transactions have predominantly been 
undertaken by large firms, and by firms from the manufacturing and information sectors. 
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With regard to assets and sales, the carved-out subsidiaries amount to about one tenth of the 
size of parent companies, and with regard to equity to about one quarter. The difference 
between assets and equity ratios is mainly due to high leverage of parent firms. ECO firms, 
particularly subsidiaries, have investment opportunities that lie above the average of their 
industry peers. At the same time, their profitability is below average, and internally generated 
funds might thus be insufficient to fuel their investment program. Coupled with the fact that 
parent companies are highly leveraged, raising equity capital may be the most reasonable way 
for these firms to avoid passing up positive NPV projects. When the actual ECO takes place 
about three to five months after its first announcement, the vast majority of firms place their 
shares in a primary offering, and parents retain about 70% in the subsidiary immediately after 
the offer. 
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3 Theoretical framework 
3.1 Section introduction 
3.1.1 Need for a theory 
Descriptive elements, such as those of the previous section, can justifiably stand on their own. 
They can benefit from comparison with other descriptive features to provide perspective, but 
if measured correctly, there is little disputing their validity. Not so in the case of evaluative 
efforts: To conclude that ECOs either create or diminish economic value, an unambiguous 
concept of value is needed, and the means need to be illuminated by which such value can be 
either created or diminished. In short, this study requires a theoretical concept of economic 
value onto which the empirical evidence can be brought to bear. And as any good theory, such 
framework must not contain contradictions and be unbiased and testable. Furthermore, for an 
evaluation of ECOs, this theoretical foundation must encompass the relevant, yet different 
aspects of restructuring and financing: On the one hand, a theory of the firm is needed 
because an ECO substantially alters the structure of both parent company and subsidiary. On 
the other hand, a theory of financing is required, since capital is collected and subsidiary 
ownership exchanged on the capital market. It is the objective of the present section to 
provide this theoretical foundation. 
3.1.2 Corporate finance as relevant discipline 
The present section resorts to the field of corporate finance as the bridge that connects the 
restructuring and financing aspects of an ECO, since corporate finance is concerned with the 
financing of firms, and is thus inseparably tied to research on the theories of the firm 
(Zingales (2000))43. Such theoretical basis, however, does not automatically follow from the 
existing literature on ECOs. In prior research on US ECOs, theoretical underpinnings have 
largely remained ad-hoc44. More thoroughness regarding theoretical aspects is encountered in 
some German dissertations on ECOs, but these still exhibit substantial variation of 
approach45. To find the most applicable theory for an evaluation of ECOs, the present section 
will contain a review of several theories of the firm that have been suggested by the literature 
on corporate finance. While such an approach invariably entails a treatment of alternatives 
                                                 
43  Zingales (2000) notes that “… corporate finance means financing of a firm – not simply an asset, 
not simply an individual, but that unique combination of assets and individuals that constitutes a 
firm” (p. 1626). He remarks that even the most practical aspects of corporate finance inherently 
build on some theory of organization. 
44  The paucity of theoretical treatises on ECOs in the US literature is likely related to the fact that 
most publications on the topic consist of journal articles with focus on empirical findings. 
Miles/Woolridge (1999) is a rare example of a book on US ECOs, but it does equally not provide 
an in-depth treatment of theoretical aspects.  
45  The theoretical alternatives offered by German dissertations on ECOs ranges from rational 
markets in Langenbach (2001) to positive agency theory in Junker (2005) and attempts to provide 
an integrated theory across various disciplines in Nick (1994). Other examples of this literature 
are Hennigs (1995), Löffler (2001), Bühner (2004), and Wagner (2005). 
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that are ultimately not chosen, this diversion conveys two advantages. First, it illustrates the 
rationale by which one theory has been selected over other potentially apt possibilities, and 
second, the discussion of theories that are later excluded offers relevant background 
information for other parts of this study. For example, an analysis of ECOs requires a model 
of return, a topic deeply rooted in neoclassical corporate finance, the introduction of which is 
hence opportune even if it is later not chosen as the unifying framework for the evaluation of 
ECOs. 
The exposition in the present section does not, however, cover all theoretical aspects of this 
study. For example, event studies and the measurement of long-term returns are both related 
to the proposition of efficient capital markets. Since this field of study does not contain 
organizational features (i.e., is not related to a theory of the firm), it is excluded from the 
review in this section and will be rather introduced when required later on. Similarly, the 
discussion of ECO market timing in Section 7 partially rests on theories of behavioral finance, 
which will not be introduced at this point but in Chapter 7.2 on page 231. 
3.1.3 Section outline 
After this, the present section proceeds in two chapters. First, several economic theories of 
organization are reviewed to identify a unifying theoretical framework for the current 
evaluation of ECOs (Chapter 3.2). Then, the effects of ECOs are considered against the 
backdrop of the chosen theory, an efficiency criterion is operationalized, and basic hypotheses 
are derived that guide the analyses throughout the remainder of this document (Chapter 3.3). 
3.2 Identification of a theoretical framework 
In corporate finance, no grand theory of the firm exists (yet) but rather a set of alternative 
theories that have developed over time and continue to coexist (e.g., Williamson (1981)). 
While generally not contradictory, these alternatives vary with regard to their emphasis (e.g., 
rules vs. arrangements), testability (i.e., stringency of required assumptions), and concept 
(e.g., contractual vs. technological). Consequently, there are several choices that are likely not 
equal in their aptitude to serve as a theoretical basis for the evaluation of ECOs. Williamson 
(1990) provides a useful categorization of organizational theories, which is summarized in 
Figure 4. Suitability as a unifying theory for this study will be individually appraised for the 
most prominent branches of this overview: neoclassical theory, property rights, transaction 
cost economics, and agency theory46. The following subchapters proceed by first presenting 
the themes of each field before assessing its suitability as an underlying theory for the 
evaluation of ECOs. 
                                                 
46  A related overview is given by Hart (1995), who reviews neoclassical theories of the firm and the 
property rights approach. Beyond the approaches listed above, other possibilities are not reviewed 
because they have either received little attention by the applicable existing literature and are thus 
not deemed apt for the present purpose (e.g., public choice) or they are not principally associated 
with corporate finance (e.g., resource-based view).  
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Figure 4: Overview of economic theories of organization 
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3.2.1 Neoclassical theory 
3.2.1.1 Themes of neoclassical theory 
Neoclassical theory, adopted by corporate finance from the marginalist microeconomic 
literature on utility maximization, “treats the firm as a production function to which a profit 
maximization objective has been ascribed” (Williamson (1981) p. 1539). As such, it does not 
concern itself with the structure of the firm, but with the conditions and rules that optimize its 
yield. The application of neoclassical theory to finance has given rise to neoclassical 
financing theory, a field most strongly characterized by its range of rigid assumptions, most 
fundamentally the presumption of perfectly competitive markets. Such markets are 
characterized by homogeneous products (products sold by different firms are perfect 
substitutes), price-taking behavior (firms and consumers cannot influence the market price), 
unrestricted access (firms are not restricted to mobilize and relocate resources), and 
symmetric information (buyers and sellers have the same information). In microeconomic 
terms, the inverse demand function for a firm in a perfectly competitive environment is 
constant, i.e., the firm faces invariable prices regardless of the quantity produced (Luenberger 
(1995)). On capital markets, these assumptions imply rational and risk-averse investors47, 
                                                 
47  Risk aversion describes the preference pattern of individuals who, given a choice of between two 
alternatives with equal levels of expected return, will select the one with a lower level of risk, 
where risk is commonly expressed as the variance of expected return. Risk-neutral individuals 
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fixed interest rates, and the absence of transaction costs48. Neoclassical thinking has been 
fundamental to the formulation of several models that can broadly be joined in their objective 
to describe the pricing of investment projects. The most prominent of these are succinctly 
introduced below: the irrelevance theorems by Modigliani/Miller (1958), portfolio theory by 
Markowitz (1952), the capital asset pricing model, attributed to Sharpe (1964), Lintner 
(1965), and Mossin (1966), and arbitrage pricing theory (e.g., Ross (1976)). 
Irrelevance theorems. In their classic 1958 article, Modigliani/Miller express three central 
propositions on capital structure. The first states that – in the absence of transaction costs and 
taxes – firm value is solely based on the value of its investments, rather than on the ways in 
which these are financed. Consequently, as long as the investment program of a firm does not 
change, its capital structure is irrelevant for the value of the firm, and the cost of capital will 
be “equal to the capitalization rate of a pure equity stream of its class” (p. 269). The rationale 
for this proposition lies in the effect of arbitrage: Investors can mirror the capital structure of a 
company through private investment decisions (including home-made leverage by borrowing) 
and force the price of a firm’s stock up or down if its return is not aligned with that of their 
private replication. The second proposition of Modigliani/Miller describes the relationship 
between the expected rate of return and leverage. While leverage equips investors with a 
chance to benefit from increased profits, it also engenders exposure to financial risk (e.g., the 
liability of interest payments), which needs to be reflected in higher expected rates of return. 
Modigliani/Miller (1958) note that this risk is accounted for by “a premium related to 
financial risk equal to the debt-equity ratio times the spread between ρk and r” (p. 271), the 
latter denoting the expected rate of return on a portfolio of a firm’s assets and the expected 
rate of return on its debt, respectively. In equilibrium, increases in return are offset by 
increases in expected return. The third and last proposition relates to a company’s investment 
program: A firm should undertake all investments, and only those, whose expected return 
exceeds their marginal cost of capital, which is “… equal to the capitalization rate for an 
unlevered stream in the class to which the firm belongs” (p. 288). If the expected rate of 
return on a project exceeds the cost of debt but not that of equity, contrary effects entail: The 
project, financed with debt, increases firm value because its yield is higher than its cost, while 
the corresponding increase in leverage raises the required rate of return on the equity in the 
firm, leading to a reduction in firm value. Projects should be undertaken as long as the former 
effect outweighs the latter. 
Across all three propositions, the assumed absence of taxes weighs heavy, and the classic 
article contains only a brief discussion of their effect on firm value. Modigliani/Miller present 
the effect of tax shields more formally in a later “correction” (Modigliani/Miller (1963)), 
                                                                                                                                                        
solely focus on the magnitude of the expected return, regardless of its distribution, and risk-
seeking individuals are willing to accept lower expected return for increases in variance (e.g., 
Luenberger (1995)). Attitude toward risk can be inconsistent for one individual and may depend 
on the level of return involved, as e.g., evidenced by individuals who purchase insurance as well 
as lottery tickets (compare e.g., Friedman/Savage (1948) for an early exposition). 
48  Further details on perfect capital markets are contained in Miller/Fishe (1995) or Breuer (1998). 
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where they recognize tax breaks obtained through interest payments on debt as “sure income” 
(p. 438), which leads to an increase in firm value when additional debt is incurred. The reason 
that firms that are not entirely financed by debt, they argue qualitatively, is seen in the 
limitations imposed by lenders and in the reduction of flexibility incurred through debt. Still, 
however, the propositions by Modigliani/Miller (1958) rely on a host of assumptions that do 
not reflect reality. Future research on capital structure has extended the early arguments by 
studying the effects of taxes, the cost of financial distress (i.e., costs of bankruptcy), 
heterogeneous interest rates, transaction costs, and asymmetric information49. 
Portfolio theory. The contribution of portfolio theory lies in its study of the relationship 
between risk and return of a security. Diversification among multiple securities can reduce an 
investor’s risk for a given level of expected return, since the volatility of a portfolio is smaller 
than the average volatility of individual securities so long as their volatility is not perfectly 
correlated (Markowitz (1952)). If investors are rational, this leads to efficient combinations of 
securities with an optimal combination of expected return and risk. 
Capital asset pricing model. Based on the insights of portfolio theory, the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) determines the price that investors demand for risk. Risk is expressed 
as an asset’s sensitivity to the volatility of the combined set of all risky assets, or, put 
differently, as its risk contribution to the universe of risk. In the CAPM, the overall return 
received by an investor can be seen as a reward for waiting, i.e., the risk-free interest rate, and 
a reward for risk, i.e., the uncertain additional return on a risky asset (Sharpe (1964)). Its 
composition E(Rit ) = Rft + β i(Rmt − Rft )  reflects this separation, where E(Rit ) denotes the 
expected return of security i  at time t , Rft  the risk-free interest rate, and Rmt  the return on the 
overall stock market. Variable βi  represents the covariance of security return with the return 
of the market, divided by the variance of the market return and is thus an expression of the 
degree to which the security return and the market index move together. The importance of 
the CAPM to corporate finance is hard to overestimate, and it has itself become the subject of 
numerous subsequent studies. As a noteworthy example, Black (1972) shows that the CAPM 
is valid even under restricted borrowing, and that the return on a risky asset is a linear 
function of beta50. Not least because of its intuitive structure and its theoretical universality, 
the CAPM still finds use today and can also be found in a recent contribution to the study of 
ECOs (Weiser et al. (2005)).  
                                                 
49  Recommended reviews of the irrelevance theorems are included in two sets of articles on the 30th 
anniversary of the seminal publication by Modligliani/Miller, contained in the Journal of 
Economic Perspectives (1988 pp. 99-158) and in Financial Management (1989 pp. 12-38). 
50  In his theoretical exposition, Black (1972) demonstrates that an efficient portfolio of risky assets 
can be decomposed into two efficient sub-portfolios without violating the rules of CAPM. Black 
shows that thus a portfolio may be found that is completely uncorrelated with the market portfolio 
and which can be used instead of the risk-free asset, leaving the basic CAPM propositions intact 
regardless of whether or not riskless borrowing is allowed. Different assumptions on risk-free 
borrowing affect the slope of the regression line of return and beta but not the general nature of 
their relationship. 
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The model has, however, not been spared from criticism. Roll (1977) notes on the lack of 
testability arising from the fact that the composition of the true market portfolio is unknown. 
Banz (1981) documents a size-related misspecification of the CAPM as smaller firms exhibit 
higher return than implied by their level of risk. In a similar approach, Basu (1983) confirms 
the size effect and additionally finds return sensitivity to the earnings’ yield of a firm. In a 
subsequent study, even after controlling for beta and size-effects, Bhandari (1988) shows that 
expected return is sensitive to the debt-to-equity ratio. As a last example, in a much-noted 
contribution, Fama/French (1992) show that firm size and the book-to-market ratio of the 
value of equity may explain return variations better than beta. The wealth of evidence 
indicates that market return alone may be insufficient to explain the entire variation of the 
return of individual securities (for further details, see Chapter 5.3 on p. 108). 
Arbitrage pricing theory. The arbitrage pricing theory (APT) has been introduced by Ross 
(1976) and takes a different vantage point than CAPM: It expresses the risk of a security in 
relation to a vector of undiversifiable determinants of its price, of which market return may 
(but does not have to) be one. These explanatory factors generally include features of 
macroeconomic risk, the sensitivity to which differs across securities. If a security’s 
sensitivity to all factors is zero, i.e., if the security is not affected by macroeconomic changes, 
investors expect to earn the risk-free rate of return, and a return commensurate with its 
sensitivity to (macroeconomic) risk factors if these are non-zero. If security return is not 
aligned with its risk, then investors can realize certain profit by buying or selling the affected 
security (hence the theory’s name), which will drive prices to equilibrium. Even if investors 
agree on a security’s sensitivity to an external factor, it is not a necessary precondition that 
they share the same beliefs about the probability distribution of this factor itself. Arbitrage 
pricing theory thus goes one step further than CAPM since “it does not require the stringent 
homogeneity of anticipations of the mean-variance theory” (Ross (1976) p. 355) for the 
derivation of a capital market equilibrium. A limitation of APT, which follows directly from 
its more encompassing composition, is that it does not deliver a list of all factors that 
influence return, as opposed to the CAPM, which offers an arguably narrow but clear-cut 
definition of beta51. 
3.2.1.2 Neoclassical theory and ECOs 
As exemplified by the four neoclassical contributions introduced above, the advancement of 
the study of risk and return is a major contribution of neoclassical financing theory. These 
insights could be applied to an evaluation of ECOs because the risk and return attributes of 
firms involved in such transactions are likely affected. Groups of companies could be 
interpreted as artificial portfolios comprised of different assets with unique characteristics 
(Méndez (2003)). Splitting a group of companies – as implied by an ECO – creates two 
publicly-listed companies with different risk and return characteristics, which could be 
analyzed with the help of the CAPM. Post-ECO, investors are able to diversify among parent 
                                                 
51  See e.g., Dhrymes et al. (1984) for empirical tests of the APT in general and for the number of 
required explanatory factors in particular. 
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company and subsidiary according to the principles of portfolio theory, and the value that 
they attach to this possibility to choose could be a measure of the value brought about by an 
ECO. Alternative inroads to a neoclassical evaluation of ECOs could be made on the ground 
of capital structure, following the arguments of Modigliani/Miller that its adjustment can 
provoke changes in the value of the firm. As an ECO occasions an inflow of equity, the 
upshot on capital structure could form the basis of an evaluation of the transaction. 
Neoclassical financing theory therefore clearly meets one of the two requirements for a 
framework of ECO analysis: a consideration of its effect on capital markets. At the same time, 
possible benefits of diversification or adjustments to the capital structure do likely not 
encompass all consequences of an ECO. This is where neoclassical theory may reach its 
limits as the basis for an evaluation of ECOs: Since the firm is largely treated as a production 
function (Williamson (1981)), it is impossible to analyze the implications of an ECO for the 
internal structures of the organizations it affects52. The ex-post effect of an ECO may be 
observable on capital markets but no theoretical basis is offered for the origins of this result. 
Not only does neoclassical theory say little about the structure of the firm, but its stringent 
assumptions also preclude most conjecture to this effect. The supposition of symmetric 
information, for example, is incompatible with probes into the role of added transparency 
(e.g., through separate SEC filings of the subsidiary after an ECO). The same applies to 
enhanced incentive compensation or to the monitoring incentives of blockholders – aspects of 
an ECO that appear plausible on realistic grounds but which are not provided for in a 
neoclassical view of the firm. Because of these limitations, neoclassical financing theory is 
not chosen as unifying theoretical framework for the evaluation of ECOs in this study. 
Notwithstanding this exclusion, several of the tools used in later sections are inspired by 
neoclassical theory and rest on its fundamental contribution to the concept of risk and return. 
3.2.2 Property rights 
The study of property rights, the second organizational concept under review, represents an 
important part of the field of New Institutional Economics, a more recent branch of economic 
research. It is therefore suitable to set out with a brief introduction of the broader class to 
which property rights belong before its characteristics are explained in detail. 
3.2.2.1 New Institutional Economics 
As shown above, neoclassical financing theory can explain much of the pricing behavior on 
capital markets. Yet, many of its strong and hardly realistic assumptions hint at the theory’s 
limits, and phenomena incongruent with neoclassical theory are plenty. The prevalence of 
financial intermediation and the multitude of financial and legal instruments are examples for 
institutions that lie beyond the scope of neoclassical explanations and show the gap in which a 
newer, institutional view of finance is rooted. New Institutional Economics concerns itself 
                                                 
52  This is reflected by the assertion of Jensen/Meckling (1976) that early theories of the firm are 
essentially theories of markets in which firms merely constitute important actors. 
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with the study of these institutions, which have developed despite their associated costs and 
loss in welfare53. The three major subdisciplines of New Institutional Economics, property 
rights, transaction cost economics, and agency theory (Williamson (1985b)), are covered by 
this and two subsequent subchapters. 
Despite differences between these subdisciplines, they share a common fundament onto 
which any theory of the firm must build: the contractual view (e.g., Jensen/Meckling (1976), 
Fama (1980), Williamson (1991)). An organization is interpreted as “a legal entity that serves 
as a nexus for a complex set of contracts (written and unwritten) among disparate individuals” 
(Jensen (1983) p. 326). To provide an example, the contractual view of the firm has been 
elemental to the classic contribution by Alchian/Demsetz (1972), who argue that it is not the 
bestowal of fiat or authority that sets firms apart from markets, but the fact that input owners 
operate as a team54. The authors reason that there is a mode of contracting – bilaterally with a 
central common party instead of multilaterally among all input owners – that is particularly 
apt for team production, and that these team contracts form the basis of the firm. They thus 
provide an explanation for the existence of the institution firm, exemplifying the relevance of 
New Institutional Economics for the present objective of finding a theoretical framework for 
the analysis of ECOs55. 
3.2.2.2 Themes of property rights 
Coase (1960) suggests that factors of production should be thought of as rights, the exercise 
of which commonly engenders a loss elsewhere (most basically the loss represented by not 
being able to exercise that right)56. In the absence of transaction costs, the structure of these 
property rights is irrelevant for the composition of output. The infliction of an externality 
always roots in the exercise of a property right and can thus form the basis of negotiation with 
                                                 
53  One of several plausible definitions of institutions is provided by Furubotn/Richter (2003), who 
identify these as systems of interlinked, formal and informal rules, including any means required 
for their application (p. 7). 
54  According to Alchian/Demsetz (1972), the contractual powers amount to the withdrawal of 
business or the seeking of redress regardless of whether production is organized separately or in a 
team (i.e., on markets or within a firm). 
55  Critique of New Institutional Economics voiced by O'Sullivan (2000) contends that with its focus 
on contracts and exchange, it treats production as a black box just as the firm has been treated as a 
black box in earlier research. 
56  The term property rights may be misleading since the underlying concept of rights is far broader 
than the term suggests. Alchian (1965) notes that perhaps “the whole of economics is the analysis 
of property rights in non-free goods” (p. 40), construing property rights as rights to scarce 
resources. It is suggested that property rights essentially denote human rights (Jensen/Meckling 
(1976), Barzel (1989)). Demsetz (1967) notes that “property rights specify how persons may be 
benefited or harmed, and, therefore, who must pay whom to modify the actions taken by persons” 
(p. 347). In greater abstraction, Furubotn/Pejovich (1972) define that property rights refer “to the 
sanctioned behavioral relations among men that arise from the existence of things and pertain to 
their use” (p. 1139). 
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an optimal outcome57. Such assumption, however, is unrealistic, and it is shown that the 
distribution of property rights engenders welfare effects in more realistic scenarios. This 
recognition of transaction costs marks a clear departure from neoclassical assumptions and 
lays the groundwork for a study of the benefits and detriments of different arrangements of 
property rights. 
As briefly alluded to above, Alchian/Demsetz (1972) take the step from recognizing the 
relevance of property rights for economic analysis to providing a theory of the firm. Team 
production conveys benefits because its output exceeds the sum of the output of individual 
factors, but it is susceptible to the detriment of opportunistic behavior: Since its output 
function is not separable by input factor, and since the detection of input productivity is 
costly, team members are induced to shirk responsibility and effort. A solution is offered by 
the institution of a central party who monitors team members’ productivity. This party, 
however, will only then have no incentives to shirk if it receives (the property right to) the 
residual rewards of team production. Such constellation characterizes what is regularly termed 
a firm, and the central party represents the owner/employer who maintains bilateral contracts 
with all input owners. This understanding of the theoretical roots of the firm has been notably 
extended by Fama (1980), who remarks that the two function of this central party, namely 
management and risk bearing, can be separated between professional managers and 
shareholders. 
In its further development, the study of property rights advanced its structure, its terminology, 
and its understanding of the attributes of property rights. Furubotn/Richter (2003) provide an 
overview of these aspects, which also presents some of the jurisdictional links of this 
discipline (also compare Williamson (1991)). To provide greater structure, property rights 
could, for example, be categorized along their conditionality or exclusiveness (see e.g., 
Hardin (1968) on the “tragedy of the commons”). Demsetz (1967) provides an account of the 
emergence of property rights and shows how these may change over time, e.g., as 
externalities change (the author uses the example of fur trade, the rise of which drastically 
changed the externality of hunting and thus caused a realignment of property rights). As noted 
in the survey by Furubotn/Pejovich (1972), the study of property rights is inherently 
connected to aspects of political power, which therefore need to be tied into a theory of the 
state. 
3.2.2.3 Property rights and ECOs 
The study of property rights, chiefly through Alchian/Demsetz (1972), offers the fundament 
for an organizational theory of the firm, which fills the corresponding void in neoclassical 
approaches. Such theory of the firm would be directly applicable to a study of ECOs, as it 
could help to assess the implications of winding up with two firms instead of one. Following 
                                                 
57  The arguments by Coase (1960) only refer to Pareto optimality, i.e., aspects of distribution are 
entirely ignored. The structure of property rights is of course always paramount for individual 
welfare positions. 
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the arguments of this theory, it could be analyzed how an ECO affects the team structure of 
the firm. Following the suggestions by Fama (1980), such analysis has two sides. The first 
relates to the management role of the third party supervisor, which is principally a question of 
monitoring and could be used to explain the internal implications of an ECO. The second 
relates to risk bearing, which is frequently decoupled from management and which therefore 
relates to the capital market on which property rights of residual risks and rewards are 
exchanged (the market for risk-bearing). 
In contrast to a neoclassical theoretical approach, the application of property rights to a study 
of ECOs could benefit from the explicit provision for asymmetric information and 
opportunism. An analysis of ECOs could start with the hypothesis that such a transaction 
leads to improvements in the third party management function, e.g., because a formerly large 
team (i.e., firm) is split into two, which facilitates oversight. The view could be extended to 
study the subsidiary as a team within a larger team, whose separation will affect the 
distribution of property rights within and across firms. A property rights-inspired analysis of 
ECOs could further consider the factor-wise inseparability of production that underlies its 
organizational view: An ECO forces such separation, and if there is bearing to the proposition 
that a firm is testament to the superiority of team production for the task at hand, then 
improvements in transparency or risk-bearing agreement would need to be weighed against 
the production-related detriment of such separation. 
Property rights theory thus offers several potential points of entry into a study of ECOs, both 
for their organizational aspects and for the role of the capital market. They are thereby more 
fitting as a theoretical framework for ECO evaluation than purely neoclassical approaches. 
Their applicability to the current study, however, may be limited by the nature of the 
discipline: The study of property rights rests principally on the rules that underlie economic 
organization (Williamson (1990)). It provides little latitude to study more closely the 
arrangements that individuals strike under these rules, and consequently, it may not lend itself 
to study changes in the organizational surround with focus on risk preferences or incentive 
structures. While risk and incentives play a role in property rights to explain why contracts are 
specified so that some individuals bear rights to fixed claims and others to variable residuals, 
these aspects are not the focus of the study of property rights58. At the same time, property 
rights research has formed an indispensable building block of later efforts, which have built 
on property rights to assign more fundamental roles to elements such as risk and incentives. 
Consequently, such research may provide a more comprehensive theoretical basis for the 
current study than property rights, which will be considered in the remainder of this review. 
                                                 
58  Boundaries are not well defined, and incentive aspects in team production arguments are 
canonical elements of agency theory (see below). Nonetheless, this work subsumes classic team 
production contributions to property rights as these do not chiefly study the stylized relationship 
of a principal and an agent. 
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3.2.3 Transaction cost economics 
3.2.3.1 Themes of transaction cost economics 
The study of transaction costs, altogether grouped under transaction cost economics (TCE), 
builds on the notion that transactions are the basic unit of economic analysis (following 
Commons (1934)), and that conducting transactions comes at a cost. As put by Coase, to 
whom the origins of this theory are attributed, transaction costs represent the costs of using 
the price mechanism, most notably the cost of discovering relevant prices (Coase (1937)). 
Later contributions have expanded this definition to include the costs associated with the 
introduction, use, maintenance, and modification of institutions (Furubotn/Richter (2003))59. 
As with the economics of property rights, the recognition of transaction costs marks a major 
departure from the restrictive assumptions of neoclassical views, and related research studies 
how they occur, and how they can be managed and enforced under alternative settings, such 
as on markets or within firms. 
In its contractual understanding of the firm, TCE shares common theoretical ground with the 
theory of property rights. At the same time, TCE goes a step further and concerns itself with 
the exchange of property rights. It thus focuses on arrangements where the property rights 
approach largely deals with rules (compare Figure 4 on p. 41). TCE has been the classic 
framework for the study of vertical integration, the fundamental question of which has been 
articulated by the Coasian Puzzle (Williamson (1999)): Why not organize everything in one 
big firm? Answers are offered by the suggestion that centralized systems equally engender 
costs: costs of organizing, as put by Coase (1937), costs of contracting, as suggested by 
Alchian/Demsetz (1972), or costs incurred by subordinate levels to influence the central 
decision maker (Milgrom (1988)). The question of the optimal arrangement of production 
therefore becomes a question of relative transaction costs. 
Transaction costs can be categorized according to their origin and according to factors 
influencing their severity. With regard to their origin, four types can be identified 
(Furubotn/Richter (2003)): search and information costs (e.g., advertising or the costs to run a 
capital market), negotiation and decision costs (e.g., contract costs), monitoring and execution 
costs (e.g., the costs of litigation), and investments into social capital (e.g., the costs to 
establish a business network). Regarding the severity of transaction costs, three factors are 
commonly distinguished: asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency (Williamson (1979)). 
Asset specificity follows from investment decisions in former periods. Special-purpose 
investments bear the advantage of lower costs or higher returns but come at the cost that they 
are not fully redeployable (e.g., Klein et al. (1978)). To the degree that these assets are 
nonsalvageable, they engender the risks of obsolescence and lock-in60. Regarding the pivotal 
                                                 
59  Or, as put by Furubotn/Pejovich (1972) in an earlier publication, transaction costs relate to 
“defining, exchanging, policing, or enforcing property rights” (p. 1143). 
60  High asset specificity (and consequently the risk of lock-in) also has signaling implications, as 
Klein/Leffler (1981) point out in their model of contractual performance: Nonsalvageable means 
of production can supply quality-assuring services. 
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question of vertical integration, if asset specificity is high, transaction costs are lower if 
transactions are governed within a firm. Of the three determinants of transaction cost severity, 
asset specificity is generally regarded as the most important factor. As Williamson (1985a) 
notes, “the condition of asset specificity is the main factor to which a predictive theory of 
vertical integration must appeal” (p. 103)61. 
Uncertainty, the second determinant of the severity of transaction costs, may be strategic or 
non-strategic. Strategic uncertainty (also referred to as internal or behavioral uncertainty) 
originates from opportunism when a party obscures its true motive to derive added benefits, 
while nonstrategic uncertainty (sometimes referred to as external uncertainty) describes a state 
where all parties share uncertainty about the probability distribution of the outcome of an 
event. Remediation can be brought about by observing input or by developing trust, both of 
which are facilitated if production is organized within a firm instead of on markets 
(Williamson (1985a)). Frequency of transaction, the third and last determinant of the severity 
of transaction costs, rests on the concept that the use of an institution represents both variable 
and fixed costs. The fixed portion of these costs will increase transaction costs when 
transaction frequency is low. Within a firm, transaction frequency may be too low to warrant 
the separate establishment of the relevant institution, rendering a situation more viable in 
which an institution is shared among a larger number of parties in a market setting. 
3.2.3.2 Transaction cost economics and ECOs 
Vertical integration being its central theme, TCE is directly related to the study of ECOs. 
Following the elemental notion that production should always be organized in a firm if this 
leads to reductions in transaction costs relative to a market setting, TCE could be used as a 
theoretical basis to assess under which conditions transaction costs are reduced when a firm is 
divided. An ECO would certainly not transfer production entirely to the market, as the 
Coasian dichotomy merely marks two extremes between which economic activity aligns, but 
it makes the group of companies more permeable to market elements62. As an example, after 
an ECO, the subsidiary is no longer tied to the parent company as its primary purveyor of 
goods and services. Its larger discretion may lead to reductions in the price of purchased 
items, but these need to be weighed against supplementary costs of procurement, representing 
transaction costs related to search or negotiation. In this spirit, TCE could form the theoretical 
basis for a comparative institutional analysis, which has been described by Williamson 
(1981): 
“The study of transaction-cost economizing is thus a comparative institutional 
undertaking which recognizes that there are a variety of distinguishably different 
transactions on the one hand and a variety of alternative governance structures on the 
                                                 
61  At least six (not always mutually exclusive) types of asset specificity have been distinguished in 
the literature: site specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, dedicated assets, 
brand name specificity, and temporal specificity (Williamson (1981), Williamson (1985a), 
Furubotn/Richter (2003)). For a review of the last variant, also compare Masten et al. (1991) p. 
11. 
62  This is also the notion that has motivated the analysis of Langenbach (2001). 
  
51
other. The objective is to match governance structures to the attributes of transactions in a 
discriminating way” (p. 1544). 
TCE-inspired ECO analyses could be guided by the question if an ECO represents a useful 
tool in creating such match between governance structure and transaction characteristics. It 
could further contrast permanent reductions in transaction costs, a recurring figure, with the 
cost of the ECO itself, a one-off transaction cost. TCE thus combines both aspects deemed 
relevant for an analysis of ECOs, as it compares markets and central structures (firms) as 
alternative arrangements. TCE thus provides the organizational dimension that helps study the 
effects of an ECO within a firm, and which is absent in a purely neoclassical view of the firm. 
Constructive as such an approach might be, its viability is less clear. The definition of 
transaction costs allows substantial latitude, and difficulties arise from this nearly all-inclusive 
concept. As Ankarloo (2002) points out, if transaction costs represent the costs of using the 
price mechanism (or put differently, the price to knowing the price), then there has to be a 
price to knowing the price of the price and so forth. Accordingly, Williamson (1981) notes 
that transaction costs have not been operationalized because it has not been clear how this can 
be achieved. TCE is consequently not used as a theoretical framework for the present study, 
as it may impair the empirical testability of the economic value created through ECOs63. 
3.2.4 Agency theory 
3.2.4.1 Themes of agency theory 
Agency theory, the fourth and last theory of economic organization here reviewed, is chiefly 
concerned with contracting problems when one (a principal) hires another (an agent) to act on 
his or her behalf. The resultant relationship is frequently laden with efficiency problems due 
to a combination of asymmetric information, interest divergence, and opportunism. 
Asymmetric information arises from the inability of the principal to monitor the agent, as the 
input the agent delivers is usually unobservable and the output it produces only a noisy signal 
of the agent’s effort64. Opportunism describes “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson 
(1981) p. 1545) and becomes a problem because the interests of principal and agent are 
usually not fully aligned (i.e., interest divergence prevails)65. Consequently, the agent exhibits 
a propensity to act in his or her interest rather than in the interest of the principal (shirking). 
                                                 
63  In similar spirit, Demsetz (1988) notes that “… the role of transaction costs in explaining the 
manner in which organization responds to these problems [of internal organization] is like the 
role of gravity in explaining chemical reactions” (p. 151). 
64  See e.g., the seminal papers of Spence/Zeckhauser (1971) and Ross (1973), the former for an 
exposition from insurance, the latter for a more general discussion. Levinthal (1988) provides a 
broader survey of agency. 
65  Berle/Means (1932) discuss the above point in Chapter VI: The Divergence of Interest Between 
Ownership and Control, where they conclude that “… where the bulk of the profits of enterprise 
are scheduled to go to owners who are individuals other than those in control, the interests of the 
latter are as likely as not to be at variance with those of ownership and that the controlling group 
is in a position to serve its own interests” (p. 116). Still earlier formulations can be found in the 
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Ex-ante, i.e., before principal and agent enter into a contract, opportunism leads to the risk of 
adverse selection, which may arise if agents do not fully disclose their ability (hidden 
information) and under which a principal is unable to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
agents. The agent can mitigate the risk of adverse selection by signaling, and the principal by 
screening or filtering. Ex-post, opportunism can lead to moral hazard if agents do not supply 
proper amounts of input under a contract (hidden action, also compare Williamson (1981) or 
Holmström (1982)), which the agent can mitigate through bonding and the principal through 
monitoring (see below)66. Agency research studies arrangements (i.e., contracts) that 
maximize utility in such settings. In this search for optimality, it has been noted that only a 
second-best solution is feasible, as remarked by Spence/Zeckhauser (1971): 
”The insurer can be cognizant of this adverse incentives problem, but he cannot overcome 
it. Given his limited information-monitoring capability, his selection of the optimal 
insurance payoff function is second-best exercise” (p. 387). 
First-best solutions are generally precluded because the coexistence of opportunism and 
unobservability does not provide the corresponding incentives (Holmström (1979)). The 
difference between the hypothetical first-best solution and a realized second-best solution 
represents the costs of agency. 
The agency relationship has been expressed in various theoretical models, all of which are 
based on similar basic principles (Gibbons (1998)). For an agent who takes the unobservable 
action a  to produce output y , a linear production function is given as y = a + ε, where ε 
represents a noise term. The principal bears the property right to y  and is assumed to enter 
into a contract with the agent to pay a wage w  contingent on y . An example contract may 
take the form w = s + by , where s denotes a fixed salary and b a bonus rate. If c  denotes a 
disutility from effort for the agent, which is dependent on a , the agent will receive (in units of 
utility) w − c(a) and the principal y − w . If b = 0, the agent has no incentive to increase a, 
which is problematic since a cannot be observed by the principal. If b =1, the principal is no 
longer exposed to the residual since w = y  (assuming s = 0). Such models of the agency 
relationship therefore assume that the agent is risk-averse, through which the agent faces 
changes in b as a tradeoff between high incentive pay and low risk. 
First-best solutions would assume that output is fully observable, in which case no welfare 
loss would need to be incurred because sharing rules are not required, or that the agent is risk-
neutral, in which case sharing rules would not translate into a welfare loss as agents do not 
demand higher pay for same output (or inversely, deliver less-than-optimal levels of output) 
to compensate for increases in the variance of compensation (Holmström (1979), Shavell 
                                                                                                                                                        
literature: Both Berle/Means (1932) and Jensen/Meckling (1976) quote a pertinent passage from 
Smith (1776). 
66  On the central role of opportunism, Williamson (1999) notes that without “… opportunism, all of 
the following would vanish: moral hazard, adverse selection, shirking, filtering, undisclosed 
subgoal pursuit, distortions, and all other strategic deceits” (p. 1099). 
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(1979))67. Extension to the above simple-form agency model have been made through non-
linear sharing rules, specific assumptions around the utility functions of principal and agent 
(such as convex disutility from effort), consideration of their relative risk aversion, and the 
choice of behavior-based input contrasts vs. outcome-based result contracts (e.g., 
Holmström/Milgrom (1987), Eisenhardt (1989), Prendergast (1999)). Holmström (1982) 
presents an agency model with many agents, which serves to study free riding and the role of 
competition. The author shows that competition between agents can serve as a means to 
extract information. 
Since the original publications by Spence/Zeckhauser (1971) and Ross (1973), the 
development of agency theory “has resulted in two almost entirely separate and valuable 
literatures that nominally address the same problem” (Jensen (1983) p. 334). Jensen refers to 
the first as principal-agent theory and to the other as positive agency theory. The contracting 
relationship presented above lies at the root of the principal-agent literature, which is 
concerned with the structure of preferences, uncertainty, and information. In deriving 
implications for risk sharing, optimal contracting, and wealth effects, it follows a 
mathematical and predominantly non-empirical orientation. Positive agency literature, in 
contrast, focuses on the organizational implications of monitoring and bonding mechanisms: 
“The positive agency literature proceeds on the implicit assumption that the variables 
emphasized in the principal-agency literature are relatively unimportant in understanding 
the observed phenomenon when compared with richer specifications of information costs, 
other aspects of the environment, and the monitoring and bonding technology” (Jensen 
(1983) p. 335). 
Assuming normative issues solved68, positive agency theory directs its focus toward a budget-
constrained owner-manager with positive NPV projects who seeks outside financing. A 
seminal publication on this topic is Jensen/Meckling (1976), who interpret equity and debt 
financing in the light of agency theory and argue as follows. If the owner-manager sells equity 
in the firm, he or she no longer bears the full cost but derives the full benefits of (firm value-
reducing) perquisite consumption (consumption on the job). The level of perquisites 
consumed will be determined by their marginal benefit and their marginal cost (in terms of 
                                                 
67  Costs arising from an agent’s risk aversion may be reduced by lowering his or her exposure to 
exogenous influences through behavioral-based contracts (or e.g., contracts that measure 
performance relative to peer firms) or through long-term contracts or relationships (Eisenhardt 
(1989)). 
68  To illustrate, Jensen/Meckling (1976) note that the existing “… literature focuses almost 
exclusively on the normative aspects of the agency relationship; that is, how to structure the 
contractual relation […] between the principal and agent to provide appropriate incentives for the 
agent to make choices which will maximize the principal’s welfare given that uncertainty and 
imperfect monitoring exist. We focus almost entirely on the positive aspects of the theory. That is, 
we assume individuals solve these normative problems and given that only stock and bonds can 
be issued as claims, we investigate the incentives faced by each of the parties and the elements 
entering into the determination of the equilibrium contractual form characterizing the relationship 
between the manager […] and the outside equity and debt holders” (p. 309f). 
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reduced firm value), which will be equal in equilibrium69. Prospective equity owners foresee 
this reduction in firm value and will impose a discount on the firm compared to the owner-
manager scenario. They can engage in costly monitoring (through auditing, formal control 
systems, budget restrictions, or incentive compensation) or the manager in bonding (voluntary 
curtailment of his or her scope of possible action, e.g., by guarantee to allow accountants or 
contractual limitations on decision making power) to avoid this value loss70. Regardless of the 
option chosen, the manager will bear the full cost since the shareholders’ reservation price is 
discounted for monitoring. Even with optimal monitoring and bonding, investors will 
discount the value of the firm by some amount, which represents a residual loss. The sum of 
monitoring costs, bonding costs, and the residual loss represents the costs of an agency 
relationship. 
Subject to the owner-manager’s wealth constraint, debt financing can be used to avoid these 
agency costs of outside equity. With debt only, the owner-manager can claim all residual 
gains generated by his or her additional effort, which ensures an efficient level of effort. 
Jensen/Meckling (1976), however, show that agency costs also arise for debt financing. The 
main agency costs of debt arise through misaligned incentives. The manager can promise to 
undertake (debt-value-enhancing) projects of low variance, but later change to (equity-value-
enhancing) high-variance projects71. Bondholders will anticipate this behavior and adjust 
pricing accordingly. As with equity, monitoring and bonding costs can be incurred to reduce 
this effect, for which the owner-manager will pay in either case (e.g., through higher yield-to-
maturity). Also, bondholders will impose a discount for the costs of potential bankruptcy 
(e.g., settlement, reorganization, revenue risk), which increase in the presence of debt. 
In conclusion, if a manager is wealth-constrained, profitable projects may be passed up 
without external financing. If external financing is entirely provided in the form of equity, the 
manager has optimal incentives for risk but suboptimal incentives for effort, and welfare will 
be reduced by agency costs of equity. To the degree that external financing is provided in the 
form of debt, the manager faces suboptimal incentives for risk, and agency costs of debt will 
be incurred. The sum of these two types of agency costs determines the total costs of agency, 
which can be reduced (but never fully eliminated) through monitoring and bonding. 
                                                 
69  Jensen/Meckling (1976) expand on this relationship to show the effects for firm size: The 
manager will undertake additional investments to the point where the increment in firm value is 
just offset by its incremental reduction from his consumption of further perquisites. 
70  Marginal arguments apply, e.g., the manager incurs bonding costs as long as the marginal 
increase in wealth (through higher firm value) is more valuable than the marginal benefit of 
perquisites given up in bonding. 
71  To illustrate the argument by Jensen/Meckling (1976), two projects with identical expected return 
and identical CAPM beta have identical market value. Due to the option character of equity (see 
Chapter 3.3.3 on p. 60), if the absolute variance of one project is greater, then the value of its 
equity is also greater, and the value of debt must be proportionately lower. 
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3.2.4.2 Agency theory and ECOs 
Both strands of agency theory (principal-agent theory and positive agency theory) are 
applicable to an analysis of ECOs. With its focus on sharing rules and incentive alignment, 
principal-agent theory could be used to study the effect such a transaction has on the 
possibility to align the diverging interests of shareholders and management, while positive 
agency theory could be used to study an ECO’s effect on information costs as well as possible 
changes to monitoring and bonding technologies. Agency theory furthermore encompasses 
both the internal, organizational perspective and the external, capital-market perspective 
required of a theoretical framework for the evaluation of ECOs. It provides the latter most 
clearly through positive agency theory, and the former through the applicability of principal-
agent theory to relationships within a firm (e.g., between a headquarters and its business units 
or between subsidiary and parent firm management). 
Agency theory furthermore incorporates aspects of property rights theory, onto which it 
builds: Shareholders represent residual claimants, while other contracts grant recipients 
property rights to fixed quantities. Agency theory expands the study of property rights 
through its direct consideration of the risk profiles of the involved parties and corresponding 
incentive arrangements. In comparison to TCE, agency theory can be seen as a more tractable 
theoretical framework because agency costs represent a better-defined concept for 
quantitative assessment than transaction costs72. Finally, agency theory also builds on insight 
from neoclassical research, as exemplified by its reliance on arguments of diversification 
(e.g., Fama/Jensen (1983b)). Based on these arguments, agency theory is chosen as the 
underlying, unifying theoretical framework for this study of ECOs. Accordingly, the 
following chapter will review the effects of an ECO on agency relationships. 
3.3 The agency effects of ECOs 
Following from the chosen theoretical framework, the pivotal question becomes how an ECO 
affects agency-related aspects of the companies that are involved in an ECO. An assessment 
of these transactions then builds on their effects on the costs of agency. The choice of agency 
costs as criterion precludes other criteria, such as the consequences of an ECO for 
management, workers, or other stakeholders. This abstraction, however, is intentional because 
it is consistent with the contractual view of the firm: The contracts of these constituents are 
complete, and an ECO does therefore not affect the wealth of these individuals73. In the 
following, the effect of an ECO on agency costs is theoretically reviewed. This effort builds 
on Junker (2005), whose work includes a review of ECOs with regard to agency costs. Junker 
distinguishes the agency effects of an ECO along two dimensions, namely by the 
                                                 
72  As an example, Ang et al. (2000) conduct an empirical test of the agency cost propositions set 
forth by Jensen/Meckling (1976), which they largely confirm. 
73  By way of background, the commentary by Demsetz (1997) on the abstraction of neoclassical 
theory from managerial aspects represents a related discussion of the narrow perspective of a 
theoretical framework. 
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determinants of agency cost and by the principal-agent relationship. The following subchapter 
is structured accordingly. 
3.3.1 Categorization of ECO agency effects 
Determinants of agency costs. In both strands of agency theory, agency costs arise because 
the principal and the agent suffer from interest divergence. It has been shown above that 
sharing rules can be used to alter this disparity, and a first and fundamental determinant of 
agency costs is thus represented by the degree of interest divergence after such arrangements 
have been exhausted. In this regard, an ECO may play an important role in changing the 
possibility to introduce sharing rules. The above presentation has further shown that a first-
best solution could be attained if the agent’s action were directly observable by the principal. 
The degree to which this is not possible, i.e., the quality of the information environment, can 
therefore be seen as a second determinant of agency costs. Third and finally, with regard to 
positive agency theory, Jensen/Meckling (1976) define agency costs the sum of the 
monitoring expenditures incurred by the principal, the bonding expenditures incurred by the 
agent, and the residual loss. Since any residual can by definition only indirectly be influenced, 
monitoring and bonding technologies represent a third determinant of the severity of agency 
costs. 
Principal-agent relationships. Holmström/Tirole (1989) contend that principal-agent theory 
commonly disregards relationships within firms, and Bolton/Scharfstein (1998) argue that 
firms represent multiple agency relationships (e.g., between headquarters/investors and 
headquarters/divisions). Attempts to recognize the relationships within a firm (e.g., between 
supervisors and workers) have further been made by Tirole (1986) on colluding agents and by 
Holmström/Milgrom (1990) in their model of side contracting between agents. These works 
suggest a broader application of agency theory, and consistently, the firm can be interpreted 
as a construct of multi-layered agency relationships, which are embedded into an external 
agency relationship with shareholders. Of these, an ECO, first, affects the agency relationship 
between the parent company and the business unit in which shares are sold. Second, regarding 
the relationship between parent management and parent shareholders, this agency relationship 
is also affected because an ECO changes the asset base that lies at the root of this 
relationship74. In addition, a third agency relationship is newly created through the ECO: the 
relationship between subsidiary management and subsidiary shareholders. Based on the 
arguments by Jensen/Meckling (1976) that a residual loss will prevail in any agency 
relationship, the creation of a new agency relationship between subsidiary management and 
shareholders could be seen as an invariable increase in the costs of agency through an ECO. 
This agency relationship must, however, be compared to the agency relationship it replaces, 
since the assets in question have formerly been owned by parent shareholders and controlled 
by parent management. The effect of an ECO thus becomes a question of the relative agency 
                                                 
74  In a related study, Aron (1991) studies the effect of a spin-off on the relationship between 
management and shareholders from a principal-agent perspective. Her model builds on the 
argument that after the offer, stock prices are a cleaner signal of managerial productivity. 
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costs of these arrangements. Through an ECO, agency costs may change in all three of these 
agency relationships. 
Figure 5: Two-dimensional agency framework for ECO analysis 
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Two-dimensional agency framework. The above presentation has shown that on each of the 
two dimensions by which agency costs are categorized, three aspects are distinguished. These 
can be married up to derive (3 x 3 =) nine unique types of ECO agency costs in a two-
dimensional framework of agency costs suggested by Junker (2005). The compartments of 
this framework represent the different determinants of agency costs for different principal-
agent relationships. A graphical representation of these ECO agency costs is provided in 
Figure 5. To evaluate an ECO, it needs to be assessed how agency costs change because of 
the transaction. The overview in Figure 5 helps to conduct a structured review of agency costs 
before and after an ECO. If agency costs are lower after the ECO than before, this is 
interpreted as the creation of economic value, and vice versa75. 
3.3.2 ECOs and changes in agency costs 
Based on the map of agency costs related to an ECO (Figure 5), the effect of such a 
transaction on agency costs can be identified and compared. In the derivation of this 
                                                 
75  The horizontal dimension changes through the ECO because subsidiary shareholders do not yet 
exist before the offer. This, however, does not obstruct an assessment of the agency costs before 
and after an ECO for the group of companies. 
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overview, Junker (2005) conducts such review, the results of which are summarized in the 
following. 
Figure 6: Potential agency cost reductions through an ECO 
Parent
shareholders /
parent
management
Parent
management /
subsidiary
management
Subsidiary
shareholders /
subsidiary
management
Interest
divergence
Information
environment
Monitoring/
bonding
technology
Determinants of agency cost
Principal
agent
relationship
Increase in
transparency of
parent company
due to separation
from subsidiary
Improved
disclosure due to
subsidiary SEC
filing
requirements
Improved
monitoring
incentives for
parent as
blockholder
Decrease in
overinvestment
due to smaller
internal capital
market
Improved
investment
efficiency due to
reduced cross-
subsidization
Reduction of
interest
divergence due
to stock-based
compensation
Source: Based on Junker  (2005)
 
3.3.2.1 Agency cost reductions through an ECO 
Of the nine types of ECO agency costs, six can be associated with potential reductions 
through the transaction. Regarding the types of agency relationships, an ECO likely affects 
interest divergence along all three of these. The internal market of the parent company 
shrinks, which has a positive effect on investment efficiency (e.g., Jensen (1986) in his 
arguments on free cash flow). The separation between parent company and subsidiary further 
leads to fewer opportunities to cross-subsidize inefficient business units (e.g., Rajan et al. 
(2000)), and interest divergence between subsidiary shareholders and management can be 
reduced if stock-based compensation is introduced (e.g., Keating (1997) for a review of 
divisional incentive evaluation schemes). The information environment is affected by an ECO 
for the two types of shareholder/management relationships: for the parent company since the 
separation from the subsidiary leads to greater focus and thus transparency (e.g., Zuckerman 
(2000) on “dediversification”), and for subsidiaries since these are subject to separate 
reporting requirements after the offer (e.g., Glosten/Milgrom (1985), Gilson et al. (2001) on 
disaggregated financial statements). Lastly, an ECO affects the monitoring and bonding 
between the management of the parent company and its subsidiary, since the parent company 
becomes a blockholder of the latter and thus has particular incentives to monitor its 
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performance (e.g., Shleifer/Vishny (1986)). A summary of these potential reductions of 
agency costs due to an ECO is provided in Figure 6. 
3.3.2.2 Agency cost increases through an ECO 
Just as for potential reductions, the overview by Junker (2005) lists potential increases for six 
types of ECO agency costs. Interest divergence is again affected for all three types of 
principal-agent relationships. Regarding the relationship between shareholders and 
management of the parent company, the collection of offer proceeds may exacerbate 
overinvestment (as also suggested by Allen/McConnell (1998)). Also, reductions in cross-
subsidization between parent company and subsidiary may not materialize as argued above, 
but become worse due to the availability of additional cash from the offer. This is particularly 
likely if the parent company retains a high degree of control over the subsidiary after the 
ECO. Regarding the third principal-agent relationship between shareholders and management 
of the subsidiary, the introduction of stock-based compensation creates the risk that the 
discretion entailed by such arrangements is abused if management wields undue influence 
over the pay setting process (e.g., Bebchuk/Fried (2003) on the role of power, camouflage, 
and suboptimal pay structures). 
Furthermore, an ECO may entail negative effects for the information environment of the 
subsidiary shareholder/management relationship because of complementarity of public and 
private information (Kim/Verrecchia (1994) on the potential increase of information 
asymmetry through earnings announcements). Regarding the monitoring/bonding technology, 
two adverse effects are identified, both of which work to the detriment of minority 
shareholders. Management of the parent company and the subsidiary may collude, causing 
adverse effects for minority shareholders (e.g., Pagano/Röell (1998) for a theoretical 
treatment of collusion and optimal monitoring), and blockholders of subsidiary shares (of 
which the parent company regularly is one) may expropriate minority shareholders (e.g., 
Johnson et al. (2000) on tunneling). Figure 7 summarizes the potential increases in agency 
costs due to an ECO. 
3.3.2.3 Net change in agency costs through an ECO 
The above review has shown that an ECO engenders simultaneous increases and reductions of 
agency costs. This assertion holds even if one contends that the above compilation of effects 
is not exhaustive, as long as its current contents are recognized to be valid. The multitude of 
concurrent effects confirms the description of ECOs as complex, dual-character transactions 
(see Chapter 1.3 on p. 6). From a theoretical point of view, it is thus only possible to assert 
that an ECO likely affects the agency costs of the involved companies, while the net effect 
remains unclear: Due to the multitude and frequently unrelated nature of effects, it cannot be a 
priori determined if increases in agency costs will outweigh its decreases or vice versa. 
Therefore, such assessment becomes an empirical question. Such analyses follow in the 
sections after this, and in their preparation, the following two subchapters aim to render the 
theoretical agency cost framework operable. 
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Figure 7: Potential agency cost increases through an ECO 
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3.3.3 Equity proxy 
To ensure consistency of this section’s theoretical exposition and the empirical assessment 
later on, agency costs are maintained as analysis criterion. At the same time, the empirical 
analysis requires an operationalization of agency costs, and therefore, in extension of the 
contractual view of the firm, equity value is chosen as its proxy (compare Chapter 3.2.1.2 on 
p. 44). Equity’s particular position follows from the difficulty to write state-contingent claims 
in the sense of Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959): 
“To specify the total payoffs to be obtained in all future states, one would need to identify 
all current and future decisions of an organization through state contingent claim 
contracts. Given the costs and information requirements this implies, it is not surprising 
that state contingent claims are not the dominant system for allocating risk” (Fama/Jensen 
(1983a) p. 329). 
In such a situation, Grossman/Hart (1986) argue, it is optimal to specify a number of contracts 
(i.e., to grant several specific rights) and let one party purchase all residual rights. Therefore, 
contracts of e.g., labor, suppliers, and creditors are complete, while equity, the residual 
agreement, is the only incomplete contract (Fama (1980))76. Black/Scholes (1973), in their 
fundamental publication on option pricing, also allude to the logic of residual rights and 
compare common stock in a company to a call option on its assets sold by the bondholders of 
                                                 
76  As Zingales (2000) notes, other contracts may also be incomplete (e.g., those of workers). The 
contracts of shareholders may therefore be understood as those that are least protected.  
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the firm. Put differently, bondholders buy the firm with their cash, concurrently selling an 
option to equity holders to buy the firm back at a strike price equal to the value of debt. The 
theoretical value of this option at the end of the period will be the greater of the value of the 
firm less the face value of the bonds or zero77. The choice of equity value as overarching 
criterion also follows the general approach in ECO research (e.g., Schipper/Smith (1986), 
Allen/McConnell (1998), Vijh (1999), Vijh (2002)), whereas the choice of operating 
measures has remained restricted to a small number of studies only (e.g., Frank/Harden 
(2001), Powers (2003)). 
3.3.4 Guiding hypotheses 
Following the evaluation criterion introduced above, the null hypothesis denotes that an ECO 
does not engender changes in agency costs, and the alternative hypothesis states the reverse: 
(3.1)  H0 : agency costspost − agency costspre = 0 
(3.2)  H1 : agency costspost − agency costspre ≠ 0. 
Applying the equity proxy, this can be expressed as the change in equity value, i.e., the return 
R to an owner of the firm: 
(3.3)  H0 : equity valuepost − equity valuepre ≡ R = 0 
(3.4)  H1 : equity valuepost − equity valuepre ≡ R ≠ 0. 
Finally, to accommodate the possibility that changes in return may be attributable to aspects 
unrelated to the ECO, the null and alternative hypotheses are normalized by expected return 
(i.e., the return the company would have attained without an ECO) to arrive at abnormal 
return AR: 
(3.5)  H0 : R − E(R) ≡ AR = 0 
(3.6)  H1 : R − E(R) ≡ AR ≠ 0. 
To capture the full effect of an ECO, the null hypotheses will be tested for the entire group of 
companies, i.e., agency costs and equity value after the ECO are measured across both the 
parent firm and its subsidiary. Further details are presented in the empirical parts of this 
paper, starting with Chapter 4.3 on p. 68. 
                                                 
77  This basic relationship applies to what Fama/Jensen (1985) refer to as open corporations. Their 
paper contains a review of the characteristics of the residual claimant status across several other 
organizational forms. 
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4 Short-term ECO performance 
4.1 Section introduction 
4.1.1 Announcement effect 
In Section 2, the ECO activity in the US between 1995 and 2002 has been presented. While 
instructive in a descriptive way, such exposition does not yet address the guiding question of 
this work: whether these transactions have created economic value. In Section 3, it has been 
concluded that the economic effect of an ECO cannot be theoretically predicted. Since 
theoretical considerations alone are thus insufficient to derive an answer, this and the 
subsequent sections resort to empirical analysis to determine a posteriori which of the 
contrary economic effects prevails in practice. As a first step into that direction, the present 
section contains analyses that study the immediate effects of an ECO. More precisely, this 
section investigates how the stock market reacts when the intent to conduct an ECO first 
becomes known to the public. As such, the following assessment represents a classic event 
study, adopting a methodology that has become an exceptionally well-established instrument 
throughout empirical corporate finance research. 
The benefit of methodological assuredness from applying a recognized technique to an oft-
studied phenomenon comes at an inherent risk, namely lack of new insight. This work is not 
the first to conduct an event study of the announcement effect of ECOs, and its contribution 
can therefore be expected to be mainly incremental and confirmatory. Notwithstanding this 
reality, the present section deserves full attention for several reasons. First, a work that has set 
out to determine the economic effect of ECOs can arguably not do without an event study of 
their announcement effect: The results from this section form an indispensable building block 
of arguments in later sections of this document, and consistency would not be assured were 
the assertions not based on insight derived from the same sample. Second, the present sample 
is collected over a period that overlaps little with previous research. Could the economic 
effect of an ECO be theoretically predicted, this section might be unneeded. Since the 
opposite applies and these economic effects require empirical analysis, the present section is 
well placed: In contrast to universally true theoretical arguments, there is no guarantee that 
empirical findings remain valid over time. And finally, yet importantly, the analysis that 
follows includes methodological extensions over existing US ECO event studies, applying 
techniques such as SUR and GARCH to substantiate results. 
4.1.2 Section outline 
After this introduction, the current section contains five chapters. The first contains a review 
of existing research on short-term ECO performance (Chapter 4.2). The classic event study 
approach is presented thereafter (Chapter 4.3), including a discussion of the validity of using 
stock prices as the yardstick to measure ECO performance. This is followed by an 
introduction of the data and methods (Chapter 4.4), and the section concludes with a 
presentation (Chapter 4.5) and discussion (Chapter 4.6) of its results. 
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4.2 Existing research on short-term ECO performance 
The following exposition builds on and applicably expands the introductory presentation of 
ECO research in Chapter 1.4 on p. 10. To demonstrate how ECO announcement return forms 
an exception from other types of equity offerings and why its study is hence particularly 
intriguing, the exposition will set out with a comparison of the announcement effects of ECOs 
and SEOs. 
4.2.1 ECO versus SEO announcement return 
Volume 15 of the Journal of Financial Economics contains a series of influential articles on 
the share price effect of security offer announcements. In one of these contributions, 
Schipper/Smith (1986) examine the announcement effect of ECOs and find a positive average 
abnormal share price reaction of 1.83% during the four days preceding the announcement, 
which is statistically significant at the 2% threshold. 
This finding by Schipper/Smith (1986) is groundbreaking not only because of its pioneering 
character, but also because of the contrast in which it stands to parallel research on SEOs, 
some of which is contained in the same journal volume. Asquith/Mullins (1986) show that 
over 80% of industrial SEOs exhibit negative announcement-day abnormal return, the average 
of which lies at statistically significant –2.70%. Masulis/Korwar (1986) confirm this finding 
and conclude that at 2.25%, abnormal announcement-day return is larger for industrial 
companies than for public utilities, which still exhibit significant negative abnormal returns of 
–0.45%. In a third parallel article, Mikkelson/Partch (1986) study the announcement effect of 
different types of financing activities and also find that the announcement of common stock 
offerings is associated with a negative share price reaction (of –3.56%). Linn/Pinegar (1988) 
confirm above findings in an analysis of the announcement of preferred stock offerings. 
Related evidence has already existed earlier. Dann/Mikkelson (1984) detect abnormal 
announcement returns for convertible debt offerings of –0.99% for the announcement day and 
–2.32% for the [–1 1] day event window. Consistent with these findings, Mikkelson (1981) 
detects a statistically significant negative announcement effect of convertible debt calls, by 
which the intent to convert debt into common stock is announced78. 
The robustness of these findings is also documented through reverse studies, following the 
argument that, if the reaction to an announcement of a stock offering has been found negative, 
one should expect a positive reaction to an announcement of share repurchases and exchange 
offers. Dann (1981) confirms this expectation empirically, documenting announcement-day 
average raw return of 8.95% across a sample of 143 announcements of repurchase tender 
offers. Masulis (1980) finds announcement-day raw return of 11.31% for a similar portfolio, 
                                                 
78  In yet another variant of the analysis, Moore et al. (1986) show that both regular SEOs and those 
that make use of SEC’s shelf registration Rule 415 exhibit negative share reactions to registration. 
Heron/Lie (2004) find negative announcement returns for regular offerings but not for shelf 
offerings. For more information on Rule 415, see Bhagat et al. (1985), Moore et al. (1986), or 
Blackwell et al. (1990). 
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with 86% of stocks exhibiting a positive reaction. Vermaelen (1981), applying a refined 
normalized approach, finds abnormal return of 5.25% for the announcement of repurchases 
across a sample of 131 tender offers. The above inference could be contended on the ground 
that repurchase tender offers usually lie well above the prevailing market price. While the 
confirmation of negative SEO announcement returns thus decreases with the level to with 
which one interprets the positive repurchase announcement returns as a consequence of these 
premiums (Vermaelen (1981)), the listed studies fail to deliver evidence that is contradictory 
to the negative SEO announcement returns documented in other studies. 
Against the backdrop of these studies, the results by Schipper/Smith (1986) stand out clearly. 
To ensure robustness of their results in light of the contradictory SEO evidence, 
Schipper/Smith (1986) examine selection bias as a potential cause for the discrepancy 
between SEO and ECO announcement returns. After having detected the positive average 
abnormal announcement return for their sample, the authors recalculate the abnormal 
announcement return for a subset of the same sample that consists of only those parent 
companies that have also announced an SEO within five years of the ECO announcement. 
Results mirror previous findings in that SEO announcement returns lie at an average of –3.5% 
for the five-day period surrounding the SEO announcement, while abnormal ECO return is 
significantly positive for the same firms. Selection bias can therefore be ruled out as an 
explanation for the positive ECO announcement return. 
In summary, the abnormal announcement return of ECOs is insofar singular as it constitutes 
the only form of equity financing that is consistently accompanied by a positive stock market 
reaction. 
4.2.2 Research on ECO announcement return 
The peculiarity of the results by Schipper/Smith (1986) has sparked a number of subsequent 
studies that have investigated the returns to announcing an ECO. Table 10 provides an 
overview of the research that has been published on the subject. Before presenting select 
studies in greater depth, some comments on the overall emerging picture of ECO 
announcement returns are in order. 
After Schipper/Smith first addressed ECO announcement returns in 1986, this topic has been 
the subject of continuous research, both in the US and in Europe. While some (particularly 
non-US) studies base their findings on low (say, N < 40) sample sizes (including a number of 
studies not listed in Table 10 because of still smaller samples), results are remarkably 
consistent. All studies have reported positive ECO announcement returns, whose order of 
magnitude lies between 1% and 2% for 13 of the 18 presented cases. Furthermore, tests of 
statistical significance indicate robustness at the 5% threshold for 15 of the 18 studies. 
Finally, inferring insofar as possible, results appear robust across geographies. With regard to 
methodology, the standard approach applied by most studies is a classic event study that relies 
on a standard market model, estimated via OLS. Exceptions are few and include Hulburt et al. 
(2002), who use market-adjusted returns instead of a market model, and Weiser et al. (2005), 
who use the CAPM to estimate expected return. Market-adjusted returns are supplied as 
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robustness checks to market model adjusted returns in Kaserer/Ahlers (2000) and Vijh (2002), 
and results have been found highly consistent across these approaches. Junker (2005) applies 
advanced statistical techniques such as SUR and GARCH and confirms the robustness of 
regular OLS approaches to these extensions. 
Table 10: Short-term ECO studies79 
Study Focus Start End N Window AR
Schipper/Smith (1986) US 1965 1983 76 -4 0 1.83% **
Klein/Rosenfeld/Beranek (1991) US 1966 1983 52 -1 0 1.06% *
Michaely/Shaw (1995) US 1981 1988 28 -1 -1 1.20% ***
Slovin/Sushka/Ferraro (1995) US 1980 1991 32 0 +1 1.23% **
Hand/Skantz (1998) US 1981 1995 265 0 0 1.08% ***
Allen/McConnell (1998) US 1978 1993 186 -1 +1 1.90% ***
Kaserer/Ahlers (2000) D 1984 1997 23 -50 0 5.00% **
Langenbach (2000) D 1984 1999 32 -1 0 0.81% **
Elsas/Lffler (2001) D 1984 2000 39 0 0 1.08% ***
Vijh (2002) US 1980 1997 336 0 0 0.67% ***
Hulburt/Miles/Woolridge (2002) US 1981 1994 185 -1 +1 1.92% ***
Madura/Nixon (2002) US 1988 1993 88 0 +1 1.35% *
Fucks (2003) EU 1994 2004 103 0 0 1.11% ***
Bhner (2004) EU 1984 2002 66 0 0 1.64% **
Brettel/Junker/Pinker (2004) D 1984 2001 50 -1 0 1.35% **
Wagner (2005) D 1984 2002 81 0 0 0.70% **
Weiser/Uzik/Rhrig (2005) D 1984 2005 25 -10 +10 0.92%
Junker (2005) D 1984 2003 55 0 0 1.26% ***  
Turning toward a discussion of individual studies that warrant closer attention, the study by 
Michaely/Shaw (1995) is noteworthy because the authors study the announcement returns for 
a subsample of general ECOs, comprised of those cases in which shares are issued to the 
public through the creation of a Master Limited Partnership. The authors argue that these 
transactions are less influenced by tax and control issues. Results are fully commensurate with 
                                                 
79  In this table and at later occurrences in the document, N denotes sample size and AR abnormal 
return. Table 10 includes contributions that have empirically studied the announcement effect of 
ECOs. Not included are studies whose results do not allow generalization due to small samples (N 
< 20), such as Pellens (1993), Hasselmann (1997), Méndez (2003), and Mathesius (2004). The 
study by Löffler (2001) is not included since its results have likely been considered in the 
publication of Elsas/Löffler (2001). The reported event window is the one that most closely 
reflects the [0 0] event day. [-1 -1] is reported for Michaely/Shaw (1995) as this corresponds to 
their definition of event day. Abnormal return in Weiser et al. (2005), published only for event 
windows, is statistically not significant but the authors report (unpublished) significance for 
individual event days. With regard to AR, * denotes two-tailed significance at the 10% level, ** 
at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
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those found by other ECO studies, underscoring on the one hand the robustness of the general 
academic opinion on the topic, and demonstrating on the other hand the lack of need to form a 
subsample comprised of such partnerships80. 
Notable extensions over the standard event study approach first applied by Schipper/Smith are 
offered by the analysis of rival reactions to the announcement of an ECO. Slovin et al. (1995) 
apply such an approach, contending that the (unobservable) subsidiary value should be the 
basis of measurement rather than the share price of the parent company. Particularly in the 
presence of signaling, the authors argue, parent and subsidiary values may be subject to 
contrary effects. Therefore, instead of using parent share price as a proxy for the value that an 
ECO creates for the subsidiary, they analyze the share price reaction for subsidiary rival firms 
of ECO subsidiaries. For these rival firms, selected by industry classification, the authors 
document a significant negative reaction, which they interpret as evidence that an ECO is a 
signal of overvaluation in the subsidiary industry. They attribute the positive share price 
reaction of the parent company to its undervaluation relative to its subsidiary: Were the parent 
company more overvalued than the subsidiary, not an ECO but an SEO would have been 
conducted. Slovin et al. (1995) report further evidence that is consistent with their argument, 
namely positive share price reactions for rival firms of subsidiaries that are spun-off. 
Subjecting the results by Slovin et al. (1995) to critical assessment, much of their conclusion 
hinges on the validity of inference from rival reactions. While documented rival reactions are 
statistically significant, cause and effect may not be as proposed by the authors. Rather than 
overvaluation, the rival reaction could also be interpreted as an expected change to the 
competitive environment in the respective industry. Furthermore, overvaluation of subsidiary 
assets does not necessarily imply undervaluation of parent assets. Rather, if parent assets were 
correctly valued, and an ECO taken as a signal for overvalued subsidiary assets, then the 
announcement of an ECO should lead to a negative stock market reaction, as subsidiary assets 
are still embedded in the group of companies when the ECO is announced. Lastly, it should 
be noted that the results of Slovin et al. (1995) are based on a relatively small sample, 
comprised of only 36 ECOs. Hulburt et al. (2002) overcome this last limitation. In their study 
of rival reactions, they rely on a much larger sample of 185 ECOs. While the authors confirm 
the significant negative reaction for subsidiary rivals, they find that rivals of parent firms also 
exhibit a significant negative reaction to the announcement of an ECO. While the 
announcement of an ECO seems to have measurable effects for ECO parent company and 
subsidiary rivals, the findings by Hulburt et al. (2002) call the valuation-related interpretation 
by Slovin et al. (1995) into question. 
In a noteworthy extension to the prior research, Bühner (2004) studies ECOs that have been 
announced but subsequently cancelled. He finds that abnormal short-term return is similar in 
magnitude to ECOs that have been consummated, but not statistically significant. 
Furthermore, he is able to detect a negative share price reaction to the announcement of the 
                                                 
80  See the appendix to Michaely/Shaw (1995) for an introduction to the structure of Master Limited 
Partnerships. 
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cancellation of the ECO, which again is consistent with the overall findings on abnormal 
short-term returns surrounding ECO announcements81. A different extension is provided by 
Gleason et al. (2006), who show that ECOs that are subsequently reacquired lead to a 
negative announcement reaction, i.e., the market foresees the probability that the subsidiary 
will be reacquired by the parent firm. The authors further show that this effect is more 
pronounced if the subsidiary is entirely instead of only partially reacquired, and control 
sample tests are administered to ensure that the results reflect true reacquisition effects. The 
subsequent reacquisition announcement elicits a positive stock market reaction. 
4.3 Event study approach 
Of the ECO studies presented above, the regular instrument employed by the vast majority is 
a classic event study. Event studies assess the quality of a subject-of-study by measuring the 
market reaction to its announcement82, usually using abnormal return (the excess of raw 
return over its expected value, sometimes referred to as excess return) as the relevant proxy 
(Cowan (1992)). As reflected by the research on ECOs, event studies have become one of the 
most well-accepted tools of empirical financial research, and their robustness has been proven 
in numerous studies (compare e.g., Shleifer/Vishny (1997b)). The methodology has been 
introduced in early studies such as Ball/Brown (1968) or Fama et al. (1969), which implies 
that it has been in use for almost four decades now83. In-depth overviews of its details are 
provided in Peterson (1989), Armitage (1995), Thompson (1996), McWilliams/Siegel (1997), 
and McWilliams/Williams (2000). 
In order for an event study to deliver valid results, several conditions must be met. On the one 
hand, some of these conditions lie outside of the researcher’s control, termed here theoretical 
aspects, which represent basic assumptions of the event study approach and are the subject of 
the first part of the following discussion. On the other hand, the researcher has discretion over 
other important aspects, termed here practical aspects, which will be the subject of subsequent 
discussion. 
4.3.1 Theoretical aspects of event studies 
Classic event studies infer the quality of an event through the stock market reaction to its 
announcement. As laid out in Chapter 3.3.4 on p. 61, the null hypothesis states that ECOs are 
not associated with changes in agency costs, and the case for equity value as proxy for such 
                                                 
81  The author notes that insufficient demand was the most frequently stated motive for the 
cancellation of these ECOs, which he interprets as evidence that the firm is overvalued. The 
observed negative stock price reaction is seen as a consistent response. 
82  To ensure clear terminology, the announcement, and not the actual subject-of-study (e.g., the 
ECO) is taken as the relevant event. What is referred to as an event study in standard terminology 
is in fact the announcement-of-an-event study. In delineation to other alternatives, a study of the 
announcement effect is referred to in this document as a classic event study, while the analysis of 
longer post-offer windows (conducted in Section 5) is referred to as a long-term event study. 
83  MacKinlay (1997) argues that event studies have been used since as early as 1930, although the 
introduction of more rigorous methodology is generally associated with the studies above. 
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costs has been made. Even if the change in equity value is an effective measure of the agency 
costs of the underlying event, the degree to which stock prices can serve to evaluate an event 
still rests on the efficiency with which prices reflect equity value. If stock prices reflect the 
true value of the equity only gradually (i.e., if the price that correctly accounts for the inherent 
risk of the equity is arrived with delay), or are subject to noise, an accurate assessment of the 
event is impossible with short event windows. Rather, stock prices must correctly and 
immediately reflect the change in equity value, or – to restate – informationally efficient 
capital markets are prerequisite for an event study to deliver valid results. 
4.3.1.1 Capital market efficiency 
The degree to which capital markets are informationally efficient has been subject to intense 
academic debate. This debate “is concerned with whether prices at any point in time ‘fully 
reflect’ available information” (Fama (1970) p. 413), the affirmation of which is expressed by 
the hypothesis of efficient capital markets. In a useful separation by degree, Fama 
distinguishes three forms of market efficiency. The first, to which the author refers as the 
weak form, assumes that prices reflect all security market information. Prices therefore reflect 
all past (historic) information. Markets are efficient because past information is not assumed 
to bear relevance for future performance, and thus no arbitrage opportunity exists on historic 
information. The second form of market efficiency, denoted the semi-strong form, posits that 
prices account for all current information publicly available. In this quality, semi-strong 
market efficiency includes all information of the weak form (because all security market 
information is by definition public) plus information that exists beyond capital markets. The 
third and highest type of market efficiency is its strong form, which stipulates that prices 
reflect all information available under the semi-strong scenario, plus all private (insider) 
information. Prices in this scenario therefore embed all past and all current, and all public and 
all private information, and no investor can attain a privileged position. 
According to the above classification, market efficiency refers to the property of markets to 
reflect information, and all three forms posit that capital markets are efficient. Differences lie 
in the type of information reflected (i.e., public vs. private) and in the delay with which it is 
reflected (immediately/current vs. delayed/historic). To derive a full picture of possible 
alternatives, Fama’s market efficiency trilogy could be supplemented by a fourth zero 
efficiency form, denoting a state where the market mechanism is dysfunctional and capital 
markets do not respond to new information at all. In such scenario, the random development 
of stock prices over time would obstruct any valid inference from prices on the quality of 
events. 
4.3.1.2 Evidence of strong and weak market efficiency 
With regard to the question of which form of market efficiency prevails in reality, Fama 
(1991) admits that information and trading are hardly costless (thereby abandoning typical 
neoclassical assumptions). Deviations from strong-form market efficiency, Fama contends, 
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are thus positively correlated to the costs of information and trading. Consistent with this 
view, strong-form market efficiency is generally regarded as 
“… an extreme form which few people have ever treated as anything other than a logical 
completion of the set of possible hypotheses” (Jensen (1978) p. 97). 
Different degrees of market efficiency can be tested by assessing if superior trading strategies 
can be built on certain types of information. In this context, the conclusion that strong-form 
market efficiency generally does not prevail is supported by evidence of the benefits to insider 
trading by corporate officers (e.g., Finnerty (1976), Jaffe (1974)) and security analysts (e.g., 
Womack (1996)). Since their private information could form the basis of superior trading, 
strong-form market efficiency can generally be ruled out. In the spectrum of remaining 
alternatives, empirical evidence generally suggests that capital markets are more rather than 
less efficient. Weak-form market efficiency assumes that future returns can be predicted by 
relying on historic information, and this proposition has been tested by e.g., Fama (1965) and 
Fama/MacBeth (1973), who examine the autocorrelation of stock prices, and Fama/Blume 
(1966), who study filter trading rules. Both approaches show that past stock market 
information bears no significant relevance for future stock performance and thus support the 
proposition that capital markets are at least weakly efficient. 
4.3.1.3 Evidence of semi-strong market efficiency 
That market efficiency has been subject to intense academic debate, as alluded to above, 
largely follows from the fact that evidence for semi-strong market efficiency is mixed. Studies 
that have tested semi-strong market efficiency can be broadly grouped into two categories: 
Those that analyze the stock market reaction to releases of relevant information, and those 
that aim to predict future return based on the cross-sectional characteristics of securities. The 
first kind of test, generally conducted through event studies on various topics, has consistently 
delivered robust and confirmatory results, as reflected by the related ECO literature and the 
references contained therein (see Chapter 4.2 on p. 64). Research has shown that capital 
markets have instantaneously adjusted to public releases of relevant information, and future 
return can thus not be predicted by relying on public information – altogether evidence for 
semi-strong market efficiency. 
In contrast, evidence from cross-sectional methods is ambiguous. Studies have shown that the 
return for individual stocks may vary with factors such as size or book-to-market ratio (most 
prominently by Fama/French (1992)). This observation, while crucial for later parts of this 
work (where it is expanded on84), has little relevance for the present section: Consistent 
evidence for semi-strong market efficiency in event studies suffices to rationalize the chosen 
approach. To summarize the underlying view of market efficiency, Roll (2000) comments as 
follows: 
                                                 
84  Idiosyncrasies of semi-strong market efficiency are considered in Chapter 5.3 on p. 108, where 
the design of long-term return measurement is introduced, and in Chapter 7.2.2 on p. 235, where 
potential limits to market efficiency are taken into account. 
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“General stock price movements are notoriously unpredictable and financial economists 
have even developed a coherent theory (the theory of efficient capital markets) to explain 
why they should be unpredictable” (p. 541, emphasis in original). 
Roll refers to general price movements: Any share price movements in reaction to a value-
relevant event are not general, and the unpredictability of remaining influences becomes the 
foundation of event studies. All other general price movements have an expected mean of 
zero, which is asymptotically attained if events are aggregated over a sufficiently large 
sample. 
Until this assertion is reconsidered later on, market efficiency is assumed to be semi-strong. 
To reduce the reliance on this assumption, research design can be adjusted to account for the 
possible existence of weak-form market efficiency. The present study analyzes different event 
days as well as event windows of varying length to identify event anticipation or lagging 
responses. For example, if market efficiency is indeed weak, longer post-event windows 
allow information to become historic in order to be reflected in security prices (compare 
Chapter 4.3.2.2 on p. 72). 
4.3.2 Practical aspects of event studies 
The researcher has discretion over various critical event study parameters, which are 
individually discussed in the following. 
4.3.2.1 Choice of event 
For an event study of ECOs, it needs to be determined what constitutes the relevant event for 
which the stock market reaction is measured. Several possibilities exist, which differ both in 
their timing and with regard to the information they contain. Three options will be discussed 
in more detail below: the announcement, the SEC registration, and the offer itself. 
The ECO announcement is the first time that the intent to list the subsidiary as a separate 
entity on the capital market is reported to the public. It is not uncommon that ECOs are 
announced multiple times, and empirical research has shown that the stock market still reacts 
to subsequent announcements, if only with reduced vehemence. Copeland et al. (1987), in a 
study of spin-offs, empirically show this phenomenon. In a sample of 188 cases, 68% were 
announced at least twice, 38% at least three times, 20% at least four times, and one spin-off 
was announced 13 times. The authors find that abnormal return is still statistically significant 
at the 1% level for the second announcement and at the 10% for the third announcement. 
They further show that successive announcements carry relevant information about the 
probability that the transaction is finally completed because announcement return is higher for 
those transactions that are finally completed, as opposed to those that are cancelled. While a 
distinction of cancelled events is irrelevant for the present study, which only examines 
completed transactions, the findings by Copeland et al. (1987) demonstrate the advantage of 
using early (and optimally first) announcements as relevant events. 
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Regarding the SEC registration, this refers to one of the first official steps to initiate the 
listing of a new security in the US. In reference to the form on which it is filed, this 
registration statement is sometimes referred to as an S-1, and its filing needs to be authorized 
by the board of directors of the parent company. An advantage of using the registration rather 
than the first announcement can be seen in the increased probability that the transaction will 
be ultimately completed. At the same time, much relevant information will likely already 
have reached the market, most importantly, the general intent to conduct an ECO. With regard 
to the probability of commensuration, the actual offer provides the greatest certainty. The 
information that the ECO actually takes place, however, constitutes only a (small) portion of 
all information pertaining to the ECO, most of which has become public at the first 
announcement. 
For the present study, the first ECO announcement date is chosen as event. This follows the 
dominant choice in existing ECO research, as exceptions to this approach are rare85. The year 
leading up to any candidate announcement is searched to identify potential earlier 
announcements. If the date on which the ECO was first announced represents a non-trading 
day, the next trading day is defined as the event date. Entries with confounding events on the 
earliest announcement date are purged from the sample86. 
4.3.2.2 Event window length 
Besides market efficiency, two assumptions are relevant with regard to the length of the event 
window (McWilliams/Siegel (1997)): Events must be unanticipated, and there must not be 
any confounding events. Regarding unanticipated events, the important condition is that 
market participants do not possess relevant information before the event. Anticipation can 
follow from information leakage, in which case some market participants receive relevant 
information about the impending ECO to which they react. The degree of event anticipation 
may be captured through the application of longer event windows preceding the event date. 
The present study will calculate abnormal return for event windows of up to 30 days before 
the ECO announcement. 
With regard to confounding events, measurement of the stock price reaction to an event relies 
on the condition that the measured effect is isolated from any other event that contains value-
relevant information. If the stock market reacts to different events on the event date or within 
an event window, the event study approach will invariably measure the combined effect of 
these events. Since the addition of any stock market reaction to the one being studied will 
                                                 
85  One such exception is given by Kaserer/Ahlers (2000), who define the event as the approval of 
the ECO registration by the German SEC-equivalent. 
86  An alternative approach, which aims to avoid the resulting reduction of sample size from 
eliminating contaminated entries, may consist of a parallel calculation of abnormal return in the 
contaminated sample and in a control sample from which contaminated entries are purged, the 
two of which are ultimately evaluated jointly. However, sample size can be considered 
sufficiently large in the present sample to proceed without this adjustment, particularly given that 
only one entry with a confounding effect has been identified. 
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alter the measured effect (unless the effect of the secondary event is zero and thus value-
irrelevant), shorter event windows are generally preferable since this reduces the risk of 
confounding effects. Consequently, a compromise needs to be made with regard to the event 
window length: While shorter event windows enhance the isolation of the studied event, they 
also increase the risk of error if the event has not been accurately captured or if the market 
anticipates the event. The length of event window therefore turns into a question of 
specification of the approach (higher for short windows) vs. power of the approach (higher for 
long windows). 
In summary, extended pre- and post-event windows allow to capture event anticipation and 
potentially weakly-efficient market reactions. Event studies based on longer event windows, 
however, usually suffer from test statistics with lower power (e.g., Brown/Warner (1980)87). 
Furthermore, long event windows bear the risk of capturing confounding events. In the 
present study, extended event windows will be examined in combination with very short 
event windows and individual event days around the actual announcement day to arrive at a 
full picture of abnormal return. 
4.3.2.3 Estimation period 
The estimation period must include a time span when the stock is expected to behave 
normally. The present study uses an estimation period that is 255 trading days long (one 
calendar year), and which ends 51 days before the event (allowing calculation of first 
abnormal return for day –50). If a security does not have all price data for the entire 
estimation period, the estimation of expected return is based on the available information, 
subject to a minimum of at least three data points, which was met by all 172 firms in the event 
study sample.  
4.4 Data and methods 
To introduce the data and methods of the event study in this section, this chapter proceeds in 
four steps that follow logical order: raw return, normal return, abnormal return, and 
robustness of abnormal return, whereby the last part contains a presentation of test statistics. 
4.4.1 Raw return 
The analysis of the short-term stock market reaction is based on discrete daily returns, 
calculated as the percentage change of the sum of stock price appreciation and dividends, 
relative to the stock price at the end of the previous period (see Brown/Warner (1985) for the 
applicability of daily data to event studies): 
                                                 
87  Brown/Warner (1980) show that, as a consequence of an extension of the event window from one 
to eleven days, the power of test statistics may deteriorate to such an extent that even substantial 
abnormal return may no longer be detected. 
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(4.1)   Rt = Pt + Dt − Pt−1Pt−1
 
where Rt , Pt , and Dt  denote return, stock price, and the sum of all dividends and 
distributions per share at the end of period t , respectively. 
4.4.2 Normal return 
The above chapter has outlined the procedure of normalizing actual return for expected return. 
This expected return can be estimated via a market model, which relates a security’s return – 
in strictly univariate fashion and without lags or leads – to the return on a market index. Its 
standard version is given as 
(4.2)   E(Rit ) = ai + βiRmt  
for expected return E(Rit ), and 
(4.3)   ARit = Rit − ai − β iRmt + εit  
for abnormal return ARit , where ai  is the regression constant, Rmt  the market return in period 
t , and ε the residual error. Alternative models for the estimation of the expected return are 
given by the CAPM, APT, and the Fama-MacBeth model. Chapter 3.2.1.1 on p. 41 contains 
details on the first two, which are therefore here not reiterated. The third model has been 
introduced by Fama/MacBeth (1973) in connection with empirical tests of various two-
parameter (i.e., risk and return) pricing models, most notably the CAPM. While the authors 
cannot reject the hypothesis that these models are correctly specified, they propose their 
Fama-MacBeth model as an extension to the standard model. Following Armitage (1995), it is 
given as 
(4.4)   E(Rit ) = α1t + α2tβit  
where α1t  and α2t  represent cross-sectional regression coefficients of return against beta, 
while βit  denotes the observed beta of stock i  at time t . The value of α1t  can be interpreted as 
the portion of return that is explained by the return on a zero-beta portfolio, and α2t  as the 
portion of return explained by the observed beta of stock i  (Armitage (1995)). 
Empirically, however, the accuracy of the return estimation via asset pricing models such as 
CAPM or the Fama-MacBeth model has been shown to be poor, and Fama/French (1992) 
state that they “are forced to conclude that the SLB [Sharpe-Lintner-Black (CAPM)] model 
does not describe the last 50 years of average stock returns” (p. 464). Armitage (1995) 
concludes that none of these alternatives has “gained acceptance in empirical work, which if 
anything has become increasingly standardized on the use of the market model” (p. 29). The 
market model, in the tests conducted, is found to be always at least as powerful as the next 
best alternative. Brown/Warner (1980) come to a similar conclusion and state that 
methodologies that are more complicated do not convey any benefits over a simple, one-
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factor market regression model. Thompson (1988) and Prabhala (1997) also underline the 
robustness of standard event study approaches and the relatively small import of more 
advanced approaches88. Consistent with these conclusions, the present study applies a market 
model to derive normal return, estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS) regression89. 
Regressions are based on a value-weighted index of all NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq stocks, as 
reported by CRSP90. 
4.4.3 Abnormal return 
The above has shown the calculation of expected event return, which is used to normalize 
actual return to derive a measure of abnormal return. If abnormal return is greater than zero, 
the effect of the event on firm value is positive, and negative otherwise. Following the 
theoretical foundations of this study, positive abnormal return indicates a reduction and 
negative abnormal return an increase in agency costs. Abnormal return for firm i  on date t  
( ARit) is calculated as 
(4.5)    ARit = Rit − E(Rit ) 
where Rit  represents its actual and E(Rit ) its expected return. For event windows, cumulative 
abnormal return ( CARit) is derived by summing ARit  over all T  event window days: 
(4.6)    CARi = ARit
t=1
T∑  
The abnormal return for an event day t  across the entire sample ( ARit) is calculated as the 
arithmetic average across the N  sample firms: 
(4.7)    ARt = 1N ARiti=1
N∑  
For event windows, the cumulative average abnormal return across the entire sample ( CARt ) 
is calculated by first summing abnormal return across T  event window days for each sample 
firm, and then summing over N  sample firms: 
                                                 
88  Further discussions of model selection are contained in Brenner (1979), Brown/Weinstein (1985), 
Strong (1992), and Cable/Holland (1999). 
89  Market model estimation via OLS is tied to the important statistical assumptions that returns are 
jointly multivariate normal as well as independently and identically distributed over time 
(MacKinlay (1997), also see Henderson (1990)). The accommodation of potential violations of 
these assumptions is discussed in the next chapter (4.4.4) with regard to test statistics. 
90  While not reported in detail, all calculations of this section, including GARCH and thin trading 
adjusted variants (see below), with and without bootstrapping, have been replicated with an equal-
weighted index as a robustness check. Results are virtually identical in both magnitude and 
statistical significance. 
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(4.8)    CAR = 1
N
ARit
t=1
T∑
i=1
N∑ . 
Equation (4.7), the average return across the sample, can be interpreted as the return on an 
equal-weighted portfolio of sample firms formed in event time (Dann (1981)). In addition to 
average abnormal return, precision-weighted abnormal return is reported. Precision-weighting 
accounts for unequal variance of abnormal return across sample stocks91 by introducing a 
weight based on a stock’s variance contribution to overall portfolio variance (Cowan (2005)). 
This weight is given by the denominator in Equations (4.9) and (4.10) and is inversely related 
to the expected volatility of the security. Formally, 
(4.9)   PWARt = ARit
sit (1/sit )
i=1
N∑i=1
N∑  
for event dates, and 
(4.10)   PWCAR =
sit
2
t=1
T∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
−0.5
sit
2
t=1
T∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
−0.5
i=1
N∑t=1
T∑ ∗ ARit
i=1
N∑  
for event windows, where PWAR  and PWCAR  denote precision-weighted abnormal return 
and precision-weighted cumulative abnormal return, respectively. Variable sit  represents a 
maximum likelihood estimate of the standard deviation of stock i  at time t  (see Equation 
(4.14) below for details). As opposed to averaging standardized abnormal return, precision 
weighting has the advantage of preserving a portfolio interpretation of abnormal return, since 
abnormal return is not transformed, but merely multiplied by different weights. As Cowan 
(2005) points out, PWAR  therefore fulfills the reporting needs for which sometimes 
standardized cumulative abnormal return is published, but at the advantage of lower 
manipulation. 
4.4.4 Robustness of abnormal return 
Results are supplemented with various statistical tests to indicate their statistical robustness 
and thus the degree to which they may be generalized. These tests include both parametric 
tests, which rely on specific assumptions of the theoretical distribution of abnormal return, 
and a nonparametric test, which compares the characteristics of abnormal return during the 
event period to a non-event period. To ensure consistency with the null hypothesis of zero 
abnormal return, all significance levels are two-tailed, reflecting the fact that expectations 
                                                 
91  For a detailed discussion of unequal variance of abnormal return, see Chapter 4.4.4.2 on p. 78. 
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about the direction of abnormal return (positive vs. negative) are not formulated (compare the 
guiding null hypothesis in Chapter 3.3.4 on p. 61). 
Parametric tests are based on time-series and on cross-sectional variance and reported in 
simple and in standardized form, yielding a total of 2 x 2 = 4 test statistics. As abnormal 
return estimated via GARCH is already standardized, it contains only two test statistics, while 
SUR uses a wholly separate F-statistic. The nonparametric Z-statistic is reported for all results 
except SUR. 
4.4.4.1 Time-series t 
As a first measure, a simple t-statistic is calculated, using the time-series variance of AR for 
all sample firms during the estimation period as a single variance estimate for the entire 
sample. Its calculation is given as (based on Brown/Warner (1980) p. 253): 
(4.11)  t(AR) = 1
N
ARi
i=1
N∑ 1N 1E −1 ARit − ARitEi=1
E∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
2
t=1
E∑
i=1
N∑  
for event days, and 
(4.12)  t(CAR) = 1
N
CARi
i=1
N∑ 1N T ∗ 1E −1 ARit − ARitEi=1
E∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
2
t=1
E∑
i=1
N∑⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟  
for event windows, where E  denotes the number of days in the estimation period and T  the 
number of days in the event window. 
This portfolio time-series t-statistic is referred to by Brown/Warner (1980) as the “Crude 
Dependence Adjustment” (p. 233) because it accounts for cross-sectional dependence 
(sometimes referred to as event clustering). Cross-sectional dependence occurs when event 
periods of securities in the sample overlap and when these are correlated, as is likely when the 
event is induced by regulatory mandates or other external influences with a simultaneous 
impact on several sample firms92. Brown/Warner (1980) conclude that the impact of event 
clustering on the specification of test statistics is small as long as market performance is taken 
into account, which is the case in the present study through the focus on abnormal rather than 
raw return. Other studies, however, come to differing conclusions, and Collins/Dent (1984) 
find that cross-sectional dependence can induce errors of inference if events occur at the same 
time or are clustered within an industry. Bernard (1987) supports this view and notes that the 
severity of the bias is highly context-specific. Similar to Collins/Dent, the author argues that 
the effect of cross-sectional dependence is possibly low in inter-industry settings but may be 
high if sample firms are related. 
                                                 
92  An overview of different clustering issues (e.g., event date clustering, industry clustering, risk 
clustering) is contained in Henderson (1990). 
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Based on these observations, the time-series t-statistic, able to account for cross-sectional 
dependence, will be added as a complement to other test statistics. Other tests are required 
since the time-series t-statistic has two shortcomings: It does not accommodate unequal 
variance of abnormal return across securities, and it cannot account for variance shifts over 
time. The following test statistic presents an extension that accounts for the first of the two 
flaws, namely unequal residual variance. 
4.4.4.2 Standardized time-series t 
Unequal residual variance follows from the phenomenon that stocks naturally differ in 
variance, and that a large swing may be more common for one stock than for another. Since 
these variance characteristics likely carry over into abnormal return, market model residuals 
exhibit unequal variance across sample firms. This leads to misspecification of test statistics, 
which generally assume that abnormal return is independent and identically distributed across 
stocks. To account for this lack of identical distribution, a standardized Patell (1976) test 
statistic is reported. To account for differences in variance, abnormal return is divided by an 
adjusted form of its variance during the estimation period, resulting in abnormal return 
parameters with equal unit-normal properties for the residuals across all sample firms (i.e., 
expected mean of zero and variance of one). Examples of its application in empirical finance 
are Dodd/Warner (1983) in their analysis of the effect of proxy contests, Linn/McConnell 
(1983) in their study of antitakeover amendments, and last but not least, Schipper/Smith 
(1986) in their seminal ECO study. 
Specifically, standardized abnormal return for event dates is calculated as the arithmetic 
average of the standardized abnormal return for single stocks: 
(4.13)   SARt = 1N
ARit
Siti=1
N∑  
where 
(4.14)   sit = si 1+ 1E +
Rmt − Rm( )2
Rmt − Rm( )2
t=1
E∑  
with 
(4.15)   si = 1E − 2 ARit
2
t=1
E∑ . 
SARit  denotes standardized abnormal return, Rmt  the observed return on the market index at 
time t, and Rm  the average return on the market index during the estimation period. Symbol 
sit  represents the residual variance during the estimation period, which is adjusted by the root 
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term in Equation (4.14) to reflect that forecasts for the event window are made outside of the 
estimation period. The extent of uncertainty surrounding this variance forecast depends on the 
length of the estimation period and on the deviation of the  market return from past averages 
(Collins/Dent (1984)). The resulting adjusted variance can thus be interpreted as a maximum 
likelihood estimate for its value on event day t. Since adjusted estimation period variance is 
taken as an estimate for event variance, standardized abnormal return is sometimes also 
referred to as a standardized prediction error (SPE), reflecting the fact that it is based on a 
prediction rather than an observed, actual value. Calculation of the test statistic is 
straightforward since the standardized abnormal return has an expected mean of zero and unit 
variance: 
(4.16)   t(SAR) = N ∗ SARt  
where t follows a Student’s t distribution with E–2 degrees of freedom (Cowan (2005)). 
Calculation of the standardized t-statistic for event windows proceeds by summing abnormal 
return over the T  days of the event window for each sample company, which is standardized 
by an estimate of standard deviation. This standard deviation is itself adjusted twofold: once 
for the out-of-sample forecast as above, and once for the fact that event windows of two or 
more days are taken into consideration (e.g., Mikkelson/Partch (1988), McWilliams/Williams 
(2000))93: 
 (4.17)   CSAR = 1
N
ARit
siwt=1
T∑
i=1
N∑  
across all N firms in the sample, where CSAR denotes cumulative standardized abnormal 
return and siw  the double-adjusted estimation period standard deviation, given as 
(4.18)   siw = si T T + TE +
Rmt − Rm( )2
t=1
T∑
Rmt − Rm( )2
t=1
E∑
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
. 
Calculation of the test statistic is derived as 
(4.19)   t(CSAR) = N −0.5 ∗ CSAR . 
4.4.4.3 Cross-sectional t 
While the standardized Patell (1976) time-series t-statistic accounts for unequal residual 
variance, it accommodates neither cross-sectional dependence (since the standardization 
                                                 
93  The adjustment for event windows accounts for the fact that abnormal return for each firm is 
serially correlated, as values for individual days in the event window are a function of the same 
market model (Cowan (2005)). 
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procedure uses cross-sectional variance to derive unit abnormal return) nor variance shifts. 
Variance shifts, also referred to as event-induced variance, refer to changes in security 
volatility, which may be an effect of the actual event. If time-series data from a non-event 
period is used to estimate abnormal return variance during the event period, a null hypothesis 
of zero abnormal return can be too frequently rejected if the event is accompanied by 
increases in variance (Brown/Warner (1985)). Example studies that have analyzed this aspect 
include Beaver (1968), who finds significant increases in residual variance after earnings 
announcements, Patell/Wolfson (1979), who show variance increases in call options for 
anticipated events, and Dann (1981), who finds volatility increases in the case of stock 
repurchases. Ball/Torous (1988), for a sample of stock splits and dividends, reject the null 
hypothesis of no change in the variance of abnormal event-period return at the 1% 
significance level. 
Using cross-sectional instead of time-series standard deviation for the calculation of the test 
statistic, generally referred to as the ordinary cross-sectional method, can account for variance 
shifts. To calculate variance, this method only uses observations during the event period. Its 
properties are further outlined in Armitage (1995), and an example for its application is given 
in Imhoff/Lobo (1984) for analyst forecast revisions. 
Calculation of the test statistic is given as 
(4.20)  t(CAR) = 1
N
ARi
i=1
N∑ 1N(N −1) ARi − ARiNi=1
N∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
2
i=1
N∑  
for event dates, and for event windows 
(4.21)  t(CAR) = 1
N
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i=1
N∑ 1N(N −1) CARi − CARiNi=1
N∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
2
i=1
N∑ . 
4.4.4.4 Standardized cross-sectional t 
The ordinary cross-sectional test, while well-specified, commonly exhibits low power and 
may thus fail to detect abnormal performance (Brown/Warner (1985)). Furthermore, it is 
unable to account for unequal residual variance across sample securities. To counter these 
problems, Boehmer et al. (1991) have developed an extension of the Patell (1976) 
standardized statistic that relies on cross-sectional variance and is thus able to account for 
variance shifts. The authors report that their test is more powerful than the unadjusted cross-
sectional t-statistic and just as well-specified in the case of zero abnormal return. The test 
statistic is given as follows (Boehmer et al. (1991) p. 270): 
(4.22)   t(SAR) = 1
N
SARi
i=1
N∑ 1N(N −1) SARi − SARiNi=1
N∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
2
i=1
N∑  
for event days, and for event windows 
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(4.23)   t(CSAR) = 1
N
CSARi
i=1
N∑ 1N(N −1) CSARi − CSARiNi=1
N∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
2
i=1
N∑  
where SAR  and CSAR follow the standardized values from Equations (4.13) and (4.17), 
respectively. Table 11 gives an overview of the qualities of the parametric test statistics 
introduced above. 
Table 11: Summary of parametric test statistics 
Unequal residual
variance
Variance
shifts
Cross-sectional 
dependence
Time-series t X
Standardizedtime-series t X
Cross-sectional t X
Standardizedcross-sectional t X X
X : accounts for issue
Source: Based on Armitage 1995  
4.4.4.5 Nonparametric tests 
All the above test statistics rely on assumptions regarding the distribution parameters of 
abnormal return. It is a general shortcoming of this approach that the actual properties of the 
theoretical distribution are unknown, specifically that its normality is not guaranteed. To 
account for this shortcoming, the present study also applies a nonparametric test statistic that 
compares the distribution of abnormal return during the event period to its known distribution 
during the estimation period. While Brown/Warner (1985) argue that normality can be 
assumed for sufficiently large samples and that standard parametric tests are therefore well-
specified, no assurance exists that their assertion pertains to all situations. Particularly small 
and volatile samples may be prone to exhibit nonnormal properties. The event study literature 
therefore recommends supplementing standard parametric tests with nonparametric versions 
that do not rely on assumptions of universal probability distributions (e.g., MacKinlay 
(1997)). 
Two types of nonparametric tests are commonly applied in event studies: a generalized sign 
test and a rank test (e.g., Corrado/Zivney (1992)). A generalized sign test compares the 
occurrences of observed positive abnormal return during the event period with the expected 
frequency of positive abnormal return inferred from the estimation period. A rank test, 
advocated by Corrado (1989), ranks security abnormal return across the combined estimation 
and event period, and compares the sample average rank during the event period to the sample 
average rank during the combined estimation and event period. By basing the test statistics on 
the number of positive versus negative occurrences or the rank of abnormal return without 
taking absolute values of abnormal return into consideration, these nonparametric tests 
generally remain well specified in the presence of outliers. 
ardized al t 
ardized ti  t 
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Cowan/Sergeant (1996) examine the qualities of test statistics on thinly traded stocks in event 
studies (for thin trading, see next chapter) and find that nonparametric test results remain well 
specified. This finding is consistent with Corrado/Zivney (1992), who show via simulation 
that nonparametric tests maintain high quality in situations where small sample size or short 
estimation periods lead to a distortion of parametric t-statistics. While the authors find that the 
generalized rank test performs slightly better than the sign test, simulation evidence in Cowan 
(1992) indicates that the rank test is not very well-specified for Nasdaq stocks and in the case 
of event-induced variance shifts, while the generalized sign test handles these challenges well 
and still exhibits high power. Building on these results, the present study reports a generalized 
sign test as a robustness check for problems regarding sample size, outliers, or the 
assumptions about the distribution of abnormal return. 
In the result panels, the number of sample stocks with positive and negative average abnormal 
return during the event period is presented. The null hypothesis for the generalized sign test 
states that the distribution of these positive and negative occurrences follows the distribution 
during the estimation period. The reported test statistic implies the significance level at which 
this null hypothesis can be rejected, i.e., it shows the robustness with which it can be asserted 
that the observed event distribution differs from the expected distribution, inferred from the 
estimation period distribution. Calculation of test statistic ZG  is given as follows 
(McWilliams/Siegel (1997)): 
(4.24)    ZG = PNt
obs − PNtexp
PNt
exp (1− PNtexp )
N
 
where PNt  is the percentage of negative abnormal returns at time t , and the superscripts obs 
and exp denote observed and expected, respectively, where the latter refers to the estimation 
period. 
4.4.5 Methodological extensions 
Standard market models, estimated via OLS, represent the basis of virtually all studies on the 
ECO announcement effect. Junker (2005) applies several methodological extensions to a 
study of German ECOs, and this work follows his suggestions by applying these techniques to 
a set of US ECOs. Four extensions are presented: an adjustment of the market model 
estimation for thinly traded stock, an estimation via generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (GARCH), one via seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), and the 
bootstrapping of confidence intervals. Their following introduction proceeds in corresponding 
order94. 
                                                 
94  Where not indicted differently, the presentation of methodological extensions follows closely the 
expositions by Junker (2005). 
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4.4.5.1 Thin trading adjusted market model 
A problem arises with an OLS-estimated market model when stocks are not traded on a daily 
basis: If demand is low and a stock not traded, then its last closing price is usually carried 
forward. Its return is therefore zero during such periods, in contrast to situations when it is 
traded for the first time after an interval of inactivity: Where daily return of the first is too 
low, the latter situations exhibit daily return that is too high, or, put differently, daily return is 
autocorrelated. Since the present section relies on daily returns, this may lead to a market 
model that underestimates the risk of a security (Dimson (1979)). Two solutions have been 
suggested to counter the poor specification of the market model in such situations of thin 
trading. The first, introduced to the event study literature by Scholes/Williams (1977), starts 
by regressing the return of each sample firm return on market return under three variants, with 
a lags of –1, 0, and +1 days, respectively: 
(4.25)   Rit = ai + β ikRmt +k + εit | k = −1, 0,1. 
The estimate of the Scholes/Williams-adjusted β proceeds by aggregating its estimate of the 
three individual regressions, where its magnitude is deflated by the severity of first-order 
autocorrelation during the estimation period ( ρM ): 
(4.26)   βiSW = β i
−1 + β i0 + β i+1
1+ 2ρM . 
The estimate of a is given by the vertical intercept of the market model if this adjusted version 
of β is used (i.e., it forces the estimated regression line through the sample mean). The second 
solution has been recommended by Dimson (1979) and represents an aggregated coefficients 
model. This name follows from its design, which builds on a sum of the β estimates across 
different leads or lags of the market return with length n: 
(4.27)   Rit = ai + β ikRmt +k
k=−n
n∑ + εit . 
The β for the estimate of expected return is the sum of its 2n+1 (lead and lag) values, and a is 
determined as above. The existing event study literature generally concludes that the methods 
by Scholes/Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979) deliver results of similarly high quality 
(Brown/Warner (1980), McInish/Wood (1986))95, and the present study thus applies the 
methodology suggested by Scholes/Williams (1977) to account for the effects of thinly traded 
firms in the sample. It is supplemented with all test statistics introduced above. 
                                                 
95  Fowler/Rorke (1983), however, note that the method by Dimson (1979) requires adjustment to 
attain equally robust properties as that by Scholes/Williams (1977). 
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4.4.5.2 GARCH 
Stock returns have been shown to exhibit positive autocorrelation (e.g., Mandelbrot (1963), 
Fama (1965)), which violates the basic assumptions of OLS and may thus reduce the quality 
of results. The second methodological extension here applied consists of a methodology that 
accommodates autocorrelation by subjecting the regression error of the market model 
estimation to conditions that depend on lagged characteristics. These techniques have been 
introduced to the financial literature by Engle (1982) in the form of autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) and by Bollerslev (1986), who has offered an extended version of 
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH). An overview of the 
methodology and its application is contained in Bollerslev (1992), and example applications 
are contained in French et al. (1987) and Akgiray (1989), who use ARCH to model variants of 
market return. For event studies, GARCH is discussed by Corhay/Tourani Rad (1996), 
Brockett et al. (1999), and Savickas (2003). 
Its calculation builds on a regular market model. Since GARCH assumes that regression 
residuals exhibit autocorrelation, in a GARCH (p,q) model, the variance of the error εit  
depends (i.e., is conditional) upon its p squared lags and on the q previous realizations of the 
error (Bollerslev (1986)). For a GARCH (1,1) model, this is given as (Cowan (2005)) 
(4.28)   Rit = ai + β iRmt + εit with εit | Ψt−1 ~ (0,hit )  
(4.29)   hit = ai + bihit−1 + ciεit−12 | ai > 0 ; bi ≥ 0 ; ci > 0 ; bi + ci <1 
where Ψt−1 represents all information available at time t-1, and hit  the conditional variance of 
the error of stock i  at time t . While several papers have discussed the applicability of 
GARCH in the event study context (see above), actual applications have been few, and with 
regard to ECOs, only Junker (2005) has employed this technique. In a comparison between 
several event study methods (including those suggested by Brown/Warner (1980) and 
Boehmer et al. (1991)), Savickas (2003) shows that GARCH exhibits the highest power while 
remaining well-specified, both for data from auction markets (Amex, NYSE) and dealer 
markets (Nasdaq)96. Furthermore, Corhay/Tourani Rad (1996), for a sample of divestitures, 
show that GARCH delivers more-efficient estimators than other methods. Brockett et al. 
(1999) also reach the conclusion that event samples may exhibit ARCH effects, which can be 
accommodated by application of the above methodology. Based on these findings, the present 
work applies a GARCH (1,1) model estimated via maximum likelihood method. 
4.4.5.3 Seemingly unrelated regression 
SUR, introduced by Zellner (1962) as a more efficient method of coefficient estimation than 
OLS, applies joint generalized least squares to solve a system of market model equations 
simultaneously. Its increased efficiency is rooted in the fact that SUR accommodates non-zero 
correlation of error terms (i.e., cross-sectional dependence) – the issue that the most elaborate 
                                                 
96  Compare e.g., Campbell/Wasley (1993) for particular data aspects of Nasdaq stocks. 
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test statistic for the OLS market model (standardized cross-sectional t) fails to account for97. 
As such, SUR successfully accommodates all econometric issues listed in Table 11 on p. 81. 
Malatesta (1986) and Ingram/Ingram (1993) provide simulation evidence of this technique 
(also compare Binder (1985)). For its ability to accommodate cross-sectional dependence, 
SUR has e.g., been used to study the effects of regulatory changes that affect all firms at the 
same time (e.g., Schipper/Thompson (1983), Schipper/Thompson (1985)). 
Regarding its calculation, the system of equations that is simultaneously estimated consists of 
one market model for each of the N sample companies, expressed as 
(4.30)   Rit = ai + β iRmt + δitDit + εit  
where Dit , denotes a dummy variable for the event period, whose coefficient δit  represents a 
measure of abnormal return. The key difference between this market model and the standard 
OLS variant (Chapter 4.4.2 on p. 74) lies in the fact that this version is estimated in one step 
across the combined estimation and event period, whereas the regular version first estimates 
the market model parameters during the estimation period, which are then applied to estimate 
normal return during the event period. This one-step procedure is deemed more efficient since 
more data is used to estimate the market model parameters (Thompson (1985)). This method 
is therefore sometimes referred to as an event parameter approach (Cowan (2005))98. 
The N  market models of the form of Equation (4.30) are aggregated in a stacked system, 
which can be expressed as the following matrix (compare Junker (2005) following Zellner 
(1962)): 
(4.31)   Y = X Γ + ε 
where Y  is a vector of the return, X  a matrix of explanatory variables, for which vector Γ 
contains the coefficients, and ε a vector or errors. Following the above one-step market 
model, Γ is a 3 x 1 vector of a , β , and δ . The calculation of these parameters is based on 
joint generalized least squares and proceeds as follows: 
(4.32)   ˆ Γ = ′ X ˆ Σ −1 ⊗ I( )X( )−1 ′ X ˆ Σ −1 ⊗ I( )Y( ) 
where ˆ Σ denotes the variance-covariance matrix of residuals ε, estimated via equation-by-
equation application of OLS, and I  a unit matrix. The consideration of the matrix of errors 
accounts for the fact that SUR can accommodate cross-sectional dependence between sample 
firms. The name of the approach follows from the fact that individual market model equations 
do not share common explanatory variables, as is the case with other simultaneous methods. 
They are, however, only seemingly unrelated since they are linked via the error matrices. 
                                                 
97  In his original publication, Zellner (1962) notes that in SUR, the “… gain in efficiency can be 
quite large if ‘independent’ variables in different equations are not highly correlated and if 
disturbance [i.e., error] terms in different equations are highly correlated” (p. 348). 
98  Details on the event parameter approach are included in Karafiath (1988). 
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The advantage of using SUR over OLS has been controversially discussed in the financial 
literature. Campbell/Wasley (1993) and Cowan/Sergeant (1996) report that if daily data is 
used during short event windows, then the power and specification of event studies is not 
materially effected (also compare Malatesta (1986) and McDonald (1987)). SUR may even 
engender disadvantages due to estimation error induced by the OLS estimation of the residual 
variance-covariance matrix, whereas other researchers maintain that OLS may be 
misspecified if cross-sectional dependence is strong (e.g., Ingram/Ingram (1993)). The present 
sample exhibits some overlap of estimation periods and even sporadic overlap of event 
periods. Furthermore, the sample is somewhat concentrated in the information sector relative 
to the universe of US exchange-listed firms, which makes cross-sectional dependence more 
likely. Therefore, SUR is applied in this study as a robustness check of more basic techniques. 
Results from the calculation of abnormal return via SUR are supplemented with a Chi-
squared distributed F-statistic. Consistent with other test statistics reported in this document, 
its two-tailed version is presented. 
4.4.5.4 Bootstrap 
Bootstrapping accounts for the fact that, while empirical techniques may derive the observed 
distribution parameters of a sample, its true theoretical distribution generally remains 
unknown. The central limit theorem usually provides sufficient ground for quantitative 
analysis, but problems surface if sample size is too small to ensure that asymptotical 
assumptions are met. Bootstrapping aims to narrow the gap between the observed and the 
theoretical distribution by using simulation techniques to derive a closer estimate of the 
theoretical distribution, which is then used to infer levels of significance from the observed 
test statistics (Maddala/Li (1996)). 
Efron (2000) gives an overview of the bootstrap literature, and its methodology is outlined in 
Hall/Wilson (1991) with regard to the accommodation of specific issues, while Hall (1994) 
and Maddala/Li (1996) provide broader expositions. Lyon et al. (1999) discuss bootstrapping 
in an event study context. Bootstrapping proceeds by randomly resampling the available 
sample with high frequency and replacement of drawn entries, where the resampling ratio 
determines the size of each of the resamples in relation to the original sample. Each of these 
resamples yields a new estimate of the unknown parameters of the theoretical distribution, 
which can be aggregated into an empirical distribution. This artificial distribution is then 
assumed en lieu of an a priori assumed (normal) distribution. Based on the critical p-values 
set by the researcher, the bootstrap distribution is used to assign new critical t-values. If the 
original t-values exceed these bootstrapped critical t-values, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
It should be noted that bootstrapping does not change estimates of abnormal return, nor does 
it lead to new t-values – the observed sample parameters remain unchanged. What is affected 
are the assumptions about the underlying theoretical distribution and hence the critical t-
values that correspond to p-value thresholds. It follows that t-values formerly in excess of 
critical values may no longer lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis and vice versa. With 
regard to the present study, while the size of its sample is sufficiently large to assume that 
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distribution parameters are close to their asymptotical limits, bootstrapping is included as a 
robustness check, and bootstrapped confidence intervals are reported for all four types of 
parametric tests. 
4.5 Results 
Presentation of the short-term ECO effect begins with a discussion of the abnormal return as 
summarized in a set of tables. Attention will then be drawn to several observations on 
methodology before a graphical depiction of the development of abnormal return around the 
announcement day concludes the chapter. 
4.5.1 Tabular presentation 
Results of the analysis of the ECO announcement effect are reported in six tables starting on 
p. 89. Table 12 and Table 13 show the OLS estimates of abnormal return for event days and 
windows, respectively, and Table 14 and Table 15 abnormal return for days and event 
windows under the Scholes/Williams thin trading adjustment. Table 16 displays the results 
obtained via GARCH, and Table 17 those via SUR. All tables use identical notations: ts-t 
labels the column containing the regular time-series t-statistic, std-ts-t its standardized 
version, cs-t the cross-sectional t-statistic, and std-cs-t its standardized version. The column 
labeled pos:neg contains the frequency of sample firms with positive and negative abnormal 
return, respectively, which add up to the number of firms underlying the analysis. Finally, 
sign-Z reports the test statistic for the nonparametric generalized sign test. All test statistics 
are supplemented with indicators of two-tailed statistical significance: *** denotes p-values 
smaller than 1%, ** smaller than 5%, and * smaller than 10%. The frequency of positive and 
negative observations pos:neg is also accompanied by an indicator of statistical significance, 
where the symbols < and > correspond to the asterisks above, while also indicating the 
direction of difference. To illustrate, <<< therefore shows that an entry in column pos:neg 
represents more negative than positive values than expected (based on the generalized sign 
test), and that this result is statistically significant at p < 0.01. 
Table 12 displays the results from the OLS market model estimation of abnormal return for 
individual days surrounding the ECO announcement. Abnormal return on the event day 
amounts to 1.47%, which represents the arithmetic average of all 172 sample firms that have 
been included in the short-term analysis. The precision-weighted version of abnormal return, 
which instead of a straight average employs a weighted averaged that accounts for differences 
in variance, lies slightly below that at 1.19%. Of the 172 sample firms, 102 exhibit positive 
abnormal returns on the event day. The statistical significance of this positive average 
announcement-day abnormal return is extremely high, as all tests indicate p-values smaller 
than 1%. The t-values furthermore exceed critical t-values for p < 0.01 of a bootstrapped 
distribution. The [–1 –1] pre-announcement day also exhibits positive abnormal return of 
0.80% (0.57% if precision-weighted), whose statistical significance is high, but not as robust 
as on the actual event day. For the [–1 –1] day, results of the generalized sign test do not 
reject the null hypothesis, and both test results relying on time-series variance are not robust 
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to bootstrapping. Abnormal return for still earlier days (three to five days before the 
announcement) is positive throughout, but statistically not significant under all testing 
variations. The same weakly significant positive abnormal return can be observed on the day 
after the announcement. Abnormal return for later days (two to five days after the 
announcement) may be positive or negative and does not meet any thresholds of statistical 
significance. 
Turning from individual days to the detection of abnormal return during windows of multiple 
days, Table 13 shows cumulative abnormal return during these windows from using OLS 
market model estimates. Results are extraordinarily consistent in that cumulative abnormal 
return is positive and highly statistically significant for all pre-event windows, and positive or 
negative without any statistical robustness during windows following the event. This 
observation also applies to bootstrapped significance levels, which are reduced for tests that 
rely on measures of time-series variance, but still attain p-values of smaller than 5% for all 
pre-announcement windows. The nonparametric sign test confirms these findings, and for 
event windows up to 30 days before the announcement, consistently 100 or more of the 172 
sample firms exhibit positive CAR. Regarding its magnitude, abnormal return for the 30 days 
before the announcement sums to 5.03%, while precision-weighted results are somewhat 
smaller at 4.01%. Cumulative abnormal return increases steadily as event windows become 
larger, with the only exception of the [–5 0] day window. The latter attains slightly larger 
abnormal return (3.54%) than its successor and exhibits the highest statistical significance of 
all windows. 
Table 14 displays abnormal return for individual days under the Scholes/Williams (1977) 
adjustment for thinly traded stock. Findings are next to identical to those obtained by using 
the standard OLS market model. Event-day abnormal return lies at 1.45% (compared to 
1.47% under OLS) and is statistically robust to all variations of significance tests, be it 
parametric, nonparametric, or bootstrapped. The immediate pre-event day exhibits some 
statistical significance for its positive abnormal return of 0.74%, in contrast to other pre-event 
days at which abnormal return is generally positive but only sparsely if at all robust. The first 
day after the event exhibits positive abnormal return with weak statistical significance, while 
other post-event days show no signs of statistical robustness. Table 15 provides an overview 
of the thin trading adjusted results for event windows, and the main conclusion runs in 
parallel to individual days and concerns the high consistency to regular OLS results. 
Abnormal return adjusted for thinly traded stock for event windows is marginally smaller than 
unadjusted results, attaining 4.80% (compared to 5.03% in OLS) for the straight average of 
CAR across the sample during the 30 days before the announcement, and 3.74% (compared to 
4.01%) for its precision-weighted average. With CAR of 3.43%, the [–5 0] day window 
remains statistically the most robust of the examined windows. All abnormal pre-
announcement return is statistically robust at the 1% threshold (5% relative to the 
bootstrapped distribution), whereas post-event windows show no statistical significance 
whatsoever. 
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Table 12: Abnormal short-term return (OLS; days)99 
Day AR PWAR ts-t std-ts-t cs-t std-cs-t pos:neg sign-Z
Regular
-5 0.12% 0.09% 0.44 0.52 0.52 0.57 84:88 0.64
-4 0.47% 0.39% 1.70 2.35 1.81 2.14 90:82 1.55
* ** * **
-3 0.19% 0.04% 0.68 0.21 0.59 0.18 80:92 0.03
-2 0.50% 0.29% 1.82 1.75 1.93 1.53 82:90 0.33
* * *
-1 0.80% 0.57% 2.92 3.41 2.13 1.90 83:89 0.48
*** *** ** *
  0 1.47% 1.19% 5.39 7.05 3.48 3.87 102:70 3.39
*** *** *** *** >>> ***
  1 0.63% 0.27% 2.29 1.60 1.24 0.93 85:87 0.79
**
  2 -0.26% 0.02% -0.96 0.14 -1.03 0.12 79:93 -0.13
  3 -0.39% -0.20% -1.43 -1.17 -1.50 -1.08 74:98 -0.89
  4 -0.31% -0.16% -1.12 -0.95 -1.40 -0.97 74:98 -0.89
  5 0.21% 0.24% 0.76 1.43 0.82 1.33 89:83 1.40
Bootstrapped
-5 0.12% -    0.44 0.52 0.52 0.57 -    -   
-4 0.47% -    1.70 2.35 1.81 2.14 -    -   
* * **
-3 0.19% -    0.68 0.21 0.59 0.18 -    -   
-2 0.50% -    1.82 1.75 1.93 1.53 -    -   
*
-1 0.80% -    2.92 3.41 2.13 1.90 -    -   
* ** **
  0 1.47% -    5.39 7.050 3.48 3.87 -    -   
*** *** *** ***
  1 0.63% -    2.29 1.60 1.24 0.93 -    -   
  2 -0.26% -    -0.96 0.14 -1.03 0.12 -    -   
  3 -0.39% -    -1.43 -1.17 -1.50 -1.08 -    -   
  4 -0.31% -    -1.12 -0.95 -1.40 -0.97 -    -   
  5 0.21% -    0.76 1.43 0.82 1.33 -    -   
 
                                                 
99  In this and similar tables following after this, symbols to denote statistical significance are 
reported below the value of the corresponding test statistic. 
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Table 13: Abnormal short-term return (OLS; windows) 
Window CAR PWCAR ts-t std-ts-t cs-t std-cs-t pos:neg sign-Z
Regular
(-30,0) 5.03% 4.01% 3.31 4.03 3.02 3.98 100:72 3.08
*** *** *** *** >>> ***
(-25,0) 4.73% 3.79% 3.39 4.19 3.02 4.00 106:66 1.80
*** *** *** *** >>> ***
(-20,0) 4.17% 3.23% 3.33 4.01 2.86 3.71 105:67 3.85
*** *** *** *** >>> ***
(-15,0) 3.94% 3.16% 3.61 4.53 3.12 4.00 106:66 4.00
*** *** *** *** >>> ***
(-10,0) 3.45% 2.80% 3.81 4.90 3.32 4.11 106:66 4.00
*** *** *** *** >>> ***
(-5,0) 3.54% 2.57% 5.29 6.15 4.30 4.75 108:64 3.48
*** *** *** *** >>> ***
(+1,+5) -0.13% 0.18% 2.25 1.73 -0.22 0.43 86:86 0.94
(+1,+10) -0.80% -0.37% -0.92 -0.67 -0.90 -0.62 85:87 0.79
(+1,+15) -0.96% -0.46% -0.91 -0.69 -1.03 -0.71 79:93 -0.13
(+1,+20) -0.40% -0.07% -0.32 -0.10 -0.35 -0.10 73:99 -1.05
(+1,+25) -0.17% 0.06% -0.13 0.08 -0.14 0.08 76:96 -0.59
(+1,+30) 0.49% 0.43% 0.33 0.45 0.36 0.46 85:87 0.79
Bootstrapped
(-30,0) 5.03% -    3.31 4.03 3.02 3.98 -    -   
*** *** *** ***
(-25,0) 4.73% -    3.39 4.19 3.02 4.00 -    -   
** *** *** ***
(-20,0) 4.17% -    3.33 4.01 2.86 3.71 -    -   
** *** *** ***
(-15,0) 3.94% -    3.61 4.53 3.12 4.00 -    -   
** *** *** ***
(-10,0) 3.45% -    3.81 4.90 3.32 4.11 -    -   
*** *** *** ***
(-5,0) 3.54% -    5.29 6.15 4.30 4.75 -    -   
*** *** *** ***
(+1,+5) -0.13% -    -0.21 0.46 -0.22 0.43 -    -   
(+1,+10) -0.80% -    -0.92 -0.67 -0.90 -0.62 -    -   
(+1,+15) -0.96% -    -0.91 -0.69 -1.03 -0.71 -    -   
(+1,+20) -0.40% -    -0.32 -0.10 -0.35 -0.10 -    -   
(+1,+25) -0.17% -    -0.13 0.08 -0.14 0.08 -    -   
(+1,+30) 0.49% -    0.33 0.45 0.36 0.46 -    -   
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Table 14: Abnormal short-term return (Scholes-Williams; days) 
Day AR PWAR ts-t std-ts-t cs-t std-cs-t pos:neg sign-Z
Regular
-5 0.11% 0.08% 0.41 0.50 0.48 0.57 85:87 0.73
-4 0.42% 0.36% 1.51 2.13 1.61 1.96 92:80 1.80
** * > *
-3 0.18% 0.03% 0.65 0.20 0.58 0.17 77:95 -0.49
-2 0.53% 0.30% 1.92 1.78 2.08 1.56 81:91 0.12
* * **
-1 0.74% 0.51% 2.67 3.01 1.97 1.67 80:92 -0.03
*** *** ** *
  0 1.45% 1.16% 5.23 6.90 3.43 3.76 103:69 3.48
*** *** *** *** >>> ***
  1 0.62% 0.29% 2.25 1.73 1.23 1.01 86:86 0.89
** *
  2 -0.29% 0.02% -1.04 0.11 -1.12 0.10 76:96 -0.64
  3 -0.37% -0.19% -1.32 -1.11 -1.38 -1.03 78:94 -0.34
  4 -0.29% -0.17% -1.04 -0.99 -1.32 -1.02 74:98 -0.95
  5 0.23% 0.24% 0.83 1.45 0.90 1.35 86:86 0.89
Bootstrapped
-5 0.11% -    0.41 0.50 0.48 0.57 -    -   
-4 0.42% -    1.51 2.13 1.61 1.96 -    -   
*
-3 0.18% -    0.65 0.20 0.58 0.17 -    -   
-2 0.53% -    1.92 1.78 2.08 1.56 -    -   
* **
-1 0.74% -    2.67 3.01 1.97 1.67 -    -   
** *
  0 1.45% -    5.23 6.90 3.43 3.76 -    -   
*** *** *** ***
  1 0.62% -    2.25 1.73 1.23 1.01 -    -   
  2 -0.29% -    -1.04 0.11 -1.12 0.10 -    -   
* *
  3 -0.37% -    -1.32 -1.11 -1.38 -1.03 -    -   
  4 -0.29% -    -1.04 -0.99 -1.32 -1.02 -    -   
  5 0.23% -    0.83 1.45 0.90 1.35 -    -   
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Table 15: Abnormal short-term return (Scholes-Williams; windows) 
Window CAR PWCAR ts-t std-ts-t cs-t std-cs-t pos:neg sign-Z
Regular
(-30,0) 4.80% 3.74% 3.11 3.75 2.88 3.77 98:74 2.72
*** *** *** *** >>> ***
(-25,0) 4.48% 3.51% 3.17 3.87 2.87 3.79 105:67 3.79
*** *** *** *** >>> ***
(-20,0) 3.99% 3.02% 3.14 3.73 2.74 3.51 106:66 3.94
*** *** *** *** >>> ***
(-15,0) 3.80% 2.98% 3.42 4.25 3.02 3.85 105:67 3.79
*** *** *** *** >>> ***
(-10,0) 3.32% 2.65% 3.61 4.62 3.18 3.92 105:67 3.79
*** *** *** *** >>> ***
(-5,0) 3.43% 2.45% 5.06 5.84 4.20 4.61 109:63 4.40
*** *** *** *** >>> ***
(+1,+5) -0.09% 0.20% -0.14 0.53 -0.15 0.49 88:84 1.19
(+1,+10) -0.84% -0.41% -0.96 -0.75 -0.95 -0.69 82:90 0.27
(+1,+15) -1.05% -0.54% -0.98 -0.80 -1.13 -0.84 75:97 -0.80
(+1,+20) -0.53% -0.19% -0.43 -0.24 -0.48 -0.25 76:96 -0.64
(+1,+25) -0.26% -0.06% -0.19 -0.05 -0.21 -0.06 78:94 -0.34
(+1,+30) 0.26% 0.22% 0.17 0.24 0.19 0.25 84:88 0.58
Bootstrapped
(-30,0) 4.80% -    3.11 3.75 2.88 3.77 -    -   
*** *** *** ***
(-25,0) 4.48% -    3.17 3.87 2.87 3.79 -    -   
** *** *** ***
(-20,0) 3.99% -    3.14 3.73 2.74 3.51 -    -   
** *** *** ***
(-15,0) 3.80% -    3.42 4.25 3.02 3.85 -    -   
** *** *** ***
(-10,0) 3.32% -    3.61 4.62 3.18 3.92 -    -   
*** *** *** ***
(-5,0) 3.43% -    5.06 5.84 4.20 4.61 -    -   
*** *** *** ***
(+1,+5) -0.09% -    -0.14 0.53 -0.15 0.49 -    -   
(+1,+10) -0.84% -    -0.96 -0.75 -0.95 -0.69 -    -   
(+1,+15) -1.05% -    -0.98 -0.80 -1.13 -0.84 -    -   
(+1,+20) -0.53% -    -0.43 -0.24 -0.48 -0.25 -    -   
(+1,+25) -0.26% -    -0.19 -0.05 -0.21 -0.06 -    -   
(+1,+30) 0.26% -    0.17 0.24 0.19 0.25 -    -   
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Table 16: Abnormal short-term return (GARCH) 
Regular Bootstrapped
Day AR ts-t cs-t pos:neg sign-Z ts-t cs-t
-5 0.14% 0.50 0.58 86:86 0.83 0.50 0.58
-4 0.49% 1.80 1.87 89:83 1.29 1.80 1.87
* * *
-3 0.22% 0.79 0.69 80:92 -0.09 0.79 0.69
-2 0.54% 1.98 2.09 82:90 0.22 1.98 2.09
** ** * **
-1 0.86% 3.14 2.28 83:89 0.37 3.14 2.28
*** ** * ***
  0 1.51% 5.52 3.59 102:70 3.28 5.52 3.59
*** *** >>> *** *** ***
  1 0.65% 2.38 1.28 83:89 0.37 2.38 1.28
**
  2 -0.22% -0.82 -0.88 79:93 -0.24 -0.82 -0.88
  3 -0.37% -1.34 -1.42 73:99 -1.15 -1.34 -1.42
  4 -0.27% -0.98 -1.21 74:98 -1.00 -0.98 -1.21
  5 0.23% 0.83 0.89 86:86 0.83 0.83 0.89
Regular Bootstrapped
Window CAR ts-t cs-t pos:neg sign-Z ts-t cs-t
(-30,0) 6.08% 4.00 3.71 101:71 3.12 4.00 3.71
*** *** >>> *** *** ***
(-25,0) 5.59% 4.01 3.59 107:65 4.04 4.01 3.59
*** *** >>> *** *** ***
(-20,0) 4.85% 3.88 3.35 104:68 3.58 3.88 3.35
*** *** >>> *** *** ***
(-15,0) 4.44% 4.06 3.51 106:66 3.89 4.06 3.51
*** *** >>> *** *** ***
(-10,0) 3.82% 4.22 3.70 106:66 3.89 4.22 3.70
*** *** >>> *** *** ***
(-5,0) 3.75% 5.60 4.54 107:65 4.04 5.60 4.54
*** *** >>> *** *** ***
(+1,+5) 0.02% 0.03 0.04 90:82 1.44 0.03 0.04
(+1,+10) -0.46% -0.53 -0.52 88:84 1.14 -0.53 -0.52
(+1,+15) -0.50% -0.47 -0.53 82:90 0.22 -0.47 -0.53
(+1,+20) 0.28% 0.23 0.25 76:96 -0.70 0.23 0.25
(+1,+25) 0.68% 0.50 0.54 78:94 -0.39 0.50 0.54
(+1,+30) 1.47% 0.99 1.05 84:88 0.53 0.99 1.05
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Table 16 shows the announcement effect based on a GARCH market model. The results 
closely match those obtained from the standard OLS approach: Differences in magnitude are 
generally smaller than 10%, and results remain statistically highly significant for the actual 
event date, significant for the preceding day, and somewhat significant yet another day before 
that. Statistical robustness of event windows persistently exceeds the 1% threshold for all pre-
event periods, while bootstrapped confidence intervals show only minor changes in p-values. 
For event windows, significance levels of the bootstrap distribution remain in excess of the 
1% threshold, while shifts in significance levels for event dates are immaterial. The actual 
event date remains statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Regarding the fourth and last variant of abnormal return, the results from the SUR approach 
are presented in Table 17. Abnormal return on the event date is highly consistent with OLS 
estimates both in magnitude (1.47% vs. 1.44%) and in statistical significance (p < 0.01). The 
days immediately before and after the announcement also exhibit statistical significance, 
albeit somewhat lower than the actual event date at p < 0.10. For other pre-event days and for 
event windows, abnormal return estimates obtained via SUR – while generally positive – are 
slightly smaller than those detected by OLS. Apart from the day immediately after the 
announcement, post-ECO periods do not exhibit statistically significant abnormal returns. The 
[–5 0] day window shows abnormal return of 2.99% (compared to 3.57% in OLS), which 
increases to 4.05% for the entire pre-ECO month. Statistical robustness is high (p < 0.05) for 
event windows for up to 15 days before the ECO, while longer event windows and periods 
after the offer do not exhibit statistical significance. 
Table 17: Abnormal short-term return (SUR) 
Day AR F Window CAR F
-5 0.16% 0.41 (-30,0) 4.05% 3.72
-4 0.38% 1.01 (-25,0) 3.72% 3.64
-3 0.03% 0.09 (-20,0) 3.12% 3.69
-2 0.34% 0.89 (-15,0) 2.97% 8.01 **
-1 0.65% 6.29 * (-10,0) 2.82% 8.35 **
  0 1.44% 19.24 *** (-5,0) 2.99% 11.28 **
  1 0.74% 6.25 * (+1,+5) -0.03% 1.13
  2 -0.34% 1.35 (+1,+10) -0.03% 1.86
  3 -0.40% 1.24 (+1,+15) -1.10% 1.43
  4 -0.35% 1.72 (+1,+20) -1.32% 0.91
  5 0.32% 1.81 (+1,+25) -0.87% 0.42
(+1,+30) -0.47% 0.29
 
4.5.2 Methodological aspects 
Table 18 compares the parameters of the OLS, Scholes/Williams, and GARCH market 
models, detailing the average, median, minimum, and maximum values across the 172 sample 
firms of the short-term analysis. While a comparison of R-squared values indicates that the 
GARCH approach leads to the best average and median goodness-of-fit, the advantage 
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appears to be minor. For F-values, the same comments apply as to R-squared, although these 
values are generally very high and thus indicate that the regression coefficients are jointly 
robustly different from zero. The average of the regression parameter β , the measure of 
systematic risk, is higher for the Scholes/Williams (1977) thin trading adjusted version than 
for the standard OLS approach, indicating that the latter may underestimate systematic risk 
and that thin trading may be a real (if small) phenomenon in the present sample. Goodness-of-
fit measures indicate slightly lower quality for the variant that adjusts for thin trading, 
showing that this provision comes at a statistical cost. 
Table 18: Market model parameters 
Average Median Minimum Maximum
OLS
Alpha 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Beta 0.99 0.95 -1.19 3.30
R-squared 11.5% 8.7% 0.0% 60.1%
F 38.42 24.08 0.06 380.91
Scholes-Williams
Alpha 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Beta 1.13 1.04 -0.80 3.88
R-squared 11.0% 8.2% 0.0% 60.2%
F 37.15 22.55 0.09 382.61
GARCH
Alpha 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01
Beta 0.95 0.89 -0.82 3.28
R-squared 12.0% 9.2% 0.0% 60.4%
F 39.90 25.63 0.06 385.17
 
From a methodological perspective, three further observations merit attention. First, 
precision-weighted averages always lie below straight averages of AR or CAR, which 
indicates that mean and variance of abnormal return are positively correlated. This finding is 
unsurprising and underlines the importance of test statistics that account for unequal residual 
variance for an examination of results. This is accounted for in the present study by including 
the standardized Patell (1976) time-series test and the standardized Boehmer et al. (1991) 
cross-sectional test. 
Second, bootstrapping recurrently has a different effect on different types of test statistics. 
Tests using cross-sectional variance are remarkably robust to bootstrapping, and the absolute 
value of critical t-values may actually be smaller than those assumed under normality, while 
the reverse applies to time-series tests. Test statistics that are based on the variance of market 
model residuals during the estimation period tend to underestimate variance and may lead to 
excessive rejection of the null hypothesis. The cross-sectional distribution of abnormal return 
therefore appears to resemble the normal distribution more closely than its time-series 
distribution. Following from this, while non-bootstrapped test results for cross-sectional 
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variants can be assumed to deliver trustworthy results, the bootstrapped test versions should 
be relied on for time-series tests. 
Third, and last, while differences in abnormal return are small between the thin trading 
adjusted and regular OLS variants, t-statistics of the thin trading adjusted variant are 
consistently smaller than those obtained via regular OLS estimation. Thus, since abnormal 
return is similar under the two approaches, the provision for thin trading appears to result in a 
distribution with higher variance. This slight loss in statistical significance may reflect that 
some stocks are thinly traded, or it may reflect the provision for thin trading if this 
phenomenon is absent. These differences, however, are minor and do not lead to different 
interpretations of the results. 
4.5.3 Graphical presentation and summary 
Across the four variants of abnormal return, the emerging picture of the ECO announcement 
effect is remarkably consistent. On the day it is first announced, the stock market reacts with a 
statistically significant increase of approximately 1.5%. While the event day is not followed 
by significant abnormal return, the days immediately before the announcement exhibit 
positive abnormal return whose statistical significance decreases with distance to the event 
day. If measured in event windows, this pre-event abnormal return renders all results up to 
one month prior statistically significant. For the 30-day period before the announcement, 
abnormal return varies between 4% to 6%, depending on methodology. 
Figure 8: ECO announcement effect  
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Figure 8 provides a graphical depiction of results, showing the cumulative average abnormal 
return of individual days for the 100 days surrounding the ECO announcement. A slight but 
steady increase in abnormal return can be detected from around 30 days before its first 
announcement up to around three days before the event, at which point abnormal return 
sharply increases. After the event, no abnormal return can be detected. A subsequent falloff 
appears to occur at around 40 days after the announcement, although little can be said about 
the robustness of this observation, given the short-term study design and the interpretational 
restrictions it imposes on long event windows. A discussion of the longer-term ECO effects 
will be set aside until Section 5. 
A graphical comparison of the different methodologies is presented in Figure 9. Over the two 
months surrounding the ECO announcement, the paths of cumulative abnormal return are 
highly consistent. Abnormal return estimated via GARCH somewhat stands out from other 
variants, delivering [–30 0] day CAR that is about 20% higher than that of the standard OLS 
variant. SUR, on the other hand, exhibits the lowest level of abnormal return, while the results 
based on the standard OLS and the Scholes/Williams thin trading methodology are highly 
consistent. Overall, it can be noted that the divergence between the methods is considerably 
greater for post-event windows, which is unsurprising as these are statistically insignificant 
throughout. Pre-announcement results, in contrast, are almost identical for OLS, 
Scholes/Williams, and SUR, while GARCH detects slightly higher levels of abnormal return. 
Figure 9: Comparison of market model estimation techniques 
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4.6 Discussion 
The announcement of an ECO provokes a statistically significant positive stock market 
reaction in the order of 5% of the share price. Following fundamental event study arguments, 
such results allow an inference on the effects engendered by an ECO: A positive stock market 
reaction reflects the market’s expectation that the ECO will reduce agency costs. Present 
findings thus suggest that an ECO represents a beneficial transaction and a source of 
economic value. This result will be reviewed in a discussion that proceeds in four steps. First, 
its economic relevance will be put into perspective. Second, it will be reviewed in light of the 
evidence from related research, particularly with regard to signaling theory. Third, market 
efficiency will be appraised against the current results, while fourth, and most importantly, the 
overall validity of the present results will be critically assessed. 
4.6.1 Economic relevance 
Cumulative abnormal return for the month before the actual offer amounts to 5%. While not a 
large number at face value, the economic implication of this finding needs to be appreciated 
with regard to the base to which it applies. As the descriptive statistics in Chapter 2.3.3 on p. 
29 show, the median market value of the ECO parent firms lies at USD 2.5 billion. A 5% 
share price increase therefore corresponds to a change in market value of USD 123 million. 
The summary of offer details in Section 2 shows that the median gross offer volume of an 
ECO in the sample is USD 118 million. The increase in market value brought about by the 
announcement of an ECO therefore roughly equals the proceeds collected in the transaction. 
If the same logic is applied to averages instead of medians, the relative weight of the 
announcement effect becomes even larger, although averages are arguably a distorted 
measure for this purpose due to the severe skew of the distribution of sample firm size. From 
an overall perspective across the eight years under consideration, the positive ECO 
announcement effect adds up to more than USD 20 billion in economic value. Such a figure is 
equivalent to the market value of a sizeable US public company. 
4.6.2 Comparison to existing research 
4.6.2.1 Announcement effect 
The announcement returns found for the present sample confirm the finding by earlier 
research. Since the first detection of this phenomenon by Schipper/Smith (1986), all studies 
have led to the detection of positive abnormal ECO announcement returns, and most with 
very high statistical validity. The present results do therefore not require a comparison to 
individual earlier studies. Instead, to assess the magnitude of abnormal return of this study, a 
comparison to the average of earlier results is conducted. Across all short-term ECO studies 
listed in Table 10 (which represents the announcement window most closely identifiable to 
the actual [0 0] announcement day), the average abnormal return attains 1.45%. For the 
present sample, announcement-day abnormal return based on the OLS market model attains 
1.47%, indicating the high consistency of the present findings with earlier studies. 
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This result once more confirms that ECOs constitute the only form of equity financing with a 
robust positive announcement effect. Section 1 has presented the dual character of ECOs. 
With regard to the announcement effect, the restructuring attributes of these transactions seem 
to outweigh their financing aspects: While Asquith/Mullins (1986), Masulis/Korwar (1986), 
and Kalay/Shimrat (1987) all show that SEOs engender negative announcement effects, 
Miles/Rosenfeld (1983), Hite/Owers (1983), Rosenfeld (1984), John/Ofek (1995), 
Krishnaswami et al. (1999), and Mulherin/Boone (2000) show that spin-off or sell-off 
announcements lead to positive stock market responses100. Figure 10 provides a graphical 
overview of the announcement effects across related restructuring and financing events. 
Figure 10: Comparison of short-term effects across related events 
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4.6.2.2 Signaling effect 
Of the previous research on ECOs, the work by Nanda (1991) assumes a particular position 
because the author attributes the announcement effect entirely to signaling effects (see 
Chapter 1.4.3.1 on p. 12 for details). Implicit in such argument is the proposition that an ECO 
                                                 
100  By way of background, Allen et al. (1995) conjecture that these positive spin-off announcement-
period abnormal returns may be related to reductions in value that the respective firms have 
suffered in earlier acquisitions.  
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is not a source of genuine economic value, but rather a source of information about the true 
value of the involved firms. The stock market reaction to its announcement is seen as the 
mere correction of erroneous beliefs that investors have previously held. As a precursor to 
Section 6 (the study of efficiency effects), a brief sideline computation is conducted to 
address the question of whether the positive ECO announcement effect is related to signaling 
or if this document can continue to pursue the possibility that ECOs constitute a source of true 
economic value. 
The following analysis builds on the argument that if positive ECO announcement returns are 
the result of signaling effects, return should increase with the ratio of parent company to 
subsidiary market value. Since an ECO sends a signal that the parent firm is more likely 
under- than overvalued and vice versa for the subsidiary, investors should react more 
positively if the share of undervalued assets in the firm is greater. The computational 
procedure follows the net-assets approach applied by Vijh (2002). Specifically, subsidiary 
market value is calculated as offer price times the number of shares outstanding immediately 
after the offer, net of primary shares to arrive at the implied pre-offer subsidiary value. Market 
value for the parent firm is calculated for the last fiscal-year end before the ECO and adjusted 
for the implied subsidiary market value to arrive at the market value of nonsubsidiary assets 
only. Finally, the two values are divided to obtain the pre-ECO parent-to-subsidiary ratio. 
OLS announcement return for the [–5 0] day window is sorted by this ratio, and average CAR 
calculated separately for firms whose ratio is smaller than one and for firms whose ratio is 
larger than one. Results are determined for four variants: one across all firms, then one for 
only those firms whose parent-to-subsidiary ratio is greater than zero (as the pricing of firms 
with negative stubs may be affected by irrational investor behavior), and last of all, for both in 
a second version that excludes the 1998-2000 period when the market as a whole may not 
have correctly interpreted the ECO signal due to special market conditions (for details see 
Section 8 on p. 283). 
Table 19: Abnormal short-term return by parent-to-subsidiary size 
par/sub > 1 par/sub < 1
Full sample
All firms 1.19% 8.39% 4.27 ***
par/sub > 0 1.19% 5.87% 2.85 ***
Excluding 1998-2000
All firms -0.36% 6.67% 4.12 ***
par/sub > 0 -0.36% 4.40% 2.91 ***
diff-t      [-5 0] day short-term CAR
 
As summarized in Table 19, empirical evidence does not support the predictions of signaling 
effects. Under signaling, as the parent-to-subsidiary market value ratio decreases, the negative 
  
101
signal that the subsidiary is overvalued should increasingly outweigh the positive signal that 
the parent company is undervalued. The opposite effect can be observed, as the short-term 
reaction is substantially greater for firms whose subsidiary is relatively larger. The difference 
between the two groups is statistically significant at the 1% level, as detected by a 
homoskedastic difference-in-means t-test. These findings are unaffected by the exclusion of 
potentially irrational cases during the 1998-2000 period. 
Three observations follow from this consideration of signaling effects. First, signaling can be 
ruled out as a cause for the positive announcement effect, and the proposition that ECOs 
constitute a true source of economic performance can be further pursued in this document. 
Second, there appears to be a systematic effect related to the exclusion of ECOs that have 
taken place during the 1998-2000 period. Cases in which the parent firm is larger than the 
subsidiary even exhibit negative announcement returns when these years are excluded. While 
it is premature to draw conclusions from this observation at this point, this phenomenon 
warrants further scrutiny, and accordingly an entire section of this document is devoted to its 
study (Section 8). Third, and last, these results hint at a systematic influence of relative parent 
and subsidiary size. The size effect following from Nanda (1991) is not only absent, but a 
robust reverse effect can be observed. When the determinants of the announcement effect are 
analyzed more closely in Section 6, this needs to and will be accounted for through the 
inclusion of size-related control variables. 
4.6.3 Abnormal short-term return and market efficiency 
For the [–30 –1] day event window, the present sample exhibits positive abnormal return of 
3.56%101. Following the relentless rigor of strong market efficiency, this constitutes an 
anomaly, as its proposition posits that prices instantaneously reflect all relevant information. 
To highlight why the present findings may constitute an anomaly, the market’s response to an 
ECO announcement can be interpreted in light of the findings by Patell/Wolfson (1984). In 
their study of the intraday speed with which stock prices adjust to news, the authors find that 
the majority of the response to earnings and dividend announcements occurs within the 
twelve to fifteen minutes after the news release. Trading may stretch into the overnight period 
and to the first trades of the next day, whereas pre-release activity is minor. While earnings 
and dividend announcements certainly differ substantially in nature from ECO 
announcements, the current findings appear irreconcilable with the almost instantaneous 
manner of stock market reaction documented by Patell/Wolfson. 
This anomaly is likely the result of anticipation. Anticipation is represented by the advance 
action of investors and follows from two determinants: first, information, which affords 
investors with an idea of the probability that the event will occur, and second, their 
willingness to act on imperfect information. The extreme form of the first determinant takes 
                                                 
101  Derived as [–30 0] day abnormal return of 5.03% minus [0 0] event-day abnormal return of 
1.47% (compare Table 12 and Table 13). 
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place if inside information leaks to a privileged group of investors102. This provides them a 
good (although not perfect) signal that the ECO will take place, and they will begin to 
purchase shares. Information may also be conveyed in more ambiguous format: Investors may 
observe curiosities that lead them to believe that a certain event may occur. Some investors 
may, for example, observe adjustments to the product range, changes to the organizational 
structures, or frequent contacts to investment banks, from which they deduct a probability that 
an ECO may happen. While it is plausible that investors are able through such alertness to 
anticipate the ECO itself, given the vast preparation that such a transaction entails, the 
relevant date in this event study is not the actual ECO but rather its announcement. The 
anticipation of an announcement from observations of the environment seems much less 
likely, given that it can easily be changed and that the average waiting time between the ECO 
announcement and the actual transaction amounts to three to five months and varies 
substantially across ECOs. This leads to the conclusion that the pre-event abnormal returns 
are likely caused by anticipation through the leakage of specific information about the 
impending ECO announcement. 
Anticipation casts light onto market (in-)efficiency. Results show that the market reacts in 
gradual fashion during the period until the announcement, and that the reaction slowly 
becomes stronger as the event date draws closer. This can be taken as an indication that 
capital markets are not strongly efficient. As positive and significant abnormal returns are 
detectable before the announcement, some information of the event must exist in the market. 
Yet if markets were strongly efficient, i.e., reflected all public and private information, then 
the price pattern would not be that of a gradual increase, as in the present study, but prices 
would fully and instantaneously adjust to all information sometime before the event103. It can 
be concluded that markets are at their most efficient in the semi-strong sense. 
The fact that no statistically significant abnormal returns are found after the event date forms 
an interesting complement. The absence of post-announcement returns may constitute a floor 
to market efficiency where the presence of pre-announcement returns constitutes a ceiling. 
Taken together, evidence exists that the market reaction to the announcement of an ECO is 
more than weakly and less than strongly efficient: Private information is not fully reflected 
before the announcement, but all public information is fully and instantly impounded on the 
announcement date. All evidence indicates that the average market reaction to the 
announcement of an ECO is efficient in the semi-strong sense. 
                                                 
102  A privileged group of investors may consist of classic insiders (i.e., officers of the respective 
firm), who are by law banned from trading but may engage in it regardless, or of de facto insiders, 
representing outside investors to whom information about the event has leaked. 
103  Another possible explanation could be that the event is fully anticipated and that markets are in 
fact efficient only in the weak sense, i.e., markets adjust only to historic information. Such a 
pattern, however, seems irreconcilable with the pronounced market reaction on the date of the 
actual announcement. A less illustrious explanation is that, for a number of ECOs, the 
announcement date may have been incorrectly captured. While a residual uncertainty always 
remains, the present study has analyzed potential earlier announcement dates for any candidate 
announcement date, which reduces the probability of erroneous entries.  
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4.6.4 Ability to generalize results 
To critically appraise the current findings, three aspects deserve mention, all of which deal 
with the ability to generalize the current results. The first regards the fact that these findings, 
statistically unambiguous as they may be, represent an average across 172 ECOs and do 
therefore not imply that any ECO is favorably received by the stock market. 41% of ECOs in 
the sample (70 out of 172) have in fact evoked a negative reaction to their announcement. 
While inferential statistics allow the generalization that the average ECO engenders positive 
effects, managers, investors, and researchers alike must remember that this does not 
automatically hold for all cases. If in the remainder of this document it is asserted that ECOs 
exhibit a positive announcement effect, this always denotes that on average ECOs elicit a 
positive announcement reaction. 
A second and equally important qualification follows from the design of the analysis: ECOs 
elicit a positive share price reaction for those companies that have undertaken an ECO. This 
qualification is necessary since the sample only contains firms that have conducted an ECO. 
As such, ECOs may have been chosen precisely by those firms to which they convey the 
largest benefits, and any generalization of these findings must bear this endogeneity in mind. 
At the same time, the longitudinal nature of the event study approach does allow inferences 
into cause-and-effect: On average, the announcement of an ECO has caused a positive stock 
market reaction for sample firms. What remains unknown is whether the same would have 
applied for firms that have not conducted an ECO. To the results of this chapter, the same 
qualification therefore applies that has been formulated by Allen/McConnell (1998), who note 
that ECOs can create value for some firms at some times (for further details on endogeneity 
and causal inference, see Chapter 7.1.2 on p. 229). 
A third and last point of critical appraisal relates to the durability of the current findings. The 
classic event study approach of this section substantially loses power as event windows 
become longer, and it is therefore not suitable for an examination of the long-term effects 
after an ECO announcement or after the ECO itself. The qualification that the results from 
this section have not (yet) been validated for longer horizons represents the bridge to the next 
section, which is entirely dedicated to the study of the long-term effects of the 174 ECOs in 
the sample. 
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5 Long-term ECO performance 
5.1 Section introduction 
5.1.1 Expanded horizon of analysis 
In the previous section, it has been documented that the stock market has, on average, reacted 
positively to the announcement of an ECO during the 1995-2002 period. The analysis has 
further shown that this finding is statistically highly significant and remarkably robust to 
variations in quantitative methodology and to the application of event windows of different 
lengths. At the same time, even the longest event windows considered in Section 4 only span 
several weeks after the ECO announcement. As demonstrated by Figure 8 on p. 96, which 
shows abnormal return for up to 50 days after the announcement, the level of abnormal return 
begins to fall at around 40 days after the event – a phenomenon yet unaddressed. Moreover, 
as shown in Chapter 4.3.2.1 on p. 71 on the choice of event, the ECO announcement is one of 
several possible alternatives, and other researchers have decided on other options for the basis 
of their study. The question is therefore warranted if the previous section’s short-term analysis 
of the announcement effect has indeed captured all abnormal returns related to an ECO. 
It is, after all, plausible that only after the ECO, as the two companies, parent and subsidiary, 
embark on their separate courses of business, additional and relevant information will become 
available to investors. During the months and even years after an ECO, many decisions are 
made that the ECO demands, but whose outcome cannot yet be predicted when it is first 
announced. To provide examples of such decisions, the exact composition of the subsidiary 
board of directors is determined on the first shareholder meeting after the event. Or, while the 
intended use of proceeds from the ECO is usually announced before the event, what they are 
spent on in actual fact can only be assessed with certainty when the offer is completed and 
proceeds exist – again long after the initial announcement. Additionally, the amount of 
disclosure, or more precisely the degree to which reporting in the new company exceeds the 
regulatory mandate, is only observable when the first quarterly and annual statements are 
published. And, as many ECOs are only the first part of a two-step disposal of subsidiary 
shares (which are later spun-off), it may take years to determine the ultimate control structure 
after the separation. 
In an effort to reach a verdict on the value that ECOs on average create, all consequences of 
the transaction should be taken into consideration, not only those that are directly foreseeable 
on the day when the ECO is announced. Accordingly, the stock market’s reaction to decisions 
such as those outlined above should be viewed together and interpreted as a reaction to the 
ECO itself, since none of these decisions would be necessary had the ECO not taken place. To 
provide just one example, if it turns out that qualified subsidiary board members are not 
available and governance would be better had the subsidiary been left in the hands of the 
parent company, the negative stock market reaction to the election of the new board of 
directors clearly needs to be included in the evaluation of the ECO. The fact that such events 
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occur at very different points in time across sample firms calls for extended event windows to 
capture their effects. 
If done properly, such long-term event study allows an evaluation that goes far beyond the 
short-term focus of the classic approach of the previous section. Critics of long-term return 
studies may still argue that short event windows will suffice for an exhaustive evaluation, 
crediting highly efficient capital markets with the ability to estimate the most likely outcome 
of such decisions and correctly impound the resulting expectations into short-term stock 
prices. Even if one subscribes to this view, the present long-term analysis should at least 
confirm the durability of the short-term results and lead to the detection of zero abnormal 
long-term returns. If the short-term reaction fully reflects all ECO characteristics and 
anticipates the most likely outcome of decisions such as those outlined above, long-term 
performance of companies that have undergone an ECO should be commensurate with those 
that have not. Supporters of long-horizon event studies and their critics alike will thus find 
their share in the present section, which proceeds as follows. 
5.1.2 Section outline 
To determine the long-term ECO performance, the remainder of this section is divided into 
five chapters. In the first, the existing literature is reviewed for approaches and results of 
research on the long-term performance of ECOs (Chapter 5.2). Based on this review, the 
approach of the present work is introduced, particularly with regard to the underlying 
assumption that the long-term reaction constitutes a rational reaction to additional information 
(Chapter 5.3). The next chapter presents the underlying data and methods used for in the 
analyses (Chapter 5.4), followed by the results of the latter (Chapter 5.5). The concluding 
discussion of these results (Chapter 5.6) interprets the long-term ECO performance in light of 
the positive announcement effect found in the previous section. To structure this discussion, a 
categorization of possible short- and long-term reactions to an event is introduced and 
applied. 
5.2 Existing research on long-term ECO performance 
As in the previous section, this first chapter is dedicated to a review of the applicable 
literature, expanding on the introductory paragraph on this topic in Chapter 1.4.2 (p. 11). In 
contrast to the previous section, however, the emerging picture of the long-term performance 
of ECO firms is far less consistent than their positive announcement effect. Table 20 on p. 
108 contains an overview of the publications that have documented the long-term 
performance of ECOs. By nature of the event, the post-ECO subject-of-study is twofold, since 
the parent company as well as the subsidiary can now be analyzed because both now have 
public share prices and are subject to public disclosure requirements. Panel A of Table 20 
therefore contains long-term studies on the performance of ECO parent companies, and Panel 
B studies of ECO subsidiaries. 
Regarding the long-term performance of ECO parent companies, results are either statistically 
insignificant or negative, and only one US study (Madura/Nixon (2002)) and one German 
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study (Junker (2005)) show statistically significant abnormal return, compared to two studies 
in each geography that do not reject the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return with 
statistical significance. The long-term performance of ECO subsidiaries is indeterminate: 
Four existing studies report positive and six report negative abnormal returns, and both types 
of result include cases with statistical significance (e.g., Michaely/Shaw (1995) report BAHR 
of –20.2% at p < 0.01 and Miles/Woolridge (1999) BHAR of 28.7% at p < 0.05). 
Madura/Nixon (2002) document the largest negative abnormal return at –62%, but this result 
is not robust if the sample is divided between financially distressed and non-distressed parent 
companies. The long-term subsidiary underperformance found by Wagner (2005), while 
mildly robust after three years, is not robust to variations in measurement technique and time 
horizon. In the largest study to date, Vijh (1999) does not find statistically robust abnormal 
performance of parent companies or subsidiaries, although his results seem to suggest that 
subsidiaries perform somewhat better than parent firms104. 
Turning from a presentation of results to a review of methodology, most of the long-term 
studies on ECOs have been conducted during the past ten years, which leads to relatively high 
consistency of approach. All studies apply buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) as the main 
method to aggregate return (for methodological details, see Chapter 5.4 on p. 112), with the 
exception of Kaserer/Ahlers (2000), who only use cumulative abnormal return (CAR). Some 
studies report CAR as an additional robustness check of BHAR (e.g., Brettel et al. (2004), 
Junker (2005)). Matching firms represent the main benchmark for return adjustment, and only 
few (generally early) studies rely entirely on market-adjusted returns (e.g., Klein et al. (1991), 
Michaely/Shaw (1995), Kaserer/Ahlers (2000)). Such index-adjusted return is still reported as 
a robustness check by several later contributions (e.g., Vijh (1999), Junker (2005))105. 
Matching firms are generally identified based on their size and book-to-market attributes, and 
a very thorough review is provided by Vijh (1999), who reports abnormal return over three 
types of matching firms: The first relies on regular size and book-to-market attributes, the 
second on size and industry classification, and the third on size and earnings-to-price ratio. 
Results are broadly consistent across these variants. Vijh (1999) also applies the respective 
parent or subsidiary firm as a benchmark and shows that the performance of the subsidiary 
exceeds the performance of the parent companies. A unique methodology is presented by 
Prezas et al. (2000), who assess the performance of ECO subsidiaries over matched IPOs 
instead of matched firms. Some studies also report abnormal return over reference portfolios, 
which represent an equal- or value-weighted aggregation of a set of matching firms (Powers 
(2003) in the US and Junker (2005) and Wagner (2005) for German ECOs). Finally, Klein et 
                                                 
104  The extremely high number of subsidiaries in the sample by Vijh (1999) results from the fact the 
author includes ECOs whose parent is a private firm, whereas the present sample – to assess 
relative performance – only contains cases where both parent firm and subsidiary are publicly 
listed after the ECO. 
105  Kaserer/Ahlers (2000) also report [0 250] day abnormal return over a market model with a [-750 
–500] day estimation period. Results are slightly more negative than index-adjusted return, but 
consistent both with regard to its sign and statistical significance. 
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al. (1991) study only ECOs that are followed by a second event (sell-off or reacquisition) and 
may therefore not be directly comparable to other long-term ECO studies, not least since the 
reported horizon varies by case depending on the timing of the second event. 
Table 20: Long-term ECO studies106 
Study Focus Start End N Horizon
(years)
AR
Panel A: Studies on parent company
Miles/Woolridge (1999) US 1981 1993 87 3.0 -10.4%
Vijh (1999) US 1981 1995 300 3.0 0.7%
Kaserer/Ahlers (2000) D 1984 1997 23 0.5 -5.9%
Madura/Nixon (2002) US 1988 1993 88 3.0 -39.6% *
Brettel/Junker/Pinker (2004) D 1984 2001 30 1.5 -7.3%
Junker (2005) D 1984 2003 55 3.0 -27.3% ***
Panel B: Studies on subsidiary
Klein/Rosenfeld/Beranek (1991) US 1966 1983 28 4.4 -18.2%
Michaely/Shaw (1995) US 1981 1988 61 2.0 -20.2% ***
Miles/Woolridge (1999) US 1981 1993 87 3.0 28.7% **
Vijh (1999) US 1981 1995 628 3.0 8.0%
Prezas/Tarimcilar/Vasudevan (2000) US 1986 1995 236 3.0 -7.8% **
Madura/Nixon (2002) US 1988 1993 88 3.0 -62.4% *
Powers (2003) US 1980 1990 181 5.0 3.6%
Brettel/Junker/Pinker (2004) D 1984 2001 30 1.5 0.2%
Wagner (2005) D 1984 2002 40 3.0 -24.6% *
Junker (2005) D 1984 2003 55 3.0 -12.2%  
5.3 Long-term approach 
The present section aims to measure the abnormal return for the parent company and its 
subsidiary after an ECO107. In Chapter 4.3.1 on p. 68, it has been shown that empirical tests 
                                                 
106  The table contains academic publications of long-term ECO studies. If multiple benchmarks have 
been used to estimate expected return, the one most akin to size and book-to-market matched 
reference portfolios is reported. Regarding the horizon of the study, the event window closest to 
[0 3] post-offer years is shown. The study by Klein et al. (1991) studies the performance of 
subsidiaries until a second event (reacquisition or spin-off); consequently, horizon varies by case 
and measures on average 1,102 trading days. With regard to AR, * denotes two-tailed significance 
at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
107  Therefore, the present section tests the durability of the abnormal return documented in Section 4. 
The full abnormal return associated with an ECO is the sum of its announcement return and its 
long-term post-offer ECO-induced performance. For a discussion of the period between the 
announcement and the offer, see Chapter 7.5.1 on p. 261. 
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have delivered sufficient evidence of (semi-strong) market efficiency to warrant the use of a 
classic event study. By nature of construction, however, classic event studies are limited to 
short event windows: Results may exhibit poor quality because the parameters of the 
underlying market model need not be stationary. The following subchapters present 
alternative methods to estimate long-term normal return as well as the implications of a long-
term return study for market efficiency. 
5.3.1 Measures of long-term normal return 
Just as for the short-term study, realized sample return needs to be adjusted by expected 
(normal) return to isolate the effect of the ECO. Neoclassical theory offers a prominent tool 
that could be used to this end: the CAPM (see Chapter 3.2.1.1 on p. 41). Assuming that risk 
remains stationary, the pre-event estimated beta could be used to express normal return as a 
function of market return. Three limitations, however, speak against this option. First, since 
the subsidiary does not have a track record of return, and since beta estimation during post-
offer windows would be self-fulfilling prophecy, the CAPM cannot be used to estimate 
subsidiary return. Second, for the parent company, beta exhibits the same flaw as market 
model parameters: It is not guaranteed that this measure of risk remains constant over long 
periods (during which e.g., production-related risk attributes may change the risk of a stock). 
And third, as shown in Chapter 3.2.1.1 on p. 41, empirical studies have delivered evidence of 
flaws of the CAPM, which jointly suggest that its risk estimate may only partly explain the 
variation in the cross-section of return. 
In response to these limitations, the long-term return research regularly uses out-of-sample 
cross-sectional return to adjust the return of a sample firm. For the selection of the appropriate 
cross-section, this field of research has greatly benefited from the wealth of research on the 
validity of the CAPM. Such research has focused on cross-sectional variations of risk-
adjusted returns (i.e., after accounting for beta), which have been considered by the long-term 
return literature to identify the appropriate cross-section of return that represents the expected 
return of a sample firm. Three dimensions have been discovered along which (risk-adjusted) 
cross-sectional return varies108: P/E ratio, firm size, and book-to-market ratio (compare 
Chapter 3.2.1.1 on p. 41). To prepare the identification of an appropriate benchmark for the 
present evaluation of ECOs, this research is briefly reviewed. 
Price-earnings ratio. Basu (1975) and Basu (1977) show that after risk-adjustment, stocks 
with low P/E ratios outperform the market, whereas those with high P/E ratios significantly 
underperform the market. This finding has been confirmed in research by Peavy/Goodman 
(1983), who equally conclude that firms in the lowest P/E quintile exhibit stronger 
performance than firms in the highest quintile. 
                                                 
108  Relevance for the cross-sectional distribution of return has also been discovered for leverage 
(Fama/French (1992)), trading activity (James/Edmister (1983)), and information (Barry/Brown 
(1984)). The relationships listed above have been confirmed with higher robustness and thus 
constitute the focus of this presentation. 
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Firm size. Reinganum (1981) and Banz (1981) have extended the research by Basu on P/E 
effects to study the role of firm size for risk-adjusted return. Both studies deliver evidence that 
small firms exhibit stronger performance than large firms. In a response, Basu (1983) 
combines both aspects to show that small firms with low P/E ratios exhibit the highest risk-
adjusted returns. Subsequent research has focused on the possibility that the riskiness of small 
firms has not been properly accounted for since these firms trade more infrequently than large 
firms (Roll (1981)). Applying the thin trading adjusted technique suggested by Dimson 
(1979), Reinganum (1982) is able to show that the risk of small firms has indeed been 
incorrectly measured by standard OLS risk-return models, but the author equally shows that 
even after this correction, differences in the cross-section of return persist109. 
Book-to-market ratio. The ratio of a firm’s book value to its market capitalization has been 
suggested by Rosenberg et al. (1985) as an additional dimension along which future stock 
returns might systematically vary. This idea has been picked up and expanded by 
Fama/French (1992), who assess individual and joined effects of beta, size, P/E ratio, 
leverage, and book-to-market ratio. Their research builds on earlier studies that have 
examined the cross-section of beta-adjusted return to test the CAPM. Extending this test 
approach, Fama/French (1992) include beta as one of several factors. The authors show that 
the size effect is more robust than adjustment purely on beta and that the book-to-market ratio 
is positively correlated with return. An essential insight of this contribution is the observation 
that size and book-to-market ratio are both significant when jointly included, and that they 
represent a superior explanation for the cross-section of return than other factors (e.g., beta or 
P/E ratio). These findings have been confirmed by e.g., Chan et al. (1991) for Japanese firms, 
by Fama/French (1993) on the joint inclusion of stock and bond market factors, by 
Fama/French (1995) in a joint analysis with earnings, and by Lie (2001) in a context of 
operating performance. 
The insight by Fama/French (1992) that size and book-to-market ratio represent a superior 
explanation for the variance of return across stocks than beta represents the fundament on 
which nearly all long-term return research over the past decade has built. This study follows 
this approach and will apply benchmarks that are identified accordingly. Further details are 
provided in the presentation of the quantitative approach in Chapter 5.4.2 on p. 114. 
5.3.2 Implications for market efficiency 
The detection of statistically significant long-term return that is unrelated to differences in 
risk, transaction costs, or information can be interpreted as a violation of semi-strong market 
efficiency: A superior trading rule can be devised on the public information about a cross-
section of stocks (e.g., by firm size, book-to-market ratio, or the completion of an ECO). 
                                                 
109  For further evidence on the size-effect, compare Stoll/Whaley (1983) for considerations of 
transaction costs, Reinganum (1983b) for issues of rebalancing, Dimson/Marsh (1986) for a 
discussion in an event study context, Chan et al. (1985) for additional measures of risk, and 
Brown et al. (1983) and Reinganum (1992) for temporal stability. The small firm effect has 
generally been confirmed as a long-run fact.  
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Proponents of market efficiency have therefore pointed to the joint test character of long-term 
return studies, as these involuntarily examine the efficiency of capital markets and the validity 
of the underlying model of expected return (Fama (1970)). What researchers on the long-term 
return effects of corporate events interpret as gradual adjustments of return on weakly-
efficient markets is seen as the result of incorrect models of return on efficient markets by the 
critics of such studies (e.g., Fama (1991))110. These critics point to the high consistency of 
event studies, which show that capital markets frequently correctly impound the expectation 
of future events in their short-term announcement reactions111. Schwert (2003), in his survey 
of market anomalies, notes that many (although not all) deviations from market efficiency 
have vanished over time, and often so after their publication in academic journals, implying 
that markets are generally efficient, and that is has just been the dispersion of information that 
has been lagging in some cases. 
These contentions have sparked a still ongoing discussion about the validity of long-term 
return studies (see e.g., the discussion in Byun/Rozeff (2003), who call for caution in their 
long-term analysis of stock splits). One of the most prominent examples has in this regard 
been the discussion on the underperformance of equity issuers, which has first been 
documented by Ritter (1991) for IPOs and Loughran/Ritter (1995) for SEOs. To name just a 
few example studies that have taken argument with these findings, Brav/Gompers (1997) 
show that IPO underperformance may be driven by small nonventure-backed issuers, and in a 
historical analysis, Gompers/Lerner (2003) show that underperformance is sensitive to 
methodological variations. Eckbo et al. (2000) claim to have solved the long-term return 
anomaly of the New Issues Puzzle, as this phenomenon has been termed after the publication 
of Loughran/Ritter (1995), arguing that equity issues decrease leverage and with it a firm’s 
exposure to unexpected inflation and default risk112. 
The present work welcomingly receives the arguments by the critics of long-term return 
studies, as it approaches the topic without discrimination. The confirmation of different forms 
of market efficiency has so far largely been an empirical question, and it would therefore be 
too easy a way out to discard the possibility of long-term effects purely on theoretical 
grounds. This work reckons that such empirical analysis is an indispensable part of any effort 
that tries to fully evaluate ECOs, under two conditions: That the best available methods be 
used and that the results not be taken at face value but critically assessed in light of all 
available evidence (e.g., in light of the short-term market reaction to an ECO). The chapters 
that follow aim to meet these conditions. 
                                                 
110  Examples of other (more recent) sources that point to the methodological sensitivity of long-term 
return studies are Fama (1998), Brav et al. (2000), Brav (2000), and Eckbo et al. (2000). 
111  With regard to ECOs, Vijh (2002), Bühner (2004), and Gleason et al. (2006) show that the market 
reaction to an ECO announcement already contains an anticipation of second events (e.g., full 
spin-off or cancellation).  
112  Eckbo et al. (2000) match sample firms and benchmarks based on pre-event characteristics, which 
does not capture event-induced shifts in financial characteristics. This study avoids this hazard by 
matching parent firms and subsidiaries to benchmarks based on post-ECO attributes (see Chapter 
5.4.5.4 on p. 125). 
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5.4 Data and methods 
Replete reference not withstanding, there is no agreement on how long the long run really is. 
For the purpose of the present study, 36 months are regarded as long enough to provide a 
clear impression of the overall effects of an ECO. This choice also considers the practical 
rationale that an extension of the horizon would have pushed the examinable sample further 
into the past. Since the beginning of the sample period is imposed by data limitations, such 
extension would have entailed an undesirable reduction in sample size. Also, arguing against 
a shorter horizon, the applied approach corresponds to long-term horizons of related work, 
such as Vijh (1999), Madura/Nixon (2002), and Junker (2005), and thus ensures the 
comparability of findings. All results are of course also calculated and reported for shorter 
post-ECO periods. 
The following discussion of data and methods for the long-term analysis proceeds in the same 
four steps of logical order as the corresponding chapter in Section 4: raw return, normal 
return, abnormal return, and robustness of abnormal return. This sequence is then 
supplemented with a review of possible biases and their accommodation in the present study. 
Rather than in the following introduction of different return measures, an examination of the 
more intricate issues of long-term return are set aside until the discussion of potential biases. 
5.4.1 Raw return 
As in the short-term analysis, return represents the yardstick for performance and thus forms a 
fundamental building block for the quantitative analysis. The following introduction 
concentrates on its most basic type, namely raw return, which represents the unadjusted return 
observable for individual firms. 
5.4.1.1 Calculation of return 
Calculation of return follows Equation (4.1) from the short-term analysis and thus 
incorporates share price changes, dividends, and all other distributions. As does the short-term 
approach, the long-term analysis builds on discrete returns. The superiority of using discrete 
rather than continuously compounded return for abnormal returns studies is discussed in 
Barber/Lyon (1997), who show that such studies may not be well-specified if the underlying 
return is calculated in continuous form113. The main difference to the short-term analysis 
consists of the fact that data is of monthly instead of daily granularity. The earliest post-ECO 
return is calculated for the first month after the calendar month during which the offer took 
place. Consequently, the price at the end of the ECO month represents the earliest data point 
that is used for each sample firm ( Pt−1 in Equation (4.1)). 
                                                 
113  As the authors note, only if all stocks in a benchmark exhibit equal discrete return – an all but 
likely assumption – will the choice of return type be irrelevant. 
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5.4.1.2 Aggregation over time 
To calculate multi-period raw return, two basic methods apply, which differ with regard to 
their reinvestment assumptions. The first variant, denoted cumulative return (CR), assumes 
that the amount of invested capital remains constant over time. If the return that is earned each 
period is not reinvested, return for an event window is simply the sum of the return of all T  
periods it spans: 
(5.1)   CR = Rt
t=1
T∑ . 
In the second variant, referred to as buy-and-hold return (BHR), the amount of invested 
capital differs according to the (compounded) return realized in prior periods. It assumes that 
return is reinvested and is therefore calculated as the product of subperiod return: 
(5.2)   BHR = (1+ Rt )
t=1
T∏ −1. 
5.4.1.3 Portfolio return 
In notable contrast to an analysis of the ECO announcement effect, the long-term perspective 
allows the separate analysis of parent company and subsidiary. In addition to these, 
performance will be assessed for a parent/subsidiary portfolio to reflect the performance of 
what was formerly one company in one joined measure. From an investor’s perspective, this 
return matches the return on a portfolio of the two stocks, which are acquired at the end of the 
offer month and held for the length of the event window. The respective market 
capitalizations at the end of the ECO year serve as portfolio weights. To avoid double-
counting, the portion of parent market capitalization represented by its post-ECO subsidiary 
share needs to be excluded (Junker (2005)). Therefore, portfolio weights are given as: 
(5.3)   wpar = MVpar − MVsub ∗OWNMVpar + MVsub ∗ 1− OWN( )  
(5.4)   wsub = MVsubMVpar + MVsub ∗ 1− OWN( ) 
where wpar  and wsub  denote the weight of the parent and subsidiary, respectively, MVpar  and 
MVsub  the market value of parent and subsidiary at ECO year-end, and OWN  the percentage 
of subsidiary shares retained by the parent after the offer. Following the approach used by 
Junker (2005), for cases where the imputed market value of its subsidiary share exceeds 
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parent market capitalization, the subsidiary weight is set to 100%. Such constellations have 
occurred in some cases, in particular during the hot-market period of 1998-2000114. 
5.4.2 Normal return 
Raw return is a component of performance but not its ultimate measure. To accommodate any 
systematic changes in return, denoted as those that are expected based on a firm’s 
characteristics, raw return is adjusted by a proxy of normal return. As noted above, attribute-
based matching firms and control portfolios have become the standard reference for long-term 
return. In the present study, raw return of each sample firm is normalized by four proxies of 
normal return: two derived through reference portfolios, matching firms, and an index. 
Following recommendations from the literature, the first three are matched based on size and 
book-to-market characteristics, while index-adjusted return serves as a robustness check. 
5.4.2.1 Reference portfolios 
Reference portfolios represent the main benchmark for the detection of abnormal long-term 
return in the present study. Using reference portfolio raw return as a proxy for normal return 
of a (sample) company assumes that the average of a set of similar companies mirrors the 
systematic changes in firm value. Two variants are applied in the present study: one in which 
return of the various firms in a reference portfolio receive equal weight and one in which its 
weight is determined by the size of the respective company. Regarding the first, equally 
weighted return RP
EW  of a portfolio of M  firms with subscript j  is simply the arithmetic 
average of the return of individual firms: 
(5.5)   RP
EW = 1
M j=1
M∑ R j . 
With foresight to different variants of (abnormal) return in later analyses, it should be noted 
that R j  can represent the return of an individual period, as well as multiperiod return derived 
as CAR or BHR. The value-weighted variant is obtained as 
(5.6)   RP
VW = 1
MV j 0
j=1
M∑
MV j 0
j=1
M∑ R j  
where MV j 0  represents the market value of company j  at the end of the year during which 
the ECO of the corresponding sample firm has taken place. 
For the construction of reference portfolios, the universe of publicly-listed firms in the US has 
been considered. For each of the eight years of the study, all firms listed on the NYSE are 
                                                 
114  The anomaly of negative stubs has been studied by Lamont/Thaler (2003), who explain such 
phenomena with arbitrage failure due to short-sell constraints. Further details are provided in 
Chapter 7.3 on p. 242. 
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sorted into size deciles according to their year-end market capitalization (closing price per 
share for the last trading day in December times number of shares outstanding at that point in 
time). In a second step, firms listed on the Nasdaq and Amex are placed into their respective 
NYSE size deciles. Next, each size decile is split into book-to-market sub-deciles, based on 
the year-end book value as reported by Compustat115. This procedure yields 10 x 10 = 100 
reference portfolios for each of the eight years. Sample firms are assigned the reference 
portfolio that they would have fallen into. 
This approach implies that reference portfolios contain different numbers of companies. Since 
the NYSE hosts in general the largest of all US exchange-listed companies, the later addition 
of Nasdaq and Amex firms occurs largely to the deciles with smaller firms. As a result, the 
last size decile contains on average 293 firms, compared to an average of only 22 for the first. 
The advantage of this approach lies in its much improved representation of sample 
characteristics: Whereas in equal-sized groupings, the three largest size deciles would 
correspond to 70% of sample companies, this figure is reduced to about 40% with the applied 
method. Equal-sized reference portfolios would therefore represent more a normalization by 
book-to-market ratio alone rather than a joined adjustment by both book-to-market ratio and 
size characteristics116. 
Following the methodological literature (e.g., Barber/Lyon (1997), Lyon et al. (1999), 
Cowan/Sergeant (2001), Vijh (1999)), certificates, primes and scores117, closed-end funds, as 
well as all sample parent and subsidiary firms have been excluded from the universe of 
companies from which reference sets have been identified118. Furthermore, in order to qualify, 
a security has to be listed on the NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq during the respective period, 
regardless – to avoid survivor bias – of whether it was subsequently delisted, acquired, or 
merged. 
5.4.2.2 Matching firms 
In addition to the (equal- or value-weighted) average of multiple firms, raw return for each 
sample company is also normalized by the return of a single (matching) firm. As for reference 
portfolios, the identification of matching firms is based on size and book-to-market 
characteristics of the sample firms. The exact process parallels that of Barber/Lyon (1997) 
                                                 
115  The applied measure of book value is calculated as the sum of the book value of common stock, 
capital surplus, and retained earnings less the book value of treasury stock and accumulated 
unpaid preferred dividends. 
116  As a robustness check, the calculation of abnormal long-term return has been replicated using 
equal-sized reference portfolios (by which, on average for the different years, the performance of 
each sample firm is assessed against 67 other firms). These portfolios have been formed by using 
a one-step construction of size deciles across all NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq firms. While not 
reported in detail, results are not materially affected by this methodological variation. 
117  Primes and scores are separate parts of securities that are individually resold (usually through a 
trust, e.g., American Trust) and traded. For details, see e.g., Jarrow/O'Hara (1989). 
118  The identification of excluded securities has been conducted via their CRSP-assigned share code. 
It has further been ensured that no sample company belongs to any of the excluded categories. 
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and Vijh (1999): First, based on end-of-December data for the year during which the 
respective ECO took place, those firms of all US exchange-traded companies119 are identified 
for each sample firm whose market capitalization was within 70% to 130% of its own market 
capitalization. In a second step, the firm has been chosen as matching firm whose book-to-
market ratio was closest to that of the sample firm. 
5.4.2.3 Market index 
A simple market index is used as a basic robustness check of the above more sophisticated 
approaches. Inclusion of index-adjusted return further allows a comparison to other ECO 
studies, since Michaely/Shaw (1995), Powers (2003), and Junker (2005) report abnormal 
return based on a value-weighted index. Therefore, a CRSP value-weighted index across the 
three major US stock exchanges (NYSE, Amex, Nasdaq) has been chosen as a fourth method 
to adjust sample firm raw return.  
5.4.2.4 Fama-French three-factor model 
The Fama-French three-factor model presents an additional instrument to estimate normal 
return. While it is not applied in the present study, it is closely enough related to warrant an 
introduction, not least to show the rationale for its exclusion. The three factors taken into 
consideration by the model are market return, excess return of small over large stocks, and 
excess return of firms with high book-to-market ratio over those with low book-to-market 
ratio. The model proceeds by regressing the long-term excess return of a sample firm over the 
risk-free rate against the three factors. A positive (negative) regression intercept is interpreted 
as a measure of positive (negative) abnormal return. Formally, its derivation is given as 
(Fama/French (1993)) 
(5.7)   Rit − Rft = α i + β i(Rmt − Rft ) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + εit  
where Rft  denotes risk-free return, Rmt  the return on a market index, SMBt  (small-minus-big) 
the return of a portfolio of small stocks over a portfolio of large stocks, and HMLt  (high-
minus low) the return of a portfolio of stocks with high over one with low book-to-market 
ratios. The parameters βi , si, and hi , estimated either over a period preceding the event or 
thereafter, describe the relevance of each of the three factors for explaining the return of the 
sample company. Finally, intercept α i represents the measure of abnormal return. The 
advantage of the Fama-French three-factor model lies in its increased flexibility, since size 
and book-to-market characteristics are not statically assigned to each sample company. 
Instead, the dimension that best predicts the return of a sample company is estimated via the 
inclusion of SMB and HML  on the right side of the regression, and the model thus allows for 
irregular cases where large firms have return or book-to-market properties that follow those of 
small firms and vice versa. 
                                                 
119  To the universe of exchange-traded companies, the same exclusions apply as for the construction 
of reference portfolios. 
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Despite its intriguing design, this model has demonstrated poor specification in several 
simulation studies. Kothari/Warner (1997) show this in the case of CARs, while Lyon et al. 
(1999) find evidence that the model is misspecified when samples are nonrandom and exhibit 
size or book-to-market biases. An analysis of the present sample indicates the occurrence of 
such biases for the set of ECO firms, particularly with regard to a substantially right-skewed 
distribution of firm size. Because of evidence from the long-term return literature, the 
properties of the present sample, and the availability of recognized alternatives, the Fama-
French three-factor model is not employed in the present study. 
5.4.3 Abnormal return 
Raw return and normal return are brought together to arrive at a measure of abnormal return 
ARit . Its calculation follows the procedure of the short-term analysis: 
(5.8)   ARit = Rit − E Rit[ ] 
where E Rit[ ] denotes the normal (expected) return for sample firm i  at time t , which is 
based on the return of a reference portfolio, matching firm, or an index in the present study. In 
the presentation of raw return, different methods have been shown to aggregate return over 
time. The relevance of this aspect presents another important methodological difference to the 
short-term analysis: Announcement returns have simply been added for event windows 
(Equation (4.5)), implicitly applying CR (Equation (5.1)), which is permissible since the 
effect of compounding is negligible. In long-term event studies, in contrast, changes to the 
amount of invested capital can attain substantial levels and inadvertently induce distortion. 
The following discussion starts with an exposition of the abnormal return equivalents to CR 
and BHR, which assume that the analysis is conducted in event time, before an alternative in 
the form of a calendar-time portfolio is presented, which abandons the issue of subperiod 
aggregation altogether. 
5.4.3.1 Aggregation of event-time abnormal return 
Calculating return in event time represents the most common method of evaluating the 
development of return after an event. It proceeds by aligning all events at their date of 
occurrence, irrespective of the actual calendar date, and evaluates return thereafter. Analysis 
in event time therefore assumes that investors hold a portfolio that consists of all firms that 
have undertaken an ECO, and that the ECO occurs precisely at the time when the portfolio is 
constructed. Such a portfolio, of course, is purely hypothetical, since it cannot be assembled 
in actuality unless all events occur on the same date. Since the evaluation of this portfolio 
usually spans more than one period, the treatment of earned return becomes relevant. In 
analogy to the concepts of CR and BHR for raw return, the researcher has the choice between 
two types of abnormal return: cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and buy-and-hold abnormal 
return (BHAR). CAR builds on a summation of subperiod abnormal return. For event 
windows of T  periods, its value for firm i  is given as 
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(5.9)   CARi = ARit
t=1
T∑ . 
Across the entire sample, CAR is calculated as the arithmetic average of all sample firms: 
(5.10)   CAR = 1
N
CARi
i=1
N∑ . 
BHAR proceeds by normalizing compounded return, which requires separate compounding of 
raw return for sample and benchmark as a first step. For individual firms, it is calculated as 
(5.11)   BHARi = 1+ Rit[ ]
t=1
T∏ − 1+ E(Rit )[ ]
t=1
T∏ . 
Analogously to CAR, its aggregation across the sample is given as an arithmetic average: 
(5.12)   BHAR = 1
N
BHARit
i=1
N∑ . 
Regarding computational differences, besides the obvious inclusion of compounding, BHAR 
aggregates subperiod return separately for sample firm and benchmark, effectively calculating 
two BHRs before the subtraction of one from the other yields BHAR. The derivation of CAR, 
in contrast, since the amount of invested capital does not change, can proceed by first 
calculating AR for each subperiod and later aggregating AR over time (as in Equation (5.9)), 
or by first aggregating CR over time, separately for sample and benchmark, before subtracting 
one from the other:  
(5.13)   CAR = Rit
t=1
T∑ − E Rit[ ]
t=1
T∑  
Regarding interpretational differences, the choice of CAR versus BHAR is relevant with 
regard to the objective of the study. As first identified by Ritter (1991) and expressed by 
Barber/Lyon (1997), 
“… a test of the null hypothesis that the 12-month CAR is zero is equivalent to a test of 
the null hypothesis that the mean monthly abnormal return of sample firms during the 
event year is equal to zero; it is not a test of the null hypothesis than [sic] the mean 
annual abnormal return is equal to zero. To test the latter hypothesis, a researcher needs to 
use the annual BHAR” (p. 344). 
With regard to statistical differences, the authors conduct a direct comparison of CAR and 
BHAR for a random sample of 10,000 observations and find that CAR is a positive predictor 
of BHAR for small values and a negative predictor for large values. Up to around 13% 
BHAR, CAR is approximately 5% larger, declining rapidly in relative size as BHAR 
increases further. The authors find that CAR becomes smaller than BHAR at around 30% 
BHAR. As further identified by the authors, the degree of bias with which CAR predicts 
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BHAR depends on the security’s volatility relative to the benchmark return. Overall, these 
results reflect the fact that the compounding effect of BHAR becomes more important as 
abnormal return increases. 
Based on their evidence, Barber/Lyon (1997) strongly recommend the use of BHAR over 
CAR for long-term event studies. Kothari/Warner (1997) provide further evidence to this 
effect, showing that CAR can suffer from downward distortion. Arguing on the contrary, 
Fama (1998) advocates the use of CAR because the imperfections of BHAR become larger as 
they are compounded. Following from these contradicting recommendations, the present 
study will use both measures of abnormal return, while for its closer correspondence to an 
investor’s view, BHAR will be regarded as the primary indicator. 
5.4.3.2 Cross-sectional dependence 
A fundamental problem of the event-time approach follows from the fact that abnormal return 
is frequently correlated across sample firms. Such a correlation is problematic since the 
parametric test statistics commonly applied in long-term return studies build on the 
assumption of independent, identically distributed (IID) populations. If the abnormal return of 
sample firms is correlated, the observable variance of the average abnormal return is lower 
than provided for by an IID test statistic. The effect of unduly low variance hence leads to 
inflation of test statistics, with all the discrimination this entails. 
Cross-sectional dependence occurs under two necessary and only jointly sufficient conditions. 
First, the event windows of sample firms must overlap120, and second, their time-series of 
return must be correlated. With regard to the first aspect, at one extreme, events whose event 
periods do not overlap can naturally not exhibit cross-sectional dependence. With regard to 
the other aspect, at the other extreme, if a firm is included twice in the sample with similar 
event windows, correlation will be near-to-perfect. To assess if cross-sectional dependence is 
a problem in the present study, the sample has been analyzed along these two conditions.  
First, to evaluate the severity of overlap, a 174x174 matrix of the sample has been set up, 
which contains 15,051 possible unique overlaps, derived as n(n-1)/2 (the upper triangular 
matrix less the diagonal). Of these, 191 unique overlaps have been found to represent 
overlapping start months (i.e., months when more than one ECO has taken place), derived as 
(5.14)   C = mn ∗ n(n −1) /2[ ]
n=1
N∑  
where C  denotes the grand total of unique overlaps, n  the number of sample firms that 
overlap, and mn  the frequency with which these combinations occur for each n
121. While 191 
                                                 
120  This explains why cross-sectional dependence has not been much of an issue for the short-term 
analysis; the substantially lower probability that announcement-period event windows overlap 
shows that cross-sectional dependence is a much more severe problem for this long-term analysis. 
121  More specifically, there are 2 months when 6 ECOs take place, 6 when 5, 7 when 4, 12 when 3, 
23 when 2, 22 when 1, and 24 when no ECO takes place, yielding the total of 174 ECOs and 96 
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out of 15,051 may appear insubstantial, overlap grows fast if longer event windows are 
considered. Ultimately, if event windows of 36 months are considered, this translates into 
9,520 overlapping periods in the sample, or, to provide a more handy interpretation, for 36-
month event windows, ECOs overlap on average 63% with other ECOs. This is not 
surprising, because there exist less than four unique (i.e., non-overlapping) 36-month periods 
in the present study122. It can therefore be concluded that cross-sectional dependence, judged 
purely by overlap, is an issue that warrants attention. 
To extend the above assessment to the degree of correlation, a second matrix of all sample 
firms has been set up to determine the average correlation of 36-month BHAR for all cases of 
perfect overlap. This procedure has been conducted for both parent companies and 
subsidiaries and for BHAR based on value-weighted reference portfolios and matching firms. 
Results show some evidence of positive correlation, which has been found to lie in the order 
of 3% to 9%. While the influence of this correlation is expected to decrease as overlap is 
reduced (linearly if following the simplification suggested by Mitchell/Stafford (2000)), the 
existence of substantial overlap, coupled with evidence that correlation cannot wholly be 
ruled out, warrants further inspection of issues from potential cross-sectional dependence. 
One avenue of research recommends adjusting test statistics to account for cross-sectional 
dependence. Mitchell/Stafford (2000) propose a modification to the test statistic that proceeds 
by estimating the cross-sectional correlation of the sample and artificially inflating the 
observed return variance by an appropriate factor. The authors suggest that the average 
correlation of all perfectly overlapping cases should be determined, which they assume to 
decrease linearly with the reduction in overlap. A frequency-weighted average of the 
correlation within each level of overlap is determined for the sample, which is transformed 
into a corrective factor for sample variance. While the Mitchell/Stafford t-statistic is logically 
appealing, it may be questioned if the effect of cross-sectional dependence can effectively be 
represented in one single number, or if the underlying assumption of linearity is too 
simplistic. 
Other researchers contend that while approaches as the one above may reduce the problem of 
cross-sectional dependence, it cannot fully be eliminated (e.g., Fama (1998)). These critics 
argue to abandon event-time based return research altogether in favor of an approach that 
does not rely on cross-sectional variance. This suggestion leads to an alternative that relies on 
a calendar-time portfolio, which is introduced in detail below. The present study 
acknowledges the arguments brought up by these critics of the event-time approach, if not by 
discarding the event-time analysis altogether, at least by supplementing the calculation of 
BHAR and CAR with an analysis based on the suggested calendar approach. 
                                                                                                                                                        
months for the present sample. In the formula above, n  is the number of ECOs that take place 
simultaneously, and mn  the count of how often this occurs. 
122  8 years (sample period) + 3 years (extended measurement) = 11 years / 36 months ~ 3.67. 
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5.4.3.3 Abnormal return in calendar-time 
In the above methods, ECOs are artificially aligned at the start point of the event window. 
From the perspective of an investor, this constitutes a purely hypothetical approach. From a 
research perspective, combining the sample in event time produces the formidable problem of 
cross-sectional dependence. An alternative that is more realistic from an investor’s 
perspective and more comforting from a researcher’s point of view is given by the calendar-
time approach. This approach measures the return on a portfolio that contains all firms that 
have conducted an ECO during a specified number of months in the past. For the calendar-
time approach, the equivalent investor behavior is given by investing an equal amount of 
money each month, equally spread across all firms that have conducted an ECO during the 
past k months, while the event-time approach mirrors the behavior where an equal amount of 
money is invested in each ECO. In a calendar-time portfolio, each month weighs equally, 
although it may contain a varying number of ECOs, whereas in an event-time portfolio, each 
ECO weighs equally. 
The introduction of the calendar-time concept to the economics literature is generally 
attributed to Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974). It has received strong advocacy by Fama 
(1998), who contends that event samples generally align poorly with the assumptions of 
event-time statistics. Examples where it has recently been put into practice include 
Brav/Gompers (1997), Lyon et al. (1999), and Mitchell/Stafford (2000).  
Criticism of calendar-time approach has been voiced based on interpretational grounds. As 
Loughran/Ritter (2000) point out, event-time portfolios test the hypothesis that the average 
abnormal return over the sample is zero, while calendar-time portfolios test the hypothesis 
that the average abnormal return over the event window is zero. The authors also show that 
calendar-time tests may be of low power. Other criticism, as expressed by Junker (2005), 
roots in the fact that sample entries receive different weight in calendar-time portfolios. These 
contentions notwithstanding, the present study employs the calendar-time approach as an 
alternative to CAR and BHAR since it is deemed a better provision for cross-sectional 
dependence than the interminable sophistication of event-time test statistics. Furthermore, if 
calendar-time models exhibit low power, they should provide a fitting complement to event-
time models, which suffer from poor specification if cross-sectional dependence is present. 
Construction of the calendar-time portfolio in the current work follows the procedure outlined 
by Lyon et al. (1999). Based on Equation (5.8) for the calculation of abnormal return, 
monthly abnormal return (MAR) is calculated across all firms in the portfolio for any calendar 
month as 
(5.15)    MARt = 1N ARiti=1
N∑ . 
Then, MAR is averaged across all months T  for which a calendar-time portfolio has been 
calculated, given mean monthly abnormal return (MMAR) as 
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(5.16)    MMAR = 1
T
MARt
t=1
T∑ . 
Thus, in contrast to CAR, which is first summed over time and then averaged over the 
sample, MMAR is first averaged across the sample (for each month), and then averaged 
across time. While BHAR continues to constitute the primary indicator for the performance of 
ECOs, it is supplemented by both CAR and MMAR to ensure that results are robust to 
methodological variations. 
5.4.4 Robustness of abnormal return 
To arrive at an assessment of the statistical validity of the average abnormal return introduced 
above, each abnormal return result is supplemented with a t-statistic. For the two event-time 
measures of abnormal return, this statistic is calculated as follows, where AR can represent 
CAR as well as BHAR: 
(5.17)   t(AR) = AR
1
N(N −1) ARi −
ARi
Ni=1
N∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
2
i=1
N∑
. 
Although abnormal return is also calculated in calendar-time to mitigate the potential 
influence of cross-sectional dependence, a second test statistic is reported for BHAR that has 
been modified to account for (a part of) its influence. It follows an approach outlined by 
Cowan/Sergeant (2001) and builds on the observation that the above t-statistic, while exposed 
to potential correlation of sample firms (cross-sectional dependence), accounts for potential 
correlations between sample and benchmark (pairwise dependence) by relying on the variance 
of their difference (i.e., of abnormal return), rather than on the (unpaired) variance of the 
individual cross-sections. Without accommodation of pairwise dependence, the measure of 
variance increases and the test statistic, which assumes independent distribution, exhibits 
incorrectly low significance. Cross-sectional dependence, however, through the fact that the 
abnormal return of sample firms moves together when a regular test statistic assumes that they 
do not, reduces the observed variance of sample abnormal return and inflates the test statistic. 
In summary, pairwise and cross-sectional dependence have contrary effects on t-statistics. 
Cowan/Sergeant (2001) develop a crude dependence-adjusted t-statistic that makes use of 
these contrary effects. They argue that even if cross-sectional dependence is unwieldy, its 
distorting influence can be alleviated by the introduction of a counterbalancing effect. They 
thus develop a rather parsimonious modification to the above t-statistic by eliminating the 
correction for a potential sample-benchmark correlation. The upward bias of the test statistic 
from cross-sectional dependence will thus be countered by the downward bias of not 
correcting for correlation with benchmark return. This two-groups test, as the authors call it, 
thus exhibits lower power if cross-sectional dependence is small, but has been shown to 
perform better than the standard t-statistic in various simulation tests. It is derived as 
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(5.18)  tCS (BHAR) = BHAR
1
N(N −1) Ri −
Ri
Ni=1
N∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
2
i=1
N∑ + 1M(M −1) R j − R jMj=1
M∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
2
j=1
M∑
 
where tCS (BHAR) denotes the Cowan/Sergeant (2001) cross-section adjusted t-statistic, N  the 
number of firms in the sample and M  the benchmark ( N = M ), and the subscripts i  and j  
sample and benchmark, respectively. It should be noted that this statistic is calculated for 
BHAR only because Cowan/Sergeant do not test its properties for other types of return. 
With regard to calendar-time return, variance is not measured across the sample in event time, 
but across months in calendar time, and cross-sectional dependence is thus eliminated 
altogether. Accordingly, Mitchell/Stafford (2000) note that the distribution of calendar-time 
abnormal return closely approximates the normal distribution. Following their observation, a 
t-statistic is calculated using the MMAR time-series variance (as e.g., Lyon et al. (1999)) as 
(5.19)   t(MMAR) = MMAR 1
T 2
MARt − MARtTt=1
T∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
2
t=1
T∑ . 
5.4.5 Accommodation of expected biases 
For the assessment of abnormal long-term return, far less consensus prevails on 
methodological aspects than for a classic event study of announcement effects. To a large 
degree, this reflects wealth of uninvited effects that accompany long event windows. In a 
short-term analysis, many of these issues do not need to be considered as the brevity of event 
windows precludes many biases from surfacing. In the following, biases in the study of 
abnormal long-term return will be individually reviewed and their accommodation in the 
current study presented. 
5.4.5.1 Skewness bias 
Barber/Lyon (1997) identify what has become known as the skewness bias. Long-run BHAR, 
adjusted by any form of portfolio or index, is frequently right-skewed. This results from the 
fact that the return of an individual security (e.g., the sample firm) is by nature of calculation 
more volatile than that of aggregate return (across a reference portfolio or an index)123. The 
problem of skew for a long-term return study lies in its effect on test statistics. Positive 
outliers lead to an inflated estimate of the true variance for positive BHAR and an understated 
estimate for negative BHAR, with the corresponding biases of t-statistics. The power of the 
test is too low for positive BHAR and too high for negative BHAR, i.e., for the latter, the risk 
of Type I error is inadvertently amplified. 
                                                 
123  That this skew is positive results from the fact that stocks over time and on average earn positive 
return, which makes positive outliers more frequent than negative ones, and from the fact that –
100% represents a floor to return whereas a ceiling does (at least theoretically) not exist. 
  
124 
The literature discusses four options to accommodate skew. First, Johnson (1978) 
recommends the application of an adjusted t-statistic, which extends the regular version by 
factors of skew. Sutton (1993) suggests to bootstrap this statistic to improve results. This 
solution has also been suggested by Ehrhardt/Koerstein (2001) and applied in the context of 
ECOs by Junker (2005). Second, Cowan/Sergeant (2001) recommend winsorizing. 
Winsorization denotes a procedure whereby outliers in excess of a preset threshold (e.g., at 
more than three standard deviations) are replaced with values of the threshold. Such an 
approach, also discussed and applied by Ehrhardt/Koerstein (2001), reduces BHAR skew and 
thus approximates its distribution more closely to that of the benchmark. A drawback of 
winsorization lies in its manipulative nature, since observations are artificially altered. Third, 
skewness bias could be partially mitigated by the use of CAR instead of BHAR, and empirical 
evidence by Barber/Lyon (1997) shows that such variation can reduce distortion. Fourth and 
last, the use of matching firms instead of portfolio or index benchmarks fully accounts for the 
issue. Using matching firms has the advantage of aligning sample and benchmark one-to-one, 
thereby avoiding undesirable influences from differences in the distribution of return 
(Barber/Lyon (1997)). 
In the present study, skewness bias is taken into account through two accommodations. First, 
following this last recommendation, raw return is adjusted based on matching firms. Second, 
CAR is used instead of BHAR as a robustness check. 
5.4.5.2 Rebalancing bias 
Some benchmarks are periodically rebalanced, i.e., their portfolio weights at the beginning of 
the rebalancing period are restored. Rebalancing, it should be noted, is only required for BHR, 
since CR automatically assumes that excess return is not reinvested, and that the amount of 
invested capital thus remains constant. Periodic rebalancing is advocated by some researchers 
to ensure that benchmark characteristics do not diverge from sample firm characteristics (see 
e.g., Ehrhardt/Koerstein (2001) for a discussion). 
Periodic rebalancing of benchmark BHR leads to winner-loser effects, which have first been 
identified by Blume/Stambaugh (1983) and Roll (1983) and build on the observation that 
rebalancing of BHR mirrors a strategy where stocks that have performed strongly in the past 
are sold while poor performers are bought. Coupled with evidence delivered by 
DeBondt/Thaler (1985), which shows that poor performers subsequently perform well and 
vice versa124, rebalancing implies an upward bias of the benchmark and thus a downward bias 
of abnormal return. This relationship has been empirically confirmed by simulation evidence 
in Barber/Lyon (1997), who find negatively biased BHAR. Their publication also contains a 
detailed discussion of the topic (also see Kothari/Warner (1997)). 
                                                 
124  Rational explanations for this phenomenon include a potential bid-ask bounce, where the closing 
transaction for high (low) performers more likely lies at the posted ask (bid) price, with equal 
probability in the following period (for additional details, see Barber/Lyon (1997) and the 
references contained on p. 349 therein). 
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The most rigorous way to account for rebalancing bias, and the one applied in the present 
study, is reliance on benchmarks that are not rebalanced. While this comes at the risk that the 
characteristics of sample firms and benchmarks may diverge over time, such an approach 
much more aptly reflects buy-and-hold investor behavior. The index-adjusted return in the 
present study relies on a value-weighted index, which mimics realistic investor behavior by 
implying that strong performance of a stock compounds its portfolio weight upward, and not 
vice versa as implied by rebalancing plans. 
5.4.5.3 Overlapping-horizons bias 
Cowan/Sergeant (2001) refer to the presence of cross-sectional dependence as an overlapping-
horizons bias, which is used here as subheading for reasons of terminological consistency. 
Because of its paramount role, cross-sectional dependence has been extensively discussed 
above, and details shall therefore not be reiterated. It should be noted, however, that its 
potential influence on the present study is mitigated by applying the Cowan/Sergeant (2001) 
adjusted t-statistic, and – most importantly – by the calculation of abnormal return in a 
calendar-time portfolio, which is by design impervious to cross-sectional dependence. 
5.4.5.4 Benchmark-matching bias 
Cowan/Sergeant (2001) discuss the importance of event-induced shifts in the characteristics 
of sample firms. The possibility of such shifts is particularly acute with regard to book-to-
market ratio, one of the most commonly used attributes to identify matching and reference 
portfolio firms. If sample firms are matched on pre-event characteristics (as e.g., Vijh (1999) 
or Lyon et al. (1999)), benchmark firms may be misspecified for long-term post-event 
performance, and such aberration is generally referred to as a benchmark-matching bias. Such 
bias can reasonably be expected for ECOs: While book value remains unaffected by the 
transaction (which, if anything, only constitutes a swap between share holdings and cash – see 
Chapter 1.3.1.2 on p. 7), the analysis of the short-term ECO announcement effect in Section 4 
has shown that the market value of equity is on average markedly affected. Consequently, 
both size (measured as market capitalization) and book-to-market value may experience an 
ECO-induced shift, the first upward, the latter downward if only the announcement effect is 
considered125. 
Existing long-term return research exhibits substantial variation with regard to benchmark 
matching. Besides the studies referenced above, who use pre-event data, Junker (2005) or 
Barber/Lyon (1997) use end-of-June data. Using June data may induce further inconsistency: 
If events (e.g., ECOs) are equally distributed over a calendar year (a reasonable assumption), 
using a point in time within the event year implies that some parent firms are matched 
                                                 
125  See also Healy/Palepu (1990) for changes of relevant characteristics (such as risk) at corporate 
events (in their case for SEOs). 
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according to their pre-event characteristics while others are matched according to their post-
event characteristics126. 
Event-induced shifts in firm characteristics can be accommodated by matching reference 
firms based on post-event sample firm characteristics127. The present study matches 
benchmarks based on post-event characteristics, and end-of-December of the ECO year 
presents the relevant point in time. Period rebalancing is not conducted to avoid other 
irregularities and to maintain the investor buy-and-hold interpretation. Proceeding in this 
fashion, the present study follows the recommendation by Cowan/Sergeant (2001), who 
decidedly argue to use benchmarks that have been identified based on post-event 
characteristics. 
5.4.5.5 Measurement bias 
As shown in detail above, not only do CAR and BHAR exhibit interpretational differences, 
but they also lead to discernable differences in results (Barber/Lyon (1997)). This effect is 
generally referred to as measurement bias, which can be further exacerbated by the interaction 
with other biases. The present study mitigates measurement bias twofold. First, both CAR and 
BHAR are used to unveil potential issues, and second, the aggregation of event-time 
subperiods is abandoned altogether in an additional analysis of mean monthly abnormal return 
calculated in calendar-time. 
5.4.5.6 New-listing bias 
Aggarwarl/Rivoli (1990), Ritter (1991), and Loughran/Ritter (1995) have shown that IPOs 
generally underperform respective benchmarks. If raw return of a sample company, which is 
by definition already listed on an exchange, is normalized by a market index, which 
involuntarily includes new listings, IPO underperformance will cause an upward bias of 
abnormal return (Barber/Lyon (1997)). The calculation of index-adjusted return is included in 
the present study mainly as a robustness check and to ensure comparability with the results 
from other studies. It should, however, be kept in mind that results from this variant could 
potentially be subject to a new-listing bias. 
5.4.5.7 Survivor bias 
Related to the new-listing bias is survivor bias, which occurs when firms in the sample or a 
benchmark are delisted. Such situations may arise when firms are acquired, have merged, or 
                                                 
126  The widespread practice of matching benchmarks based on end-of-June data may be rooted in the 
fact that such an approach was used by Fama/French (1992). In contrast to the present work, 
however, their study was not based on an event sample, but constituted a general test of the cross-
section of return. 
127  It is conceivable that such shifts will take place over time and resemble an event-induced drift in 
firm characteristics rather than a swift short-term shift. Such drift can be accommodated by 
periodically rebalancing the benchmark to reflect changes in the sample firm. Periodical 
rebalancing, however, is problematic for reasons elucidated above. 
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have simply gone under, and it may cause distortion between sample and benchmark if these 
cases are not appropriately accounted for. To mitigate, at least four possibilities exist: Missing 
entries can be left blank, the last value can be carried forward or otherwise filled, or the 
respective entry may be eliminated from the sample altogether. 
Leaving an entry blank has the advantage that the return series is not manipulated, but this 
may cause unwanted effects when the interaction with other sample or benchmark firms is 
considered. Blank entries increase the weight of remaining firms in an index, a reference 
portfolio, or the sample, leading to their subsequent overrepresentation. Regarding the second 
option, if the last value of a delisted firm is carried forward, as applied e.g., by Cusatis et al. 
(1993), this flaw is ruled out. Such a procedure, however, is not undisputed, either: Carrying 
last values forward leads to a situation where a firm exhibits abnormal returns although it no 
longer exists. Furthermore, such an approach neglects the further dynamic development of 
return for the remainder of the event window. 
Filling missing entries can account for this last shortcoming, and the researcher is generally 
presented with two filling options: market return and averages of other benchmark firms. 
While the latter option has the same effects as leaving an entry blank, forms of (weighted) 
averages allow for different variants. Vijh (1999) uses a staggered filling technique where he 
keeps a reserve of up to four next-closest matching firms, which are used if the return data for 
the respective upper matching firm is unavailable. Finally, accounting for missing values by 
purging sample entries saves the researcher the trouble of defining the most adequate filling 
option, but equals a situation where bad is fought with worse: By solving a number of missing 
values through setting all values to missing, bias is all but ruled out, and firms without 
missing values are overrepresented (Kothari/Warner (1997)). 
The present study accounts for survivor bias through conservative provision. If a sample firm 
is delisted or exhibits gaps in its return series, its value is filled with benchmark return, i.e., its 
abnormal return is automatically set to zero. Such an approach reduces the power of the 
approach and leads to an increase in the risk of Type II error under the given null hypothesis 
that abnormal return is zero, but is deemed superior since it does not adversely affect model 
specification. If a matching firm is delisted or misses return data, its return is replaced with 
market return, while for reference portfolio firms, missing values are filled with an arithmetic 
average of all remaining firms in the same reference portfolio128. 
5.5 Results 
Long-term results are presented in two variants: tabular and graphical. The following 
presentation therefore contains three subchapters: The first documents the event-time results 
                                                 
128  As a robustness check, missing return data for sample and reference portfolio benchmarks has 
been filled with market return. From an investor’s perspective, this assumes that leftover funds 
are used to purchase an index. Results remain unaffected in magnitude and statistical significance, 
which is unsurprising given the infrequent occurrence in the present sample of delisted firms and 
the resultant survivor-bias issues. 
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in tabular format, the second the calendar-time results in tabular format, and the third the 
event-time results in graphical format129. The chapter ends with a review of methodological 
aspects. 
5.5.1 Event-time results 
Two tables are presented to document event-time abnormal return. Table 21 on p. 130 shows 
abnormal return based on value- and equal-weighted reference portfolios, and Table 22 on p. 
131 the results based on matching firm and index adjustments. Each table is structured in 
several panels to distinguish results as they relate to the parent company, the subsidiary, and 
the portfolio of the two, as well as with regard to the underlying form of return adjustment. 
The column labeled t contains the simple cross-sectional t-statistic of abnormal return, while 
CS-t denotes the Cowan/Sergeant (2001)-adjusted t-statistic, which provides better 
specification in the presence of cross-sectional dependence. Consistent with the presentation 
of the short-term results, *** denotes two-tailed significance at the 1%, ** at the 5%, and * at 
the 10% level. 
Value-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted event-time results. Panels A of Table 21 show 
the abnormal long-term return adjusted by value-weighted reference portfolios. Following the 
arguments outlined above, these represent the primary indicator for the long-term ECO effect. 
Panel A1 shows abnormal return of the parent company, which steadily grows more negative 
over the event period, attaining –19% for BHAR and –17% for CAR. The second half of the 
36-month event window exhibits markedly smaller changes in abnormal return than the first: 
While BHAR attains –14% during the first 18 months, it decreases by only 5% during the 
ensuing 18 months. The difference between these periods is smaller still for CAR, which 
decreases only by 1% for the second 18 months, compared to 16% during the first. Apart from 
the first 6-month window, abnormal return for the parent company is statistically significant 
throughout, and p-values are consistently smaller than 0.05. The t-values attain a crest around 
18 to 24 months after the ECO, at which they are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Panel A2 contains subsidiary BHAR based on reference portfolios. Results look 
unequivocally different: Not only is the magnitude of abnormal return lower than for the 
parent, none of the major event windows shows signs of statistical significance. Over the 36-
month period, abnormal return attains –12% BHAR and –9% CAR, and its buildup over time 
is inconsistent, being marginally positive for the first six months, clearly negative for the first 
twelve months, and indeterminately negative thereafter. It should be noted, with foresight to 
arguments following below, that abnormal return of the subsidiary attains highly statistically 
significant negative BHAR and CAR during a brief window 15 and 16 months after the offer, 
which is not reflected by the design of the above tables. Finally, Panel A3 contains a 
combination of parent and abnormal long-term subsidiary return. Both magnitude and 
statistical significance appear largely influenced by abnormal return of the parent company, 
                                                 
129  Results of the calendar-time variant are not graphically presented because of the mean monthly 
composition of its return, which does not lend itself for a depiction over time. 
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which is unsurprising since the parent company, in general the larger of the two, has higher 
average portfolio weights than the subsidiary. Both BHAR and CAR are at –19% after three 
years, and statistical significance is low during the first five of the six event windows, 
particularly so for BHAR, while the last, 36-month window is significant at the 5% for simple 
t-tests and at 10% for the Cowan/Sergeant (2001) t-test. 
Equal-weighted reference portfolio event-time results. Panels B of Table 21 contain long-
term post-ECO abnormal return based on equal-weighted reference portfolio benchmarks. For 
all three reported parts (parent, subsidiary, and portfolio), results are next to identical to those 
obtained via value-weighted reference portfolio adjustment. Building on the above 
presentation of value-weighted results, only noteworthy differences will therefore be 
highlighted. To begin with, abnormal return of the parent company in Panel B1 is more 
similar between different methods of return aggregation than under the value-weighted 
variant: BHAR and CAR both reach highly statistically significant –19% after three years. 
Abnormal return of the subsidiary (Panel B2) is slightly more negative (–16% BHAR, –14% 
CAR), but equally statistically insignificant throughout. Relative to value-weighting, 
abnormal portfolio return (Panel B3) is one to three percentage points more negative during 
the second half of the event period, while all other remarks apply as above. 
Matching firm-adjusted event-time results. Panels A of Table 22 present matching firm-
adjusted return. Regarding parent firms in Panel A1, the magnitude of abnormal return after 
36 months closely matches the findings from reference portfolio-adjusted return, attaining –
21% both for BHAR and CAR. Also consistently, this value is statistically significant at p < 
0.05. Two major differences are observable, however: Matching firm-adjusted return is 
overall statistically less significant than under other variants, and it does not build up as 
smoothly. Parent firm BHAR decreases to –19% after one and a half years, to rebound to –
15% six months thereafter before decreasing steadily to the aforementioned –21%. Panel A2 
contains matching firm-adjusted return for the subsidiaries. After 36 months, subsidiary 
BHAR attains –17%, while CAR lies at –11%, but as before, none of the major event 
windows shows signs of consistent statistical significance. Matching firm-adjusted subsidiary 
BHAR always lies slightly below other variants. Finally, portfolio results in Panel A3 show 
the most negative results throughout, reaching 25% for BHAR and 26% for CAR130. 
                                                 
130  These results exhibit the anomaly that portfolio values lie outside of the range delimited by parent 
and abnormal return of the subsidiary, which is subject of a separate discussion later on in this 
section. 
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Table 21: Abnormal long-term return (reference portfolio) 
Month BHAR t CS-t CAR t
Panel A1: Parent (value-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted)
6 -0.06 -2.27 ** -1.63 -0.06 -2.20 **
12 -0.10 -2.40 ** -2.12 ** -0.09 -2.20 **
18 -0.14 -2.93 *** -2.52 ** -0.16 -2.87 ***
24 -0.17 -3.31 *** -2.70 *** -0.16 -2.61 ***
30 -0.17 -2.85 *** -2.42 ** -0.16 -2.41 **
36 -0.19 -2.66 *** -2.21 ** -0.17 -2.33 **
Panel A2: Subsidiary (value-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted)
6 0.02 0.28 0.25 0.00 0.06
12 -0.11 -1.52 -1.43 -0.10 -1.71 *
18 -0.09 -0.75 -0.70 -0.11 -1.60
24 -0.08 -0.56 -0.50 -0.07 -0.96
30 -0.09 -0.67 -0.57 -0.08 -0.91
36 -0.12 -1.09 -0.90 -0.09 -1.05
Panel A3: Portfolio (value-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted)
6 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.35
12 -0.08 -1.82 * -1.61 -0.08 -1.72 *
18 -0.11 -1.57 -1.37 -0.16 -2.78 ***
24 -0.13 -1.34 -1.13 -0.14 -2.30 **
30 -0.16 -1.70 * -1.35 -0.16 -2.42 **
36 -0.19 -2.43 ** -1.82 * -0.19 -2.79 ***
Panel B1: Parent (equal-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted)
6 -0.05 -1.86 * -1.37 -0.05 -1.90 *
12 -0.09 -2.13 ** -1.92 * -0.09 -2.06 **
18 -0.13 -2.88 *** -2.47 ** -0.16 -2.93 ***
24 -0.17 -3.42 *** -2.78 *** -0.18 -2.83 ***
30 -0.18 -2.95 *** -2.50 ** -0.18 -2.71 ***
36 -0.19 -2.73 *** -2.29 ** -0.19 -2.63 ***
Panel B2: Subsidiary (equal-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted)
6 0.03 0.52 0.48 0.02 0.36
12 -0.11 -1.41 -1.35 -0.10 -1.64
18 -0.10 -0.85 -0.80 -0.13 -1.82 *
24 -0.12 -0.77 -0.70 -0.11 -1.40
30 -0.13 -0.93 -0.80 -0.13 -1.47
36 -0.16 -1.38 -1.16 -0.14 -1.64
Panel B3: Portfolio (equal-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted)
6 0.02 0.38 0.32 0.00 0.07
12 -0.07 -1.59 -1.44 -0.07 -1.56
18 -0.11 -1.59 -1.41 -0.17 -2.90 ***
24 -0.15 -1.47 -1.25 -0.16 -2.63 ***
30 -0.17 -1.84 * -1.48 -0.19 -2.87 ***
36 -0.20 -2.54 ** -1.94 * -0.22 -3.21 ***
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Table 22: Abnormal long-term return (matching firm and index) 
Month BHAR t CS-t CAR t
Panel A1: Parent (matching firm-adjusted)
6 -0.06 -0.94 -0.95 -0.05 -1.14
12 -0.15 -1.15 -1.19 -0.09 -1.37
18 -0.19 -1.49 -1.53 -0.16 -1.78
24 -0.15 -1.82 * -1.62 -0.15 -1.83 *
30 -0.17 -1.79 * -1.72 * -0.16 -1.83 *
36 -0.21 -2.05 ** -2.13 ** -0.21 -2.25 **
Panel A2: Subsidiary (matching firm-adjusted)
6 0.02 0.17 0.17 0.02 0.34
12 -0.19 -1.14 -1.17 -0.12 -1.29
18 -0.21 -1.30 -1.26 -0.17 -1.73 *
24 -0.18 -0.99 -0.88 -0.11 -1.07
30 -0.13 -0.80 -0.65 -0.10 -0.88
36 -0.17 -1.15 -0.97 -0.11 -0.88
Panel A3: Portfolio (matching firm-adjusted)
6 0.03 0.41 0.41 0.01 0.12
12 -0.10 -1.16 -1.17 -0.09 -1.50
18 -0.17 -1.83 * -1.68 * -0.21 -2.79 ***
24 -0.19 -1.59 -1.38 -0.20 -2.46 **
30 -0.19 -1.75 * -1.43 -0.22 -2.57 **
36 -0.25 -2.46 ** -2.06 ** -0.26 -2.96 ***
Panel B1: Parent (index-adjusted)
6 -0.04 -1.13 -1.03 -0.04 -1.34
12 -0.08 -2.05 ** -1.81 * -0.07 -1.69 *
18 -0.13 -2.85 *** -2.46 ** -0.13 -2.44 **
24 -0.17 -3.33 *** -2.79 *** -0.14 -2.18 **
30 -0.19 -3.11 *** -2.67 *** -0.14 -1.95 *
36 -0.19 -2.75 *** -2.30 ** -0.12 -1.47
Panel B2: Subsidiary (index-adjusted)
6 0.05 0.77 0.74 0.03 0.70
12 -0.08 -1.14 -1.08 -0.07 -1.19
18 -0.09 -0.78 -0.72 -0.09 -1.26
24 -0.11 -0.73 -0.65 -0.05 -0.66
30 -0.13 -0.96 -0.82 -0.07 -0.80
36 -0.18 -1.60 -1.33 -0.07 -0.75
Panel B3: Portfolio (index-adjusted)
6 0.03 0.55 0.52 0.01 0.26
12 -0.07 -1.58 -1.39 -0.06 -1.38
18 -0.12 -1.72 * -1.51 -0.15 -2.61 ***
24 -0.15 -1.54 -1.29 -0.13 -2.15 **
30 -0.19 -2.08 ** -1.64 -0.16 -2.32 **
36 -0.23 -2.87 *** -2.17 ** -0.17 -2.36 **
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Table 23: Abnormal long-term return (calendar-time portfolio) 
Month MMAR MMAR MMAR
6 -0.009 -1.44 -0.001 -0.10 -0.002 -0.25
12 -0.012 -2.69 *** -0.008 -1.30 -0.008 -1.96 *
18 -0.012 -3.07 *** -0.006 -0.95 -0.011 -2.51 **
24 -0.009 -2.32 ** -0.003 -0.42 -0.007 -1.52
30 -0.008 -2.47 ** -0.003 -0.44 -0.006 -1.66 *
36 -0.008 -2.52 ** -0.003 -0.53 -0.006 -1.85 *
6 -0.007 -1.17 0.000 0.01 0.000 0.02
12 -0.011 -2.59 ** -0.008 -1.21 -0.008 -1.74 *
18 -0.012 -3.11 *** -0.007 -1.04 -0.011 -2.47 **
24 -0.009 -2.43 ** -0.004 -0.58 -0.007 -1.60
30 -0.008 -2.57 ** -0.004 -0.67 -0.007 -1.78 *
36 -0.008 -2.61 ** -0.004 -0.73 -0.007 -1.94 *
6 -0.008 -1.19 0.007 0.72 0.002 0.21
12 -0.011 -2.32 ** -0.009 -1.43 -0.010 -1.95 *
18 -0.011 -2.51 ** -0.009 -1.41 -0.012 -2.62 **
24 -0.008 -1.69 * -0.004 -0.75 -0.008 -1.79 *
30 -0.007 -1.85 * -0.004 -0.71 -0.008 -1.91 *
36 -0.008 -2.22 ** -0.004 -0.80 -0.008 -2.23 **
6 -0.007 -1.10 0.003 0.28 0.000 0.00
12 -0.010 -2.15 ** -0.006 -0.78 -0.008 -1.44
18 -0.012 -2.53 ** -0.006 -0.74 -0.011 -2.03 **
24 -0.008 -1.77 * -0.002 -0.29 -0.006 -1.15
30 -0.008 -1.94 * -0.003 -0.44 -0.007 -1.37
36 -0.007 -1.73 * -0.003 -0.44 -0.007 -1.36
Panel C: Matching firm-adjusted
Panel B: Equal-weighed reference portfolio-adjusted
t t
Panel D: Index-adjusted
Parent Subsidiary Portfolio
Panel A: Value-weighed reference portfolio-adjusted
t
 
Index-adjusted event-time results. Results based on index-adjusted return, the fourth and last 
variation of return adjustment, are documented in panels B of Table 22. After 36 months, 
abnormal return of the parent company reaches statistically significant –19% BHAR, but 
statistically insignificant –12% CAR. The buildup pattern of abnormal return based on an 
index as benchmark is similar to that based on reference portfolio benchmarks, demonstrating 
its major decrease during the first 18 months and a slower development thereafter. Statistical 
significance, as before, reaches its maximum around 18 to 24 months after the offer, and p-
values exceed 0.01 for BHAR and 0.05 for CAR. Panel B2 shows that the index-adjusted 
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subsidiary return is negative but insignificantly so for all event windows after the ECO. 
Portfolio return in Panel B3 steadily builds up to robust BHAR of –23% and equally robust 
CAR of –17% (p < 0.05) over the three-year period. It displays only sparse statistical 
significance for earlier periods. 
5.5.2 Calendar-time results 
Table 23 shows the abnormal long-term returns based on calendar time. Before its contents 
are presented in detail, three comments are in order. First, calendar-time results are shown as 
mean monthly abnormal return MMAR. In contrast to BHAR and CAR, these exclusively 
report one-month returns. The indication of multiple months in the leftmost column represents 
the maximum number of months an ECO may lie in the past in order to be included in the 
portfolio. While the corresponding entries for BHAR and CAR represent the exact number of 
months each ECO lies in the past, in calendar-time analysis, the average time an ECO lies in 
the past will be shorter since ECOs that lie different times in the past are averaged. Second, 
more practically, Table 23 is of slightly different structure than the tables above. It contains 
four panels to show results of the four different methods to adjust return, and the three main 
columns display results by parent firm, subsidiary, and portfolio. Third, and last, only simple 
t-statistics are reported (in the column labeled t). Adjusted test statistics are not required since 
calendar-time results are by design immune against the influence of cross-sectional 
dependence. 
Parent company calendar-time results. Proceeding by column, parent company abnormal 
calendar-time return is negative regardless of how long the ECO may have occurred in the 
past (up to the longest examined window of 36 months). For 36 months, the average monthly 
return lies at 0.8% for all adjustment methods, with the only exception of the index-adjusted 
results, which attains 0.7%. For purposes of comparison to the above findings, if such said 
portfolio is held for 36 months, these MMAR translate into BHAR of –24% (CAR –27%), 
and are thus largely consistent with event-time findings. If ECOs of twelve months or longer 
are included, these abnormal returns are statistically robust, particularly for the 12 and 18 
months windows (p < 0.05). Reference portfolio-adjusted results display the highest levels of 
statistical significance, whereas the abnormal return of larger index-adjusted calendar-time 
portfolios do not surpass the 5% significance threshold. 
Subsidiary calendar-time results. Moving one column over, subsidiary results show 
consistent negative abnormal return, with the exception of the [0 6] month portfolio, which is 
positive for three of the four variants. Its magnitude is mostly less than one half that of parent 
firms: If the largest (i.e., 36 months) portfolios are held for three years, abnormal return 
accrues to 10% BHAR or CAR. Inference may be premature, however, since abnormal return 
of the subsidiary is not statistically significant for any of the examined calendar-time 
portfolios. 
Portfolio calendar-time results. Results for a value-weighted portfolio of parent company 
and subsidiary, presented in the rightmost column, reflect the higher weight of the parent 
company. Abnormal return amounts to BHAR of –21% and CAR of –23% if the largest 
  
134 
calendar-time portfolios are held for three years, again largely consistent with event-time 
results. Its statistical significance is mixed, as results are insignificant for the 6-month variant, 
significant at p < 0.05 for the 18-month calendar-time portfolio, and inconsistent across 
methodologies in all other cases. 
5.5.3 Graphical presentation 
After the presentation of tabular results, abnormal long-term return is summarized in three 
graphics. While the above result tables allow identification of the precise values of abnormal 
return and its statistical significance, these graphics are included to show the development of 
abnormal return also for those periods that are not reported in the above tables (i.e., months 2 
to 5, 7 to 11 and so on), and to allow an immediate comparison of the four methods of return 
adjustment. For these four different variants of abnormal return, each graphic displays the 
corresponding values of BHAR. Figure 11 shows BHAR for the parent firm, Figure 12 for the 
subsidiary, and Figure 13 for a value-weighted portfolio of the two. Grey-shaded areas denote 
periods when results are statistically significant. The display of statistical significance follows 
rather stringent requirements and assumes that both simple-t and Cowan/Sergeant (2001)-t 
exceed the 5% threshold for all four methods of benchmark adjustment, i.e., all of the eight 
relevant significance tests need to attain p-values of 0.05 or smaller. 
Figure 11: Abnormal long-term return of the parent company 
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Figure 11 shows the long-term BHAR for the 174 parent companies in the sample. 
Particularly at one and a half years and later, the three different benchmark methods yield 
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practically identical results, leading to abnormal buy-and-hold return in the order of –19% 
after three years. The faster decline in performance during the first one and a half years 
relative to the second 18 months can be equally seen as the high consistency between the 
different methods. The only method that shows greater variation, and strikingly so during the 
first half of the horizon, is matching firm-adjusted return, which exhibits two downward 
spikes at eight and 16 months after the offer. Much of the variance of this benchmark can 
however be traced to one outlier whose matched peer exhibited extraordinary positive 
performance during that period. 
Figure 12 shows abnormal long-term return of the subsidiary. The graphic looks visibly 
different from the one for parent performance, exhibiting a spike of around 9% seven months 
after the offer, followed by a sharp decline to a significant nadir of approximately –20% some 
15 to 16 months after the ECO. Abnormal return for longer windows appears highly variable, 
as reflected by the lack of statistical significance. Consistency across different benchmarks is 
extremely high, with the only exception of matching firm-adjusted return, which is slightly 
lower than other benchmarks but steadily follows the up and down movements of other 
benchmarks. 
Figure 12: Abnormal long-term return of the subsidiary 
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Finally, Figure 13 displays the abnormal long-term return for a value-weighted portfolio of 
parent company and subsidiary. As expected, the graphic combines idiosyncrasies of both 
parent firm and abnormal return of the subsidiary, and subsidiary characteristics dominate 
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during the first half of the examination period, while parent firm characteristics during the 
second half. After about seven months, abnormal return peaks at around 7%, then declines to 
statistically significant –15%. While its further development fluctuates more strongly 
thereafter, abnormal return remains negative and attains –15% to –25% after three years, 
depending on benchmark choice. 
Figure 13: Abnormal long-term return of the parent/subsidiary portfolio 
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5.5.4 Methodological aspects 
Several methodological aspects warrant mention, the first of which concerns benchmarks for 
sample raw return. Variations in return adjustment lead to differences in magnitude and 
statistical significance, but inferences generally remain unaffected. Any four methodologies 
(two reference portfolio variants, matching firm, or index) would separately lead to the 
conclusion that abnormal return for the parent firm is negative in the order of –20% and 
statistically robust after the offer, while abnormal return of the subsidiary is insignificantly 
negative, with the exception of the 15- to 16-month post-offer window, when it is statistically 
negative at around –10% BHAR. At the same time, a main benefit from the application of 
sophisticated adjustment approaches rests in the higher accuracy with which these can detect 
exact levels of abnormal return and their robustness. While the comparatively crude index 
adjustment serves as a reassuring consistency check, results from other approaches therefore 
document the main findings from this study. 
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Second, regarding significance levels, those inferred from the Cowan/Sergeant (2001)-
adjusted t-statistics are generally smaller than those obtained via regular cross-sectional t-
statistics. It is premature to conclude that this is the result of cross-sectional dependence: The 
Cowan/Sergeant adjustment opens the test statistic to a potential downward effect from 
pairwise dependence between sample firms and benchmark, which can counterweigh cross-
sectional dependence. It is therefore correct to interpret the lower significance levels found 
with their test as evidence for a positive correlation (i.e., pairwise dependence) between 
sample firms and benchmark. While lower significance levels reduce the risk of Type I error, 
it is consistent to conclude that, in the presence of cross-sectional correlation, the inferred 
level of Type I error more closely resembles its true level. Since an examination of the sample 
has concluded that overlap of event windows is frequent, particularly for long windows, and 
that correlation might be larger than zero (see Chapter 5.4.3.2 on p. 119), the Cowan/Sergeant 
(2001)-adjusted t-statistic can be regarded as an improvement over the simple t-statistic. 
5.5.5 Portfolio anomaly 
An interesting puzzle is presented by the fact that, in some cases, abnormal return for the 
portfolio lies outside of the range delimited by parent company and subsidiary results131. 
Inspection has shown that this puzzle results from wrongly expecting an average of averages 
when in fact a weighted average applies. More precisely, this phenomenon is rooted in a 
negative correlation between abnormal return and its weighting factor (which is determined 
by the relative market values of subsidiary and parent company). To further segregate the 
cause, abnormal return has been sorted by subsidiary weight, and difference-in-means t-tests 
conducted between the top and bottom halves of the sample. As expected, these tests exhibit 
high statistical significance when this phenomenon is more frequent (e.g., matching firm-
adjusted results). It can furthermore be shown that this phenomenon is entirely caused by the 
pattern of abnormal return of the subsidiary, while abnormal return of the parent company is 
not correlated with its weighting factor. 
For an economic interpretation, since abnormal portfolio return in these cases is downward 
biased, subsidiaries that are large relative to their parent company exhibit results that are more 
negative. While these findings are not robust to methodological variations, and at this point 
rather constitute an interesting anomaly that warrants inspection than a reportable finding, this 
result indicates that relative size should be explicitly taken into consideration in an analysis of 
the determinants of abnormal return. Accordingly, various measures of relative parent 
company and subsidiary size will be included as control variables in the cross-sectional 
regression analysis of the following Section 6. 
5.6 Discussion 
The ensuing discussion of the long-term results proceeds in several steps. First, the robustness 
of the findings is appraised, before these findings are compared to the results of related 
                                                 
131  CAR reported by Junker (2005) sporadically also demonstrates this anomaly. 
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research. After that, findings from this section are merged into the overall objective of this 
document, the evaluation of the performance of US ECOs. To this end, the long-term results 
are contrasted with the findings from Section 4, the ECO announcement effect. To aid the 
case, a categorization of market reactions is introduced as an outline to the discussion. 
5.6.1 Robustness of results 
Parent performance is negative and significant, and subsidiary performance is negative and 
insignificant. This finding is robust to using BHAR instead of CAR, to building calendar-time 
portfolios instead of event-time portfolios, and to all variations of return-adjustment. While 
this finding shows high consistency, what deserves some inspection is the relative magnitude 
and statistical significance of results under different methodologies. In particular, results 
based on matching firm benchmarks are less statistically significant in event-time. Reviewing 
the seven possible biases listed above, skewness bias can quickly be singled out as the one 
that could potentially influence results in this regard. An inspection of skewness in the 
findings provides evidence of the potential cause of this phenomenon: Parent BHAR based on 
value-weighted reference portfolio adjustment exhibits positive skew in 33 out of the 36 event 
months. Parent BHAR based on matching firm adjustment exhibits positive skew in only six 
out of these 36 event months. The high consistency of results based on the two types of 
reference portfolios and the index, all of which represent aggregated return with different 
distribution properties as individual securities, and their divergence from results based on 
matching firm benchmarks may thus be explained by the presence of skew. The finding of 
right-skewed BHAR is consistent with the predictions of Barber/Lyon (1997), who conclude 
that resulting test statistics are overstated if mean return is negative, as in the present study. 
This implies that the test statistics for portfolio adjusted return are too large, while those for 
matching firm adjustment, which are on average left-skewed, are too low. Given that both 
variants exhibit underperformance at statistical significance of p < 0.05, the interpretation of 
the findings does not change. At the same time, parent underperformance may become 
statistically significant later than indicated by portfolio adjusted results (twelve months) and 
earlier than indicated by the matching firm-adjusted results (36 months). 
Regarding subsidiary results, BHAR exhibits similar properties: It is right-skewed for all 36 
event months under the value-weighted reference portfolio approach, but only in 22 cases for 
the matching firm variant. Since none of the main event windows exhibits statistical 
significance, this finding does equally not bear interpretational relevance since lower skew 
would only reduce statistical significance further. For the future interpretation of results, 
however, it is important to note that the statistically-significant subsidiary underperformance 
at 15 to 16 months after the offer remains valid at statistical significance of p < 0.05 under all 
variations. 
5.6.2 Comparison to existing research 
The results of the present section are directionally comparable to the findings by Vijh (1999), 
whose findings feature two salient characteristics from the present sample. First, he 
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documents parent underperformance, and second, he documents that subsidiaries generally 
perform better than parent companies. His results are, however, generally not statistically 
significant, and inferences are therefore limited. More specifically, with regard to parent 
companies, 18 of the 20 event windows reported by Vijh exhibit negative abnormal returns. 
Both in magnitude and in statistical significance, however, these are substantially smaller than 
in the present study. Three-year size and book-to-market BHAR attains –3.2%, compared to –
19% in the present study, and only four of the twenty event windows exhibit abnormal return 
with t-values in excess of 1.65 (i.e., p < 0.10). Abnormal return of the subsidiary in Vijh 
(1999) more closely resembles findings from the present study. Abnormal return is generally 
positive during the first year and statistically significant at 10% in one out of five cases, while 
it is generally negative during the second year and statistically significant in two out of five 
cases. For longer periods, abnormal return of the subsidiary in Vijh (1999) is indeterminate. 
The second study with which results are highly consistent is Junker (2005) in his assessment 
of German ECOs. The comparison of the findings to Junker’s work is brief at this point since 
the international review in Section 9 will contain a detailed account of this topic. Junker 
(2005) documents significant three-year parent BHAR of –27%, compared to –19% in the 
present study. As in the present work, abnormal return of the parent company attains 
statistical significance only during the second half of the event horizon. Subsidiary results are 
insofar consistent as they equally lack statistical significance in Junker (2005). Subsidiary 
BHAR increases extremely fast after the offer, attaining values of around 50% during the first 
year after the offer, before a strong decline sets in. 
Results for the parent company are also consistent with those obtained by Madura/Nixon 
(2002), who show that parent companies underperform matching firms by 39.6%, which is 
statistical at the 10% threshold. The current findings further align with those obtained by 
Powers (2003), who finds that subsidiary performance is significantly positive during the first 
post-offer year and subject to decline thereafter. Regarding the overall evidence from existing 
long-term ECO studies, there is no study that contradicts the present findings for the parent 
company with statistical significance. Regarding abnormal return of the subsidiary, the study 
by Miles/Woolridge (1999) documents positive and significant abnormal long-term return 
where the present work has found mild underperformance. This is outweighed by four studies 
that are statistically significant and directionally consistent with the present work, while the 
remaining studies do not present statistically robust findings. 
Comparing the findings from this study more broadly to related (long-term) studies on 
restructuring and financing events, the dual character of ECOs is once more reflected. Cusatis 
et al. (1993) and Desai/Jain (1999) document positive performance of firms that engage in a 
spin-off. The first of the two studies documents that both subsidiaries and parent firms of 
spin-offs exhibit positive abnormal returns during the three years after the transaction, while 
the second shows that the long-term returns are significant and positive for cross-industry 
spin-offs that increase focus. On the other hand, evidence delivered by Ritter (1991) and 
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Loughran/Ritter (1995) shows that firms that engage in financing transactions (IPOs or SEOs) 
are subject to subsequent underperformance132. Results on ECOs from the present study 
assume a middle ground, as they are significantly negative for both parent company and 
subsidiary, although only after a substantial time for the parent company and only for a 
relatively short window for the subsidiary. Figure 14 summarizes the effects graphically. 
Overall, the present study extends various earlier long-term ECO studies with regard to 
methodology and sample size. It may, however, be precipitate to already reach a final 
conclusion on the long-term performance of ECO firms because the internal consistence of 
findings still needs to be assessed. The following subchapter turns to this topic. 
Figure 14: Comparison of long-term effects across related events 
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5.6.3 Consistency of ECO performance 
The negative and statistically significant abnormal long-term returns of the parent company 
and of its portfolio with the subsidiary stand in open contrast to the robustly positive ECO 
announcement effect documented in Section 4. During the month before the ECO 
announcement, the share price experienced a robust and abnormal increase of around 5%. 
This rise is followed by abnormal long-term return of approximately –20% for the portfolio of 
parent firm and subsidiary, i.e., for the group of companies that has previously been subject to 
                                                 
132  As documented by e.g., McLaughlin et al. (1996), SEO underperformance also robustly extends 
to operating aspects (e.g., profitability). 
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such favorable development. The net effect consequently amounts to –15% for a period of up 
to three years after the offer133. 
Figure 15: Comparison of short- and long-term effects across related events 
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The peculiarity of this finding is underlined by the contrast in which it stands to related 
transactions. Combining the insights from Figure 10 on p. 99 and Figure 14 on p. 140, it can 
be seen that restructuring events generally lead to a positive announcement effect, followed 
by positive long-term performance (as e.g., evidenced by research on spin-offs)134, and that 
financing events generally entail a negative announcement effect, followed by negative long-
term performance (also compare Chapter 1.4.2 on p. 11). ECOs, in contrast, exhibit a positive 
                                                 
133  This statement does not consider the development of abnormal return between the date of the 
announcement and the offer, a period that differs in length between sample companies and that 
spans on average three to five months. As the development of abnormal return during this period 
will be comprehensively analyzed in Section 7, it suffices to note at this point that its omission 
does not alter above arguments: Short-term (pre-offer) performance is positive and long-term 
(post-offer) performance negative. 
134  Similar evidence is provided by Ikenberry et al. (1996) on stock splits, which exhibit abnormal 
three-year performance of 12.15% over reference portfolio benchmarks after an initial 
announcement return of 3.38%. Grinblatt et al. (1984) and Desai/Jain (1997) confirm this 
directionally consistent finding. 
 
l -ter  
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announcement reaction, followed by negative long-term returns. Figure 15 graphically 
presents this peculiarity of ECOs. 
5.6.3.1 Categorization of market reactions 
Seemingly, the finding of positive short-term and larger negative long-term abnormal return 
implies that the initial positive effects of an ECO do not endure. Concluding that such 
negative net effect fairly appreciates the effects of an ECO would be premature, however, 
since it would leave much about the causes and implications of ECO return phenomena in the 
dark. Instead, the contradiction between the ECO performance in the short- and in the long-
term marks the entrance into a more intricate part of this research, namely where the focus is 
directed from observable performance to a pursuit of its determinants. Such fundaments, if 
found, cannot only show why the 174 ECOs in the current sample have performed as they did, 
but may also allow a generalization to other cases and other periods. 
As a structured opening to this part, a categorization of possible market reactions to an event, 
such as an ECO, has been developed, of which an overview is provided in Figure 16. The 
abnormal return observable in the short-term ( ARobs1) is contrasted with the observable 
abnormal long-term return ( ARobs2) and to the true abnormal return engendered by an event 
( ARtrue ). As an important extension to arguments in earlier parts of this document, investor 
rationality is for the first time put into question. Rationality, discussed in detail in Chapter 
7.2.1.2 on p. 233, relates here to the ability of investors to obtain and correctly interpret 
information. 
In all cases, abnormal long-term return approaches its true value, as denoted by the respective 
last conditions of abnormal long-term return. Security prices are therefore assumed to reflect 
all relevant information correctly in the long-term, but not necessarily in the short-term. An 
argument for this assumption can also be made on intuitive grounds, as more rather than less 
information becomes available in the long-term, which places the long-term investor reaction 
on informationally more solid ground than their short-term response. Markets are seen to 
correspond at least to the weak level of efficiency135. 
                                                 
135  Market reactions could alternatively be categorized according to their welfare effect. If correct 
prices are arrived at only with delay, the consequence is a temporary loss in welfare during the 
period when prices reflect misguiding information. Such view could rest more generally on the 
value of information or more specifically on the costs of trading (e.g., Fama (1991)). If avoidable, 
the adjustment of incorrect prices can never be Pareto optimal, and the only fully efficient and 
thus optimal reaction is represented by the instantaneous and full adjustment of prices to new 
information. 
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Figure 16: Categorization of market reactions136 
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136  Figure 16 serves as a stylized aid to the present discussion. In application to this study, the short-
term corresponds to the ECO announcement effect documented in Section 4, and the long-term to 
results from the current section. 
if … 
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5.6.3.2 Review of possible market reactions 
The first possible reaction in Figure 16 considers an efficient market reaction. In such a case, 
the short-term reaction fully reflects true abnormal return, and consequently no abnormal 
long-term return can be measured: 
 Short-term AR Long-term AR 
 ARobs1 = ARtrue  ARobs2 = 0 
In the context of the present study, the detection of abnormal long-term return is still 
reconcilable with an efficient reaction: Abnormal post-ECO return is assumed to reflect a 
reaction to newly revealed information, to each of which investors then react in a fully 
efficient and rational manner. In other words, what is captured in long-term event windows 
could be the sum of efficient and rational short-term reactions taking place over time. The 
detection of such cases has been the motivation at the outset of this section, and its 
plausibility is therefore discussed in detail below. 
As a second possibility, investors may rationally react more negatively to an event, in order to 
account for the information they do not have. In such cases, abnormal short-term return will 
be more negative than warranted by fundamentals and, subject to the condition that more 
information becomes available in the long-term (i.e., asym2 < asym1), the following pattern 
of abnormal return is observable: 
 Short-term AR Long-term AR 
 ARobs1 < ARtrue  ARobs2 > 0 s.t. asym2 < asym1
ARobs1 + ARobs2 = ARtrue
 
This scenario assumes that information is asymmetrically distributed. Investors, faced with 
informational opaqueness, assume that better-informed managers will exploit their 
informational advantage to the benefit of existing shareholders rather than to that of new 
investors. Consequently, in parallel fashion to the signaling model presented by Myers/Majluf 
(1984), investors will react to events with a discount, be it a less positive reaction to a positive 
event, a more negative reaction to a negative event, or even a negative reaction to a positive 
event137. 
If investors do not react to an event although it contains relevant information, a gradual 
adjustment to the correct level of abnormal return will ensue in the long term. This irrational 
is characterized as follows: 
 Short-term AR Long-term AR 
 ARobs1 = 0 ≠ ARtrue  0 ≠ ARobs2 = ARtrue  
                                                 
137  It should be noted that without further information, solely by observing abnormal short- and long-
term return, such inefficient yet rational reaction cannot be distinguished from an underreaction to 
a positive event, an overreaction to a negative event, or a directionally wrong reaction. 
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It could be argued that this case is a special case of underreaction (see below), representing its 
upper extreme. However, it has been included as a separate scenario to show that the absence 
of any reaction may be just as irrational as a (directional or magnitudinal) incorrect reaction 
that differs from zero. 
An underreaction to an event represents an irrational and inefficient reaction. An 
underreaction is represented by an insufficiently negative reaction to a negative event or an 
insufficiently positive reaction to a positive event, i.e., the reaction always lies closer to the 
no-reaction scenario than warranted (e.g., Aberbanell/Bernard (1992), Hong/Stein (1999)). 
The long-term reaction will therefore move away from zero into the direction of the short-
term reaction. The following pattern of abnormal short- and long-term return is observable for 
underreaction: 
 Short-term AR Long-term AR 
 0 < ARobs1 < ARtrue
ARobs1 / ARtrue > 0
 
0 < ARobs2 < ARtrue
ARobs2 / ARobs1 > 0
ARobs1 + ARobs2 = ARtrue
 
A similar irrational reaction is given by an overreaction (e.g., DeBondt/Thaler (1985), also 
compare Chapter 7.2.2.1 on p. 235). It gives the reverse case to underreaction and is 
represented by a short-term reaction that is greater than it should be. The corrective effect will 
then bring overall abnormal return closer to zero, and the overall effect is observable as: 
 Short-term AR Long-term AR 
 0 < ARtrue < ARobs1
ARobs1 / ARtrue > 0
 
0 < ARobs2 < ARobs1
ARobs2 / ARobs1 < 0
ARobs1 + ARobs2 = ARtrue
 
Finally, it is possible that investors react directionally wrongly, which leads to a gradual 
reversal of their initial reaction in the long-term: 
 Short-term AR Long-term AR 
 ARobs1 ≠ 0
ARobs1 / ARtrue < 0 
ARobs2 > ARobs1
ARobs2 / ARobs1 < 0
ARobs1 + ARobs2 = ARtrue
 
In such a case, the short-term reaction goes into the opposite reaction as the long-term 
reaction, so that the long-term reaction must be of greater magnitude than the initial reaction 
to arrive at the true value of the event that has triggered the reaction. 
Finally, if non-zero abnormal return is detected although ARtrue  is zero, or if zero abnormal is 
detected when abnormal return has materialized, error prevails. Error could first relate to 
inaccuracies of the underlying data. Second, error could follow from methodological flaws. 
For example, if the null hypothesis is expressed from an investor’s point of view, the use of 
CARs rather than BHARs could lead to the detection of abnormal return when none is in fact 
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warranted (see Chapter 5.4.3 on p. 117 for details). Third, error could result from poor model 
specification. The specification quality of a model hinges on its ability to correctly represent 
all influences, including the one under examination (i.e., to which the null hypothesis relates). 
Error from model specification would thus imply that the detected abnormal returns are not 
the result of an ECO, but are caused by a misrepresented or omitted variable. If these flaws 
lead to a situation in which the null hypothesis that ECOs are not associated to abnormal 
returns is true but rejected, the study is subject to a Type I error, which is likely if model 
specification is poor. If the null hypothesis is not true but nonetheless accepted, Type II error 
reflects the low power of the model. Consequently, abnormal short- or long-term return 
represents an error if: 
 Short-term AR Long-term AR 
 ARobs1 ≠ ARtrue = 0
(Type I error)
ARtrue ≠ ARobs1 = 0
(Type II error)
 
ARobs2 ≠ ARtrue = 0
(Type I error)
ARtrue ≠ ARobs2 = 0
(Type II error)
 
5.6.4 Categorization of ECO returns 
Against the backdrop of the above categorization of possible market reactions, the abnormal 
ECO returns in the short- and long-term are discussed and their plausibility evaluated. In the 
following, all possible constellations that are reconcilable with the observed pattern of 
positive short-term and negative long-term return are separately reviewed. Since the rational 
yet inefficient asymmetric information variant requires that the long-term reaction be positive, 
it can be ruled out. Since underreaction requires that short- and long-term reaction be 
directionally consistent, it can be equally ruled out. Overreaction requires that the short-term 
reaction be larger than the long-term reaction, which is not the case in the present study and 
can therefore also be eliminated from the set of possibilities. What remains are three cases 
that will be separately discussed in the following: Investors may react efficiently and 
rationally, they may react directionally wrongly, or the results could be caused by error. These 
possibilities are separately evaluated. 
5.6.4.1 Efficient and rational 
Following the arguments in the introductory chapter to this section, in which the rationale for 
conducting a long-term post-offer study has been discussed, the present results can indicate 
that additional and relevant information has become available after the ECO, and that this 
information stands in contrast to the positive information conveyed by its first announcement. 
It is therefore possible that the observed pattern is the consequence of new – and negative – 
information related to the ECO. 
What speaks for this scenario is the market reaction to the announcement of the ECO, which 
provides evidence of semi-strong market efficiency. It is therefore not far-fetched that the 
market may react equally instantaneously to subsequent releases of relevant information. Yet 
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what speaks against this scenario is the market’s seemingly utter lack of anticipation, and it 
appears perplexing that investors do not immediately impound the expectation of negative 
information into their short-term reaction. To restate, even though details of potential post-
ECO negative information are ex-ante unknown, investors could foresee its probability by 
analyzing previous cases. ECOs are, after all, not a new phenomenon, and what is here 
construed as a rational reaction in the short-term would in fact represent an irrational reaction 
in a broader scheme. Given the statistical soundness of the long-term underperformance, 
investors could have updated their expectation over time and come to judge that ECOs are not 
a transaction that works in their favor in the longer-term. 
In the context of ECO, evidence of the ability of the market to anticipate such relevant 
information has been delivered by Vijh (2002), who shows that the market reaction to an ECO 
already contains an anticipation of a second event (i.e., a full divestiture). Further evidence is 
provided by Gleason et al. (2006), who show that the short-term reaction of the capital market 
to an ECO already contains information about the probability that the subsidiary will 
subsequently be reacquired by the parent firm. Based on the arguments above and the 
empirical evidence from other ECO studies, it is here surmised that it is possible but unlikely 
that the observed contradictory pattern of abnormal return is a result of a series of efficient 
and (myopically) rational market reactions. 
5.6.4.2 Directionally wrong 
In the context of the above categorization of investor reactions to corporate events, the short- 
and long-term ECO returns in the present sample could fall into the category of a 
directionally-wrong reaction: Abnormal short- and long-term returns are directionally 
different, and abnormal long-term returns outweigh the short-term reaction. 
Possible as it may be, whether this is a probable scenario is less clear. The first puzzling 
characteristic is the relative size of the short- and long-term reactions. As the three-year long-
term reaction at –19% is (in absolute terms) a multiple of the short-term reaction of 5%, an 
interpretation according to which investors react directionally wrong leaves one most 
surprised at the magnitude with which investors err in the short-term. This view is further 
accentuated by the enormous economic value of the short-term reaction (roughly equivalent to 
the offer size, see Chapter 4.6.1 on p. 98). The second puzzling characteristic is the high 
statistical significance with which investors err, since abnormal short-term return is robust at 
p-values smaller than 0.01. On the ground that such explanation would require investors to err 
time and again with such predictable vehemence, this scenario is, as the first, considered 
possible but very implausible. 
A concluding remark on this scenario concerns the combination of two results that have 
sprung up along the sidelines of this study, and the combination of which can elucidate at 
least some of the existing puzzle. First, in the analysis of potential signaling effects as a cause 
for the positive announcement effect in Chapter 4.6.2.2 (p. 99), it has been documented that 
ECOs whose subsidiary was large relative to the parent have exhibited substantially larger 
abnormal short-term returns than ECOs whose subsidiary was relatively small. Second, in the 
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explanation of the long-term return anomaly in Chapter 5.5.5 on p. 137, it has been shown 
that abnormal long-term return of the subsidiary is negatively correlated to its weighing 
factor, i.e., long-term BHAR is more negative for those subsidiaries that are large relative to 
their parent firms. Viewed in connection, these two findings could indicate that there are some 
ECOs to which investors have overreacted, since the pattern of abnormal return for the ECOs 
with low parent-to-subsidiary ratios fits the one presented in the fifth case of Figure 16. As 
mentioned in the respective chapters, in response to this finding, the relative size of parent 
and subsidiary needs to (and will) be included as control variable in the cross-sectional 
regression analyses of Section 6. 
5.6.4.3 Error 
It has been concluded that the observed ECO return is unlikely a rational reaction, nor is it 
likely an irrational reaction marked by a later reversal. As all other reactions have been ruled 
out, only error remains as explanation (shown in the bottom part of Figure 16).  
Following the course above, if error is possible, it should be assessed if it is also probable. 
Considering the plausibility of error does not necessarily entail an acknowledgement that the 
quantitative studies in this work have been carelessly conducted. Even the most assiduous 
analysis is susceptible to factors that lie outside of the researcher’s control. There is always a 
positive probability that underlying data, even if collected from trustworthy sources, exhibits 
flaws. Also, as the pertinent literature unequivocally reiterates, the perfect method for 
assessing long-term performance does not (yet) exist, and the researcher is forced to choose 
the lesser imperfection among a set of alternative approaches (e.g., Lyon et al. (1999), 
Mitchell/Stafford (2000)). And lastly, the joint test problem introduced above and the ongoing 
related debate on whether abnormal long-term returns are the result of poor return models or 
poor market efficiency reflect the equivocal grounds of this field of research. It can therefore 
not be ruled out with certainty that the present results have been subject to some erroneous 
influence. In comparison to the two alternative explanations discussed above, error appears 
the most plausible cause for the results of this study so far. 
Several types of error may apply. To determine which type prevails, it is fitting to review 
what is known with certainty or near-certainty. First, it is known with certainty that sample 
firms undertake an ECO while benchmark firms do not. Second, it is known with near-
certainty that in the long-term, those firms that have not conducted an ECO perform better 
than firms that have. What may be in error then is the causal relationship that has been 
assumed between these two certainties: That ECOs produce poor long-term performance. 
Since abnormal return has been detected where the null hypothesis states that it is zero, only 
Type I error comes into question. This may suggest that the model of return is poorly 
specified. Had all tests been well specified for the assessment of the ECO, i.e., had they not 
reacted to any non-ECO influences, then abnormal short- and long-term return should not be 
contradictory. 
Closing the case like this, however, would not only be unsatisfactory because the nature of the 
error remains unidentified, but also inconclusive: Abnormal return inconsistency in the short- 
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and long-term allows three possible constellations. Only abnormal short-term return may be 
in error, only abnormal long-term return may be in error, or both abnormal short- and long-
term return may be in error. Building on this logic, the remainder of this chapter sketches a 
plan to identify the determinants of abnormal ECO returns. 
5.6.5 Outlook and approach 
In light of these contradictory findings, deciphering the source of Type I error in the 
measurement of abnormal ECO return becomes prerequisite for an accurate assessment of 
ECOs. Given that either one or both types of measurement, i.e., abnormal short-term and/or 
long-term return, might be in error, it will be constructive to isolate the error more closely. 
Proven determinants of ECO performance will therefore be examined to verify if they account 
for the present findings. As presented in Chapter 1.4 on p. 10, two potential causes of 
abnormal ECO return have been discussed in the existing literature: signaling effects and 
efficiency effects. After the analyses in Chapter 4.6.2.2 on p. 99, the first can conveniently be 
ruled out at this point, and the second major strand of ECO research, efficiency effects, will 
be turned to for an appraisal of the current findings. 
The course of the examination abides by the following logic. Efficiency effects are reviewed 
for their explanatory power for the abnormal short- and long-term ECO returns. Several 
potential solutions are feasible. If efficiency effects can explain both abnormal short- and 
long-term returns, the scenario that both are the result of rational and efficient reactions is 
confirmed. If efficiency effects can explain only the long-, but not the abnormal short-term 
return, it can be concluded that investors have reacted directionally wrongly. If efficiency 
effects can explain only the short- but not the long-term abnormal return, a deeper analysis of 
the latter is required. If efficiency effects do not account for either type of abnormal return, 
deeper analysis of both is required. 
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6 Efficiency effects 
6.1 Section introduction 
6.1.1 Objective and contribution 
Analyses in the previous sections have documented a positive stock market response to the 
announcement of an ECO. This effect, however, appears short-lived: An investor who buys 
parent shares at the time of an ECO would, after three years, be roughly 20% short of what 
could have been earned on a set of matching firms or by buying a market index. Investing in 
ECO subsidiary induces still faster corrosion: After only about one year and a half, returns lag 
benchmarks by about 17%. The previous section has concluded that these findings are 
contradictory and require further analysis. An examination of efficiency effects as potential 
determinant of abnormal return can help resolve this incongruity. If efficiency-related factors 
can satisfactorily explain both the short- and the long-term reaction, these can be seen as 
rational reactions to new information. If efficiency effects support only the long-term 
reaction, investors can be assumed to have overreacted in the short-term. All other scenarios 
(explanation of only the short-term reaction or no explanation at all) lead to a situation that 
demands further analysis. 
The exposition in Section 3 has offered a list of potential effects of an ECO on the agency 
costs of involved firms. These effects are all related to efficiency: of investments, of 
compensation, of monitoring possibilities, and of control. It has been shown that the net 
consequence of these effects is a priori unclear, as each new instrument or arrangement may 
also be misused. This section builds on the existing ECO literature to meet its objective138. 
This allows threefold contribution. First, the study of efficiency effects helps to resolve the 
above-presented abnormal returns puzzle. Second, it expands the existing research on ECO 
efficiency effects on US samples. Notwithstanding the considerable advances of existing 
studies, a uniform framework of the agency costs affected by an ECO has not yet been 
applied in the US (Junker (2005)). The present approach therefore aims to combine several 
aspects of efficiency that have so far only been examined separately by the applicable US 
ECO literature. 
Lastly, by adopting the approach suggested by Junker (2005), both results and methodology 
become comparable between this study and his. It will therefore be possible to analyze more 
accurately the differences in the efficiency effects of German and US ECOs. While such 
comparison is not part of this but of a separate section of this document (Section 9), the 
discussion at the end of this part includes an evaluation of the methodology suggested by 
                                                 
138  The existing ECO literature generally refers to these efficiency effects as efficiency gains. To 
account for the possibility that negative efficiency changes cause the long-term underperformance 
(in which case efficiency losses would represent more suitable vocabulary), the neutral term of 
efficiency effects has here been chosen. Some studies examine efficiency gains as a part of 
divestiture gains (e.g., Vijh (2002)). 
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Junker. The effectiveness of the agency cost framework depends on the explanatory power of 
its results, and the outcome of this section thus provides an indication of the quality of the 
agency approach for an examination of the efficiency effects of ECOs. 
6.1.2 Section outline 
The remainder of this section proceeds in five chapters. After a review of the existing ECO 
literature on the efficiency effects (Chapter 6.2), five potential sources of efficiency are 
broadly presented (Chapter 6.3). This review leads to the formulation of nine hypotheses 
related to the efficiency effects of ECOs. It follows an overview of the data, methodology, 
and variables used to test these hypotheses (Chapter 6.4), as well as a presentation of the 
regression results (Chapter 6.5). This section concludes with a discussion of its contribution 
and whether its results can resolve the puzzle of ECO abnormal return (Chapter 6.6). 
6.2 Existing research on the efficiency effects of ECOs 
The structure of this review of ECO efficiency aspects expands the introduction to this topic 
in Chapter 1.4.3.2 on p. 14 and is oriented along the most relevant contributions on the topic 
(since the hypothesis-related review in Chapter 6.3 below is structured by efficiency type). 
6.2.1 Short-term ECO performance and efficiency 
To explain the significant and positive reaction to an ECO announcement documented in their 
seminal study, Schipper/Smith (1986) discuss a list of potential determinants of ECO value 
gains. These include increased transparency, the possibility to conduct positive NPV projects 
that would have been infeasible without offer proceeds, enhanced interest alignment between 
investors and management through incentive compensation, concurrent restructuring, and the 
creation of a minority interest (which the authors view as treacherous). While Schipper/Smith 
(1986) substantiate these arguments with various data on parent and subsidiary firms, more 
rigorous hypothesis testing (e.g., in a regression framework) is not undertaken. 
Allen/McConnell (1998) examine the positive announcement effect in light of the managerial 
discretion hypothesis, according to which investors realize the agency costs associated with 
managerial control over discretionary capital and therefore respond positively if the offer 
proceeds are not retained but used to repay debt or pay dividends. The authors document that 
ECO announcement returns exhibit characteristics that are consistent with their prediction. 
Overall, the study by Allen/McConnell suggests that ECOs are a source of efficiency because 
the reduction of capital under managers’ discretion may increase investment efficiency and 
facilitate monitoring. 
Vijh (2002) analyzes a sample of 336 ECOs with the objective to assess which of the two 
most prominent explanations applies, efficiency gains or signaling effects. As shown in 
Section 4, the author can rule out signaling effects and thus focuses on various sources of 
efficiency gains. Besides refocusing and managerial incentives, Vijh (2002) examines the 
areas of financing and investment as well as complexity, undervaluation, and pure-play as 
potential sources of divestiture gains. He finds empirical evidence that supports these 
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hypothesized sources of value and concludes that ECOs are motivated by divestiture gains. 
For example, he finds that the announcement effect is more enthusiastic if the corresponding 
Wall Street Journal report mentions that the offer proceeds will be used to repay debt, meet 
other contingencies, or finance new projects. Vijh documents a similar effect to the 
announcement that the ECO intends to create focused pure-play firms. Hulburt et al. (2002) 
also test the efficiency gains hypothesis against the signaling hypothesis and, as laid out in 
Chapter 1.4.3.1 on p. 12, reject the latter. Efficiency gains are supported by the observation 
that operating measures improve through the ECO, as such arguments would lead to expect. 
Turning to a review of several German studies, Kaserer/Ahlers (2000) argue that the 
replacement of internal control structures by external arrangements through the ECO may 
have effects on firm value. The authors investigate this control hypothesis empirically and 
find that ECOs exhibit higher returns if conducted via primary placement. They argue that in 
such a case, all ECO proceeds are collected by the subsidiary, leading to a positive reaction of 
the parent stock because the size of its internal capital market is reduced and investment 
efficiency correspondingly higher139. Elsas/Löffler (2004) study the effects of synergy and 
opaqueness, an internal capital markets hypothesis, a managerial discretion hypothesis similar 
to Allen/McConnell (1998), and the role of banks. The authors also examine a control-related 
hypothesis that states that the gains from an ECO will be higher if control structures of debt or 
equity are not yet well developed before the transaction. Elsas/Löffler (2004) find empirical 
evidence of synergy effects and of benefits from reduced opaqueness through an ECO. No 
particular influence of banks is found (also compare Elsas/Löffler (2001)). 
Bühner (2004) examines four hypotheses that are related to the reduction of information 
asymmetry, internal resource allocation, focus, and to the degree of underpricing as an 
indicator for the magnitude of wealth transfers between old and new shareholders. He detects 
a positive relationship between abnormal announcement return and the degree of focus, as 
well as a positive relationship between the absolute value of the difference of Tobin’s q 
between parent firm and subsidiary, which he uses as indicator for the degree to which 
internal resources are channeled to more homogenous uses after the transaction. The author 
does not find evidence for his remaining propositions. On his German sample, Wagner (2005) 
tests a financing hypothesis similar to Allen/McConnell (1998), for which he finds no 
evidence, and a second hypothesis of internal conflicts from acting in different industries, 
which is directionally confirmed but statistically not significant. The author further pursues a 
proposition of relative cost advantages, arguing that an ECO represents (e.g., reputational) 
                                                 
139  Measuring investment efficiency for the parent firm by the sale of primary vs. secondary shares 
and testing this on the announcement effect may, however, represent flawed logic: Instead at the 
parent level, the sale of primary shares may exacerbate investment efficiency for the subsidiary. 
In such a case, the parent firm by definition retains its secondary shares and thus its exposure to 
subsidiary performance. The status quo of the parent internal capital market is offset by the 
negative performance of subsidiary shareholdings, and the distribution of primary to secondary 
shares will therefore be irrelevant for the announcement effect. To explain the phenomenon 
observed by Kaserer/Ahlers (2000), potential signaling effects of the retention of secondary 
shares are considered later on this document in the context of market timing (Section 7). 
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benefits over other forms of external financing, which is partly supported, and a hypothesis on 
market control transfers, which is confirmed by the observation that the relinquishment of 
control is associated with positive announcement effects. 
Finally, Junker (2005) tests the role of focus and investment efficiency, information 
asymmetry and disclosure, incentive compensation, and blockholder control. He confirms 
efficiency gains in all these areas, apart from information asymmetry and disclosure. By far 
the strongest efficiency effect originates from blockholder control, represented by the 
ownership retained by the parent directly after the offer. The author concludes that monitoring 
by the parent firm is particularly beneficial during the post-offer period because alternative 
control structures may not yet have fully developed in the subsidiary. 
6.2.2 Long-term ECO performance and efficiency 
In contrast to the strong association between the ECO announcement and efficiency effects, as 
outlined in the preceding subchapter, the abnormal return that follows an ECO in the long-
term does not appear strongly associated with such effects. Vijh (1999) examines the cross-
section of long-term post-ECO abnormal return for a potential association with efficiency 
effects. Specifically, Vijh reviews effects of focus and control, materializing through 
monitoring by the parent firm in its role as blockholder. The author finds that long-term ECO 
performance is positively related to diversification before the offer, but this effect, as any 
other propositions, is not supported with statistical significance. Findings by Junker (2005) go 
into the same direction, as the explanatory power of efficiency gains for long-term ECO 
performance is less than half that of the announcement effect. To the degree that efficiency 
gains are associated with long-term performance, the subsequent relinquishment of control by 
the parent firm appears to convey the greatest benefits. The author views this finding as 
evidence that in the long-term, shareholders welcome the reduced risk of expropriation by a 
more powerful blockholder. This result is empirically confirmed by Klein et al. (1991), who 
document that the relinquishment of control after an ECO is associated with increases in firm 
value. 
6.3 Hypotheses development 
Of the existing literature on the efficiency effects of ECOs, the study by Junker (2005) is 
particularly applicable to the present purpose. In the theoretical part of this document (Section 
3), Junker’s two-dimensional framework (Figure 5 on p. 57) has been introduced to illustrate 
two points: that an ECO affects agency costs, and that it is a priori unclear if the net effect is 
positive or negative. Reductions in the costs of agency are here set equal to gains in 
efficiency, and Junker’s agency cost framework will therefore be used to guide the following 
formation of hypotheses. 
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Effects in some of the compartments of the agency cost framework are closely related. The 
nine compartments are therefore grouped into five ECO value levers140. Specifically, interest 
divergence is separated into three areas: focus, investment efficiency, and incentive 
compensation, each pertaining to one type of principal-agent relationship. Both principal-
agent relationships whose information environment is affected by an ECO are grouped into 
information asymmetry, and both relationships whose monitoring or bonding technology is 
affected are grouped into blockholder control. Overall, five separate value levers are defined, 
which jointly span almost all efficiency gains arguments suggested by the existing ECO 
literature141. The result is graphically summarized in Figure 17. The following hypothesis 
development around each of these five aspects is based on the rich literature review in Section 
3 of Junker (2005), whose set of hypotheses – after slight adjustment – is borrowed by this 
study142. 
Figure 17: ECO value levers 
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140  Junker (2005) groups these efficiency effects into four value levers. For reasons outlined below in 
this chapter, focus and investment efficiency are here decoupled. 
141  Propositions that these five categories do not span are limited to suggestions for which existing 
studies have not found empirical evidence or which have not been picked up by other studies 
(e.g., the underpricing proposition by Bühner (2004) or the cost advantage hypothesis by Wagner 
(2005), both presented above). 
142  The following subchapters concentrate on the theoretical part of hypothesis development, while 
their operationalization is presented in Chapter 6.4.2 on p. 172. 
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6.3.1 Focus 
Focus represents the first potential source of efficiency through an ECO. As for all five 
potential sources of efficiency, the development of hypotheses starts with review of the 
applicable existing literature before the likely effect of an ECO is considered and expressed as 
hypothesis. 
6.3.1.1 Existing research on focus 
The long list of literature on focus (or diversification, as its reverse) offers an ambiguous 
picture: Explanations why focus creates value appear as numerous as accounts on the benefits 
of diversification. Theoretical arguments for the benefit of diversification have been made on 
the grounds of coinsurance and economies of scale in borrowing (Lewellen (1971)), deep 
pockets (Bolton/Scharfstein (1990)), and multi-market contact (Scott (1982), 
Bernheim/Whinston (1990))143. Other proponents of diversification have pointed to potential 
economies of scope (Panzar/Willig (1981), to whom the concept is attributed). Teece (1980) 
and Teece (1982) deliver related arguments for the multiproduct firm, which are rooted in 
TCE. Broader aspects of internal resource capability have been advocated by Schoar (2002), 
Maksimovic/Phillips (2002), and Gomes/Livdan (2004). On the other hand, agency-inspired 
arguments have largely explained diversification as a negative result of managerial discretion 
(Stulz (1990)) or as a response to the undiversifiable employment risk of managers 
(Amihud/Lev (1981)). A unique view is presented by Ofek/Yermack (2000), who suggest that 
the organizational form is an adaptation to the nature of the information it needs to process: 
Focused firms may perform better if information is vague and not readily transmitted144. 
Empirical evidence reflects this controversy. On one side, diversification is associated with 
below-average Tobin’s q (Wernerfelt/Montgomery (1988), Lang/Stulz (1994)). Berger/Ofek 
(1995) and Berger/Ofek (1996) argue that diversification produces a real loss in firm value 
and show that diversified firms are traded at a discount relative to matching portfolios of 
focused firms (in the order of 14%). Morck et al. (1990) show that diversifying acquisitions 
lead to reductions in shareholder wealth, and Comment/Jarrell (1995) report diseconomies of 
scope during the 1980s. Burch/Nanda (2003) reconstruct the value of diversified firms after a 
spin-off and document that these transactions engender value improvements. In a second step, 
the authors show that these changes depend significantly on changes in diversity145. These 
pieces of evidence have proliferated the notion of a diversification discount and of superiority 
of focused business strategies. 
                                                 
143  Montgomery (1994) contains another overview of reasons for diversification, grouping these into 
market-power arguments, agency explanations, and resource considerations. She observes that 
despite of focus-increasing changes on the margin, US firms have remained widely diversified. 
144  An entire separate literature (here not reviewed) discusses focus from an organizational 
perspective (compare e.g., Chandler (1962)). 
145  The robust positive announcement-period abnormal returns of spin-offs (see Chapter 4.6.2 on p. 
98) further corroborate the view that focus enhances firm value. With regard to the effect on 
accounting measures, Markides (1995) documents a positive link between focus and profitability. 
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More recent research, on the other side, has called this conclusion into question: While the 
association between diversification and valuation may be valid, cause and effect may not be 
as assumed. Campa/Kedia (2002), in a comparison of panel data on firms with different 
degrees of diversification, argue that diversified firms may already have been valued at a 
discount before they diversified. Using various econometric techniques, the authors show that 
the diversification discount is not robust and may even turn into a diversification premium 
under certain methodological extensions. Villalonga (2004b) delivers similar evidence by 
relying on a probit model to recalculate the diversification discount against a control group 
that is matched on its propensity to diversify. She is able to confirm the findings by 
Campa/Kedia (2002). In a parallel publication, Villalonga (2004a) shows that the 
diversification discount may also have been induced by data distortions (such as strategically 
reported segment data). Contrasting segment data from Compustat to a new establishment-
level database (Business Information Tracking Series – BITS), results are not robust: While 
the use of Compustat data confirms earlier findings of a diversification discount, the use of 
BITS data does not deliver such evidence, if even signs of a diversification premium. 
Matsusaka (2001) argues that diversification affords some firms with a better fit between their 
capabilities and their lines of business. If diversified firms are valued at a discount, then this, 
he argues, is not so much a reflection of diversification but of the organizational capabilities 
of a firm. Finally, Lamont/Polk (2001) show that there are several interpretational variants to 
the diversification discount. The authors show that firms with diversification discounts have 
high subsequent returns, and that the diversification discount may therefore be an indication 
of a higher discount rate. It could also be interpreted as a result of the higher difficulty to 
value diversified firms, in which case diversification would indeed destroy value. Finally, 
Lins/Servaes (1999) show that the diversification discount is not robust to geographic 
variation. As an example, the authors find no significant evidence for a diversification 
discount in Germany, which is supported by the study of Gedajlovic/Shapiro (1998).  
6.3.1.2 Focus and ECOs 
While the merits of focused business strategies appear not yet fully understood, many 
practitioners and researchers assume that focused business strategies outdo a diversified 
approach. With regard to ECOs, this view is echoed by earlier studies, which test the 
hypothesis that ECOs create economic value by producing pure-play firms (e.g., Vijh (2002)). 
The first hypothesis adopts this view and proposes that an ECO creates value if the firm 
increases its focus through the transaction: 
(H6-1) The effect of an ECO on firm value is positively related to an increase 
in corporate focus after the ECO. 
6.3.2 Investment efficiency 
Investment efficiency represents the second potential source of efficiency through an ECO. 
Sometimes grouped together with focus (e.g., Junker (2005)), investment efficiency is closely 
related to the risks and merits of internal capital markets. While focus and investment 
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efficiency are related, a separate treatment may uncover details about their relationship and is 
therefore pursued. 
6.3.2.1 Existing research on investment efficiency 
In the development of his free cash flow hypothesis, Jensen (1986) argues that the payout of 
cash reduces the agency costs of a corporation. Free cash flow is seen as that portion of cash 
that is left after all positive NPV projects have been financed. If these funds remain within the 
company, its value is reduced as it can only be used for negative-NPV purposes. As 
prophesized by principal-agent theory, managers will try to make the free cash flow appear 
less than it actually is to avoid its distribution to shareholders, whereby managers’ private 
benefits would be curtailed. This may lead to underinvestment since shareholders will expect 
managers to underreport free cash flow and impose according discounts. Debt financing may 
provide better incentives because managers are obligated to pay out a fixed portion of the free 
cash flow to the suppliers of finance, which reduces the risk that these funds will be 
misallocated. This free cash flow hypothesis has been empirically confirmed by Lang et al. 
(1991) in the context of bidder returns, who find that the relation between cash flow and 
return differs significantly between bidders with and without positive NPV projects. In the 
same vein, Lee (1997) argues that the underperformance of equity issuers is related to the sale 
of primary shares, which exacerbates the free cash flow problem. 
Subsequent literature has developed a theory of internal capital markets. These internal 
markets may help overcome the disadvantages of external capital markets, such as the 
consequences of adverse selection risk described by Myers/Majluf (1984)) for situations of 
high information asymmetry (Servaes (1996)). In his description of internal markets, Stein 
(1997) attributes to headquarters the value-creating role of winner-picking, a term he applies 
to denote efficient redirections of capital across segments. Internal capital markets, the author 
argues, can be value-enhancing even if the CEO aims to maximize private benefits due to an 
alignment of incentives with regard to the profitability of the firm. Gertner et al. (1994) 
propose that internal capital markets are subject to better monitoring and facilitate the 
redeployment of assets across projects. De Motta (2003) conjectures that an internal capital 
market can alleviate incentive problems that multi-divisional firms bring along, such as 
division managers’ propensity to free ride on the public good of external monitoring. 
Internal capital markets, however, open the door to inefficient cross-subsidization between 
segments of a firm. Empire building, reputation, inertia, and overconfidence have been 
suggested as sources for such inefficient transfers. (Scharfstein/Stein (2000) develop a two-
tiered agency model that shows how rent seeking can impair the functioning of internal 
capital markets. Stein (2003) identifies empire building as a main risk to investment 
efficiency, which results from the fact “that managers may have a taste for running large 
firms, as opposed to simply profitable ones” (p. 121, also see Baumol (1959) or Williamson 
(1964)). The theoretical exposition of Inderst/Müller (2003) suggests that the absence of 
capital market discipline in centralized firms (i.e., when headquarters raises funds for multiple 
projects or units) may lead to ex-ante financing constraints. Matsusaka/Nanda (2001) offer an 
  
159
encompassing view that evaluates focus as a trade-off between the value of the real option to 
avoid the deadweight loss of external capital markets and the cost of overinvestment. 
In his analysis of the investment pattern of non-oil subsidiaries of oil companies at times of 
oil price changes, Lamont (1997) empirically shows that the investment patterns of business 
units are intertwined. Khanna/Tice (2001) show that internal capital markets may indeed 
increase flexibility: The authors show that diversified incumbents with a divisional structure 
react more effectively to the entry of a new competitor than focused firms do. At the same 
time, further empirical evidence delivers support for the proposition that transfers on internal 
capital markets can be inefficient. Shin/Stulz (1998) find that even when controlling for q, 
segment investment depends significantly more on its own cash flow than on that of other 
segments. In a study on spin-offs, Ahn/Denis (2003) document that after the transaction, high 
q segments receive higher investments, which they interpret as evidence that diversified firms 
allocate capital inefficiently. Divisive restructuring, they propose, increases investment 
efficiency. These effects have later been confirmed by Gertner et al. (2002), who have also 
chosen spin-offs as subjects-of-study. 
Rajan et al. (2000) develop a model to demonstrate how in a diversified firm, incentives to 
undertake the most efficient investment can break down. The first-best solution, in which all 
resources are directed to the division with the highest return, will not necessarily be achieved 
if managers are self-interested. Division managers may opt for less efficient, defensive 
investments to avoid sharing their otherwise higher surplus with divisions that, due to lower 
efficiency or fewer assets or both, cannot contribute equally. The authors show how an ex-
ante redirection by headquarters of resources toward less efficient divisions can remedy 
distorted investment incentives. Raising the asset base of less efficient divisions, and thereby 
their asset-weighted opportunities and expected contribution, more-efficient divisions have 
again an incentive to undertake efficient investments. This socialist redirection of funds 
toward less efficient divisions constitutes a cost of diversification that can explain the 
diversification discount, and Rajan et al. (2000) find empirical evidence that is consistent with 
their theoretical arguments. 
6.3.2.2 Investment efficiency and ECOs 
An ECO reduces the size of the internal capital market since the reduction in heterogeneity of 
the group of firms reduces the risk of inefficient cross-subsidizations. Furthermore, offer 
proceeds may be used to pay down debt or pay dividends, further reducing the amount of 
capital under managers’ discretion. These effects are expressed in two hypotheses. The first 
reflects the fact that low investment efficiency before the ECO provides greater opportunities 
for improvement, while the second relates to the actual increase of investment asymmetry 
through the transaction: 
H6-2a: The effect of an ECO on firm value is negatively related to high 
investment efficiency before the ECO. 
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H6-2b: The effect of an ECO on firm value is positively related to the increase 
in investment efficiency after the ECO. 
6.3.3 Information asymmetry 
After the ECO, the subsidiary is publicly listed and thus subject to all reporting requirements 
that such status entails. This improves investors’ ability to assess the earnings outlook of the 
parent firm and the subsidiary, and may as a result reduce prevailing information 
asymmetries. The following reviews the role of disclosure and information for firm value. 
6.3.3.1 Existing research on information asymmetry 
Early efforts to incorporate the role of information into models of market equilibrium are 
based on the concept of rational expectations, according to which security prices efficiently 
aggregate information across traders (Grossman (1976), Grossman (1978)). Prices react to 
information, and prices thus convey information146. These models assume that individual 
investors possess imperfect information, and that information may be asymmetrically 
distributed. As a first variant, information may be asymmetrically distributed among investors 
(e.g., Kyle (1985)). Such scenario commonly leads to an increase of the bid-ask spread since 
the market maker needs to provide for adverse selection, which in turn translates into higher 
cost of capital for the firm (Copeland/Galia (1983), Glosten/Milgrom (1985), and 
Amihud/Mendelson (1986), who show that expected return increases with the spread). 
Asymmetric distribution of information across investors may further decrease the liquidity of 
the respective stock (Diamond/Verrecchia (1991)). Instead of across investors, information 
may also be asymmetrically distributed across stocks. It has been argued that the risk of stocks 
increases when its price no longer reflects all information (e.g., Merton (1987) or Arbel et al. 
(1983) on neglected stocks). In their model of differential information, Barry/Brown (1985) 
show that securities for which there is little information have higher expected return than 
otherwise identical securities, which they attribute to estimation risk. Grossman/Hart (1980a) 
show the role of transaction costs and disclosure laws for the provision of information, 
arguing that, in the absence of transaction costs, it is in sellers’ interest to disclose the quality 
of the item in question. 
Disclosure is generally regarded as a means to reduce information asymmetry, which can 
reduce the cost of capital for a firm, consistent with the effects presented in the paragraph 
above (Diamond/Verrecchia (1991), Verrecchia (1999), Botosan (2000)). But disclosure may 
also come at a cost. At a minimum, this cost is comprised of the expenses for preparing and 
auditing the statements, while its true cost more importantly relates to the effect of disclosing 
proprietary information to competitors (Wagenhofer (1990), Healy et al. (1999)). Disclosure 
                                                 
146  Grossman/Stiglitz (1980) argue that the neoclassical assumption of perfect information cannot 
hold if arbitrage is costly since only informationally imperfect prices provide an incentive to seek 
(costly) information. The authors suggest instead “an equilibrium degree of disequilibrium” (p. 
393). 
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may further exacerbate information asymmetry among investors since some are likely able to 
evaluate the disclosed information better than others (Kim/Verrecchia (1994)). 
Empirical evidence is supportive of the proposition that improved disclosure leads to lower 
cost of capital. Verrecchia (2001) and Healy/Palepu (2001) provide literature surveys that 
come to the conclusion that accounting data bears relevance for firm value. As an example, 
Botosan (1997) finds that voluntary disclosure can lower the cost of capital and compensate 
for low analyst coverage. In her analysis, the author suggests that the disclosure of financial 
and nonfinancial as well as forecast and historical information can reduce the cost of capital. 
In a context of spin-offs, Krishnaswami et al. (1999) show that these transactions reduce 
information asymmetries, which is positively related to firm value. The authors also find that 
spin-offs are conducted by firms that suffer from higher levels of information asymmetry than 
industry- and size-matched peer firms. 
6.3.3.2 Information asymmetry and ECOs 
The improvement in disclosure through the ECO hinges on the quality differential between 
segment reporting and the disclosure of separate, audited financial statements. Prior studies 
have shown that segment reports contain relevant information (e.g., Swaminathan (1991), 
Berger/Hann (2003)). At the same time, the authors show that segment reporting is not 
immune to distortions and manipulation (Krishnaswami/Subramaniam (1999)). It can 
therefore be assumed that the transition of the subsidiary into an independent, publicly-listed 
company entails improvements in disclosure, which is summarized in two hypotheses. The 
first relates to information asymmetry as it prevails before the ECO to account for the fact that 
not all firms can profit alike from an ECO. The second hypothesis builds on the actual 
reduction in information asymmetry through the ECO, comparing the state before the 
transaction to the situation thereafter: 
H6-3a: The effect of an ECO on firm value is positively related to high 
information asymmetry before the ECO. 
H6-3b: The effect of an ECO on firm value is positively related to the reduction 
in information asymmetry after the ECO. 
6.3.4 Incentive compensation 
The fourth value lever builds on the effect of an ECO on the interest divergence between 
subsidiary shareholders and management. Incentive compensation represents an opportunity 
to reduce the cost of this agency relationship, and this possibility is appraised in the following 
two subchapters.  
6.3.4.1 Existing research on incentive compensation 
Incentive compensation lies at the core of principal-agent theory (compare Chapter 3.2.4.1 on 
p. 51), and also the paper by Jensen/Meckling (1976) – a contribution to the positive agency 
literature – touches briefly on the topic, noting that incentive compensation alters the 
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opportunity a manager has to capture non-pecuniary benefits. The simple agency model 
presented in Chapter 3.2.4.1 includes a sharing rule (there denoted by bonus rate b, which is 
applied to output y), and the literature contains various versions principal-agent models of the 
employer/employee relationship (e.g., Mirrless (1976), Holmström (1979), Grossman/Hart 
(1983)). This research has suggested to increase the pay-performance sensitivity of executive 
compensation through bonuses or grants of stock or options (e.g., Baker et al. (1988) or Tosi 
et al. (2000), who document that the variance of CEO pay depends substantially more on firm 
size than performance). In this regard, particularly option-based schemes have been endorsed 
(e.g., Hall/Murphy (2003) on their advantages and risks). Building on the Holmström (1979) 
informativeness principle, Holmström/Tirole (1993) note that the stock market is a superior 
monitor because the stock price includes information that could otherwise not have been 
extracted from a firm’s data. Gibbons (1998) provides an agency-based review of the 
complementarity of different incentive instruments. 
The literature has also recognized incentive compensation as a costly form of remuneration, 
since risk-averse managers demand a premium to compensate the risk that high effort on their 
part is not reflected in the performance measure. Put differently, a fixed salary insures 
executives against income fluctuations, for which they are willing to pay a premium in the 
form of lower salary if they are risk-averse. In such a case, the expected value of overall 
incentive compensation needs to be higher to represent equal utility (e.g., Garen (1994)). 
Higher uncertainty thus exacerbates the cost of incentive pay, and empirical research has 
confirmed a negative relationship between risk and incentives (e.g., Aggarwarl/Samwick 
(1999), Jin (2002)). Prendergast (2000), however, calls the trade-off between risk and 
incentives into question by arguing that empirical evidence to its support has so far only been 
lukewarm. A second cost of incentive compensation results from managers’ inability to 
diversify their exposure to variable compensation, for which they equally demand a premium 
(Lambert et al. (1991), Ofek/Yermack (2000), Hall/Murphy (2002)). Baker (2000) notes that a 
cost of the incentive contract also follows from the distortion of incentives, which the author 
evaluates by comparing two vectors: one that expresses the marginal product of the 
employee’s actions on the performance measure, and a second that expresses the marginal 
product of his or her actions on firm value. The distortion of the incentive contract increases 
with the angle between these vectors. 
Empirical analyses document a positive relationship between executive performance and pay. 
In a prominent study, Jensen/Murphy (1990) show that CEO wealth changes by about three 
dollars per USD 1,000 change in shareholder wealth, and that this pay-performance sensitivity 
is mainly afforded through stock ownership and options. The authors argue that this level is 
too low to be consistent with the effects of agency theory. Lippert/Moore (1994), however, 
reconcile that the cross-sectional variation of pay is broadly consistent with efficient 
contracting, low as pay-performance sensitivity may overall be. John/John (1993) consider 
the implications of capital structure for top-management compensation and equally conclude 
that low pay-performance sensitivity can be efficient. Specifically, the authors detect a 
negative relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and leverage. The effectiveness of 
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existing compensation arrangements has further been demonstrated by Garen (1994), who 
uses a model of comparative statistics, and Haubrich (1994), who shows that even small 
amounts of risk aversion can result in low pay-performance sensitivity. Hall/Liebman (1998) 
observe that a 10% increase in firm value increases median CEO wealth by USD 1.25 million. 
The authors also document changes in payment practice: CEO compensation has increased by 
175% between 1982 and 1994147, which has been marked by a parallel sharp increase in the 
pay-performance sensitivity of CEO pay. In a later publication, Hall/Liebman (2000) ascribe 
this phenomenon to changes in corporate governance and in the market for corporate control. 
This positive relationship between pay and performance does not, however, automatically 
imply that compensation schemes that build on this relationship lead to higher firm value, as 
pay-performance sensitivity could be endogenously determined. In fact, the literature has 
delivered unclear evidence (Morck et al. (1988), McConnell/Servaes (1990), Loderer/Martin 
(1997)), Himmelberg et al. (1999), Demsetz/Villalonga (2001)), principally since the 
underlying causalities are difficult to capture. 
The literature has studied incentive compensation from a second perspective. This view builds 
on the notion that CEOs may wield undue power over their own pay. Their influence may 
thus corrode the representation of shareholder interests on the board of directors (Bebchuk et 
al. (2002), Bebchuk/Fried (2003)). Incentive compensation may serve to obscure above-
market pay levels extracted by managers, and a positive relationship between pay and 
performance does not necessarily imply a positive relationship between managerial 
contribution and performance (Bertrand/Mullainathan (2000), Bertrand/Mullainathan (2001)). 
A broad review of executive compensation, regarding both its structure and the pay-
performance relationship, is provided by Murphy (1999). 
6.3.4.2 Incentive compensation and ECOs 
The above studies on incentive compensation have focused on pay structures for top 
executives. As subsidiary managers, formerly division managers, become top executives, it is 
possible to tie their compensation to the subsidiary share price. The benefit of the ECO then 
depends on the improvement of such compensation scheme over payment structures for 
division managers. Incentive compensation for division managers can build on the stock price 
or accounting measures of the overall firm (Keating (1997)), but this provides only an 
imperfect signal of the performance of individual division managers, who would then all 
receive identical incentive rewards. Alternatively, tying reward to divisional accounting 
measures is prone to distortion and strategic reporting.  
While some studies show that business unit performance is sensitive to executive 
compensation (Lambert et al. (1993)), others come to the conclusion that while payment 
practices may vary, business unit performance may be unrelated to pay. Aggarwarl/Samwick 
(2003) find that the pay-performance sensitivity of division managers is lower than for top 
managers. This is consistent with findings from Hall/Liebman (1998), who document that 
                                                 
147  Compared to 379% for professional basketball players and 18% for professors. 
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equity-based payment structures, which are unavailable on a business unit level, provide 
incentives that are 53 times larger than changes in base salary and bonus. The current work 
therefore adopts two hypotheses, one to account for the finding that the introduction of 
equity-based executive compensation is associated with potential increases in performance 
and possibly firm value, and a second to reflect the fact that such arrangement will be most 
effective if managerial power over the pay setting process is effectively reined in: 
H6-4a: The effect of an ECO on firm value is positively related to the 
introduction of a stock option program or managerial equity ownership. 
H6-4b: The effect of an ECO on firm value is positively related to shareholder 
control over the pay setting process in the subsidiary. 
6.3.5 Blockholder control 
The vast majority of ECOs lead to a situation of blockholder control: Descriptive statistics 
show that parent firms retain a median of 72% of subsidiary shares after the offer (see Table 6 
on p. 27), representing not only substantial cash flow rights but also extensive corporate 
control rights over the subsidiary. Such blockholder control is often seen as the converse of 
the widely-held firm described by Berle/Means (1932)148. The typical Berle/Means firm may 
not prevail in its pure form in the US (Short (1994)), may not be representative across 
geographies (La Porta et al. (1999a)), and it may in fact be the result of political intervention 
rather than economic evolution (Roe (1996))149. Nonetheless, ownership dispersion remains a 
common feature of the US economy, to which blockholder control constitutes an exception 
that demands inquiry. 
6.3.5.1 Existing research on blockholder control 
Managers control the disposition of assets, however, their control is not unfettered: Managers 
are in turn controlled by the suppliers of capital (Stiglitz (1985)). As an arrangement of this 
overarching control function, blockholder ownership is tightly related to monitoring. Two 
traits of monitoring are crucial: First, that its benefits are captured by all shareholders, 
regardless if they have contributed to monitoring, which creates a positive externality 
                                                 
148  In Chapter V: The Evolution of Control, Berle/Means (1932) note: “Ownership of wealth without 
appreciable control and control of wealth without appreciable ownership appear to be the logical 
outcome of corporate development” (p. 66). Advantages of this constellation are seen in the fact 
that professional managers can be hired, since it is not likely that the owner is in fact also the 
most apt person to run the business, and in the transferability of ownership without interruptions 
to the course of business (see Fama/Jensen (1983b) for a discussion of this topic, which includes 
reviews of the roles of specialization, decision, and delegation). 
149  In his historical overview, Roe (1996) suggests that blockholder ownership has remained feeble in 
the US relative to other regions because political and popular forces have continuously curtailed 
the power of banks and insurance companies with regard to security ownership. The author 
concludes that the “… Berle-Means corporation arose to fit the kind of financial system that 
American history produced. It is an adaptation, not a necessity” (p. 287). See Section 9 for an 
international comparison. 
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(Grossman/Hart (1980b) in their paper on free riding or Demsetz/Lehn (1985) on the shirking 
by owners), and second, that monitoring is associated with fixed costs that allow economies 
of scale. The literature has studied blockholder ownership as a superior arrangement to 
individual monitoring (which is costly due to redundancy of efforts) or no monitoring 
(Pagano/Röell (1998)). In practice, blockholder roles are frequently assumed by financial 
intermediaries, and if these intermediaries are themselves not actively monitored by their 
investors, a problem of risks and incentives arises for the intermediary. Diamond (1984) 
presents a model that formally includes such delegation costs of the blockholding by financial 
intermediaries, showing that diversification within an intermediary can reduce agency costs. 
Zwiebel (1995) notes that blocks of shares are in many cases much smaller than control 
consideration would predict. The author develops a model of partial benefits of control (e.g., 
through coalition-building) that is reconcilable with small blocks of shares. Allen/Phillips 
(2000) show that the benefits of blockholder control are particularly large if ownership is 
combined with product market relationships (e.g., alliances or joint ventures). 
It is also recognized that blockholder control is costly because blockholders may expropriate 
other (minority) shareholders when a blockholder uses its power in its own interest rather than 
in the interest of all shareholders (Shleifer/Vishny (1997b), Johnson et al. (2000)). One format 
of this is collusion between blockholders and management at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Pagano/Röell (1998)). It has been documented that high divergence between 
cash flow and voting rights of blockholders exacerbates the expropriation of minority 
shareholders: Low cash flow rights of controlling shareholders increases its propensity to seek 
private benefits (Grossman/Hart (1988), Harris/Raviv (1988)). Into the same direction but 
from another angle, Burkart et al. (1997) argue that blockholder ownership entails agency 
costs because it may stifle managerial initiative through overmonitoring and excessive 
curtailment of managerial discretion. Holderness/Sheehan (1988) do however not confirm the 
proposition that firms or individuals hold majority ownership to expropriate corporate 
resources: If this were the case, majority ownership would not be as widespread a 
phenomenon as it is.  
Empirical evidence reflects both the benefits and the costs of blockholder control. 
Dyck/Zingales (2004) quantify the benefits of private control by comparing the price per 
share paid for privately negotiated transfers of controlling blocks in publicly traded 
companies to the prevailing market price. They find an average control premium of 14% 
across 39 countries, subject to substantial variance from –4% (Japan) to 65% (Brazil), with 
the US showing a slight premium of 1%. The authors further find that these control premiums 
decrease in the development of financial markets, proxied for by the state of accounting 
standards, antidirector rights, legal protection, and tax compliance. These findings can hence 
be interpreted as evidence that blockholder stakes are seen as a means to mitigate poor 
shareholder protection through legal institutions (see Section 9 for details). 
Barclay/Holderness (1989) also document that premiums are paid for blocks of shares, and 
Barclay/Holderness (1991) find that the announcement returns to block trades are positive and 
increase in the blockholder’s skills and expertise. 
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Edwards/Weichenrieder (2004) conduct an empirical study on the effects of blockholder 
ownership for German firms. The authors structure their analysis around control and cash 
flow rights and show that these have opposite effects on the value of equity: While increased 
control rights of a blockholder lower the market value of equity (due to the risk of 
expropriation and excessive control), its value increases through higher cash flow rights (as a 
result of improved monitoring through the blockholder)150. The net consequence to minority 
shareholders is thus a priori ambiguous. Edwards/Weichenrieder (2004) show that the 
presence of a blockholder may represent benefits to minority shareholders. This finding is 
consistent with a related earlier contribution to the topic: Holthausen et al. (1987) show that 
buyer-initiated block transactions engender permanent positive price reactions, which accrue 
to the benefit of existing (minority) shareholders. 
6.3.5.2 Blockholder control and ECOs 
The above discussion can be summarized in two hypotheses on the effects of blockholder 
control in an ECO. The first aims to capture the monitoring benefits that the ECO entails, 
while the second tests if the long-term relinquishment of control benefits minority 
shareholders. This separation follows Junker (2005), who argues that immediately after the 
ECO, control structures in the subsidiary are not yet well developed and that monitoring 
through a blockholder is thus particularly beneficial. In the long-term, the blockholder may 
have initiated collusion with subsidiary management or may otherwise extract private 
benefits, so that a reduction in blockholder control has a positive effect on firm value. As this 
second hypothesis relates to the absence of any blockholder, rather than just the parent firm, it 
is expressed with regard to subsidiary sovereignty: 
H6-5a: The effect of an ECO on firm value is positively related to the fraction 
of subsidiary ownership retained by the parent company immediately 
after the ECO. 
H6-5b: The effect of an ECO on firm value is positively related to the long-term 
sovereignty of the subsidiary. 
An overview of all nine hypotheses is provided in Table 24 on p. 178. 
6.4 Data and methods 
After the derivation of a set of efficiency-related hypotheses, this chapter turns to a 
presentation of the data and methods that will be used to test these. The following exposition 
consists of two parts, the first of which presents details of the cross-sectional regression 
approach, while the second presents the definition and operationalization of variables. 
                                                 
150  The authors are able to quantify the effect of each aspect individually through a separation 
between voting and non-voting shares and through an analysis of the exercise of control at annual 
shareholder meetings. 
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6.4.1 Cross-sectional regression approach and test statistics 
The previous chapter has concluded with the formulation of several hypotheses that express 
relationships between agency cost characteristics and abnormal return. Each hypothesis will 
be expressed by (at least) one variable, and in addition, a number of control variables will be 
jointly tested. The cross-sectional regression approach will therefore relate abnormal return to 
k independent (explanatory) variables (regressors). For sample firm i , the regression equation 
can be expressed as 
(6.1)   ARi = α i + β1F1i + β2F2i + ...+ βkFki + εi 
where α i denotes a constant, β  the respective coefficient for independent variable F , and ε 
the regression residual. These individual regression equations can be stacked for the N  firms 
in the sample and written in matrix form as 
(6.2)   y = Xβ + ε  
where y  represents an N +1 dimensional vector of abnormal return, X  an N x k  matrix of 
independent variables, β  a k x1 vector of coefficients, and ε an N x1 vector of residuals. X  
therefore aggregates a 1 x k  vector x  of independent variables across all N  sample firms. In 
the case of the present study, both N  and k  vary because different specifications of the 
regression model are tested. The present study applies OLS to estimate coefficients151. These 
are obtained as 
(6.3)   β = ( ′ X X)−1 ′ X y  
and supplemented by t-statistics of a test of the null-hypothesis that the respective coefficient 
is equal to zero. Estimating regression parameters via OLS assumes that residuals are 
normally distributed, independent, and stationary (Brockett et al. (1999))152. After a 
discussion of sample size and multicollinearity, the following subchapters therefore discuss 
the accommodation of potential violations of these OLS assumptions through quality-of-
model tests. 
6.4.1.1 Sample size 
The cross-sectional regression analysis relies on reduced samples of the ECOs studied in 
Sections 4 and 5. Three reasons underlie this reduction. First, financial institutions have been 
excluded since several variables do not apply to these as they do to industrial firms (e.g., 
those relying on Tobin’s q or total assets). Second, the long-term regression models rely on 
variables that are based on data at three years after the offer. A number of sample firms have 
                                                 
151  For a comparison of OLS to other (more advanced) techniques in a security return event study, 
see Karafiath (1994), who comes to the conclusion that OLS is well-specified. 
152  More specifically, residuals are assumed normally distributed with a mean of zero, cross-
sectionally uncorrelated (or not autocorrelated in a time-series context), with constant variance 
(i.e., homoskedastic), and uncorrelated with the explanatory variable (e.g., Henderson (1990)). 
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merged, have been acquired, or gone under at that point, reducing the number of firms 
available for regression analysis. Interpretation should be cognizant of the (unavoidable) 
existence of potential survivor bias in the regression results on long-term ECO performance. 
Finally, sample size is reduced through the unavailability of data. Specifically, segment data 
in Compustat is not available for all sample firms, as well as data on analyst forecasts in 
I/B/E/S. While this limitation may arguably be circumvented by resorting to less data-
demanding variables, it is seen as an explicit objective of this study to expand the existing 
ECO research through sophisticated techniques instead of merely replicating earlier work (as 
above circumvention would partially entail). Rather than estimating the regression models for 
a larger number of ECOs with less reliable data (and consequently poor expected insight), it is 
here preferred to apply an advanced approach to a smaller set of companies. To recognize the 
liability of a smaller sample, close attention will be paid to model specification and -fit to 
ensure that all relevant thresholds are met before conclusions are drawn. Exact sample size 
varies by model and is shown in the presentation of results. Overall, since this section 
borrows from an agency framework derived in a German context, the size of the reduced 
samples is still greater than sample size in German ECO studies, except for Junker (2005), 
with which it is commensurate. 
6.4.1.2 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity arises when regression parameters are mutually dependent. If it occurs, at 
least one regressor has a non-zero influence on at least one other regressor, thus hampering 
the identification of the influence of individual variables. Increasing multicollinearity reduces 
the ability to interpret the regression results. Multicollinearity may further lead to inefficient 
estimates of the regression parameters (i.e., parameters are incorrect or suffer from low 
statistical significance), and to high overall power of the model that cannot be attributed to 
individual parameters. Finally, multicollinearity may cause high sensitivity of the model to 
the exclusion of supposedly insignificant variables and to the alteration of sample size. 
Multicollinearity does not change the overall explanatory power of the model, but the 
attribution of explanatory power to individual variables. No definite test has been established 
to test for multicollinearity. Careful design of the regression models can reduce, but not 
eliminate the risk of multicollinearity. The present study therefore tests the correlation 
between all regressors to detect potential multicollinearity. Results are represented in a 
correlation matrix and values in excess of 0.50 separately assessed and considered in model 
construction. 
6.4.1.3 Quality-of-model tests 
R-squared. Both raw and adjusted R-squared are reported as measures of the goodness-of-fit 
of the regression models, i.e., to document the success in predicting the value of the left-hand 
variable. R-squared represents the fraction of dependent variable variance explained by the 
independent variables, and the derivation of its raw version is given as 
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(6.4)   R2 =1− ′ ˆ ε ˆ ε
(y − y ′ ) (y − y )  
where ˆ ε  is an N x 1 vector of estimated regression residuals and y  an N x 1 vector of the 
mean dependent variable (Cowan (2005)). Since the inclusion of additional variables can 
never decrease the explanatory power of a regression model (and R-squared will attain one if 
the number of explanatory variables equals the number of observations), its adjusted variant 
R 2 penalizes for the inclusion of additional explanatory variables (k). Specifically, it is given 
as 
(6.5)   R 2 =1− (1− R2) N −1
N − k . 
Its value is never larger than the regular R-squared and may even be negative for poor 
regression models. Adjusted R-squared is regarded the primary indicator of a regression’s 
explanatory power in this work. 
F-statistic. The F-statistic is based on a test that all coefficients of a regression model (less 
the intercept) are jointly zero. This hypothesis is rejected if the test statistic turns out 
significant, and it thus provides a measure of the statistical significance of the overall model. 
It is computed as 
(6.6)   F = R
2 k −1( )
1− R2( ) N − k( ) . 
Significance of the test statistic is inferred from an F-distribution with k −1 numerator and 
N − k  denominator degrees of freedom.  
White F-statistic. Estimating regression parameters via OLS relies on the assumption of equal 
residual variance. If this is not the case, OLS estimates may still be consistent, but as standard 
errors are no longer valid, models may exhibit poor specification or low power. White (1980) 
suggests an extension to the covariance matrix through an auxiliary regression by which the 
squared residuals are regressed on combinations of the independent variables (represented by 
the term in the parentheses in Equation (6.7)). The resultant test statistic is χ 2 distributed with 
k  degrees of freedom and tests the null hypothesis that the residual distribution is 
homoskedastic. Specifically, the modified covariance matrix is given as (compare 
MacKinnon/White (1985)): 
(6.7)   ˆ Σ White = NN − k ′ X X( )
−1 εi2
i=1
N∑ xi ′ x i⎛ ⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ ′ X X( )
−1. 
Durbin-Watson test. The Durbin-Watson statistic measures first-order residual serial 
correlation (Durbin/Watson (1950)). Residual serial correlation violates the OLS assumption 
of independence and is particularly problematic if lagged dependent variables are used in 
time-series regressions. Although the present study applies a cross-sectional regression 
without lagging, the Durbin-Watson statistic is nonetheless reported since serial correlation 
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may lead to understated standard errors. If regression residuals are serially uncorrelated, the 
Durbin-Watson statistic lies at 2, between 0 and 2 for the case of positive serial correlation, 
and between 2 and 4 for negative correlation. If it falls below a critical threshold, in this case 
set at 1.50, positive serial correlation cannot be ruled out (Johnston/DiNardo (1997)). To 
examine the potential understatement of regression standard errors in such a case, the serial-
correlation consistent standard error based on Newey/West (1987), which is introduced 
below, should be applied as a robustness check. The Durbin-Watson statistic is derived as 
(6.8)   DW = ˆ ε i − ˆ ε i−1( )2
i= 2
N∑ ˆ ε i2
i=1
N∑ . 
Jarque-Bera statistic. The Jarque-Bera statistic is based on a test of the null hypothesis that 
the regression residuals are normally distributed. Accordingly, if the test statistic is 
insignificant, the null hypothesis is not rejected and residual distribution assumed normal 
(Bera/Jarque (1981)). It is derived as 
(6.9)   JB = N − k
6
S 2 + K − 3( )
2
4
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
where S  represents the skew and K  the kurtosis of the distribution. Since normal distributions 
have skew of zero and kurtosis of three, the Jarque-Bera statistic attains zero for series that 
perfectly fit the normal distribution. The statistic follows a χ 2 distribution with two degrees 
of freedom. 
Akaike criterion. The Akaike criterion is one of two information criteria used in this study. 
These criteria build on the log-likelihood function as a measure of the information contained 
by a model relative to the theoretically true model. This goodness-of-fit measure is adjusted 
for characteristics of model construction, namely the number of explanatory variables relative 
to the number of observations. Smaller values of the information criteria represent 
specifications that are more parsimonious and thus preferred. The Akaike (1973) information 
criterion is derived as follows: 
(6.10)   AIC = 2k
N
− 2l
N
 
where l is the log-likelihood function:  
(6.11)   l = − N
2
(1− log(2π ) + log( ′ ˆ ε ˆ ε N)) . 
Schwarz criterion. The second information criterion used in this study follows Schwarz 
(1978). Its difference to the Akaike information criterion lies in a somewhat different penalty 
function for the inclusion of independent variables, as shown by the first fraction term in the 
equation below. It is equally interpreted as the Akaike criterion and derived as 
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(6.12)   SC = k logN
N
− 2l
N
. 
CUSUM test. The cumulative sum (CUSUM) test assesses the parameter stability of a 
regression model based on the cumulative sum of recursive residuals (Kianifard/Swallow 
(1996)). Specifically, this approach derives regression residuals for observation i  based on 
parameter estimates that use only the i −1 first observations of the sample, starting with the 
first k +1 observations up to N . The residuals from these regressions represent the one-step 
ahead forecast error, which is scaled to obtain recursive residuals. These are summed for each 
i  and then plotted to evaluate the presence of structural breaks. The test statistic is given as 
(6.13)   Wi = wi s
i= k +1
N∑  
where s denotes the regression standard error across all N , and wi the recursive residual, 
given as 
(6.14)   wi = yi − ′ x ib
1+ ′ x i( ′ X iXi)−1 xi
 
where b is a 1 x k  vector of coefficients estimated across the i −1 observations. The 
numerator represents the one-step ahead forecast error, and the denominator a scaling factor, 
which depends on the forecast’s variance. In the present work, a CUSUM test is applied to the 
sample sorted by offer date and thus assesses if regression parameters are stable over time. 
The value of wi under the null hypothesis is zero, and rejection of the null hypothesis is 
reported at the 5% significance threshold. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
as suggested by White (1980) are used as a robustness to assess the validity of individual 
coefficient estimates, particularly when the White F-statistic is statistically significant for the 
overall model. This variant extends the method introduced above to the calculation of test 
statistics for individual coefficients. The parameter estimates of the model remain unchanged, 
while the estimation of new standard errors may lead to changes in test statistics. 
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation-consistent standard errors. The White (1980) 
covariance matrix above assumes that the error terms are serially independent. Newey/West 
(1987) have introduced an extended covariance estimator that remains unaffected by serial 
correlation and is therefore applied as a second robustness check. Specifically, its covariance 
matrix is given as 
(6.15)  
ˆ Σ NW = NN − k ′ X X( )
−1 ˆ Ω ′ X X( )−1
ˆ Ω = N
N − k εi
2xi ′ x i
i=1
N∑ + 1− jq +1
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ xiεiεi− j ′ x i− j + xi− jεi− jεi ′ x i( )i= j +1
N∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
j=1
q∑⎡ ⎣ ⎢ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ 
⎥ 
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where q, the truncating lag, represents the number of serial correlations that are used to 
evaluate the dynamics of the error. This statistic helps to interpret the robustness of results if 
the Durbin-Watson test statistic suggests that residuals may be serially correlated. As above, 
coefficient estimates remain unchanged, while the modification to the covariance matrix lead 
to new estimates of the standard error and therefore of the coefficient t-statistics. 
6.4.2 Definition and operationalization of regression variables 
6.4.2.1 Independent variable of focus 
Research on corporate diversification abounds, and so do approaches to measure focus. Most 
of these build on segment financial information, which is aggregated to arrive at a single 
number that represents the degree of focus (or diversification) for the overall firm. One option 
is suggested by Caves et al. (1980), who propose a procedure that calculates the average 
overlap of a firm’s segment with all other firm segments based on standard industry 
classification (SIC) codes153. A related and more sophisticated variant takes the input/output 
relationships between industries into account (e.g., Fan/Lang (2000)). As an alternative, Rajan 
et al. (2000) advocate a measure of diversification based on the coefficient of variation of the 
asset-weighted Tobin’s q for each segment. Since relying on industry classification data may 
not fully capture the focus effect of an ECO since focus may also be increased within an 
industry sector, and since the effects of Tobin’s q will be captured in the variable relating to 
investment efficiency, the present study follows prior ECO research in the measurement of 
focus and builds its calculation on segment assets (e.g., Vijh (1999) and Bühner (2004), also 
compare the robustness check in Rajan et al. (2000)). Specifically, focus is measured as the 
change in the Herfindahl index of segment asset, given as 
(6.16)   FOCUS _ delta = FOCUSpost − FOCUSpre  
(6.17)   FOCUS = AT( )2
j=1
n∑ AT
j=1
n∑⎛ ⎝ ⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
−2
 
where n  denotes the number of segments, AT  the total book value of segment assets, and the 
subscripts pre  and post  the years before and after the ECO, respectively. The Herfindahl 
index takes the value one if the company is focused on a single business segment, while zero 
represents the (theoretical) lower extreme if the firm is infinitely unfocused. 
The theoretical arguments on focus have shown that the literature is divided on the relative 
risks and benefits of focused business strategies. It has therefore been argued that the variable 
FOCUS is only included as a robustness check. In contrast to other variables such as 
                                                 
153  The procedure suggested by Caves et al. (1980) takes the value of zero if two segments have the 
same 3-digit SIC code, one if their SIC code is different at the 3-digit but identical at the 2-digit 
level, and two otherwise. These values are first summed for each segment and then across 
segments to arrive at an overall firm measure. A larger value of this Caves-Porter-Spence 
concentric metric thus indicates greater diversity. 
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investment efficiency or transparency – two by and large positive characteristics – only the 
change in focus (and not its pre-ECO prevailing state) is included in the regression models. 
Following the prevailing approach in the existing ECO literature, the expected sign for the 
variable FOCUS in H6-1 is positive, although some studies (e.g., Matsusaka (2001), 
Villalonga (2004b)) call such expectation into question. 
6.4.2.2 Independent variables of investment efficiency 
The measurement of investment efficiency generally builds on financial data for the various 
business segments of a firm. For the sample studied by Junker (2005), such data was 
unavailable because reporting by segment was not required in Germany. Since a direct 
calculation of investment efficiency was thus infeasible, the author has applied several 
proxies instead, such as capital expenditures to sales ratio of the overall firm, debt reduction 
and dividend payout after the ECO, and the implementation of potential impediments against 
continued inefficient allocations. In the US, the situation is more favorable for the researcher. 
The Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 14 (SFAS 14) of the Financial Standards 
Board and SEC regulation S-K were introduced in 1976, requiring publicly traded firms to 
report their activities by major lines of business (Rajan et al. (2000), Lang/Stulz (1994)). This 
rule has been extended by the introduction of SFAS 131 in 1997, which requires that segment 
reporting follow the firm’s operating segments. Rajan et al. (2000) confirm that this 
amendment was mainly a formal change, since already under the older SFAS 14, segment 
reporting had followed major lines of business in the vast majority of cases, and is thus an 
appropriate foundation for an empirical analysis of capital allocations within a firm. 
Different approaches have been discussed in the literature to calculate investment efficiency. 
Shin/Stulz (1998) apply a regression of a segment’s capital expenditures on imputed segment 
Tobin’s q, the segment’s own, and the firm’s remaining segments’ cash flow. The authors 
hypothesize that if internal capital markets are efficient, the allocation of funds will be more 
dependent on the firm’s overall cash flow than on a segment’s own cash flow (which, in its 
extreme, would be an equivalent to a set of stand-alone firms). Billett/Mauer (2003) compare 
a segments’ capital expenditures to its own after-tax cash flows to derive a transfer measure, 
the efficiency of which they assess by comparing a segment’s ROA to the firm’s asset-
weighted average ROA. While an intriguing approach, such method cannot be used in the 
present study because hardly any sample firms report segment earnings154. 
This study applies a measure based on the expositions in Rajan et al. (2000). Consistent with 
the approach recommended therein, investment efficiency INVEFF is derived by comparing 
investments across segment and is calculated as 
                                                 
154  Even if information on segment earnings were available, such data would be prone to strategic 
reporting. The present work relies on measures such as capital expenditures and assets instead, 
which are arguable less susceptible to such behavior (Rajan et al. (2000)). 
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(6.18)  INVEFFi =
ATj (q j − q ) I jATj
− I j
ss
ATj
ss − w j
I j
ATj
− I j
ss
ATj
ss
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
j=1
M∑⎡ ⎣ ⎢ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ ⎥ j=1
M∑
ATi
 
where AT  denotes the segment book value of assets, the subscript j  each of the M  segments 
of firm i , the superscript SS  the asset-weighted average of all single-segment firms that 
operate in the same 3-digit NAICS code industry class as the respective segment in the ECO 
year, q Tobin’s q, approximated for each segment by calculating the asset-weighted q of all 
relevant single segment firms in the same industry as the respective segment, and q  the 
arithmetic average of segment q for sample firm i . The symbol I  denotes capital 
expenditures, and w j  the weight of segment j  based on book value of assets. In order to 
preserve observations, sales has been used instead of assets when AT  is unavailable. When 
comparing investment efficiency over time (pre-ECO to post-ECO), the efficiency ratio for 
one firm employs only one of either assets or sales to ensure consistency. 
Equation (6.18) can be interpreted as a double-weighted average of the industry-adjusted 
investments that a firm’s segments receive. The first weight is size, proxied for as asset value: 
Larger segments should make more investments (in absolute terms). The second weight is 
Tobin’s q: Segments with better investment opportunities should make more investments. 
Jointly, this implies that segments with above-average q should receive transfers, and more so 
if they are bigger. The second summation term in Equation (6.18) is a company-wide 
adjustment factor to account for the possibility that more-diversified firms might 
systematically invest more than single-segment firms, which could be the case since their 
average larger size might facilitate access to funds. Overall, with regard to Equation (6.18), 
larger values of INVEFF denote higher levels of investment efficiency. 
It is not possible to calculate Tobin’s q directly by business segment due to the unavailability 
of segment market prices. Its approximation through single segment firms in the same 
industry, as implied by the above approach, is justified by the findings of Schmalensee (1985) 
and Wernerfelt/Montgomery (1988), who show, in cross-sectional analyses, that the majority 
of variance in accounting measures and in Tobin’s q can be explained by industry-specific 
factors. Estimation of segment q through inference from stand-alone firms in the same 
industry has therefore become adopted by other related studies (e.g., Lang/Stulz (1994)). For 
the present purposes, the calculation of q follows the recommendations by Chung/Pruitt 
(1994) as introduced in Equation (2.1) in Chapter 2.3.5.3 on p. 32. 
The relationship between ECO value creation and investment efficiency has been expressed in 
two ways. The first, measuring the prevailing (lack of) investment efficiency before the ECO, 
relies on INVEFF in the year before the ECO. Low investment efficiency is assumed to 
provide a large opportunity for the ECO to create value, thus the expected sign of the variable 
for H6-2a is negative. The second relationship aims to capture the change in investment 
efficiency through the ECO, is calculated for each firm as the change in investment efficiency 
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from the year before the ECO (denoted by the subscript pre) to the year after the ECO 
(subscript post ): 
(6.19)   INVEFF = INVEFFpost − INVEFFpre . 
Since an increase in investment efficiency is assumed to have positive effects on firm value, 
the expected sign of the variable for H6-2b is positive. 
6.4.2.3 Independent variables of information asymmetry 
Through the creation of an additional public company, disclosure requirements are practically 
doubled through the ECO. This increase in transparency, as argued above, may decrease 
agency costs since shareholders and investors can more directly observe the actions of 
managers, while it may at the same time entail adverse effects through the disclosure of 
formerly proprietary information to competitors. To capture the effects of transparency, 
several approaches have been applied in academic literature155, many of which originate from 
the accounting literature and most of which are based on an assessment of analyst coverage. 
Related studies have proxied for information asymmetry by focusing on the number of 
security analysts that cover the involved firms. If the sum of analysts covering parent 
company and subsidiary is greater than the number of analysts covering the consolidated 
entity before the offer (i.e., the parent company), transparency is assumed to have increased 
(e.g., Junker (2005) on ECOs or Gilson et al. (2001) on ECOs and spin-offs). Instead of the 
number of analysts, other studies base their measure of transparency on the quality of the 
forecasts that these deliver (e.g., Gilson et al. (2001), Dische (2002), 
Athanassakos/Kalimipalli (2003), or Baik/Park (2003)). Yet another approach is the reliance 
on the standard deviation of the residuals of a market model as an indication for transparency, 
which builds on the presumption that these are smaller if investors share more homogenous 
beliefs about a firm’s earnings outlook (e.g., Bhagat et al. (1985), Blackwell et al. (1990), 
Krishnaswami et al. (1999), Krishnaswami/Subramaniam (1999), the last of who also use 
more refined techniques). This approach has been embraced by several German ECO studies 
since it circumvents limitations in the availability of analyst forecast data (Elsas/Löffler 
(2001), Junker (2005)). 
The present study proxies information asymmetry through measures of the quality of analyst 
forecasts, following early suggestions by Barry/Brown (1985). The applied approach follows 
the distinction of investor informedness and consensus suggested by Holthausen/Verrecchia 
(1990). Each component will be expressed by variables that rely on analyst consensus 
forecasts published through I/B/E/S, denoting arithmetic averages of analyst EPS forecasts at 
various points in time. These consensus forecasts are periodically updated as the end date of 
the forecast period (e.g., FYE) draws closer (or has already passed, if sufficient time elapses 
between its end and the actual earnings release). The present study bases its proxies of 
                                                 
155  An overview of earlier work on this topic is given in the publication by Givoly/Lakonishok 
(1984). 
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asymmetry on the first available EPS consensus forecast for the FYE before and after the 
ECO156. 
The accuracy of the average analyst forecasts is taken as a proxy for the first component, 
informedness. Specifically, it is derived as the mean absolute deviation of the consensus 
forecast: 
(6.20)   ASYM1= PEPS − EPS
EPS
 
where PEPS  denotes the I/B/E/S consensus forecast (i.e., average predicted earnings per 
share). The dispersion of analyst forecasts is taken as a proxy for consensus, the second 
component suggested by Holthausen/Verrecchia (1990). It is derived as the absolute 
coefficient of variation of EPS forecasts: 
(6.21)   ASYM2 = 1
M
PEPS j − PEPS( )
j=1
M∑ PEPS  
where PEPS j  denotes the predicted earning per share by analyst j  and M  the number of 
analysts. 
As for investment efficiency, the relationship between information asymmetry and ECO 
performance is analyzed in two ways, relating to the prevalence of information asymmetry 
before the ECO and to its reduction through the ECO. For the first, the pre-ECO levels of 
ASYM1 and ASYM2 will be used, while the second represents the change of both asymmetry 
variables157, given as 
(6.22)   ASYM_delta = ASYM pre − ASYM post . 
High levels of information asymmetry before the ECO represent larger opportunities to 
benefit from the transaction, and greater reductions indicate that these opportunities have been 
exploited. Therefore, the expected signs for the coefficients of ASYM1, ASYM2, 
ASYM1_delta, and ASYM2_delta – the variables used to test H6-3a and H6-3b – are positive 
in all cases. 
                                                 
156  To ensure the robustness of such an approach, consensus forecasts should be comprised of a 
sufficiently large number of individual forecasts. Across the present sample, for firms covered by 
I/B/E/S, the average consensus forecast is based on 12.4 individual analyst (group) forecasts, 
thereby generally meeting above requirement. 
157  While the variables relating to changes of focus or investment efficiency are based on post- minus 
pre-ECO values (more positive qualities), the variables for changes of information asymmetry use 
pre- minus post-ECO values (less negative qualities). The underlying rationale is purely practical 
and aims to ensure that all change variables have positive expected signs. 
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6.4.2.4 Independent variables of incentive alignment 
The ECO represents an opportunity to tie the compensation of subsidiary executives to the 
performance of subsidiary stock. This, it has been argued, has the advantage of increased 
incentive alignment between management and shareholders, while it also bears that risk of 
abuse and excessive payment schemes. The incentive alignment effect of an ECO is measured 
by two variables, of which one aims to capture its benefits, while the other aims to represent 
the provisions taken to mitigate the risks of incentive pay. The first variable, INFL, measures 
the total number of stock reserved for executive and employee stock option plans as a 
percentage of total subsidiary shares immediately after the offer, taken from annual reports 
and proxy statements. While admittedly a rather crude approach, this measurement should 
nonetheless reflect differences in the inclination of firms to use performance-based 
compensation arrangements158. Higher degrees of incentive-based pay are assumed superior, 
and the expected sign of this variable for H6-4a is therefore positive. 
The second variable aims to capture provisions that rein in excessive pay levels, which may 
result from performance-based compensation. Broadly following the approach used by Junker 
(2005), the representation of blockholder interests on the subsidiary board of directors has 
been analyzed. Jointly, the ECO subsidiaries had 1,287 board members, for each of whom the 
relationship to the parent company has been reviewed. The portion of board members who are 
concurrently executive officers in the parent firm is then used as the variable ALIGN to proxy 
for the commitment with which the influence over the pay-setting process is reined in. A 
higher degree of parent executive representation on the subsidiary board of directors is 
assumed to have positive effects, and the expected sign of the regression coefficient for H6-4b 
is therefore positive. 
                                                 
158  More elaborate measurements of stock-based compensation have also been considered (e.g., 
based on data from the EXECUCOMP database) but decided against since they would have 
severely curtailed the number of available observations (119 of the 174 ECO subsidiaries are not 
included in EXECUCOMP). Junker (2005) for a German sample, in contrast, applies a 0/1 
dummy to measure if stock-based compensation has been introduced or not. Not only does the 
present approach go beyond the one applied by Junker, but the inclusion of a binary dummy 
variable, while appropriate in a German setting, would be futile for a US sample due to the high 
prevalence of incentive compensation: 94% of subsidiaries in the current sample have introduced 
stock-based compensation schemes after the ECO. 
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Table 24: Efficiency hypotheses and explanatory variables 
Hypothesis Variable Calculation Expectedsign
Focus
H6-1 The effect of an ECO on firm value is 
positively related to an increase in 
corporate focus through the ECO.
FOCUS_delta Change in segment asset Herfindahl 
index pre-ECO to post-ECO
+
Investment efficiency
H6-2a The effect of an ECO on firm value is 
negatively related to high investment 
efficiency before the ECO.
INVEFF Size and Tobin's q -weighted 
average of industry-adjusted 
segment CapEx-to-assets ratio
-
H6-2b The effect of an ECO on firm value is 
positively related to an increase in 
investment efficiency through the 
ECO.
INVEFF_delta INVEFF post-ECO minus pre-ECO +
Information asymmetry
H6-3a The effect of an ECO on firm value is 
positively related to high information 
asymmetry before the ECO.
ASYM1
ASYM2
Absolute % deviation of I/B/E/S 
consensus forecast from actual EPS
Coefficient of variation of I/B/E/S 
consensus forecast
+
+
H6-3b The effect of an ECO on firm value is 
positively related to a reduction in 
information asymmetry through the 
ECO.
ASYM1_delta
ASYM2_delta
ASYM1 pre-ECO minus post-ECO
ASYM2 pre-ECO minus post-ECO
+
+
Incentive compensation
H6-4a The effect of an ECO on firm value is 
positively related to the introduction 
of a stock option program or 
managerial equity ownership.
ALIGN Percentage of subsidiary shares 
reserved for stock option program 
or managerial stock plan
+
H6-4b The effect of an ECO on firm value is 
positively related to shareholder 
control over the pay setting process in 
the subsidiary.
INFL Percentage of subsidiary board of 
directors seats held by parent 
executives
+
Blockholder control
H6-5a The effect of an ECO on firm value is 
positively related to the fraction of 
subsidiary ownership retained by the 
parent company immediately after the 
ECO.
OWNPAR Percentage of subsidiary ownership 
retained by the parent immediately 
post-ECO
+
H6-5b The effect of an ECO on firm value is 
positively related to the long-term 
sovereignty of the subsidiary. 
FLOAT Percentage of subsidiary shares 
widely held three years post-ECO
+
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6.4.2.5 Independent variables of blockholder control 
Control is proxied for by blockholder ownership. Since this may change over time, the 
variable relating to control is the only one that changes between the short- and the long-term 
analyses. For the analysis of the announcement effect, it is assumed that the parent company 
is the only blockholder, and the variable is thus comprised of the percentage of ownership in 
the subsidiary retained by the parent company directly after the ECO. For the long-term, this 
proxy is extended for other blockholders and is measured as the percentage of subsidiary 
shares that are free float at three years after the offer. Shares are assumed to be free float when 
they are not held by investors with at least 5% of shares, the disclosure of which is required 
by the SEC and is included in company proxy statements on Schedule 13D and 13G. 
Following from the theoretical arguments above, parent (blockholder) control directly after 
the offer (variable OWNPAR) is assumed to have positive effects, while high blockholder 
ownership in the long-term (variable FLOAT) is assumed to provoke negative net effects. The 
expected sign of both variables on blockholder control in H6-5a and H6-5b is therefore 
positive. 
Table 24 provides an overview of the efficiency hypotheses and the variables that will be used 
to test these, as well as their operationalization and expected signs. 
6.4.2.6 Dependent variables 
The short-term analysis uses CAR for the [–15 0] day event window as main dependent 
variable, following the observation that abnormal return starts to increase about two weeks 
before the ECO announcement (compare Figure 9 on p. 97). Event windows of different 
lengths are included as additional robustness checks. The long-term regression models 
encounter the difficulty that BHAR, the reference measure of abnormal return, exhibits 
substantial skew (compare Barber/Lyon (1997) and Chapters 5.4.5.1 on p. 123 and 5.6.1 on p. 
138 of this document). This departure from the normality assumption of the regression 
approach has been accommodated in earlier literature by standardizing the variable (e.g., 
Junker (2005) with regard to ECOs). The standardized measure, cumulative standardized 
prediction error (CSPE), represents the main left-hand variable for the regression models of 
long-term abnormal return in this study, while BHAR and straight CAR will be applied as 
robustness check. The computation of CSPE is given as 
(6.23)   CSPEi = ARit
t=1
T∑ 1T − 2 ARit2t=1
T∑ . 
6.4.2.7 Control variables 
Eight control variables are included in the regression models to account for influence factors 
that are unrelated to agency costs. These control variables may explain (a part of) the residual 
abnormal return after agency related factors have been taken into consideration and may thus 
potentially close explanatory gaps, or they may interact with agency cost variables and thus 
allow a more accurate assessment of the relationships that underlie ECO performance. The 
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number and type of control variables included in existing research varies greatly, which 
reflects the fact that there is no general rule on this topic. While it is preferable to control for 
more potential influence factors, additional control variables increase the risk of data mining, 
subtract the attention from the hypothesis-derived variables, and make the model unwieldy, 
burdening it with an excessive number of variables. The eight control variables included in 
this study represent a compromise, loosely based on the approach by Junker (2005). The eight 
control variables fall into three categories: financial ratios, firm size, and market condition. 
Four financial ratios are included in the regression model: two profitability measures 
(EBITDA margin and ROA, denoted accordingly), book-to-market ratio (B2M), and leverage 
(LEV), all relating to the parent company for the year of the ECO. The calculation of these 
proceeds as outlined in Chapter 2.3.5 on p. 30 and is therefore not reiterated. Two firm size 
variables are included: the absolute level of parent assets during the year of the ECO (SIZE) 
and the ratio of subsidiary assets to parent assets after the ECO (SIZE_rel). Finally, two 
market condition variables are included. The first measures the difference in return on a 
CRSP value-weighted US stock market index during the calendar year after the ECO to the 
calendar year before the ECO (PERFDIFF), and thereby combines the two separate prior and 
post-ECO market timing control variables applied by Junker (2005). The second control 
variable for market condition represents the total number of IPOs during the calendar year 
before the ECO (IPOPRIOR). An overview of control variables for this study is given in 
Table 25. 
Table 25: Control variables 
Control variable Calculation
EBITDA Ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization to sales
ROA Ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization to assets
M2B Ratio of market capitalization to book value of equity
LEV Ratio of non-equity positions to total assets
SIZE Total assets
SIZE_rel Ratio of subsidiary assets to parent assets
PERFDIFF Post-ECO calendar year return on CRSP market index minus pre-ECO value
IPOPRIOR Number of IPOs during calendar year before the ECO
 
6.5 Results 
The presentation of regression results proceeds in two parts. The first summarizes variable 
descriptive statistics, and the second contains the detailed regression results for the short-term 
analysis of the announcement effect, the long-term analysis of abnormal return of the parent 
company, and the long-term analysis of abnormal return of the subsidiary. 
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6.5.1 Explanatory variable statistics 
The first column of Table 26 displays the number of observations available for each variable. 
The full number of observations amounts to 156, since 18 ECOs have been excluded from the 
full sample for belonging to the financial service sector (NAICS code starting with 52). 
Variables relating to information asymmetry and the creation of transparency represent the 
bottleneck, reducing the number of available observations by over one half, following from 
the fact that data on analyst forecasts is not obtainable on I/B/E/S for all sample firms. The 
number of observations for the variable FLOAT is reduced since a number of sample firms no 
longer exist at three years after the offer (the reference point for this variable). Finally, 
missing entries for book-to-market ratio and leverage are mainly due to a number of negative 
entries for book value of equity as reported by Compustat, which have been excluded from 
the calculation of descriptive statistics to avoid potential misrepresentation. Since the cases of 
missing observations do not line up across variables, the number of observations included in 
the regression models is lower than the minimum for individual variables. 
The following columns show the average, median, and range of the explanatory variables. All 
variables that measure a change from the year before the ECO to the year thereafter (suffix 
“_delta”) have minima below zero and maxima greater than zero, indicating that changes have 
occurred in both directions. ALIGN, INFL, OWNPAR, and FLOAT can attain values 
between zero and one, as reflected by the entries in the last two columns, while the descriptive 
statistics of financial ratios and size measures largely follow their presentation in Section 2.3 
on p. 25159. Both average and median values indicate that focus has not changed after the 
ECO. The increase in focus brought about through the ECO, as measured by the Herfindahl 
index of segment assets, appears to have been offset by concurrent changes to the mix of 
business segments160. Similarly, variables related to investment efficiency and asymmetry 
show that these characteristics have not increased for the median ECO parent firm through 
after offer161. Constant averages do of course also not imply that these variables have 
remained stationary for individual firms (and that their inclusion thus remains relevant for the 
cross-sectional analysis), as witnessed by the reported standard deviations. All variables 
exhibit non-zero standard deviations, which indicates that the variance of these variables may 
serve to explain differences in ECO performance. 
Regarding the remaining variables, ECO subsidiaries reserve on average one eighth of their 
shares for the issuance of common stock, and on average 29% of subsidiary supervisory board 
                                                 
159  Minor differences to the presentation above follow from the fact that the regression analysis is 
based on 156 ECOs of non-financial firms, while the presentation in Section 2 is based on the full 
sample of 174 cases. 
160  This supposition is supported by (unreported) calculations that show that both the average and 
median number of business segments, as reported by Compustat, is larger in the year after the 
ECO than in the year before the transaction across the 174 ECO parent firms in the sample. 
161  This finding stands in contrast to the results of Gilson et al. (2001), who report that corporate 
separations entail noticeable increases in analyst forecast accuracy. This difference may at least 
partially be attributable to the fact that Gilson et al. (2001) analyze an undifferentiated sample of 
different types of conglomerate breakups (spin-offs, ECOs, and tracking stock offerings). 
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seats are assumed by parent executives (while there are also cases where the board is fully 
comprised of parent managers – or not at all). 117 of the original 156 subsidiaries are still 
publicly traded three years after the offer, while the remaining firms have been delisted for 
various reasons (most frequently after a merger or an acquisition). For the subsidiaries whose 
stock remains publicly traded, free float has increased to approximately 40% at 36 months 
after the ECO. 
Table 26: Descriptive statistics of right-hand variables 
Variable Observations Average  Median Std-Dev Minimum Maximum
FOCUS_delta 122 -0.02 0.00 0.31 -0.72 1.82
INVEFF 132 0.00 0.00 0.09 -0.98 0.20
INVEFF_delta 105 0.01 0.00 0.10 -0.21 1.03
ASYM1 106 1.20 0.20 4.12 0.00 30.00
ASYM1_delta 90 -0.35 -0.05 4.33 -15.84 29.15
ASYM2 96 0.40 0.05 2.12 0.00 20.00
ASYM2_delta 77 0.00 -0.01 0.68 -1.38 4.99
ALIGN 156 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.00 0.58
INFL 156 0.29 0.29 0.18 0.00 1.00
OWNPAR 156 0.67 0.72 0.20 0.00 0.94
FLOAT 117 0.45 0.38 0.29 0.00 1.00
EBITDA 156 0.09 0.14 0.50 -5.45 0.72
ROA 156 0.11 0.12 0.14 -0.68 0.42
M2B 147 4.77 2.79 6.62 0.40 55.08
LEV 150 0.61 0.62 0.18 0.20 0.94
SIZE 156 13.60 2.25 37.37 0.02 262.87
SIZE_rel 155 0.32 0.19 0.43 0.00 3.19
PERFDIFF 156 0.09 0.05 0.24 -0.44 0.37
IPOPRIOR 156 542 578 167 137 874  
Correlation coefficients of the explanatory variables are presented in Table 27. Underlined 
values represent correlation coefficients greater than 0.50, which are particular prone to cause 
issues of multicollinearity and are therefore individually discussed. Eight such cases exist. 
The first show the almost perfect negative correlation between investment efficiency before 
the ECO and its reduction through the ECO. This relationship is fully expected and indicates 
that firms with the lowest efficiency have benefited most through the ECO. When 
appropriate, INVEFF and INVEFF_delta will therefore not be included jointly in the 
regression models to allow a correct reading of individual coefficients. 
The next six of the eight cases occur between the various variables relating to information 
asymmetry. In addition to the same effect as for investment efficiency (correlation between 
pre-ECO value and subsequent change), ASYM1 and ASYM2 as well as their respective 
changes are highly correlated. This indicates that poor analyst forecast accuracy goes hand in 
hand with high dispersion of individual forecasts and confirms the initial assumption that 
these proxies measure the same underlying phenomenon – information asymmetry. To 
account for their correlation, the same procedure will be applied as for investment efficiency: 
Only one of these four variables will be included in the regression models when appropriate. 
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The eighth and last case indicates high correlation between two control variables, namely 
EBITDA margin and ROA. This finding is also unsurprising, given that as measures of 
profitability, both variables share the same numerator. While correlation between control 
variables does not affect the test of the hypothesized agency relationships, separate tests of all 
control variables will assess the individual influence of EBITDA and ROA. 
Table 27: Correlation coefficients of explanatory variables 
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FOCUS_delta 0.46 -0.42 0.14 0.13 0.23 0.22 0.01 -0.12 0.05 0.28 -0.05 -0.18 0.01 0.22 0.05 0.04 -0.04 -0.06
INVEFF -0.99 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.19 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.07
INVEFF_delta 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.05 0.07 0.19 0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.07 -0.08
ASYM1 0.76 0.84 0.84 0.02 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.10 -0.19 -0.07 0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.07
ASYM1_delta 0.68 0.83 0.12 0.05 0.03 -0.10 -0.10 -0.12 -0.13 0.13 -0.03 0.07 -0.13 0.03
ASYM2 0.90 -0.01 0.05 -0.12 -0.07 -0.10 -0.17 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.10 -0.06
ASYM2_delta 0.12 -0.07 0.02 -0.21 -0.32 -0.21 0.02 0.13 -0.04 -0.03 0.05 0.13
ALIGN -0.10 -0.07 0.08 -0.14 -0.20 0.12 -0.10 -0.10 -0.02 0.24 -0.13
INFL 0.16 -0.27 0.02 0.04 0.08 -0.03 -0.08 -0.14 0.01 -0.02
OWNPAR 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.17 0.04 0.09 0.14 -0.04
FLOAT 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.16 -0.01 0.14 -0.10
EBITDA 0.71 -0.42 0.06 0.07 -0.10 0.01 -0.06
ROA -0.14 -0.05 0.07 -0.15 0.03 -0.13
M2B -0.10 -0.05 0.01 0.28 -0.08
LEV 0.32 -0.21 -0.03 -0.09
SIZE -0.13 0.07 0.02
SIZE_rel -0.08 0.09
PERFDIFF -0.15
Correlation coefficients >0.50 are underlined.
 
6.5.2 Structure and approach 
The following three subchapters present the results from the regression analyses of the short-
term ECO announcement effect, the long-term performance of the parent company, and the 
long-term performance of the subsidiary, respectively. Each subchapter contains a table with 
details of the regression models, which are identically structured. 
Each table contains up to 27 regression models with different combinations of dependent, 
explanatory, and control variables. Individual models are labeled in the top row, and labels 
starting with A refer to models of the announcement effect (first subchapter), B to models of 
the long-term parent performance (second subchapter), and C to models of the long-term 
subsidiary performance (third subchapter). Variables are grouped into two panels: The upper 
contains the ten efficiency variables for the hypothesized relationships, while the lower panel 
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shows the eight control variables. Model statistics are included in a third panel in the bottom 
part of each table. 
The inclusion of different models is based on the following approach. The first model (label 
X00) represents the base case with all agency and all control variables. The next model (X01) 
contains all agency but no control variables and thus gives an indication of the explanatory 
power of the hypothesized relationships alone. The following eight models (X02 through X09 
– termed control models henceforth) include all efficiency variables and each control variable 
separately to detect multicollinearity of control variables and potential effects of control 
variables on efficiency variables. The next model (X10), if applicable, includes all efficiency 
variables and only those control variables whose coefficients have been statistically 
significant at the 10% level when included either jointly or individually. Models after that 
(X11 and higher – termed efficiency models from here on) contain variations of efficiency 
variables and only the significant control variables. In summary, models X00 and X01 
represent two base cases, models X02 through X09 serve to eliminate unneeded control 
variables (since their inclusion would unnecessarily burden the model), and model X10, if 
applicable, an adjusted base case with significant control variables only. Models X11 and 
higher test various agency relationships under the inclusion of significant control variables. 
Notations for statistical significance follow the general convention applied in this document 
(see Chapter 4.5.1 on p. 87). 
6.5.3 Short-term regression results 
Results for the regression analyses of the ECO announcement effect are presented in Table 
28, which extends across several pages and starts on p. 190. In the following, regression 
models will be presented in sequence of their labels. 
6.5.3.1 Base models 
The first model (A00) shows that the coefficients of six of the ten efficiency variables and 
three of the eight control variables are statistically significant at p-values of 10% or smaller. 
While the joint inclusion of correlated variables does not allow an interpretation of individual 
coefficients at this point, R-squared of 83% indicates high explanatory power of included 
variables. The fact that adjusted R-squared lies only slightly below that at 74% implies that 
the penalty for the inclusion of insignificant variables is low. Based on the highly significant 
F-statistic of 9.2, the possibility that all coefficients are jointly zero can be ruled out. The 
White F-statistic is insignificant, showing that regression residuals are homoskedastic, while 
the Durbin-Watson test statistic hints at mild serial correlation. The Akaike and Schwarz 
criteria are both negative and thus mirror the high R-squared of the model and confirm the 
very high fit of the model. Lastly, the Jarque-Bera statistics is insignificant, and normality of 
the residual distribution can thus be assumed, while insignificant results from the CUSUM 
test show that the sample does not exhibit structural breaks. 
Model A01 presents the second base case, in which all control variables have been excluded. 
As expected, the exclusion of variables leads to a reduction of R-squared, and as some of 
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these excluded variables were statistically significant, adjusted R-squared also drops. Even 
though explanatory power of the model falls by about 10%, R-squared attains 71% (adjusted 
R-squared 64%), showing that the hypothesized efficiency variables alone may account for 
around two thirds of the ECO announcement effect. Diagnostic statistics for model A01 show 
that residuals exhibit heteroskedasticity, while all other test results attest high model quality. 
6.5.3.2 Control models 
As outlined above, the following eight models A02 through A09 include each control variable 
separately to assess its validity and potential interaction with efficiency variables. Instead of 
introducing all characteristics of these eight control models, their results will be presented if 
relevant. The three control variables that exceeded significance thresholds in the A00 base 
model were LEV, SIZE, and SIZE_rel. With the exception of SIZE, these remain statistically 
significant when separately included, while no other control variable apart from these three 
exhibits significance in these control models. There are overall four agency-related variables 
that show significance in all but one model (A05), in which another, previously insignificant 
variable, exceeds the 5% p-value threshold, while one of the other four variables becomes 
insignificant. The control variable in question, LEV, is itself statistically significant and will 
therefore be included in later variants of the short-term model. 
The signs, the order of magnitude, and the statistical significance of the coefficients of 
efficiency variables are stable across all eight models, indicating that there are no interaction 
effects between control variables and efficiency variables. All control models exhibit 
comparable characteristics with highly significant F-values, R-squared consistently in excess 
of 70% and adjusted R-squared consistently in excess of 60%, sporadic evidence of residual 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, and otherwise benign diagnostic test statistics. An 
exception is presented by model A08, in which the inclusion of the insignificant control 
variable PERFDIFF induces a structural break, as witnessed by the significant CUSUM test. 
In summary, three control variables will be included in the following models (LEV, SIZE, 
SIZE_rel). 
6.5.3.3 Efficiency models 
Model A10 presents the adjusted base case with three control variables and all efficiency 
variables. Since only insignificant (control) variables have been excluded relative to A00, the 
drop in R-squared is not matched by a reduction in adjusted R-squared. With two exceptions, 
diagnostic statistics indicate high quality of the model. The first exception is the detection of 
heteroskedasticity and the second the elevated Jarque-Bera statistic, indicating nonnormality 
of regression residuals. Both issues are further explored in subsequent variants of the model. 
Having determined the appropriate control variables, the analysis can turn to its main part, the 
inspection of the hypothesized agency relationships. For these, descriptive statistics have 
shown that the two investment efficiency variables and the four information asymmetry 
variables are highly correlated. Therefore, the next six models A11 through A16 show their 
individual effects. For the analysis of investment efficiency, only ASYM2_delta will be 
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included of the four information asymmetry variables since, as will be shown, it delivers the 
highest explanatory contribution of these. Of the investment efficiency variables, Model A11 
includes only INVEFF, a representation of the pre-ECO prevailing state of investment 
efficiency. It exhibits the expected negative sign: Lower investment efficiency before the 
separation of parent and subsidiary represents high opportunity to benefit from the ECO. The 
coefficient is significant at p < 0.05, and model diagnostic statistics indicate high quality of 
the overall model. Exchanging INVEFF for INVEFF_delta (model A12), explanatory power 
of the model increases by three percentage points, while also inducing residual nonnormality. 
Regarding INVEFF, however, the coefficient exhibits all hypothesized characteristics: It is 
positive and highly statistically significant at p < 0.01, and will therefore be included in 
further variants of the model instead of INVEFF. Both models (A11 and A12) indicate that 
the relationships between investment efficiency and the effect of an ECO on firm value are as 
hypothesized. 
Models A13 through A16 inspect the effect of information asymmetry. Model A13 includes 
ASYM1 as the only variable pertaining to this field, representing the accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts before the offer. Low accuracy presumably embodies large improvement 
opportunities through an ECO. Regression results confirm this supposition, as the coefficient 
is positive and highly statistically significant with a t-statistic of 7.6. The contrast in which 
this result stands to the initially negative coefficient for this variable in the A00 base model 
reflects the high correlation between the information asymmetry variables and underlines the 
importance of including these variables separately. Explanatory power of model A13 lies at 
an R-squared value of 67% (62% adjusted), and low values for the Akaike and Schwarz 
information criteria also attest high model fit. As throughout so far, F-values are significant at 
the 1% threshold. Switching the pre-ECO value to the change variable ASYM1_delta, 
hypothesized relationships are further confirmed, as it also has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient (p < 0.01). Turning from forecast accuracy to the dispersion of 
forecasts, model A15 includes its pre-ECO value and shows that at a t-value of 8.76, high 
dispersion of analyst forecasts indeed goes along with a larger ECO announcement effect. 
Results are also as expected by including the change variable instead, and the respective t-
value rises once again, attaining 8.94. Overall, both hypotheses on information asymmetry are 
clearly confirmed, and the dispersion of analyst forecasts and its reduction are more strongly 
related to the ECO announcement effect than their mean accuracy. 
Turning to the remaining variables, FOCUS_delta, ALIGN, and OWNPAR are not 
statistically significant. While ALIGN exhibits a statistically significant (and directionally 
expected) value for its coefficient in one model (A15), this finding is not robust to any 
variations to model structure. FOCUS_delta attains a statistically significant coefficient value 
only for some of the initial eight control models. OWNPAR is insignificant throughout. These 
variables therefore appear unrelated to ECO announcement return. Finally, INFL, the 
representation of parent executives on the subsidiary board of directors, is highly and 
consistently related to ECO announcement return. The statistical significance of its coefficient 
oscillates between the 1% and 10% thresholds, but exhibits at least some significance in all 
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efficiency models. Analysis of the properties of independent variables has shown that two of 
the three control variables included so far are highly correlated: SIZE and SIZE_rel. Their 
separate inclusion shows that model characteristics remain virtually unchanged – with the 
exception of the Jarque-Bera statistic, which falls below the critical threshold in both cases. 
The occurrence of heteroskedasticity can therefore be traced to the joint inclusion of these two 
control variables. Models A17 and A18 show their individual inclusion. Based on superior 
values for the Jarque-Bera and Durbin-Watson statistics, coupled with the observation that in 
five out of seven efficiency models the t-statistic for the coefficient of SIZE is larger than for 
SIZE_rel, SIZE_rel is dropped. 
Model A17 is regarded as the representative result of the short-term regression analysis. Three 
control variables are relevant: The ECO announcement effect increases with low leverage, 
larger parent firms, and larger relative subsidiaries. Increases in investment efficiency, 
reductions in information asymmetry, and larger parent executive representation on the 
subsidiary board go hand in hand with more positive ECO announcement returns. The 
explanatory power of the model is 73% (adjusted R-squared 68%), reflected by indicators of 
high model fit. Residuals pass all tests on heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, residual 
normality, and structural breaks. 
6.5.3.4 Robustness checks 
The remaining short-term models A19 through A26 represent three types of robustness 
checks: variation of the event window length of the dependent variable, accommodation of 
thinly traded stock in the dependent variable, and calculation of the model using 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The base model for these checks is A16, chosen 
for its high explanatory power, which is put to test in the following models. Models A19 
through A23 test different event window durations as dependent variable, covering the 
previously untested five-day increments up to one month before the ECO announcement. 
Results indicate that the models based on the [–10 0] day to [–20 0] day event windows 
exhibit the highest explanatory power and the most robust diagnostic statistics. Explanatory 
power drops substantially for the shortest [–5 0] day event window (R-squared 25%, adjusted 
10%), which can be interpreted as a reflection of the build-up of abnormal return before the 
actual announcement (compare Figure 8 on p. 96): Longer event windows capture the 
announcement returns for all firms, while this short window implies a situation where some 
firms have already realized (all) abnormal returns while others have not yet attained any. In 
extension to the discussion in Section 4, the regression results may indicate that the run-up of 
abnormal return (captured in Section 4 only as an average across the full sample) is not 
uniformly distributed across firms, but that the 174 ECOs can be divided between cases that 
exhibit such run-up and cases that do not. 
Regarding the quality of the regression models for longer periods, results for [–25 0] day and 
[–30 0] day windows are slightly lower than for [–10 0] day to [–20 0] day windows, but 
substantially better than for the [–5 0] day window, further confirming the supposition 
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above162. The slight fall-off in quality of models based on longer event windows may follow 
from the general limitation of classic event studies on longer horizons, as these are susceptible 
to undesired influences. ASYM2_delta and the two control variables LEV and SIZE_rel are 
the most robust variables, while the statistical significance of coefficients for INFL and 
INVEFF_delta is subject to fluctuation. Signs for all variables are unaffected. 
Model A24 is an extension of model A16 to test the effect of including a dependent variable 
that accounts for thinly traded stock based on the Scholes/Williams (1977) adjustment. Under 
this variation, explanatory power and fit of the model even increase slightly, and the two 
models are otherwise nearly identical. The last two models include standard errors that are 
based on heteroskedasticity-consistent variants: Newey-West for model A25 and White for 
model A26. The examination of heteroskedasticity-consistent test statistics follows from the 
observation that the White F-statistic has been elevated in some cases (e.g., models A01, A10, 
and A19). The presence of heteroskedasticity may impair a correct reading of the significance 
of individual coefficients, and a robustness check is in order. Furthermore, the Newey-West 
variant assesses the robustness of the model with regard to serial correlation, since the 
Durbin-Watson statistic has delivered sporadic evidence of this phenomenon. 
Results of these robustness checks confirm the solidity of the efficiency models: All 
coefficients found significant remain significant at equal if not higher levels of significance. 
In addition, this robustness check uncovers two supplementary pieces of information. First, 
heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics for INVEFF_delta are smaller than the regular 
variant, while those for ASYM2_delta are larger. This points at unequal residual variance as a 
potential cause for the observation that the former has not been found robust to changes in the 
length of the event window, while the latter has turned out to be the most robust efficiency 
variable. Second, both models show some statistical significance of ALIGN. This result has 
turned up sporadically in earlier models, but heteroskedasticity may have masked its full 
effect. Hence, the overall conclusion will be extended by the confirmation of H6-4a. 
6.5.3.5 Short-term regression summary 
Both hypotheses on investment efficiency (H6-2a, H6-2b) are fully confirmed, as are both 
hypotheses on information asymmetry (H6-3a, H6-3b). Both hypotheses pertaining to 
incentive compensation are also confirmed (H6-4a, H6-4b), although the association of H6-4a 
with ECO performance appears somewhat weaker than that of H6-4b. The hypotheses on 
focus and blockholder control need to be rejected (H6-1, H6-5a). Hypothesized relationships 
                                                 
162  Further analyses deliver additional support. Results obtained for the [-5 0] day window exhibit an 
extraordinarily high Jarque-Bera statistic of 30.97, indicating a highly nonnormal residual 
distribution. This phenomenon is expected if a part of the sample realizes abnormal 
announcement returns with greater advance than others. Dropping SIZE_rel, which has solved 
nonnormality in model A16, reduces the Jarque-Bera statistic of model A19 only to still-
extraordinary 17.01 (p < 0.001). Nonnormality therefore appears to be inherent in the [-5 0] day 
dependent variable. The residual distribution of the [-5 0] day window is skewed at 1.28 and 
leptokurtic at 5.68, both consistent with the above supposition. 
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are either confirmed or not detected, i.e., no variable has delivered evidence that runs counter 
to the suggested relationships. Leverage and size control variables exhibit statistically 
significant coefficients. 
Figure 18: Variable comparison (short-term regression analysis) 
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Contribution of explanatory variables to overall ECO performance 
Short-term regression analysis, based on model A25
Efficiency variables Control variables
 
Jointly with control variables, the explanatory power of agency-related factors attains about 
70%. The relative importance of individual factors is exhibited in Figure 18163. Of all 
efficiency variables, improvements in investment efficiency are by far most closely associated 
with a positive ECO announcement effect, accounting for about half of these. Second most 
closely associated are reductions in information asymmetry, followed by incentive 
compensation and control over the pay-setting process, which each account for about 10% of 
the influence of efficiency variables. The effect of control variables is dominated by the 
strong and negative influence of leverage, which attains the highest (absolute) value of 
influence of all variables. Size effects are noticeably smaller and positive, and the relative 
parent/subsidiary size variable has higher import than the absolute measure of parent size. 
                                                 
163  Construction of Figure 18 broadly follows the “highly simplified approach” by Junker (2005), as 
the author himself refers to it (p. 354): Each right-hand variable coefficient that is statistically 
significant at a p-value of 0.10 or smaller is adjusted by a measure of the variable distribution. 
Coefficients for variables that are centered on zero (such as INVEFF_delta or ASYM2_delta) are 
multiplied with the standard deviation of the variable, while those that are strictly positive or 
negative (all others) are multiplied with variable averages. Resulting values are scaled to 100%. 
Control variables are included to provide the full picture, even though model A01 and the eight 
control models (A02 through A09) have shown that the explanatory power of agency-related 
variables remains high even if these are excluded. 
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Table 28: Short-term regression results 
Model A00 A01 A02
Dependent variable [-15 0] CAR [-15 0] CAR [-15 0] CAR
Observations 54 54 54
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- 0.07 -0.09 -0.10
(0.68) (-2.05) ** (-1.80) *
FOCUS_delta + -0.06 -0.08 -0.08
(-1.42) (-2.12) ** (-2.09) **
INVEFF - 0.80 0.55 0.58
(1.02) (0.66) (0.68)
INVEFF_delta + 1.81 2.09 2.07
(2.42) ** (2.54) ** (2.46) **
ASYM1 + -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(-2.54) ** (-2.32) ** (-2.27) **
ASYM1_delta + 0.02 0.01 0.01
(1.78) * (1.12) (1.07)
ASYM2 + 0.27 0.33 0.33
(2.49) ** (3.16) *** (2.89) ***
ASYM2_delta + -0.05 -0.10 -0.09
(-0.50) (-1.15) (-0.93)
ALIGN + 0.24 0.22 0.22
(1.74) * (1.55) (1.55)
INFL + 0.10 0.06 0.06
(1.86) * (0.95) (0.95)
OWNPAR + 0.02 0.09 0.09
(0.42) (1.45) (1.44)
EBITDA +/- 0.08 0.03
(0.47) (0.18)
ROA +/- 0.20
(1.02)
M2B +/- -0.01
(-1.22)
LEV +/- -0.25
(-2.96) ***
SIZE +/- 0.00
(1.97) *
SIZE_rel +/- 0.08
(1.72) *
PERFDIFF +/- 0.06
(1.28)
IPOPRIOR +/- 0.00
(-0.41)
R-squared 83% 71% 71%
Adjusted R-squared 74% 64% 63%
F-statistic 9.19 *** 10.54 *** 9.37 ***
White F-statistic 0.94 1.90 ** 2.37 **
Durbin-Watson test 1.43 1.52 1.52
Akaike criterion -2.45 -2.24 -2.21
Schwarz criterion -1.75 -1.84 -1.77
Jarque-Bera statistic 1.14 0.41 0.31
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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Table 28 continued 
Model A03 A04 A05
Dependent variable [-15 0] CAR [-15 0] CAR [-15 0] CAR
Observations 54 54 54
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- -0.13 -0.06 0.06
(-2.43) ** (-1.25) (0.91)
FOCUS_delta + -0.09 -0.08 -0.04
(-2.25) ** (-2.00) * (-1.21)
INVEFF - 0.50 0.86 0.60
(0.61) (1.00) (0.79)
INVEFF_delta + 1.85 2.18 2.20
(2.21) ** (2.65) ** (2.90) ***
ASYM1 + -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
(-2.48) ** (-2.36) ** (-2.57) **
ASYM1_delta + 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.18) (1.17) (1.65)
ASYM2 + 0.37 0.31 0.30
(3.39) *** (2.83) *** (3.05) ***
ASYM2_delta + -0.12 -0.08 -0.08
(-1.32) (-0.83) (-1.03)
ALIGN + 0.23 0.23 0.29
(1.63) (1.59) (2.15) **
INFL + 0.06 0.07 0.06
(0.94) (1.10) (1.00)
OWNPAR + 0.09 0.08 0.06
(1.55) (1.27) (1.12)
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/- 0.24
(1.30)
M2B +/- -0.01
(-1.24)
LEV +/- -0.21
(-2.99) ***
SIZE +/-
SIZE_rel +/-
PERFDIFF +/-
IPOPRIOR +/-
R-squared 72% 72% 76%
Adjusted R-squared 65% 65% 70%
F-statistic 9.89 *** 9.85 *** 12.16 ***
White F-statistic 1.62 1.60 1.02
Durbin-Watson test 1.71 1.48 1.43
Akaike criterion -2.25 -2.24 -2.40
Schwarz criterion -1.80 -1.80 -1.96
Jarque-Bera statistic 0.05 0.06 4.35
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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Table 28 continued 
Model A06 A07 A08
Dependent variable [-15 0] CAR [-15 0] CAR [-15 0] CAR
Observations 54 54 54
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- -0.09 -0.10 -0.09
(-2.08) ** (-2.39) ** (-1.94) *
FOCUS_delta + -0.08 -0.08 -0.08
(-2.16) ** (-2.18) ** (-2.09) **
INVEFF - 0.56 0.38 0.52
(0.67) (0.47) (0.63)
INVEFF_delta + 2.07 1.86 2.14
(2.49) ** (2.29) ** (2.58) **
ASYM1 + -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(-2.24) ** (-2.06) ** (-2.40) **
ASYM1_delta + 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.03) (1.09) (1.26)
ASYM2 + 0.33 0.31 0.35
(3.14) *** (2.93) *** (3.25) ***
ASYM2_delta + -0.10 -0.09 -0.12
(-1.14) (-1.05) (-1.29)
ALIGN + 0.22 0.23 0.18
(1.52) (1.66) (1.23)
INFL + 0.07 0.08 0.05
(1.06) (1.30) (0.90)
OWNPAR + 0.08 0.07 0.08
(1.36) (1.20) (1.41)
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/-
M2B +/-
LEV +/-
SIZE +/- 0.00
(0.65)
SIZE_rel +/- 0.10
(1.83) *
PERFDIFF +/- 0.04
(0.89)
IPOPRIOR +/-
R-squared 71% 73% 72%
Adjusted R-squared 64% 66% 64%
F-statistic 9.49 *** 10.41 *** 9.61 ***
White F-statistic 2.05 ** 2.08 ** 1.76 *
Durbin-Watson test 1.53 1.33 1.50
Akaike criterion -2.22 -2.28 -2.23
Schwarz criterion -1.78 -1.84 -1.78
Jarque-Bera statistic 0.48 1.61 0.08
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No Yes
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Table 28 continued 
Model A09 A10 A11
Dependent variable [-15 0] CAR [-15 0] CAR [-15 0] CAR
Observations 54 54 58
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- -0.08 0.07 0.10
(-1.15) (1.11) (1.56)
FOCUS_delta + -0.09 -0.05 -0.04
(-1.94) * (-1.34) (-1.30)
INVEFF - 0.55 0.48 -0.96
(0.65) (0.67) (-2.47) **
INVEFF_delta + 2.08 1.92
(2.48) ** (2.68) **
ASYM1 + -0.03 -0.03
(-2.28) ** (-2.21) **
ASYM1_delta + 0.01 0.01
(1.11) (1.53)
ASYM2 + 0.34 0.26
(3.12) *** (2.87) ***
ASYM2_delta + -0.10 -0.07 0.12
(-1.14) (-0.86) (9.12) ***
ALIGN + 0.21 0.30 0.11
(1.36) (2.42) ** (0.95)
INFL + 0.06 0.10 0.14
(0.95) (1.92) * (2.52) **
OWNPAR + 0.09 0.03 0.03
(1.43) (0.49) (0.54)
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/-
M2B +/-
LEV +/- -0.26 -0.29
(-3.64) *** (-3.99) ***
SIZE +/- 0.00 0.00
(2.38) ** (2.61) **
SIZE_rel +/- 0.09 0.12
(1.99) * (2.60) **
PERFDIFF +/-
IPOPRIOR +/- 0.00
(-0.20)
R-squared 71% 80% 73%
Adjusted R-squared 63% 74% 68%
F-statistic 9.37 *** 12.56 *** 14.28 ***
White F-statistic 1.74 * 2.00 ** 0.92
Durbin-Watson test 1.51 1.24 1.53
Akaike criterion -2.21 -2.52 -2.40
Schwarz criterion -1.77 -2.00 -2.05
Jarque-Bera statistic 0.35 16.65 *** 2.11
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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Table 28 continued 
Model A12 A13 A14
Dependent variable [-15 0] CAR [-15 0] CAR [-15 0] CAR
Observations 54 63 62
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- 0.10 0.17 0.20
(1.55) (2.64) ** (2.82) ***
FOCUS_delta + -0.03 0.01 0.02
(-0.79) (0.39) (0.54)
INVEFF -
INVEFF_delta + 1.32 1.22 1.25
(3.40) *** (3.48) *** (3.34) ***
ASYM1 + 0.02
(7.61) ***
ASYM1_delta + 0.02
(6.46) ***
ASYM2 +
ASYM2_delta + 0.12
(8.94) ***
ALIGN + 0.18 0.16 0.16
(1.47) (1.23) (1.11)
INFL + 0.13 0.18 0.15
(2.37) ** (3.15) *** (2.54) **
OWNPAR + 0.03 -0.01 0.00
(0.58) (-0.22) (-0.05)
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/-
M2B +/-
LEV +/- -0.28 -0.37 -0.38
(-3.92) *** (-5.01) *** (-4.59) ***
SIZE +/- 0.00 0.00 0.00
(2.43) ** (2.66) ** (1.96) *
SIZE_rel +/- 0.12 0.05 0.04
(2.46) ** (1.92) * (1.68) *
PERFDIFF +/-
IPOPRIOR +/-
R-squared 76% 67% 61%
Adjusted R-squared 71% 62% 55%
F-statistic 15.34 *** 12.11 *** 9.19 ***
White F-statistic 0.90 0.52 0.82
Durbin-Watson test 1.49 1.67 1.52
Akaike criterion -2.46 -2.21 -2.08
Schwarz criterion -2.09 -1.87 -1.74
Jarque-Bera statistic 7.05 ** 8.02 ** 4.00
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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Table 28 continued 
Model A15 A16 A17
Dependent variable [-15 0] CAR [-15 0] CAR [-15 0] CAR
Observations 56 54 54
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- 0.11 0.10 0.13
(1.73) * (1.55) (2.01) *
FOCUS_delta + 0.01 -0.03 -0.02
(0.39) (-0.79) (-0.48)
INVEFF -
INVEFF_delta + 1.78 1.32 1.41
(4.93) *** (3.40) *** (3.48) ***
ASYM1 +
ASYM1_delta +
ASYM2 + 0.12
(8.76) ***
ASYM2_delta + 0.12 0.11
(8.94) *** (8.29) ***
ALIGN + 0.24 0.18 0.15
(2.02) ** (1.47) (1.20)
INFL + 0.19 0.13 0.11
(3.62) *** (2.37) ** (1.89) *
OWNPAR + -0.04 0.03 0.05
(-0.71) (0.58) (0.88)
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/-
M2B +/-
LEV +/- -0.27 -0.28 -0.30
(-3.79) *** (-3.92) *** (-3.96) ***
SIZE +/- 0.00 0.00 0.00
(2.36) ** (2.43) ** (2.05) **
SIZE_rel +/- 0.11 0.12
(2.31) ** (2.46) **
PERFDIFF +/-
IPOPRIOR +/-
R-squared 75% 76% 73%
Adjusted R-squared 71% 71% 68%
F-statistic 15.73 *** 15.34 *** 14.83 ***
White F-statistic 0.71 0.90 0.47
Durbin-Watson test 1.64 1.49 1.56
Akaike criterion -2.42 -2.46 -2.37
Schwarz criterion -2.06 -2.09 -2.04
Jarque-Bera statistic 21.17 *** 7.05 ** 2.33
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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Table 28 continued 
Model A18 A19 A20
Dependent variable [-15 0] CAR [-5 0] CAR [-10 0] CAR
Observations 54 54 54
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- 0.06 0.00 0.07
(0.97) (0.02) (0.96)
FOCUS_delta + -0.03 0.02 -0.02
(-0.75) (0.49) (-0.46)
INVEFF -
INVEFF_delta + 1.42 0.41 0.97
(3.50) *** (1.12) (2.21) **
ASYM1 +
ASYM1_delta +
ASYM2 +
ASYM2_delta + 0.11 0.02 0.11
(8.25) *** (1.78) * (7.16) ***
ALIGN + 0.16 0.03 -0.01
(1.28) (0.29) (-0.06)
INFL + 0.10 0.11 0.10
(1.76) * (2.14) ** (1.68)
OWNPAR + 0.06 0.01 0.01
(1.01) (0.30) (0.18)
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/-
M2B +/-
LEV +/- -0.22 -0.08 -0.17
(-3.07) *** (-1.14) (-2.10) **
SIZE +/- 0.00 0.00
(1.42) (2.06) **
SIZE_rel +/- 0.11 0.09 0.12
(2.09) ** (2.00) * (2.13) **
PERFDIFF +/-
IPOPRIOR +/-
R-squared 73% 25% 63%
Adjusted R-squared 68% 10% 55%
F-statistic 14.90 *** 1.67 8.26 ***
White F-statistic 0.72 2.10 ** 1.32
Durbin-Watson test 1.49 1.16 1.60
Akaike criterion -2.37 -2.58 -2.21
Schwarz criterion -2.04 -2.22 -1.84
Jarque-Bera statistic 2.68 30.97 *** 13.75 ***
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
 
  
197
Table 28 continued 
Model A21 A22 A23
Dependent variable [-20 0] CAR [-25 0] CAR [-30 0] CAR
Observations 54 54 54
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- 0.02 0.07 0.08
(0.26) (0.78) (0.66)
FOCUS_delta + -0.02 -0.03 -0.05
(-0.42) (-0.51) (-0.67)
INVEFF -
INVEFF_delta + 0.95 0.87 0.80
(2.00) * (1.50) (1.08)
ASYM1 +
ASYM1_delta +
ASYM2 +
ASYM2_delta + 0.10 0.12 0.16
(5.93) *** (6.03) *** (6.16) ***
ALIGN + 0.25 0.24 0.27
(1.68) (1.34) (1.15)
INFL + 0.18 0.16 0.22
(2.71) *** (1.96) * (2.17) **
OWNPAR + 0.03 -0.01 0.00
(0.44) (-0.18) (0.02)
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/-
M2B +/-
LEV +/- -0.21 -0.26 -0.30
(-2.38) ** (-2.41) ** (-2.21) **
SIZE +/- 0.00 0.00 0.00
(2.56) ** (2.29) ** (1.65)
SIZE_rel +/- 0.16 0.20 0.17
(2.62) ** (2.76) *** (1.79) *
PERFDIFF +/-
IPOPRIOR +/-
R-squared 60% 57% 55%
Adjusted R-squared 52% 48% 46%
F-statistic 7.39 *** 6.53 *** 5.98 ***
White F-statistic 1.14 1.33 1.47
Durbin-Watson test 1.43 1.00 1.02
Akaike criterion -2.05 -1.66 -1.17
Schwarz criterion -1.68 -1.29 -0.80
Jarque-Bera statistic 2.65 3.49 11.75 ***
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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Table 28 continued 
Model A24 A25 A26
Variant Scholes/Williams Newey/West White
Observations 54 54 54
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- 0.11 0.10 0.10
(1.84) * (1.37) (1.45)
FOCUS_delta + -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
(-1.06) (-0.73) (-0.74)
INVEFF -
INVEFF_delta + 1.26 1.32 1.32
(3.36) *** (2.87) *** (2.88) ***
ASYM1 +
ASYM1_delta +
ASYM2 +
ASYM2_delta + 0.12 0.12 0.12
(9.35) *** (16.85) *** (15.96) ***
ALIGN + 0.14 0.18 0.18
(1.18) (2.04) ** (1.94) *
INFL + 0.10 0.13 0.13
(2.02) ** (2.36) ** (2.70) ***
OWNPAR + 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.60) (0.61) (0.61)
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/-
M2B +/-
LEV +/- -0.29 -0.28 -0.28
(-4.11) *** (-4.12) *** (-4.27) ***
SIZE +/- 0.00 0.00 0.00
(2.44) ** (3.23) *** (3.09) ***
SIZE_rel +/- 0.10 0.12 0.12
(2.20) ** (2.48) ** (2.41) **
PERFDIFF +/-
IPOPRIOR +/-
R-squared 77% 76% 76%
Adjusted R-squared 72% 71% 71%
F-statistic 16.29 *** 15.34 *** 15.34 ***
White F-statistic 1.23 0.90 0.90
Durbin-Watson test 1.35 1.49 1.49
Akaike criterion -2.53 -2.46 -2.46
Schwarz criterion -2.16 -2.09 -2.09
Jarque-Bera statistic 10.34 *** 7.05 ** 7.05 **
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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6.5.4 Parent company long-term regression results 
Table 29, which starts on p. 203 and extends across eight pages, contains the results from the 
regression analyses of the long-term ECO parent performance. With the exception of the 
variable on blockholder control, all variables are identical to the models of short-term ECO 
performance. Blockholder control is proxied for by FLOAT instead of OWNPAR to reflect 
the ownership of the parent at three years after the ECO. In further contrast to the short-term 
regression models, the change variables now reflect ex-post observable phenomena instead of 
ex-ante investor expectations. As explained above, CSPE for the 36 months after the ECO is 
used as dependent variable, and BHAR will be tested as left-hand variable in a subsequent 
robustness check. 
6.5.4.1 Base models 
Models B00 and B01 represent two base scenarios, one with all and one without any control 
variables. Regarding their explanatory power, three observations apply. First, its level is 
markedly lower than for the short-term analysis with R-squared of 58% (adjusted R-squared 
27%). Second, the difference between R-squared and adjusted R-squared is substantial, 
hinting at the presence of a number of insignificant variables. Third, the difference in R-
squared (both regular and adjusted) is considerable between B00 and B01 (e.g., threefold for 
adjusted R-squared), implying that a large part of the explanatory power is provided by the 
control variables. Consistent with this observation, the F-statistic is only significant for B00, 
and this only at the 10% threshold. The White F-statistic is not significant, indicating that 
heteroskedasticity is benign. The Durbin-Watson test statistic shows that serial correlation can 
be ruled out. The Jarque-Bera statistics are extremely small for both models, which reflects 
the superior quality of CSPEs relative to BHAR as dependent variable. Application of the 
CUSUM test does not deliver evidence of structural breaks. The two goodness-of-fit 
indicators exhibit elevated levels, which reflects the lower explanatory power of the two 
models. In model B01, one agency and two control variables are statistically significant, 
although only one of these at p < 0.05. When all control variables are excluded, a formerly 
insignificant agency coefficient becomes relevant at p < 0.05 while the other formerly 
significant coefficient becomes insignificant, inferring low robustness of the underlying 
relationships. 
6.5.4.2 Control models 
Models B02 through B09 test the applicability of individual control variables. Model B00 has 
shown significance of ROA and M2B, and significance of the first is confirmed in its separate 
inclusion. No other control variables exhibit significance in any of these models. Regarding 
potential interaction between individual control variables and efficiency variables, none such 
can be observed. One efficiency variable (ASYM1_delta) is statistically significant in all 
control models, while no other variables surpass the 10% significance threshold. Control 
models are insignificant throughout, as documented by their F-values, and have very low 
explanatory power, as witnessed by the fact that adjusted R-squared values generally are in 
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the single digits. Two insights follow from these control models. First, ROA and M2B should 
be included as control variables, as these are statistically significant in model B00, and 
second, there appears to be some influence of ASYM1_delta on long-term ECO parent firm 
performance, which needs to be analyzed in more detail. Model B10 presents the adjusted 
base case, including all efficiency variables and ROA and M2B as control variables. While R-
squared lies at 48%, the gap to its adjusted value is still substantial, which lies more than 20 
percentage points lower. The F-statistic nonetheless indicates that the possibility that all 
coefficients are jointly zero can be rejected at the 5% level of statistical significance. Other 
diagnostic statistics do not exceed critical values. 
6.5.4.3 Efficiency models 
Development of the efficiency models follows the approach of the short-term regression 
analysis, i.e., variables of the two groups of highly correlated variables (pertaining to 
investment efficiency and information asymmetry) are separately inspected. While in the 
short-term analysis, only the most significant variable of the other group has been included 
when variables of the respective other group have been inspected, other variables are here left 
in because of their low statistical significance. 
Models B11 and B12 focus on the two variables of investment efficiency. These are 
statistically insignificant if included jointly or separately, while there is some indication that 
INVEFF_delta is slightly more fitting, as indicated by higher R-squared and a higher F-
statistic. Furthermore, there appears to be some interaction with other variables, since their 
separate inclusion induces weak statistical significance of two other efficiency variables, one 
in each case (INFL and ASYM1_delta). While investment efficiency thus appears unrelated 
to long-term ECO parent performance, its reading should be taken for other specifications of 
the model to capture potential interaction effects. 
Models B13 through B16 show the separate inclusion of the four variables around 
information asymmetry. Only ASYM1_delta exhibits a statistically significant coefficient, 
which confirms earlier observations that this variables may be associated with the dependent 
variable. Inspection of the sign, however, reveals that the relationship runs counter to the 
hypothesized effect: Increases in analyst forecast accuracy go along with lower firm 
performance. Another observation confirms an earlier supposition: Under the inclusion of 
ASYM2_delta, the coefficient of INVEFF_delta also becomes statistically significant, and its 
sign is positive, consistent with predictions. Apparently, the joint inclusion of highly 
correlated variables around information asymmetry has masked the full effect of investment 
efficiency. For all efficiency models so far, diagnostic statistics do not indicate issues of 
heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, or nonnormality, which may in part be attributable to 
using CSPE instead of BHAR as dependent variable. 
In summary for the efficiency models, there are two strong and two weak observations. Long-
term parent firm performance is robustly associated with decreases in analyst forecast 
accuracy and with high ROA, while there is faint evidence that it is further related to increases 
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in investment efficiency and high presentation of parent executives on the subsidiary board of 
directors. The following models will subject these findings to various robustness checks. 
6.5.4.4 Robustness checks 
Models B17 through B20 assess variations of the dependent variable. Since no fully robust 
picture of the underlying relationships has yet emerged, all efficiency variables are included, 
rendering these robustness checks an extension of Model B10, the adjusted base model. 
Model B17 shows the effect of using BHAR instead of CSPE as dependent variable. While 
the inclusion of BHAR would have been preferable on interpretational grounds, constituting 
the general reference for abnormal return in this study, the extremely high and significant 
Jarque-Bera statistic of 34.96 shows that the severe skew of its distribution hampers the 
construction of solid models based on BHAR (or at least the ability to infer relationships from 
coefficient t-statistics that rely on IID assumptions). A side-by-side comparison with model 
B10 shows that the same variables are statistically significant under both variations 
(ASYM1_delta and ROA), and of all other (insignificant) variables, only one (ASYM1) 
changes sign. Explanatory power is slightly higher for the CSPE variant (five percentage 
points adjusted R-squared). Inclusion of BHAR as dependent variable, therefore, does not 
lead to additional insight and is therefore not further pursued. 
Model B18 uses CAR as dependent variable. The distribution of regression residuals based on 
CAR appears to exhibit higher normal properties than BHAR, as witnessed by the 
insignificant Jarque-Bera statistic. This observation confirms findings by Barber/Lyon (1997), 
who suggest that the use of CAR over BHAR may help mitigate skewness bias in long-term 
return studies. Model B18 based on CAR exhibits higher significant (F-statistic 4.27) and 
higher explanatory power (adjusted R-squared 48% compared to 27%). These increases can 
be traced to two observations. First, the coefficients of variables of information asymmetry 
exhibit higher statistical significance. ASYM1_delta, previously found significant, surpasses 
the 1% significance threshold, while also ASYM1 exhibits a higher t-statistic than previously. 
Both variables have negative signs and thus confirm the prior finding of (here unexpected) 
negative association to factors of transparency. Second, control variable M2B, previously 
only sporadically significant, surpasses the 1% significance threshold in model B18. 
Given these differences between model B10 and B18, two additional robustness checks based 
on CAR as dependent variable are conducted. These aim to assess if the negative sign of 
ASYM1 and ASYM1_delta is robust if these correlated variables are included individually, 
and which of the two delivers the larger explanatory contribution. Model B19 therefore 
includes all efficiency variables but ASYM1_delta, and the negative sign of ASYM1 persists 
with a t-value of –2.44. If ASYM1_delta is included as the only information asymmetry 
variable, its negative sign equally persists with a t-value of –3.81. The negative association of 
these variables can therefore be assumed robust, and ASYM1_delta has the greater 
significance of the two. 
Overall, it appears that the explanatory power of the long-term parent performance 
regressions can be increased (to adjusted R-squared of 30% to 40%) by including a larger 
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number of variables, some of which are individually not highly significant. Such models, 
however, do not allow valid inferences about the relationships of variables with insignificant 
coefficients to ECO performance. The last three robustness checks therefore include only 
those variables that have exhibited significance in earlier variants. Model B21 represents a 
model that includes only INVEFF_delta, the more significant of the two investment efficiency 
variables, as shown above, and ASYM1_delta, the most significant variable on information 
asymmetry. The less important of the two control variables has also been dropped. This model 
exhibits high quality, as witnessed by a reasonably high F-statistic, no indication of 
heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, nonnormality, or structural breaks, and passable 
explanatory power with an R-squared of 30% (adjusted 18%). The coefficient for investment 
efficiency is positive as expected, whereas it continues to be unexpectedly negative for 
ASYM1_delta. 
Models B22 and B23 conclude the regression analysis of the determinants of ECO parent 
company abnormal return by putting this optimized model to the test of heteroskedasticity-
consistent t-statistics. Model B22 applies the Newey/West approach, while B23 uses White-
adjusted t-statistics. In addition to the two significant variables of model B21, the first variant 
indicates some significance for ALIGN and INFL, and the second only for INFL. 
Significance for these coefficients is weak (at the 10% threshold), but it appears that a minor 
association with the dependent variable may have been masked by the presence of residual 
heteroskedasticity. Signs for these additional two variables are as expected, and their weak 
relevance should thus be included in the overall conclusion. 
6.5.4.5 Parent company regression summary 
None of the eight hypotheses has been fully supported. There is some evidence that increases 
in investment efficiency are positively associated with post-ECO performance (sporadic 
significance of INVEFF_delta), weakly confirming H6-2b. Weak evidence is also provided 
for the two variables on incentive compensation (ALIGN and INFL), as witnessed by the 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics in model B22, providing some support for H6-4a and 
H6-4b. ASYM1_delta delivers consistent evidence against H6-3b. No support is provided for 
H6-1, H6-2a, H6-3a, and H6-5b. ROA is positively related to long-term ECO parent 
performance. An illustration similar to Figure 18 (contribution by variable) is not provided 
since its inclusion may suggest relationships while none have in fact been detected with 
meaningful statistical significance. 
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Table 29: Parent company long-term regression results 
Model B00 B01 B02
Dependent variable [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE
Observations 43 43 43
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- -18.07 -5.16 -4.85
(-1.83) * (-1.38) (-1.07)
FOCUS_delta + -0.37 0.67 0.70
(-0.07) (0.16) (0.16)
INVEFF - 61.98 45.75 43.27
(0.64) (0.51) (0.47)
INVEFF_delta + 66.66 113.47 114.58
(0.77) (1.29) (1.28)
ASYM1 + -0.48 -2.16 -2.27
(-0.19) (-0.94) (-0.92)
ASYM1_delta + 7.38 -2.14 -2.13
(0.64) (-2.23) ** (-2.18) **
ASYM2 + -1.45 -6.90 -6.41
(-1.58) (-0.67) (-0.57)
ASYM2_delta + -1.05 6.69 6.06
(-0.10) (0.81) (0.62)
ALIGN + 5.14 13.50 13.45
(0.37) (1.02) (1.00)
INFL + 9.53 8.53 8.54
(1.72) * (1.48) (1.46)
FLOAT + 0.99 4.92 4.98
(0.24) (1.21) (1.20)
EBITDA +/- -15.07 -2.10
(-0.81) (-0.13)
ROA +/- 77.07
(3.48) ***
M2B +/- -0.89
(-1.88) *
LEV +/- 14.52
(1.61)
SIZE +/- 0.00
(0.30)
SIZE_rel +/- 3.06
(0.62)
PERFDIFF +/- 0.88
(0.16)
IPOPRIOR +/- 0.00
(-0.54)
R-squared 58% 31% 31%
Adjusted R-squared 27% 9% 6%
F-statistic 1.85 * 1.43 1.26
White F-statistic 1.37 0.66 0.55
Durbin-Watson test 2.04 2.08 2.06
Akaike criterion 6.63 6.76 6.81
Schwarz criterion 7.41 7.21 7.30
Jarque-Bera statistic 0.66 0.00 0.00
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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Table 29 continued 
Model B03 B04 B05
Dependent variable [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE
Observations 43 43 43
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- -11.88 -3.66 -7.27
(-2.79) *** (-0.90) (-1.14)
FOCUS_delta + 1.88 0.04 0.58
(0.47) (0.01) (0.13)
INVEFF - 39.71 83.57 37.97
(0.49) (0.85) (0.41)
INVEFF_delta + 76.21 126.43 108.96
(0.93) (1.42) (1.22)
ASYM1 + -0.57 -2.77 -1.89
(-0.26) (-1.16) (-0.78)
ASYM1_delta + -1.63 -2.17 -2.18
(-1.80) * (-2.26) ** (-2.23) **
ASYM2 + 0.59 -9.40 -6.07
(0.06) (-0.88) (-0.57)
ASYM2_delta + 2.95 8.82 6.29
(0.38) (1.02) (0.74)
ALIGN + 12.75 13.26 12.85
(1.05) (1.00) (0.95)
INFL + 7.12 9.07 8.78
(1.34) (1.56) (1.50)
FLOAT + 1.42 5.72 4.84
(0.36) (1.37) (1.17)
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/- 50.23
(2.66) **
M2B +/- -0.45
(-0.95)
LEV +/- 3.10
(0.41)
SIZE +/-
SIZE_rel +/-
PERFDIFF +/-
IPOPRIOR +/-
R-squared 44% 33% 31%
Adjusted R-squared 24% 9% 7%
F-statistic 2.19 ** 1.38 1.28
White F-statistic 0.92 0.48 0.89
Durbin-Watson test 2.39 2.10 2.03
Akaike criterion 6.60 6.78 6.80
Schwarz criterion 7.09 7.27 7.29
Jarque-Bera statistic 0.09 0.03 0.08
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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Table 29 continued 
Model B06 B07 B08
Dependent variable [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE
Observations 43 43 43
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- -5.46 -5.14 -5.50
(-1.42) (-1.29) (-1.37)
FOCUS_delta + 0.37 0.68 0.33
(0.08) (0.15) (0.07)
INVEFF - 49.24 45.81 45.57
(0.54) (0.51) (0.50)
INVEFF_delta + 113.90 113.70 108.80
(1.28) (1.26) (1.19)
ASYM1 + -2.25 -2.17 -2.29
(-0.97) (-0.93) (-0.96)
ASYM1_delta + -2.20 -2.14 -2.17
(-2.24) ** (-2.19) ** (-2.21) **
ASYM2 + -7.04 -6.88 -6.89
(-0.67) (-0.65) (-0.65)
ASYM2_delta + 6.80 6.68 6.77
(0.81) (0.79) (0.80)
ALIGN + 13.70 13.49 14.77
(1.02) (1.00) (1.03)
INFL + 9.07 8.52 8.73
(1.51) (1.45) (1.48)
FLOAT + 4.79 4.92 5.25
(1.16) (1.19) (1.21)
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/-
M2B +/-
LEV +/-
SIZE +/- 0.00
(0.40)
SIZE_rel +/- -0.10
(-0.02)
PERFDIFF +/- -1.27
(-0.25)
IPOPRIOR +/-
R-squared 31% 31% 31%
Adjusted R-squared 7% 6% 7%
F-statistic 1.28 1.26 1.27
White F-statistic 0.76 0.66 0.70
Durbin-Watson test 2.05 2.08 2.10
Akaike criterion 6.80 6.81 6.80
Schwarz criterion 7.29 7.30 7.30
Jarque-Bera statistic 0.03 0.00 0.02
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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Table 29 continued 
Model B09 B10 B11
Dependent variable [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE
Observations 43 43 43
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- 0.29 -10.31 -11.83
(0.05) (-2.40) ** (-3.02) ***
FOCUS_delta + -1.60 1.07 0.23
(-0.34) (0.27) (0.06)
INVEFF - 53.13 94.04 4.47
(0.60) (1.07) (0.10)
INVEFF_delta + 115.72 91.64
(1.33) (1.14)
ASYM1 + -2.57 -1.31 -2.22
(-1.12) (-0.60) (-1.04)
ASYM1_delta + -2.05 -1.63 -0.84
(-2.15) ** (-1.84) * (-1.05)
ASYM2 + -4.69 -2.35 8.12
(-0.45) (-0.24) (1.08)
ASYM2_delta + 6.55 5.71 -3.96
(0.79) (0.73) (-0.74)
ALIGN + 7.93 12.33 11.90
(0.57) (1.04) (1.05)
INFL + 9.13 7.77 8.80
(1.59) (1.49) (1.70) *
FLOAT + 5.36 2.26 3.74
(1.32) (0.58) (1.03)
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/- 54.79 52.31
(2.92) *** (2.90) ***
M2B +/- -0.65 -0.63
(-1.51) (-2.16) **
LEV +/-
SIZE +/-
SIZE_rel +/-
PERFDIFF +/-
IPOPRIOR +/- -0.01
(-1.18)
R-squared 34% 48% 41%
Adjusted R-squared 10% 27% 22%
F-statistic 1.44 2.28 ** 2.16 **
White F-statistic 0.55 0.63 0.78
Durbin-Watson test 2.14 2.38 2.73
Akaike criterion 6.76 6.57 6.57
Schwarz criterion 7.25 7.11 7.05
Jarque-Bera statistic 0.22 0.17 0.34
CUSUM test significant at 5%? Yes No No
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Table 29 continued 
Model B12 B13 B14
Dependent variable [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE
Observations 43 43 48
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- -11.09 -5.44 -7.02
(-2.61) ** (-1.56) (-2.21) **
FOCUS_delta + 2.26 4.14 3.89
(0.60) (1.12) (1.17)
INVEFF - -4.89 16.10
(-0.07) (0.26)
INVEFF_delta + 20.03 76.65 101.46
(0.44) (1.41) (2.03) **
ASYM1 + -0.81 0.06
(-0.38) (0.06)
ASYM1_delta + -1.55 -1.11
(-1.76) * (-2.33) **
ASYM2 + -0.52
(-0.05)
ASYM2_delta + 4.15
(0.54)
ALIGN + 13.13 10.47 14.27
(1.10) (0.88) (1.26)
INFL + 7.94 5.16 7.14
(1.52) (0.90) (1.32)
FLOAT + 1.46 1.42 2.68
(0.38) (0.35) (0.74)
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/- 53.97 16.75 15.75
(2.87) *** (1.32) (1.63)
M2B +/- -0.46 0.13 0.05
(-1.17) (0.36) (0.15)
LEV +/-
SIZE +/-
SIZE_rel +/-
PERFDIFF +/-
IPOPRIOR +/-
R-squared 46% 20% 30%
Adjusted R-squared 26% 1% 14%
F-statistic 2.37 ** 1.06 1.82 *
White F-statistic 0.81 0.99 0.85
Durbin-Watson test 2.43 1.90 2.03
Akaike criterion 6.57 6.75 6.62
Schwarz criterion 7.06 7.14 7.01
Jarque-Bera statistic 0.04 0.59 0.46
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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Table 29 continued 
Model B15 B16 B17
Dependent variable [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE [0 36] BHAR
Observations 43 43 43
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- -11.40 -8.83 -1.49
(-3.02) (-2.55) ** (-2.07) **
FOCUS_delta + 3.02 3.23 0.37
(0.91) (0.95) (0.57)
INVEFF - 56.76 79.96 21.93
(0.68) (0.92) (1.50)
INVEFF_delta + 69.60 74.77 15.20
(0.85) (0.90) (1.13)
ASYM1 + 0.26
(0.72)
ASYM1_delta + -0.36
(-2.43) **
ASYM2 + 6.25 -1.87
(1.42) (-1.13)
ASYM2_delta + 2.40 1.57
(0.66) (1.20)
ALIGN + 10.43 5.51 0.97
(0.94) (0.49) (0.49)
INFL + 5.45 5.92 1.01
(1.04) (1.10) (1.16)
FLOAT + 0.11 -0.41 0.50
(0.03) (-0.11) (0.77)
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/- 66.59 63.70 8.78
(3.71) *** (3.56) *** (2.80) ***
M2B +/- -0.53 -0.70 -0.11
(-1.35) (-1.69) (-1.57)
LEV +/-
SIZE +/-
SIZE_rel +/-
PERFDIFF +/-
IPOPRIOR +/-
R-squared 39% 37% 44%
Adjusted R-squared 23% 20% 22%
F-statistic 2.39 ** 2.19 ** 2.00 *
White F-statistic 0.78 0.56 0.53
Durbin-Watson test 2.47 2.21 2.63
Akaike criterion 6.57 6.61 2.99
Schwarz criterion 6.98 7.02 3.53
Jarque-Bera statistic 0.69 1.40 34.96 ***
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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Table 29 continued 
Model B18 B19 B20
Dependent variable [0 36] CAR [0 36] CAR [0 36] CAR
Observations 43 43 48
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- -0.93 -1.15 -0.71
(-1.73) * (-1.94) * (-1.61)
FOCUS_delta + 0.07 0.01 0.83
(0.13) (0.02) (1.81) *
INVEFF - 12.04 9.51 -4.35
(1.10) (0.78) (-0.51)
INVEFF_delta + 14.59 11.54 14.67
(1.44) (1.03) (2.12) **
ASYM1 + -0.53 -0.72
(-1.94) * (-2.44) **
ASYM1_delta + -0.32 -0.25
(-2.89) *** (-3.81) ***
ASYM2 + -0.71 1.68
(-0.57) (1.64)
ASYM2_delta + 1.07 -0.79
(1.10) (-0.97)
ALIGN + 0.74 0.91 0.99
(0.50) (0.55) (0.63)
INFL + 0.63 0.36 0.57
(0.97) (0.51) (0.76)
FLOAT + 0.26 0.14 0.13
(0.52) (0.27) (0.25)
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/- 6.61 8.04 1.68
(2.81) *** (3.15) *** (1.25)
M2B +/- -0.09 -0.09 0.04
(-1.74) * (-1.57) (0.86)
LEV +/-
SIZE +/-
SIZE_rel +/-
PERFDIFF +/-
IPOPRIOR +/-
R-squared 63% 53% 44%
Adjusted R-squared 48% 36% 30%
F-statistic 4.27 *** 3.15 *** 3.27 ***
White F-statistic 0.56 0.66 1.56
Durbin-Watson test 1.72 1.97 1.24
Akaike criterion 2.42 2.62 2.67
Schwarz criterion 2.95 3.11 3.06
Jarque-Bera statistic 1.68 2.44 2.53
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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Table 29 continued 
Model B21 B22 B23
Variant [0 36] CSPE Newey/West White
Observations 48 48 48
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- -6.75 -6.75 -6.75
(-2.27) ** (-2.77) *** (-2.73) ***
FOCUS_delta + 4.33 4.33 4.33
(1.49) (1.48) (1.25)
INVEFF -
INVEFF_delta + 90.42 90.42 90.42
(2.91) *** (4.40) *** (4.16) ***
ASYM1 +
ASYM1_delta + -1.10 -1.10 -1.10
(-2.39) ** (-3.29) *** (-3.27) ***
ASYM2 +
ASYM2_delta +
ALIGN + 14.61 14.61 14.61
(1.35) (1.71) * (1.64)
INFL + 7.29 7.29 7.29
(1.39) (1.76) * (1.89) *
FLOAT + 2.63 2.63 2.63
(0.76) (0.79) (0.77)
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/- 14.94 14.94 14.94
(1.66) (1.50) (1.48)
M2B +/-
LEV +/-
SIZE +/-
SIZE_rel +/-
PERFDIFF +/-
IPOPRIOR +/-
R-squared 30% 30% 30%
Adjusted R-squared 18% 18% 18%
F-statistic 2.43 ** 2.43 ** 2.43 **
White F-statistic 0.91 0.91 0.91
Durbin-Watson test 2.05 2.05 2.05
Akaike criterion 6.54 6.54 6.54
Schwarz criterion 6.85 6.85 6.85
Jarque-Bera statistic 0.61 0.61 0.61
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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6.5.5 Subsidiary long-term regression results 
Results from the cross-sectional regression analyses on subsidiary ECO performance are 
presented in Table 30, which starts on p. 215 and spans eight pages. As the regression models 
on abnormal return of the parent company, the variable FLOAT is used as a proxy for 
blockholder control, while all other agency and control variables are identical to those used in 
the short-term models. As for the parent analysis, CSPE are used as the main dependent 
variable to ensure robustness of inference from coefficient t-statistics, while BHAR and CAR 
are included as robustness checks. 
6.5.5.1 Base models 
The subsidiary base model C00 looks very similar to the base model B00 of the parent 
company: sparse significance of individual coefficients, high discrepancy between R-squared 
and its adjusted value, overall model significance around an F-statistic of 1.8, and no 
indication for heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, or nonnormality of the residuals, as well 
as no indication for structural breaks. If all control variables are excluded (model C01), R-
squared drops substantially, hinting at the fact that efficiency variables alone have only 
limited explanatory power. This model furthermore exhibits unequal residual variance, 
evidence of serial correlation, and is overall insignificant. Four variables show signs of 
statistical significance in these base cases and should therefore be included in later cases: 
FLOAT with an expected positive sign, FOCUS_delta and ALIGN with unexpected negative 
signs, and the control variable IPOPRIOR with a negative sign. 
6.5.5.2 Control models 
Models C02 through C09 show the eight control variants. Apart from the previously detected 
significance of the coefficient of IPOPRIOR, the t-values of no other control variable 
surpasses critical thresholds. Efficiency variable FLOAT is statistically significant 
throughout, while ALIGN exhibits significance in only one of the eight cases. FOCUS_delta 
shows sporadic signs of statistical significance, and both FOCUS_delta and FLOAT are most 
robustly significant when IPOPRIOR is also included. INVEFF_delta changes sign, but at 
minimal t-values, as do ASYM1 and ASYM1_delta. Regarding model quality, all control 
models exhibit unequal residual variance, which is lowest in C02 and C09. Five of the eight 
models are overall not statistically significant (F-values not significant at the 10% level). 
Model C09 is seen as the adjusted base case. Under the inclusion of IPOPRIOR as control 
variable, coefficients for FOCUS_delta, ALIGN, and FLOAT are statistically significant at p-
values of 5% or lower. Adjusted R-squared is mediocre at 26%, and the fact that regular R-
squared is higher by 20 percentage points indicates that several efficiency variables 
unnecessarily burden the model. The model is overall significant at an F-statistic of 2.37, 
implying p < 0.05. White’s F-statistic indicates moderate heteroskedasticity, while all other 
diagnostic statistics attest high quality of the model. 
  
212 
6.5.5.3 Efficiency models 
In the adjusted base case C09, two of three statistically significant efficiency variables exhibit 
signs that are directionally opposed to the underlying hypotheses. The first efficiency model 
(C10) therefore excludes the one variable that behaves as expected to detect potential issues 
of multicollinearity in the other two cases. Results indicate that both FOCUS_delta and 
ASYM2_delta retain their unexpected negative signs even if FLOAT is excluded. In addition, 
however, ASYM2_delta exhibits weak statistical significance under this variant. 
The following models, starting with C11, proceed in the reverse direction, eliminating 
variables with statistically insignificant coefficients. To account for the correlation between 
the variables of investment efficiency as well as between those pertaining to information 
asymmetry, these variables are individually assessed, proceeding due to low statistical 
significance as for the parent regression by including only one of the respective other 
category. Regarding investment efficiency, model C11 includes only the pre-ECO variables, 
while C12 includes only the change variable. Here it shows that the correlation between the 
variables has indeed masked the relevance of this group of variables, as they exhibit statistical 
significance if individually included – in both cases with signs that contradict the 
hypothesized relationship. For its higher significance, the pre-ECO variables INVEFF is 
included in further subsidiary efficiency models. Regarding information asymmetry, models 
C13 through C16 document the separate inclusion of the four related variables, leading to the 
insight that only ASYM2_delta is statistically significant, retaining its positive sign (as 
hypothesized). The fitness of ASYM2_delta is also reflected by higher levels of R-squared 
and the F-statistic, and lower values of the information criteria and of the Jarque-Bera 
statistic. 
As a final adjustment, the insignificant variable INFL is excluded, as it has not exhibited any 
contribution in control and agency regressions. As a result of this exclusion, adjusted R-
squared drops slightly to 33%. The F-statistic, in turn, improves and indicates that the overall 
model is significant at the 1% level. Serial correlation indicators also improve, although it 
cannot be ruled out that the model is affected by serial correlation since the Durbin-Watson 
test statistic lies below 1.5 (which should be reviewed with the Newey/West (1987) serial 
correlation-consistent standard error technique – results see below). The Jarque-Bera statistic 
is benign and confirms the validity of coefficient tests that assume normally distributed 
residuals. Model C17 is therefore regarded as the representative result of the long-term 
subsidiary regression analysis. Three of the five included efficiency variables (FOCUS_delta, 
INVEFF, ALIGN) exhibit signs that are not as expected, while the remaining two 
(ASYM2_delta and FLOAT) behave as hypothesized. The included control variable 
IPOPRIOR is significant and carries a negative sign. 
6.5.5.4 Robustness checks 
Six models are included as robustness checks. The first four apply variations of the dependent 
variables, while the last two use heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. All robustness 
checks are based on C17. Model C18 uses BHAR as dependent variable, and the first 
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observation is the strikingly high Jarque-Bera statistic of 55.03. This finding is consistent with 
the substantial positive skew of BHAR documented in earlier parts of this document. Apart 
from a reduction in significance for ASYM2_delta (and the resulting drop in the explanatory 
power of the model), all relationships of C17 remain intact. Model C19 uses CAR instead of 
CSPE. As for the parent company, this variant exhibits low values of the Jarque-Bera statistic 
and slightly increased values of R-squared. No variables changes signs, but ALIGN becomes 
statistically insignificant. All other characteristics of this model indicate high quality and 
robustness, and therefore two additional variants are provided in C20 and C21, representing 
the stepwise elimination of the two remaining insignificant variables ALIGN and IPOPRIOR. 
As with any variable exclusion, R-squared is slightly reduced, while the stability of adjusted 
R-squared shows that the exclusion affects variables with low explanatory power. This effect 
is reflected by the concurrent increase in F-values from 5.61 in C19 to 7.66 in C21. Model 
C21 therefore shows that it is possible to express above relationships even with a highly 
parsimonious model, which includes only four efficiency variables and leads to almost no 
deterioration in quality compared to C19. 
Finally, models C22 and C23 test the robustness of the t-statistics of model C17. The first 
applies Newey/West-adjusted t-statistics to account for potential unequal variance and serial 
correlation of the regression residuals, while the second applies the White approach to this 
effect. Results from both models indicate that despite the sporadically low value of the 
Durbin-Watson statistic, the relationships found so far are robust. The statistical significance 
of the coefficients of all five efficiency variables exceeds the 1% threshold. 
Figure 19: Variable comparison (long-term subsidiary regression analysis) 
-125%
-107%
167%
119%
-310%
356%
100%
FOCUS ALIGN INVEFF ASYM FLOAT IPOPRIOR Total
Contribution of explanatory variables to overall ECO performance
Long-term subsidiary regression analysis, based on model C17
Efficiency variables Control variable
Counter hypothesis
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6.5.5.5 Subsidiary regression summary 
Two hypotheses are fully confirmed: Reductions in forecast variability are positively related 
to the long-term performance of ECO subsidiaries (H6-3b), as are higher degrees of widely-
held shares (H6-5b). Three other hypotheses, however, are statistically significant but with 
signs that are opposite to expectations. First, if the parent company has increased its focus 
through the ECO, subsidiaries tend to perform worse (H6-1). Second, high investment 
efficiency before the ECO is associated with poor performance (H6-2a), and so are, third, 
higher percentages of shares reserved for stock option programs (H6-4a). Coefficients for the 
variables underlying the remaining hypotheses (H6-2b, H6-3a, H6-4b) are insignificant, and 
these hypotheses therefore need to be rejected. Of the control variables, a high number of 
IPOs during the year preceding the offer is associated with poor long-term performance. 
Figure 19 summarizes the effects and presents a rough comparison of the relative importance 
of individual variables, based on the procedure outlined in Chapter 6.5.3.5 on p. 188. 
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Table 30: Subsidiary long-term regression results 
Model C00 C01 C02
Dependent variable [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE
Observations 43 43 43
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- 3.87 -1.86 0.87
(0.46) (-0.61) (0.25)
FOCUS_delta + -6.92 -6.41 -6.18
(-1.63) (-1.83) * (-1.79) *
INVEFF - 63.57 102.24 80.93
(0.77) (1.42) (1.11)
INVEFF_delta + 9.59 9.17 18.69
(0.13) (0.13) (0.27)
ASYM1 + 0.69 0.41 -0.48
(0.33) (0.22) (-0.25)
ASYM1_delta + 5.71 -7.80 -0.14
(0.58) (-0.93) (-0.18)
ASYM2 + 0.31 -0.22 -3.60
(0.39) (-0.29) (-0.41)
ASYM2_delta + 0.74 9.30 3.86
(0.09) (1.38) (0.50)
ALIGN + -29.09 -17.33 -17.79
(-2.44) ** (-1.62) (-1.69)
INFL + 3.54 5.23 5.31
(0.75) (1.12) (1.16)
FLOAT + 6.56 7.69 8.23
(1.83) * (2.33) ** (2.52) **
EBITDA +/- -14.91 -18.08
(-0.95) (-1.41)
ROA +/- 24.64
(1.31)
M2B +/- 0.18
(0.44)
LEV +/- 3.67
(0.48)
SIZE +/- 0.00
(-0.95)
SIZE_rel +/- -5.33
(-1.27)
PERFDIFF +/- 1.97
(0.43)
IPOPRIOR +/- -0.01
(-1.73) *
R-squared 57% 36% 40%
Adjusted R-squared 24% 16% 18%
F-statistic 1.75 * 1.79 1.86 *
White F-statistic 0.94 3.47 *** 1.80 *
Durbin-Watson test 1.51 1.21 1.10
Akaike criterion 6.31 6.34 6.32
Schwarz criterion 7.09 6.79 6.81
Jarque-Bera statistic 1.17 0.61 0.14
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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Table 30 continued 
Model C03 C04 C05
Dependent variable [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE
Observations 43 43 43
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- -4.90 -3.01 -2.17
(-1.32) (-0.91) (-0.42)
FOCUS_delta + -5.86 -5.92 -6.42
(-1.69) (-1.67) (-1.80) *
INVEFF - 99.50 73.20 101.07
(1.40) (0.92) (1.35)
INVEFF_delta + -7.73 -0.78 8.50
(-0.11) (-0.01) (0.12)
ASYM1 + 1.13 0.88 0.45
(0.60) (0.45) (0.23)
ASYM1_delta + 0.01 -0.20 -0.23
(0.01) (-0.25) (-0.29)
ASYM2 + -4.41 -5.89 -7.68
(-0.51) (-0.68) (-0.88)
ASYM2_delta + 7.60 7.66 9.24
(1.13) (1.10) (1.34)
ALIGN + -17.67 -17.15 -17.43
(-1.67) (-1.60) (-1.59)
INFL + 4.59 4.82 5.27
(0.99) (1.03) (1.11)
FLOAT + 6.10 7.08 7.68
(1.77) * (2.10) ** (2.29) **
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/- 22.79
(1.39)
M2B +/- 0.34
(0.90)
LEV +/- 0.46
(0.08)
SIZE +/-
SIZE_rel +/-
PERFDIFF +/-
IPOPRIOR +/-
R-squared 40% 38% 36%
Adjusted R-squared 18% 15% 13%
F-statistic 1.85 * 1.69 1.58
White F-statistic 3.88 *** 4.39 *** 3.81 ***
Durbin-Watson test 1.31 1.28 1.20
Akaike criterion 6.32 6.36 6.38
Schwarz criterion 6.81 6.85 6.87
Jarque-Bera statistic 0.70 0.88 0.63
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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Table 30 continued 
Model C06 C07 C08
Dependent variable [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE
Observations 43 43 43
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- -1.61 -0.68 -1.79
(-0.52) (-0.22) (-0.55)
FOCUS_delta + -6.16 -5.99 -6.34
(-1.71) * (-1.72) * (-1.70) *
INVEFF - 99.38 105.37 102.27
(1.35) (1.47) (1.40)
INVEFF_delta + 8.82 20.32 10.03
(0.12) (0.29) (0.14)
ASYM1 + 0.49 0.26 0.44
(0.26) (0.14) (0.23)
ASYM1_delta + -0.18 -0.27 -0.22
(-0.23) (-0.35) (-0.27)
ASYM2 + -7.69 -6.75 -7.81
(-0.90) (-0.81) (-0.92)
ASYM2_delta + 9.21 8.95 9.29
(1.35) (1.34) (1.36)
ALIGN + -17.49 -17.65 -17.56
(-1.61) (-1.66) (-1.51)
INFL + 4.80 4.78 5.20
(0.99) (1.03) (1.09)
FLOAT + 7.80 7.86 7.63
(2.33) ** (2.40) ** (2.17) **
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/-
M2B +/-
LEV +/-
SIZE +/- 0.00
(-0.41)
SIZE_rel +/- -4.98
(-1.21)
PERFDIFF +/- 0.23
(0.06)
IPOPRIOR +/-
R-squared 36% 39% 36%
Adjusted R-squared 14% 17% 13%
F-statistic 1.60 1.79 1.58
White F-statistic 3.69 *** 2.71 ** 3.00 ***
Durbin-Watson test 1.24 1.48 1.20
Akaike criterion 6.38 6.34 6.38
Schwarz criterion 6.87 6.83 6.87
Jarque-Bera statistic 0.55 1.02 0.63
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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Table 30 continued 
Model C09 C10 C11
Dependent variable [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE
Observations 43 43 43
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- 6.47 7.78 6.39
(1.43) (1.87) * (1.54)
FOCUS_delta + -9.88 -5.76 -11.11
(-2.75) *** (-1.92) * (-3.66) ***
INVEFF - 113.50 28.70 106.88
(1.68) (0.50) (3.46) ***
INVEFF_delta + 12.61 -54.34
(0.19) (-0.94)
ASYM1 + -0.21 0.56 -0.81
(-0.12) (0.55) (-0.54)
ASYM1_delta + -4.43 -0.50 0.04
(-0.56) (-0.76) (0.06)
ASYM2 + -0.09 -10.19 -1.68
(-0.12) (-1.37) (-0.30)
ASYM2_delta + 9.09 11.27 7.12
(1.45) (1.85) * (1.78) *
ALIGN + -25.84 -18.82 -22.27
(-2.43) ** (-1.76) * (-2.39) **
INFL + 6.15 4.08 5.78
(1.40) (1.00) (1.40)
FLOAT + 8.35 8.58
(2.70) ** (3.05) ***
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/-
M2B +/-
LEV +/-
SIZE +/-
SIZE_rel +/-
PERFDIFF +/-
IPOPRIOR +/- -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(-2.36) ** (-1.77) * (-2.68) **
R-squared 46% 24% 46%
Adjusted R-squared 26% 6% 31%
F-statistic 2.37 ** 1.32 2.98 ***
White F-statistic 2.06 * 1.95 ** 1.67
Durbin-Watson test 1.26 1.36 1.25
Akaike criterion 6.22 6.26 6.10
Schwarz criterion 6.71 6.66 6.54
Jarque-Bera statistic 1.04 3.70 0.94
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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Table 30 continued 
Model C12 C13 C14
Dependent variable [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE
Observations 43 54 52
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- 5.68 0.64 0.47
(1.23) (0.16) (0.12)
FOCUS_delta + -8.34 -8.56 -8.37
(-2.34) ** (-3.30) *** (-3.21) ***
INVEFF - 92.84 92.89
(3.08) *** (3.08) ***
INVEFF_delta + -83.98
(-2.45) **
ASYM1 + 0.21 -0.64
(0.12) (-1.00)
ASYM1_delta + 0.00 -0.38
(0.00) (-1.03)
ASYM2 + -3.29
(-0.40)
ASYM2_delta + 8.06
(1.25)
ALIGN + -24.42 -9.80 -9.34
(-2.24) ** (-1.09) (-1.04)
INFL + 6.64 5.91 5.75
(1.48) (1.42) (1.35)
FLOAT + 7.57 8.80 8.12
(2.40) ** (3.46) *** (3.05) ***
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/-
M2B +/-
LEV +/-
SIZE +/-
SIZE_rel +/-
PERFDIFF +/-
IPOPRIOR +/- -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-2.19) ** (-1.63) (-1.61)
R-squared 41% 34% 32%
Adjusted R-squared 22% 24% 21%
F-statistic 2.20 ** 3.37 *** 2.89 **
White F-statistic 0.81 1.46 1.71 *
Durbin-Watson test 1.01 1.95 1.95
Akaike criterion 6.26 6.17 6.16
Schwarz criterion 6.71 6.46 6.46
Jarque-Bera statistic 0.25 0.69 0.89
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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Table 30 continued 
Model C15 C16 C17
Dependent variable [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE [0 36] CSPE
Observations 43 46 46
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- 3.14 6.16 7.92
(0.76) (1.56) (2.07) **
FOCUS_delta + -9.22 -10.42 -10.47
(-3.53) *** (-4.09) *** (-4.05) ***
INVEFF - 85.78 98.50 104.48
(2.84) *** (3.52) *** (3.70) ***
INVEFF_delta +
ASYM1 +
ASYM1_delta +
ASYM2 + 4.10
(1.17)
ASYM2_delta + 6.28 6.42
(2.52) ** (2.53) **
ALIGN + -13.84 -21.32 -20.80
(-1.53) (-2.44) ** (-2.34) **
INFL + 7.26 6.04
(1.77) * (1.54)
FLOAT + 8.17 8.16 6.96
(3.22) *** (3.23) *** (2.84) ***
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/-
M2B +/-
LEV +/-
SIZE +/-
SIZE_rel +/-
PERFDIFF +/-
IPOPRIOR +/- -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(-2.36) ** (-2.90) *** (-2.69) **
R-squared 38% 45% 42%
Adjusted R-squared 28% 35% 33%
F-statistic 3.63 *** 4.45 *** 4.63 ***
White F-statistic 1.88 * 1.46 0.72
Durbin-Watson test 1.75 1.27 1.30
Akaike criterion 6.13 5.99 6.00
Schwarz criterion 6.44 6.30 6.28
Jarque-Bera statistic 1.04 0.49 0.37
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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Table 30 continued 
Model C18 C19 C20
Dependent variable [0 36] BHAR [0 36] CAR [0 36] CAR
Observations 46 46 46
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- 1.12 0.58 0.15
(1.31) (0.90) (0.28)
FOCUS_delta + -2.02 -1.52 -1.35
(-3.48) *** (-3.47) *** (-3.29) ***
INVEFF - 20.12 22.95 21.91
(3.18) *** (4.82) *** (4.68) ***
INVEFF_delta +
ASYM1 +
ASYM1_delta +
ASYM2 +
ASYM2_delta + 0.78 0.99 0.89
(1.37) (2.31) ** (2.12) **
ALIGN + -5.20 -1.65
(-2.61) ** (-1.10)
INFL +
FLOAT + 1.52 1.02 0.94
(2.77) *** (2.47) ** (2.31) **
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/-
M2B +/-
LEV +/-
SIZE +/-
SIZE_rel +/-
PERFDIFF +/-
IPOPRIOR +/- 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-1.98) * (-1.56) (-1.17)
R-squared 34% 46% 45%
Adjusted R-squared 24% 38% 38%
F-statistic 3.32 *** 5.61 *** 6.46 ***
White F-statistic 0.88 1.16 1.56
Durbin-Watson test 0.73 0.72 0.79
Akaike criterion 3.01 2.44 2.43
Schwarz criterion 3.29 2.72 2.67
Jarque-Bera statistic 55.03 *** 2.01 0.20
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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Table 30 continued 
Model C21 C22 C23
Variant [0 36] CAR Newey/West White
Observations 46 46 46
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Constant +/- -0.39 7.92 7.92
(-1.72) * (2.84) *** (2.82) ***
FOCUS_delta + -1.23 -10.47 -10.47
(-3.08) *** (-3.77) *** (-3.76) ***
INVEFF - 21.95 104.48 104.48
(4.67) *** (3.55) *** (3.66) ***
INVEFF_delta +
ASYM1 +
ASYM1_delta +
ASYM2 +
ASYM2_delta + 0.80 6.42 6.42
(1.94) * (4.20) *** (4.40) ***
ALIGN + -20.80 -20.80
(-3.80) *** (-3.41) ***
INFL +
FLOAT + 0.96 6.96 6.96
(2.35) ** (2.84) *** (2.76) ***
EBITDA +/-
ROA +/-
M2B +/-
LEV +/-
SIZE +/-
SIZE_rel +/-
PERFDIFF +/-
IPOPRIOR +/- -0.01 -0.01
(-3.20) *** (-3.25) ***
R-squared 43% 42% 42%
Adjusted R-squared 37% 33% 33%
F-statistic 7.66 *** 4.63 *** 4.63 ***
White F-statistic 1.45 0.72 0.72
Durbin-Watson test 0.77 1.30 1.30
Akaike criterion 2.42 6.00 6.00
Schwarz criterion 2.62 6.28 6.28
Jarque-Bera statistic 1.10 0.37 0.37
CUSUM test significant at 5%? No No No
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Table 31: Overview of regression results 
Hypothesis Short-term
Long-term
parent
Long-term
subsidiary
Focus
H6-1 The effect of an ECO on firm value is positively
related to an increase in corporate focus
through the ECO.
0 0 --
Investment efficiency
H6-2a The effect of an ECO on firm value is negatively
related to high investment efficiency
before the ECO.
++ 0 --
H6-2b The effect of an ECO on firm value is positively
related to an increase in investment efficiency
through the ECO.
++ + 0
Information asymmetry
H6-3a The effect of an ECO on firm value is positively
related to high information asymmetry
before the ECO.
++ 0 0
H6-3b The effect of an ECO on firm value is positively
related to a reduction in information asymmetry
through the ECO.
++ -- ++
Incentive compensation
H6-4a The effect of an ECO on firm value is positively
related to the introduction of a stock option program
or managerial equity ownership.
+ + --
H6-4b The effect of an ECO on firm value is positively
related to shareholder control over the pay
setting process in the subsidiary.
++ + 0
Blockholder control
H6-5a The effect of an ECO on firm value is positively
related to the fraction of subsidiary ownership retained
by the parent company immediately after the ECO.
0 n/a n/a
H6-5b The effect of an ECO on firm value is positively
related to the long-term sovereignty of
the subsidiary. 
n/a 0 ++
Adjusted R-squared 68% 18% 33%
Legend: ++ fully confirmed, + weakly confirmed, 0 not confirmed, -- counter to hypothesis, n/a not applicable
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6.6 Discussion 
Regression results are summarized in Table 31. Highly aggregated, the findings indicate that 
the short-term announcement reaction, but not the long-term post-offer performance of an 
ECO is associated with efficiency gains. The two parts of this statement are separately 
appraised in the following subchapters. 
6.6.1 Strong tie of short-term ECO performance and efficiency 
The majority of hypotheses about the association of ECO announcement return and efficiency 
improvements have been confirmed in this study, and explanatory power of the overall 
regression models is high. The following subchapters contain an assessment of the quality of 
this result. 
6.6.1.1 Comparison to existing research 
The literature review in Chapter 6.2.1 on p. 152 has come to the conclusion that the positive 
relationship between an ECO announcement return and efficiency improvements has been 
confirmed by existing studies. Current findings can therefore be seen as a confirmation of 
earlier results. It has also been mentioned above that prior studies have approached the 
measurement of ECO efficiency aspects from very different angles and with very different 
methodologies. In this regard, the transplantation of the approach by Junker (2005) to a 
sample of US ECOs represents an extension over earlier work because it combines various 
efficiency aspects that jointly deliver a high degree of explanatory power. 
The fact that this section derives from the work by Junker (2005) marks an exception to the 
general rule that the heterogeneity of efficiency tests makes direct comparisons across studies 
difficult. Without too much revelation of contents of Section 9, which contains a detailed 
comparison between the current study and Junker (2005), it can be noted that the explanatory 
power of the short-term regression models is broadly similar. While adjusted R-squared tends 
to be several percentage points higher in the German study, hypotheses are marginally more 
fully confirmed in the present work164. 
The observation of the detrimental consequences of high leverage has not yet been clearly 
articulated in the existing ECO literature. As shown in Figure 18 on p. 189, on average, the 
influence of leverage has induced a reduction of efficiency gains by more than one half. 
While it has been recognized before that high leverage is a general characteristic of firms that 
conduct an ECO (compare Chapter 2.4.3 on p. 35), the effect of this attribute in relation to 
potential efficiency gains has here been shown more clearly. The practical implications that 
follow from this finding are discussed in Chapter 10.4.1.1 on p. 359. 
                                                 
164  See Chapter 9.2 on p. 316 and Chapter 9.5.2 on p. 343 for details on the comparison between the 
results from this section and findings reported in Junker (2005). 
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6.6.1.2 Rejected hypotheses 
All but two hypotheses have been confirmed in the short-term regression analyses. Rationale 
for hypothesis formulation has been amply provided above so that this discussion can turn to 
an exploration of the two propositions that have been rejected: the positive influence of focus 
and the positive influence of blockholder control. 
The rejection of the positive influence of focus does not come utterly unexpected: Recent 
research has put the diversification discount into serious question. Notwithstanding the belief 
by many practitioners, most arguments for focus do not withstand deeper probing, and current 
findings thus fall in line with recent research that focus per se may not be causally connected 
to firm value. Focus can reduce managers’ discretion over free cash flow and limit across-
segment investment opportunities. While this can increase investment efficiency, the effect of 
focus is only indirect, and it can thus at best serve as a noisy proxy of efficiency gains. 
Consistent with these arguments, the current results clearly confirm the positive effect of 
improvements in investment efficiency. This implicitly shows that investment efficiency and 
focus may but do not need to be closely associated, and that researchers should rely on 
investment efficiency as the theoretically more correct variable in an evaluation of 
restructuring. 
The rejection of the positive influence of blockholders does, however, come unexpected: This 
variables has been the most powerful variable in the tests of Junker (2005) in the German 
context, which leads one to believe that the influence of blockholder control varies by 
geography. This possibility shall not be further pursued at this point, as the topic of 
geographic differences is intricate enough to warrant a section of its own. It is therefore set 
aside until Section 9, which is entirely deals with differences in ECO performance and its 
performance between Germany and the US. 
6.6.1.3 Residual gap 
The short-term regression models have not been able to account for all abnormal returns, and 
a residual gap of around 30% remains. Since abnormal returns are not the consequence of 
chance (as witnessed by their high statistical robustness), they must have been caused by 
something else. As a first possibility, the explanatory gap may result from an imperfect 
operationalization of explanatory variables. This interpretation implies that the proposed 
agency relationships do account for the full effect of an ECO announcement but that the 
regression analyses are impaired by the failure of variables to express all underlying agency 
relationships. Tests of refined variables may be required to assess the likelihood of this 
scenario. 
As an alternative explanation, the present set of agency hypotheses may not be exhaustive. 
Despite the careful review of all agency cost effects of an ECO, some effects may have been 
left undetected. Reconsideration of all agency implications of an ECO may be required to 
determine this possibility. As a third possibility, the agency approach could indeed have 
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captured all relevant agency relationships, but the unexplained residual may stem from 
influences that are unrelated to agency aspects. Powers (2003) shares this belief: 
“Analysis of the CARs associated with equity carve-out announcements leads some 
researchers to conclude that the primary motivation for carve-outs is that the new 
corporate structure will produce efficiency gains. Although this may be true on average, it 
is by no means the only rationale motivating carve-outs” (p. 48). 
This scenario requires a reevaluation of the theoretical foundations of this work, since it has 
been theoretically argued that agency costs reflect all costs of an ECO. Two possibilities 
present themselves: An entirely different theoretical framework may be chosen (one that 
encompasses but is not limited to agency aspects) or – more likely – the existing agency 
framework is supplemented by theoretical aspects that the present one does not include. 
As a last and realistic possibility, the explanatory power of the short-term regression models 
may already be so high that one cannot expect higher levels due to noise. Such noise may 
arise from data imperfections and sampling methodology. This phenomenon is accentuated by 
the finding of Junker (2005), who reports a similar magnitude of the unexplained residual. 
Whichever of the above possibilities may be true, these findings underline the high quality of 
the two-dimensional ECO agency cost framework by Junker (2005). This praise applies with 
regard to the high significance of the hypotheses that it produces (six of eight confirmed), but 
also with regard to their high joint explanatory power. Pertinent implications for future 
research are considered in Chapter 10.3.2.1 on p. 354. 
6.6.1.4 Endogeneity 
In combination with the descriptive observation of below-average ECO parent profitability 
(Section 2), the finding that low efficiency is associated with positive announcement returns 
helps to shed light onto the nature of endogeneity in this work: Conjectures about endogeneity 
can plausibly be extended to assume that ECOs self-select firms with above-average degrees 
of inefficiency, i.e., firms for which an ECO represents a large improvement opportunity. To 
investigate this supposition, several implications for future research are expanded on in 
Section 10. 
6.6.2 Weak tie of long-term ECO performance and efficiency 
The long-term underperformance of firms that are involved in an ECO is not associated to 
changes in agency costs: This represents an important result in itself. In tracing the error 
discussed at the end of Section 5 to abnormal long-term return, the study of the short-term 
effect can now be laid to rest and attention redirected. Several comments on the discord of 
long-term regression models conclude this section. 
6.6.2.1 Comparison to existing research 
The current finding that most hypotheses about the relationship of long-term ECO 
performance and efficiency effects have been rejected is consistent with the study by Vijh 
(1999), who equally reports that the long-term performance of ECOs is not or only spuriously 
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related to efficiency aspects. The second study that has conducted an in-depth analysis of this 
topic is Junker (2005), whose regression models of long-term ECO return and efficiency 
exhibit much lower explanatory power than his analyses of the announcement effect. A 
noteworthy parallel is provided by the observation that within the poor explanatory 
contribution of his long-term models, Junker (2005) shows that the relinquishment of control 
by the parent company is most positively related to performance. This very relationship is one 
of few long-term conclusive findings of the present study, and it can be surmised that, in the 
long-term, sovereignty of the subsidiary is beneficial. Overall, current findings and existing 
research are congruent with regard to long-term efficiency effects. 
6.6.2.2 Robustness of the long-term regression findings 
This section will close with a brief appreciation of the robustness of its results. It has been 
shown above that the validity of long-term return studies has been questioned by some 
researchers. As an example, Solow (1985) provides the following commentary: 
“As soon as time-series get long enough to offer hope of discriminating among complex 
hypotheses, the likelihood that they remain stationary dwindles away, and the noise level 
gets correspondingly high. Under these circumstances, a little cleverness and persistence 
can get you almost any result you want” (p. 328). 
To defy that and similar arguments, it should be noted that the very different findings for the 
short- and the long-term are the result of an identical approach. First, apart from blockholder 
control, the same variables have been tested on abnormal return. Second, variables contain 
pre-ECO state and pre- vs. post-ECO change variables, thus constituting a broad explanatory 
basis for short- and abnormal long-term return. And third and last, the same model refinement 
technique has been applied: Base models have been established, control models examined, 
and correlated efficiency variables included separately in efficiency models. What is more, all 
variables have been theoretically derived, are embedded in prior research, and have not been 
subjected to unnecessary transformation (e.g., short-term dependent variables have not been 
centered since skew is immaterial for short event windows). Overall, the consistency of data 
and methodology underscores the discrepancy between the short- and long-term regression 
results. 
6.6.2.3 Counter-hypothesis long-term results 
The hypothesized relationships between agency costs and abnormal return in the long-term 
have been more than rejected: Across parent firm and subsidiary, four cases exhibit 
significant results that run counter to hypothesis – a finding that cannot be disregarded. 
Three of these cases apply to the subsidiary. The first and second suggest that subsidiary 
performance may deteriorate if the parent company focuses through the ECO, and if the 
parent company has exhibited low investment efficiency before the ECO, respectively. These 
raise the question if the parent company may have benefited through the ECO at the expense 
of the subsidiary. It may have focused on superior parts of its business, loading the subsidiary 
with odd ends that are less viable on their own. Such interpretation is not contradictory to the 
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finding that increases in focus are not associated with superior short-term ECO performance: 
Even if focus is not rewarded by investors (at the parent firm), the later may express 
discontent for the cost at which it comes (at the subsidiary). The same argument applies for 
the contradictory finding pertaining to investment efficiency: The parent firm may realize 
increases in efficiency by unloading the sources of inefficiency to the subsidiary. 
The third contradictory finding for the subsidiary implies that its performance may be poorer 
if incentive compensation has been introduced. This only appears plausible when investors 
have been disappointed with the introduction of such payment schemes, i.e., when they have 
indeed overreacted in the short-term with regard to this item. Given the above finding of high 
market efficiency, it may be equally likely that this contradictory result does not bear much 
practical relevance and is due to measurement error or chance. The same applies to the last 
contradictory finding, i.e., that the parent firms perform poorly if forecast accuracy has been 
improved through the ECO. While the increased transparency may have brought to light 
unfavorable attributes of the parent company, the importance of this singular finding should 
not be overemphasized. 
The overall low explanatory power of the (parent and subsidiary) long-term regression models 
highlights that the main finding of this section lies somewhere else: Long-term abnormal 
ECO return is unrelated to efficiency effects. A different approach is required to fill this gap, 
and the following section will endeavor into that direction. 
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7 Market timing 
7.1 Section introduction 
7.1.1 Course of the argument 
To appreciate the course of the argument, this section will open with a brief recapitulation. In 
the discussion of the long-term results at the end of Section 5, all possible investor reactions 
to an event have been categorized (compare Figure 16 on p. 143). The pattern of the present 
sample is potentially reconcilable with two types of investor reaction. First, the reaction could 
constitute a rational and efficient response, initially in a positive direction after the ECO 
announcement, and then in a negative direction after the offer, when new (unfavorable) 
information related to the ECO becomes publicly available. The fact that rational investors do 
not anticipate the average negative long-term information after an ECO renders such 
explanation clearly improbable. A second alternative suggests that investors react 
directionally wrongly in the short-term. As investors have an opportunity to revise their initial 
reaction over time, abnormal long-term return may reflect the true value of an ECO more 
correctly than the short-term reaction. Particularly the high statistical significance with which 
investors would continuously err does not make this explanation highly probable, either. 
Reviewing the mutually exhaustive set of alternatives in Figure 16, error remains as the only 
plausible explanation for the discrepancy of return. Putting the observed results entirely down 
to error, however, would be premature, since inconsistency between short- and long-term 
results does not consequentially imply that both types of abnormal return are erroneous. 
Therefore, based on the conclusion from previous ECO research that efficiency effects are a 
fundamental determinant of their performance, a cross-sectional regression analysis has been 
conducted to assess the degree to which abnormal short- and long-term return can be 
explained with arguments of heightened (or lessened) efficiency. The results indicate that 
efficiency effects are indeed the main determinant of the on average positive reaction to an 
ECO announcement. With regard to the long-term share price reaction to the offer, however, 
the explanatory power of efficiency effects is feeble at best. Investors clearly associate ECOs 
with efficiency gains when the intent to separate the subsidiary first becomes public 
information, and the long-term analysis does not refute the argument that these efficiency 
gains do indeed materialize. Investors, in other words, correctly anticipate the efficiency 
effects of an ECO at its announcement. What remains an open question at this point is the 
cause of the negative abnormal long-term returns documented in Section 5. 
7.1.2 Intricacies of causal inference 
Economic models are frequently built to assess the influence of an exogenous variable (a 
treatment, in the words of causal inference theory). In the current work, such treatment is 
given by an ECO. Treatments, however, are rarely indiscriminate (as a natural disaster would 
be), but represent the result of decision or are artificially imposed by the researcher 
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(Villalonga (2004b)). This bears no relevance as long as it assured that the treatment occurs as 
if it was indiscriminate: 
“… the simple average difference in outcomes between treatment and control groups is 
only an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect when units are randomly assigned to the 
treatment” (Villalonga (2004b) p. 6). 
An example from the original paper of Heckman (1979) is used to illustrate the issue: “The 
wages of migrants do not, in general, afford a reliable estimate of what nonmigrants would 
have earned had they migrated” (p. 153). It is assumed that migrants earn more than 
nonmigrants. If the treatment “migration” occurs randomly, it can be asserted that migration 
leads to higher wages. Since it is likely that migration (the result of a decision) is related to 
post-migration wage (i.e., endogeneity prevails), the example remains formidable: Not only 
may nonmigrants not have earned as much if they had migrated, but migrants may have 
earned more than nonmigrants had they not migrated. In the first case, it is possible that 
migration is undertaken by individuals whose wage level will increase through migration (i.e., 
self-selection prevails), whereas in the second case, migration is undertaken by individuals 
who earn more in general (other forms of selection prevail, e.g., migration may be costly). In 
the first scenario, further research may pursue (at a minimum) the hypothesis that migration 
has led to higher wages for those who have migrated, whereas the hypothesis that migration 
has an effect on wages must be rejected in the latter case. 
To determine which is the case, research can be designed longitudinally: By comparing 
migrants’ pre- to post-migration wage, the influence of migration can be reliably assessed for 
migrants. This case represents precisely the design of the short-term analysis in Section 4 of 
this document, since an event study represents an extremely scrupulous form of longitudinal 
comparison. Therefore, it has been concluded that the announcement of an ECO has caused a 
positive share price reaction for firms that have conducted an ECO. An example of how 
treacherous causal inference under endogeneity can be is provided by Cho (1998), who shows 
that the prior inference “beneficial ownership structure leads to superior investment, which 
leads to higher firm value” is wrong, since, as the author shows, superior investment leads to 
higher firm value, which attracts a certain kind of ownership structure. Cho shows that 
beneficial ownership structure (the equivalent to “migration” in Heckman’s example) is 
without effect on investment (“wage”). In a subsequent study, this finding has been confirmed 
by Demsetz/Villalonga (2001). 
7.1.3 Toward a theoretical foundation of valuation effects and ECOs 
Against the backdrop of this digression into causal inference theory, it is the objective of this 
section to reassess the long-term post-ECO analysis and find the error it presumably contains. 
Specifically, it aims to address the question if there may be an omitted variable that impairs 
the inference “an ECO leads to long-term underperformance”. If it could be shown that this 
inference is invalid, then long-term underperformance may not be irreconcilable with the 
short-term positive announcement effect of an ECO. To this end, the idea is here pursued that 
there exists an external variable that is related both to the treatment “ECO” and to abnormal 
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long-term return. To refer one last time to Heckman’s example, such variable could be given 
by the trait “low risk aversion”, which independently leads to a higher wage and to the 
decision to migrate. Higher wage and migration would then be correlated, but without causal 
relation. 
In the current context, it is suggested that overvaluation represents such omitted exogenous 
variable in the study of ECOs, since overvaluation may lead managers to conduct an ECO 
(i.e., engage in market timing to sell equity at high prices) and cause long-term 
underperformance. In such a case, the occurrence of an ECO would be correlated but causally 
unrelated with long-term underperformance. If this were true and overvaluation ignored as a 
variable, then a study of abnormal long-term return could lead to impairments of causal 
inference and to incongruent results. The econometric literature presents a range of advanced 
statistical techniques that can assess the likelihood of the existence as well as the effect of 
omitted variables165. For the present purpose, their application may, however, be premature, 
since a thorough unified theoretical foundation of the complex of ECOs, valuation, and 
market timing has not yet been presented by the literature. It is the objective of this section to 
make a first step into that direction. 
7.1.4 Section outline 
To assess the relationship between ECOs, valuation, and market timing, the remainder of this 
section is grouped into five chapters. The first contains a review of the theoretical foundations 
that underlie market timing, specifically with regard to market timing as a form of market 
anomaly (Chapter 7.2). Then, the applicable literature is surveyed to show the current state of 
research on ECO market timing (Chapter 7.3). It follows a theoretical exposition of the effect 
of market timing on the measurement of abnormal return, which concludes with a set of 
hypotheses on the effect of market timing on abnormal long-term return (Chapter 7.4). These 
hypotheses are empirically reviewed on the present sample, and results presented (Chapter 
7.5) and discussed (Chapter 7.6) in the remainder of this section. 
7.2 Theoretical foundations of market timing 
7.2.1 Definitions 
7.2.1.1 Market timing 
Broadly speaking, market timing refers to the execution of a transaction at an advantageous 
point in time. This can occur if opportunistic individuals exploit an informational advantage 
(or a reduced disadvantage) when such behavior is possible166. More narrowly, market timing 
                                                 
165  The standard statistical technique for this purpose is the two-stage method introduced by 
Heckman (1979). Examples of its application to related topics are Campa/Kedia (2002) and 
Villalonga (2004b), both with regard to the diversification discount. Both papers contain 
references to relevant literature, and the latter an empirical comparison to alternative techniques. 
166  For example, Dharan/Ikenberry (1995) show that firms apply for listing on the Amex or NYSE 
when managers expect a deterioration in performance that would complicate a later listing. 
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refers to the practice of fund managers to increase the variance of their portfolios in 
expectation of strong market performance, as studied by Fabozzi/Francis (1979), Veit/Cheney 
(1982), Kon (1983), Chang/Lewellen (1984), and Hendriksson (1984)167. For the current 
purpose, market timing denotes the issuance of equity deliberately at those times when it is 
valued on capital markets at higher levels than at other times. In the following, two variants of 
market timing are presented (irrational market timing and rational market timing) and a 
related form expressly delineated (pseudo market timing). 
Irrational market timing arises when investors have misguided (i.e., excessively high) 
expectations about the future performance of the equity they are offered and are willing to pay 
an irrationally high price per share. Managers, in contrast, are assumed to be rational and 
exploit this constellation by demanding a higher price for the offer than warranted by 
company fundaments. Three essential conditions must be jointly met for such irrational 
market timing. First, investors must act on misguided expectations, i.e., they must behave 
irrationally (for details on rationality, see below). Second, managers must know the true value 
of the equity, or know it better than investors, i.e., information must be asymmetrically 
distributed. Were managers equally unaware that the stock was overvalued, then no 
systematic exploitation could occur. And third, managers must be inclined to behave 
opportunistically and aim to exploit their informational advantage168. Rational market timing 
constitutes a second, less prominent variant. It follows from the adverse selection argument 
by Myers/Majluf (1984) and assumes that managers time equity offers to periods when 
information is less asymmetrically distributed, i.e., when rational investors place a smaller 
discount on the offered equity as provision for information they do not have. 
To distinguish these two types of market timing, the irrational variant consists of the sale of 
overvalued equity, whereas the rational variant consists of the sale of less undervalued equity. 
The latter alternative thus automatically implies a ceiling to the gains from market timing 
when the equity is correctly valued (i.e., when information asymmetry is zero), whereas the 
irrational variant is theoretically unbounded, rendering irrational market timing the practically 
more relevant phenomenon. Furthermore, an increase in asymmetric information facilitates 
the irrational variant of market timing, while it is the detriment to its rational form. It is a 
characteristic of both variants that they are irreconcilable with strong-form capital market 
efficiency. If prices correctly reflected all (including all private) information, information 
asymmetry would be zero and both rational discounting and overvaluation per definition 
impossible. At least semi-strong market efficiency is therefore assumed to prevail, since the 
existence of insider information induces investors to compensate for their informational 
                                                 
167  Research on the market timing abilities of fund managers in the above-mentioned studies 
generally concludes that the investment performance of mutual funds is commensurate with 
benchmarks and that managers are not able to foresee changes in market condition. Further 
methodological studies on (the measurement of) market timing are provided by Merton (1981) 
and Hendriksson/Merton (1981). 
168  Details on opportunistic behavior are presented in Chapter 3.3 on p. 55 and here not reiterated. 
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disadvantage (in the rational variant) and allows managers to exploit their superior knowledge 
(in the irrational variant). 
For the purpose of the present analysis, market timing is delineated from a practice it is 
sometimes brought in connection with, namely to conduct equity offers at times when security 
prices are high in general or when equity offerings are frequent. These phenomena are not 
necessary indications of lower levels of rational discounting or exploitable stock prices, since 
company fundamentals may fully support high share prices. Consistent with the publication 
by Schultz (2003), this latter behavior will be henceforth referred to as pseudo market timing. 
7.2.1.2 Rationality 
The idea that individuals behave rationally has been fundamental to much economic 
reasoning, be it neoclassical or new institutional – an assumption most clearly reflected by the 
portrait of the economic man (e.g., Williamson (1981)). Rationality is also fundamental to the 
present discussion of market timing, but from an opposite vantage point: Instead of assuming 
that individuals behave rationality, rationality is – for at least one variant of market timing – 
assumed to be impaired. Since the assumption of an economic man may still be more 
orthodox than the assumption that humans are not fully economic, this condition requires 
some appraisal. Despite the fact that rationality has formed the subject of intense academic 
debate, the following presentation is succinct and geared toward the given objective, an 
analysis of post-ECO underperformance. 
Rationality is generally viewed as an attribute of attitude or behavior that relates to its 
governance by logical judgment as opposed to prejudice or sentiment. It appears reasonable to 
assume that rationality represents a desirable quality for individuals who seek funding or part 
with their capital on financial markets. Desirable as it may be in such settings, its maximizing 
form, according to which individually correctly consider all consequences of a choice, may 
not prevail in reality (Williamson (1985a)). The introduction of the alternative concept of 
bounded rationality is accredited to Simon (1957)169, who notes that investors intend, but do 
not succeed, to be fully rational. Limits to full rationality arise from the difficulty to process 
the mass of information as well as to formulate and solve complex problems, resulting in a 
portrait of market participants who are “neither infinite in faculties, nor in apprehension” 
(Shleifer/Vishny (1997a) p. 1576)170. 
                                                 
169  The quoted source is an early and insightful collection of essays on the topic, of which Number 
14 is deemed particularly pertinent (“A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice”). Simon’s notion 
of rationality is exemplified by his choice of words in a subsequent publication, where he refers to 
aspects such as mind and attention as scarce resources (Simon (1978b)). 
170  Besides maximizing and bounded rationality, Williamson (1985a) lists a third type of rationality, 
referred to as organic rationality, which describes a weak form in which rationality forms the 
result of a dynamic discovery process. This process takes place over time as individuals revise 
their behavior toward higher levels of rationality. Under all three forms of rationality, individuals 
update their beliefs in a (Bayesian) way consistent with prior information. 
  
234 
Such bounded rationality is assumed for the following examination of the long-term 
performance of ECO return171. This follows from the logic that, for an exploitable situation to 
exist, the behavior of managers must be more rational than that of investors. Consequently, at 
least investor rationality must be bounded. Following the arguments of Simon, this means that 
managers are better informed (plausible, due to asymmetric information) and/or have higher 
intellectual capacity than investors (implausible)172. 
Williamson (1981), in a different context, presents a felicitous summary of the preconditions 
of irrational market timing, both with regard to the limits of investor rationality and 
managers’ inclination to exploit their informational advantage: 
“The human agents that populate the firms and markets with which I am concerned differ 
from economic man (or at least the common caricature thereof) in that they are less 
competent in calculation and less trustworthy and reliable in action. A condition of 
bounded rationality is responsible for the computational limits of organization man. A 
proclivity for (at least some) economic agents to behave opportunistically is responsible 
for their unreliability” (p. 1545). 
With regard to the effect of bounded rationality in the context of ECOs, uncertainty is seen as 
a relevant factor. Uncertainty does not impair rationality, but it presents a condition that 
demands rational appraisal. To illustrate its influence, uncertainty, which has been introduced 
in Chapter 3.2.3.1 on p. 49 in the context of TCE, is here segregated into three simple forms. 
The first and most severe type of uncertainty prevails if individuals do not know the range of 
possible consequences of a choice. If they are reined by milder uncertainty and know what is 
possible, they may still not know what is probable, i.e., individuals do not know the 
probability distribution of individual outcomes. The third and weakest form of uncertainty 
prevails if individuals know the probability of all possible outcomes. 
On capital markets, it can mostly be assumed that investors know some aspects about the 
probability distribution of return, which they may infer from the observation of company 
fundamentals and a stock’s past return characteristics173. In the case of an ECO (or an IPO, 
more generally), both methods are severely complicated, since subsidiary stock does not have 
a track record of return and since it has not been subject to public disclosure requirements. It 
is therefore assumed that investors who consider investing in an ECO face higher levels of 
uncertainty than investors in seasoned offerings or listed stock in general. 
                                                 
171  A comprehensive treatment of rationality in the context of ECOs, including a broad overview of 
related literature, is represented by Langenbach (2001). 
172  For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the (theoretical) state of zero rationality is 
irreconcilable with market timing. While share prices may depart from their true values, the lack 
of rationality implies that there is no force that redirects prices toward their true level in the long-
term. Managers are thus unable to anticipate how investors may value their firm’s equity in the 
future. The actual level of rationality is therefore assumed greater than zero but smaller than its 
full (maximizing) variant. 
173  For example, investors are able to derive, via the CAPM, the beta of stocks with a trading history. 
Rational conduct in such a situation is guided by the portfolio selection rules of Markowitz 
(1952). For details, see Chapter 3.2.1.1 on p. 41. 
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Bounded rationality increases the likelihood of suboptimal outcomes. Higher uncertainty 
represents an additional challenge to individuals with bounded rationality. Taken together, 
this implies that decisions about investments into ECOs are particularly prone to suffer the 
disadvantages of bounded rationality. 
7.2.1.3 Market anomaly 
Market anomalies denote states that are irreconcilable with the proposition of efficient capital 
markets. With regard to the distinction of market efficiency provided by Fama (1970), an 
anomaly arises when not all information is correctly reflected by share prices. Market timing 
constitutes a form of market anomaly since it requires (at a minimum) the relevance of private 
information, as otherwise managers could not exploit periods when share prices temporarily 
exceed fundamental values (until all relevant information becomes historic and as such 
correctly reflected in prices). Attempts to deliver explanations for market anomalies have 
sometimes succeeded (e.g., the January effect – see below), while other anomalies persist 
without being well understood (e.g., the long-term ECO underperformance). 
7.2.2 Evidence of market anomalies 
Market timing represents a market anomaly. The following exposition therefore takes a step 
back and reviews the existing literature for evidence and explanations of market anomalies in 
general, intentionally excluding market timing at this point, which is separately considered in 
Chapter 7.2.3 on p. 239. 
7.2.2.1 Anomalies of the capital market in general 
The literature is rife with empirical evidence that is inconsistent with the proposition of 
strongly or semi-strongly efficient capital markets. In this document, some of these 
publications have been introduced in Chapter 4.3.1 on p. 68, and the following review aims 
expand that overview by highlighting further salient examples that help to prepare the 
subsequent discussion of market timing. 
The special issue number 6 of the Journal of Financial Economics conveys a flavor of the 
early contributions on market anomalies. In this issue, Ball (1978), in a broad literature 
survey, defends market efficiency by putting the anomalies down to omitted variables in the 
underlying return estimation models. Testing the propositions by Ball (1978) on earnings 
announcements, Watts (1978), however, is unable to attribute return anomalies to deficiencies 
in asset pricing models and concludes that they must be the result of market inefficiencies. 
Long (1978) finds premiums on stock with cash dividends as opposed to those where equal 
value is represented by capital gains and reaches the conclusion that either informational 
opaqueness prevails and investors are not fully aware of all possibilities and implications, or 
that investors behave irrationally by paying a premium for one security over another one of 
equal value. The author views his analysis, conducted on two different security types by the 
same company, as a real-world test (and refutation) of the Modigliani/Miller (1958) theorem. 
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One prominent irregularity is presented by the January anomaly, which has been described by 
Branch (1977). It refers to the phenomenon that, for tax reasons, investors are inclined to sell 
stocks at the end of the year and reacquire these or new stocks at the beginning of the next 
year. The resulting effect on prices represents an anomaly that is irreconcilable with semi-
strong market efficiency since future returns could be predicted by relying on public 
information. This occurrence has been confirmed by subsequent research (e.g., Keim (1983), 
Reinganum (1983a)). 
In their seminal study on stock performance, DeBondt/Thaler (1985) show that a stock that 
has performed strongly in the past systematically does poorly in subsequent periods, and the 
authors attribute this anomaly to investor overreaction, referencing to the overreaction 
phenomena found in experimental psychology. Shiller (1990) shows in a questionnaire-based 
approach that irrational motives play an important role in investors’ purchase decision. 
Evidence for misguided expectations are also detailed in La Porta (1996), who studies analyst 
forecasts and shows the superiority of contrarian trading strategies. In related research, La 
Porta et al. (1997a) can explain the superior return of value stocks through expectational 
errors. Bernard/Thomas (1989), building on earlier work by Ball/Brown (1968), detect a long-
run positive drift after better-than-expected earnings announcements and conclude that this 
represents a delayed price response. Odean (1998) finds that investors are inclined to sell 
winning investments too soon and to hold losing investments too long, describing an irrational 
component in investment behavior that is based on a suboptimal reluctance to realize 
losses174. 
Section 5 contains a review of long-term abnormal return after corporate events. To name, 
therefore, here just two examples, Agarwal et al. (1992) find significant long-term post-
merger returns, which contradict the notion that all relevant information should have been 
evaluated by the market upon completion of the transaction, and Cusatis et al. (1993) find 
significant positive abnormal long-term returns for spin-off parents and their spun-off 
subsidiaries. 
7.2.2.2 Anomalies of the present sample 
Analyses carried out on the present sample have also delivered evidence that markets are not 
strongly efficient. Most obviously, the long-term analysis of ECO performance has led to the 
detection of non-zero abnormal returns, which the present section aims to explain. Even if 
these are the result of new (unfavorable) information after the offer, they are irreconcilable 
with an efficient market on which investors impound the expectation of negative information 
into the stock price as soon as an ECO is announced. Furthermore, short-term results also 
contain indications that markets are less-than-strongly efficient: The event date is preceded by 
a steady run-up of abnormal return over up to 30 days before the actual announcement. 
                                                 
174  A further overview of literature on anomalies of the capital market in general is contained in 
Appendix A of Daniel et al. (1998) and in the “Nonrandom Walk Down Wall Street” (p. 61) in 
Malkiel (2003). 
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Various reasons for this anomaly have been discussed (see Chapter 4.6 on p. 98), including 
anticipation and the fact that markets may be slow to respond to private information. This 
suggests that private information is not fully reflected by prices and market efficiency 
therefore at most semi-strong. 
7.2.2.3 Causes of market anomaly 
The above research principally deals with the detection of market anomalies. The discussion 
of individual behavior, say of investors or managers, as an explanation for these anomalies 
has generally remained ancillary to the study of abnormal return. Because of this focus on 
market characteristics, formal models of individual behavior as a determinant for abnormal 
return have mostly not been provided. The fact that the research outlined above is linked by 
consistency of results, if at all, rather than by a unifying underlying theory reflects this 
phenomenon. 
Attempts to close this gap through the systematic study of the relevant traits of market 
participants have not been undertaken until more recently175. During the 1980s, early 
contributions to this field have laid the foundations for what has evolved into a separate 
discipline of finance, known as behavioral finance. This discipline focuses on the attributes of 
market participants and thus operates at a multi-disciplinary cross-section, most importantly 
of finance, social science, and psychology. Forming part of the broader field of behavioral 
economics, behavioral finance explicitly considers irrationality as a cause of observable facts 
on capital markets, which marks a clear departure from neoclassical research (see Chapter 
3.2.1 on p. 41)176. 
Barberis/Thaler (2003) separate behavioral finance into two broad categories, namely limits 
of arbitrage on the one hand, and psychological approaches on the other hand177. With respect 
to the first part, arbitrage is seen in classic capital market models as the mechanism that drives 
prices toward equilibrium and thus ensures their rationality. Some investors may behave 
irrationally, but the presence of at least some rational investors, coupled with arbitrage, 
ensures rational results. As presented in the article by Shleifer/Vishny (1997a), this 
mechanism may fail, leading to the emergence of irrational phenomena on capital markets 
proportional to the limits of arbitrage. One example of arbitrage failure is shown in the study 
by Lamont/Thaler (2003) on negative stubs, whereby the imputed total value of a spin-off 
parent may be lower than the value of its share in the subsidiary. While classic theory would 
predict that subsidiary shares are heavily short-sold, the authors outline why this arbitrage 
                                                 
175  Simon (1978a) observes that “… economics has traditionally been concerned with what decisions 
are made rather than with how they are made” (p. 494, emphasis in original). 
176  A fitting paper on the historic roots of the connection between economics and psychology is 
provided by Simon (1959). 
177  A thorough collection of early contributions to behavioral finance can be found in the book by 
Thaler (1993), which includes 21 (mostly previously published) articles on topics such as noise 
trading, excessive volatility, and overreaction. The book by Shleifer (2000) and the article by 
Shiller (2003) provide further overviews of related research, the latter with focus on the origins of 
the discipline. 
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opportunity cannot be exploited. Lamont/Thaler (2003) conclude that markets may not always 
be efficient since arbitrage can fail to impose rational pricing. Another example of limits of 
arbitrage is provided by the work of Mitchell et al. (2002). For a 16-year period, the authors 
are able to identify 77 situations with negative stub values and find that most (but not all) of 
these cases are subject to subsequent correction. While this indicates that the enforcing 
mechanism works most of the time, arbitrage failure appears to be an equally real 
phenomenon, which Mitchell et al. (2002) mainly attribute to imperfect information178. 
The limits-of-arbitrage side of behavioral finance assumes that some individuals do not 
behave rationally. This does not, however, explain what determines irrationality, which is the 
subject of psychological approaches, the second broad part of behavioral finance. Hirshleifer 
(2001) proposes that the return of a stock depends both on risk, which can be expressed by 
beta, and erroneous valuation, which follows from psychological attributes179. An early 
example for a psychological concept adopted for the study of financial phenomena is prospect 
theory, which deals with the descriptive study of the preferences of individuals. Prospect 
theory differs from other utility theories in its focus on changes in wealth rather than on the 
level of wealth and in its assumption of loss aversion (Ritter (2003b)). Its origin is attributed 
to Kahneman/Tversky (1979), who have developed a model of individuals’ reactions to 
different levels of uncertainty (certainty effect) and the unduly low emphasis placed on items 
that are included in all of multiple prospects (isolation effect). Kahneman/Tversky (1979) thus 
show that individuals react differently to equivalent choices if they are differently presented. 
In its application to finance, prospect theory has been used to provide insight into the ways 
investors make decisions, particularly with regard to their degree of risk aversion. 
An example of a financial model that builds on psychological contributions (in this case of 
Griffin/Tversky (1992)) is presented in the work by Barberis et al. (1998). The authors link 
investor over- and underreaction to the psychological concepts of conservatism (individuals 
are reluctant to adjust their beliefs) and the representativeness heuristic (individuals 
overweigh evidence, due to its strength, relative to its actual probability). In a parallel 
publication, Daniel et al. (1998) also formally model investor behavior with reference to 
psychological research. To develop their model of abnormal market reaction, the authors use 
the concepts of overconfidence (individuals view their abilities too positively) and biased self-
attribution (investors overreact to private and underreact to public information)180. Hong/Stein 
(1999) suggest a behavioral theory of market phenomena in which investors are grouped into 
newswatchers and momentum traders. Underreaction, the authors argue, follows from gradual 
information diffusion, and overreaction from momentum-related trend chasing. A recent 
                                                 
178  The special issue on limits of arbitrage of the Journal of Financial Economics 66/2 (2002) is 
recommended as a source of further details on the topic. 
179  Hirshleifer (2001) also provides a survey of investor psychology and asset pricing that contains 
and goes beyond the points presented in this document. 
180  Barberis/Thaler (2003) present several other psychological concepts that have been used in 
behavioral finance, including overoptimism, wishful thinking, belief perseverance, anchoring, and 
the availability bias. Stein (2003) discusses the possibility that managers suffer from 
overconfidence with regard to the assets they control. 
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example is Hirshleifer et al. (2006), who provide a theoretical treatment of potential gains to 
irrational investors, assuming that some, but not all investors are rational. 
7.2.3 Evidence of market timing 
As the review above has shown, evidence abounds that capital markets – at least temporarily 
and with regard to certain events – exhibit anomalies. While behavioral finance provides 
approaches that can, to some degree, describe the mechanics of these anomalies, two relevant 
questions remain at this point: First, does the market for equity offerings also exhibit 
anomalies? And second, do managers exploit these anomalies by timing the issuance of 
equity? In the definitional part above, the rational and the irrational variant of market timing 
have been distinguished, and the following review is correspondingly structured. 
7.2.3.1 Rational investors and market timing 
The first variant of market timing, which assumes that investors are rational, is based on the 
signaling model introduced by Myers/Majluf (1984) and argues that investors rationally 
discount equity issues to account for information they do not have. Assuming the existence of 
asymmetric information between investors and managers, this model presents an adverse 
selection process that leaves only overvalued companies to issue stock. If a firm is 
undervalued, management may refrain from issuing stock even if this implies that it has to 
forgo positive NPV projects because shares would have to be sold at less than their intrinsic 
value, leaving existing shareholders worse off181. Therefore, the market interprets an issue 
announcement as a signal that the company is overvalued, leading to the observable negative 
returns to issue announcements. This negative effect increases with the offer volume and with 
the degree of information asymmetry between management and investors. 
The Myers/Majluf (1984) signaling model has been called upon by some researchers as an 
explanation for the market timing of equity issues since companies may aim to minimize the 
negative economic effect entailed by the decision to issue equity by choosing an offer period 
when information asymmetries are low. Building on this thought, Lucas/McDonald (1990) 
develop a model in which managers will defer an issue if information asymmetry is high. 
Consistent with the above predictions, Korajczyk et al. (1991) find empirical evidence that 
issues are clustered after information releases. Bayless/Chaplinsky (1996) find that equity 
issues are more frequent when the negative announcement effect is smaller, which they 
attribute at least in part to reduced levels of asymmetric information. Cornett/Tehranian 
(1994) provide further evidence of Myers/Majluf-inspired market timing. In a comparison of 
voluntary IPOs to involuntary IPOs for commercial banks (the latter encompassing issues that 
are undertaken to meet regulatory capital requirements), the authors find that voluntary IPOs 
exhibit negative stock price reactions that are about 2.5 times larger than those for involuntary 
                                                 
181  The argument further assumes that the loss in existing shareholders’ wealth is greater than their 
share in the proceeds from positive-NPV investment projects that can only be financed through 
the issue. If the later was not the case, also correctly- or even undervalued companies will issue 
equity. 
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ones, and of higher statistical validity, indicating that investors believe that overvaluation 
plays an important role in the motivation of voluntary stock offerings. 
Although it has been argued above that pseudo market timing rests on different assumptions, 
the contribution suggested by Schultz (2003) shall here be briefly reviewed since it is, after 
all, more than just terminologically related. Pseudo market timing does not assume that prices 
deflect from their true values, nor does it require managers to predict share price movements. 
It merely assumes that managers are more inclined to offer equity when the performance of 
other offers is strong, and vice versa182. Managers, if anybody, are assumed irrational for 
pseudo market timing (and hence its categorization in the present subchapter). In an effort to 
explain the long-term underperformance of equity offers, Schultz assumes that poor 
performance of an offer is equally likely as strong performance, and that the degrees of poor 
and strong are equal. He further assumes that only strong performance invites other 
candidates to the offer of shares. If a period of strong performance has attracted more offers, 
these new offers are again equally likely to perform poorly or strongly. Thus, while strong 
IPO return is subsequently at least partially diluted by the poor-performing cases it provokes, 
poor-performing cases do not attract any further IPOs and stand as they are. To restate, the 
expected null (i.e., average of poor and strong) performance following strong offers brings the 
average of those offers closer to zero, while such effect does not occur for poor cases. Despite 
the ex-ante equal probability of poor or strong performance, an ex-post measure of event-time 
performance shows that the average offering performs poorly. The long-term 
underperformance of equity issuers, Schultz contends, is a reflection of this situation. 
7.2.3.2 Irrational investors and market timing 
The second variant of the market timing of equity offers assumes that investors are irrational 
and builds on the argument that shares are mispriced over time. It is further assumed that 
managers are aware of this mispricing while (at least some) investors are ignorant. Managers 
can exploit this constellation by issuing stock at terms more favorable for existing 
shareholders: Relative to firm fundamentals183, they can collect a larger amount of offer 
proceeds for a given number of shares, or choose to part with fewer shares for a given amount 
of cash. 
In their survey of 392 CFOs about practices in corporate finance, Graham/Harvey (2001) find 
that 67% of respondents rate The amount by which our stock is undervalued or overvalued by 
the market and 63% rate If our stock price has recently risen, the price at which we can sell is 
‘high’ as important or very important in their decision to issue stock (p. 216). This indicates 
that at least the attempt to time the market is common practice. This pattern is reflected in the 
finding by Asquith/Mullins (1986), who show that equity offerings follow after periods of 
                                                 
182  Empirical evidence for this phenomenon is provided by Lowry/Schwert (2002). 
183  On the fundamental value of the firm, Barberis/Thaler (2003) note: “This is the discounted sum of 
expected future cash flows, where in forming expectations, investors correctly process all 
available information, and where the discount rate is consistent with a normatively acceptable 
preference specification” (p. 1056). 
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sustained increases in market returns. This period of increasing returns begins at around one 
year before the announcement of the intention to offer equity, and continues until well beyond 
the offer (more than one year). The authors further find that in the two years before the 
announcement, sample firms outperform the market by 33%, while they lag the market by 6% 
after the offer. 
A review of the research on the long-term performance of equity offers delivers further 
evidence that managers may have undertaken attempts to time these issues. Most prominently, 
Ritter (1991) documents statistically significant negative abnormal three-year returns of –17% 
after IPOs, basing his conclusion on 1,526 IPOs sampled from the 1975-1984 period. Studies 
by Aggarwarl/Rivoli (1990) and Loughran/Ritter (1995) confirm this finding. Spiess/Affleck-
Graves (1995) and Loughran/Ritter (1995) show that the evidence found for IPOs also holds 
for SEOs with comparable levels of statistically significant long-term underperformance184. 
Loughran et al. (1994) show the international validity of this phenomenon in their collection 
of evidence from 25 countries. As a direct test of the market timing hypothesis, the authors 
show that stock index level and number of IPOs are positively correlated in 14 out of the 15 
countries where this analysis was feasible, in most of these cases with high statistical 
significance. Ikenberry et al. (1995) take the opposite vantage point and follow the argument 
that if the long-term reaction to SEOs is negative, then long-term reaction to share 
repurchases should be positive. The authors find empirical evidence that is consistent with 
their predictions, thus confirming the conclusion that the market for equity offers is subject to 
anomalies185. 
In a historic analysis of the topic, Burch et al. (2004) study the abnormal returns associated 
with rights offers versus firm commitment offers during the 1933-1949 period. Their 
argument rests on the logic that, in timing the market, managers are more willing to exploit 
prospective new investors than existing shareholders, so that rights offers, which grant 
existing shareholders pro-rata rights to buy new shares in the firm, are less susceptible to 
market timing186. Firm commitment offers, in contrast, are directed toward prospective 
shareholders and therefore regular market timing arguments apply. The authors can confirm 
their propositions and find that the abnormal return during the 13 months after the offer is 
statistically significant and negative at around 10% for firm commitment offers, but not for 
rights offers. Further evidence consistent with the finding that the market for equity offers is 
subject to anomalies has been provided by Denis/Sarin (2001), who find that investors react 
negatively to post-SEO earnings announcements of small firms, which they interpret as 
                                                 
184  As with Ritter (1991), the large samples and long sampling periods of Spiess/Affleck-Graves 
(1995) and Loughran/Ritter (1995) underline the robustness of their findings, with 1,247 SEOs 
during 1975-1989 and 8,455 IPOs and SEOs during 1970-1990, respectively. 
185  See Chapter 4.2.1 on p. 64 for a commentary on the validity of this reverse inference. 
186  Rights recipients might subsequently decide to sell their rights, in which case, however, the 
benefits of the offer still rest with the existing shareholders and the proposition by Burch et al. 
(2004) applies. 
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evidence that these firms have conducted equity offers at times when the market has 
overestimated their earnings potential. 
In a further study, Jain/Kini (1994) find that IPOs are priced according to pre-issue firm 
characteristics, which on average decline substantially after the transaction, leading the 
authors to the conclusion that investor expectations are seriously misguided187. In his models 
to predict the capital structure of a sample of UK firms, Marsh (1982) finds that market 
conditions are a strong and statistically significant predictor of an increase in the equity-to-
debt ratio, indicating that managers time equity offerings to periods of strong market 
performance. Baker/Wurgeler (2000) present the same phenomenon from a different angle 
and show that firms prefer to issue equity before periods of low market returns, and that thus 
the share of equity in the total amount of capital raised can be seen as a strong predictor of the 
future market condition. In a subsequent study, the authors extend their analysis to the effect 
of market timing on capital structure (Baker/Wurgeler (2002)) and find that market timing 
does indeed strongly influence financing choice. Specifically, the authors conclude that 
leverage is closely related to firm valuation at the time capital was raised and that “capital 
structure evolves as the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market” (p. 
27), which constitutes a clear contrast to the neoclassical propositions on capital structure. In 
summary, Ritter’s conclusion that “equity markets and the IPO market in particular are 
subject to fads that affect market prices” (Ritter (1991) p. 4) seems plausible in light of the 
empirical evidence188. 
7.3 Existing research on ECO market timing 
Relative to the overall number of studies conducted on ECOs, market timing has generally 
remained an orphan topic adopted by a few studies only. Pagano et al. (1998) study a sample 
of 29 Italian ECOs and conclude that “public holding companies appear to list their profitable, 
low-debt subsidiaries with superior market timing” (p. 60). Hand/Skantz (1999) conclude that 
market timing is a real phenomenon for ECOs, and base this assertion on four findings. First, 
the authors find that market return in the year before the offer is higher than unconditionally 
expected. Second, pre-ECO mean market return is substantially greater than post-ECO return. 
Third, ECO offers coincide somewhat with peaks of market return, while fourth and last, 
ECOs are contrarian predictors of market return. Where Hand/Skantz (1999) assume the 
external vantage point, Powers (2003) analyzes internal aspects and finds that operating 
performance of firms that undertake an ECO peaks at issue. The author also finds that the 
                                                 
187  Similar evidence is contained in Webb (1999), who documents strong pre- and poor post-offer 
performance of firms that conduct an IPO. 
188  A valuable extension to the analysis of the market timing of equity issues would be a study of the 
nature of information asymmetry, as managers could exploit market-wide, industry-wide, or firm-
specific mispricing in their decision to issue equity. This question has only been addressed 
implicitly in past research. For example, Ritter/Welch (2002) argue that a firm’s decision to go 
public is most strongly driven by market condition, which can explain the significant variation of 
IPOs over time, while Baker/Wurgeler (2002) base their analysis on firm-specific (operating) 
characteristics. 
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subsequent decline is greater when a higher percentage of equity is sold, which he interprets 
as potential evidence for market timing. 
Wagner (2005), for a sample of German ECOs, examines market timing by contrasting ECOs 
to general IPOs. He argues that it is not a priori clear which of the two will exhibit the 
stronger market timing characteristics. On the one hand, ECOs, through the existence of an 
internal capital market and thus potentially less reliance on external capital, afford managers 
with greater flexibility to time the offer. On the other hand, ECO market timing may 
jeopardize the reputation of a large parent firm. Wagner finds evidence that both ECOs and 
IPOs are timed to market, and the latter more so than the former, suggesting that reputational 
concerns outweigh increased flexibility. The author further detects a deterioration of operating 
performances after the offer for both types of offering, which are larger for general IPOs than 
for ECOs. 
Junker (2005), while explicitly not including market timing in the formal part of his analysis, 
finds evidence that “weakly points towards a potential role of market timing” (p. 279) in the 
stock market reaction to the announcement of an ECO, and, for the long-term, finds that 
“ECOs that are successfully timed to market peaks, lead to an inferior subsequent 
performance of the subsidiary” (p. 302). 
Without making explicit reference to market timing, several other ECO studies find market 
anomalies that they are unable to explain with standard signaling or efficiency effect 
arguments. These anomalies generally take the shape of significant non-zero abnormal long-
term returns, as witnessed for the subsidiary by Michaely/Shaw (1995), Miles/Woolridge 
(1999), Prezas et al. (2000), or Madura/Nixon (2002), and for the parent company by 
Madura/Nixon (2002) and Junker (2005). The study on negative stubs by Lamont/Thaler 
(2003) provides evidence of market anomalies for firms that are involved in an ECOs 
(compare Chapter 1.4.4 on p. 15). While their 1998-2000 sample is only comprised of spin-
offs, and furthermore of only those spin-offs that exhibit the contradictory misvaluation 
phenomenon that their study focuses on, all these spun-off subsidiaries have first been 
separated by the parent company via an ECO. 
7.4 A model of ECO market timing 
The previous chapters have shown that the market timing of equity offers is a real and 
frequent phenomenon. Furthermore, previous research contains tentative arguments that in 
this respect, ECOs are no exception. In what follows, the effects of market timing on the 
measurement of long-term post-ECO abnormal return are considered, first theoretically, then 
empirically. The guiding objective is to arrive at an answer if market timing – in contrast to 
efficiency effects – can account for the long-term ECO underperformance documented in 
Section 5. 
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7.4.1 Excess valuation 
It is assumed that investors are homogenously irrational189, which allows prices to stray from 
their true values (i.e., from those warranted by company fundamentals). The (observable) 
market price, by multiplication with the number of outstanding shares, implies a value of the 
firm V obs, which may not equal V true , the true value of the firm. Excess valuation EVt  
represents the difference between V obs and V true  at time t . If EVt  is greater than zero, the 
firm is overvalued, and undervalued in the reverse case. If EVt  is equal to zero, the firm is 
fully (i.e., correctly) valued. 
The properties of excess valuation over time are essential. As investors realize discrepancies 
between expected and actual levels of earnings (e.g., as their bounded rationality suffices to 
discover V true  over time), they will adjust their behavior accordingly. Levels of (positive or 
negative) excess valuation will not endure, and the expected (long-term) value of EV  is zero. 
Building on the arguments of loss aversion, it is assumed that investors are more inclined to 
sell stocks that they believe will fall in value than they are inclined to purchase stocks whose 
prices they believe will rise. Consequently, excess valuation is not distributed symmetrically 
over time, but longer periods of increase are followed by shorter periods of decrease190: 
(7.1)   
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7.4.2 Paid-in capital 
In the following, the effects of an equity offering are discussed if EV > 0. The value of the 
firm after the offer, i.e., its post-money valuation, is comprised of its value before the offer 
plus the value of the paid-in capital. Since EV > 0, the paid-in capital can be divided into two 
parts: a first part that corresponds to the fundamental value of the new shares, and a second 
part that corresponds to the amount that exceed that value. The latter can be interpreted as the 
portion of EV  that has been locked in as cash. Its calculation is simple math, as it only 
depends on two parameters, namely the number of shares offered, and the dollar amount of 
overvaluation per share: 
                                                 
189  In microeconomic terms, a homogenous irrational increase in willingness-to-pay represents a 
right-shift of the demand curve (similar to an exogenous effect), where the ensuing movement on 
the curve results in a new equilibrium price whose final value is inversely correlated to the 
elasticity of the supply of shares. The following exposition could also be based on 
heterogeneously irrational investors and arbitrage failure. 
190  How realistic is this assumption? As a point of empirical evidence, the Nasdaq closed at an all-
time high of 5,648.62 on March 10, 2000, after a value of 1,114 in August 1996, about four years 
prior, the same level it attained in October 2002, about one and a half years later (Pastor/Veronesi 
(2006)). This suggests substantial asymmetry in the direction assumed above. Although 
developed with focus on corporate investment, the paper by Scharfstein (1990) on herd behavior 
provides an illustrative supplement how reputational concerns may play into such stock market 
phenomena. 
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(7.2)   M prim = Sprim
Spre
EVEO  
where M prim  denotes the excess part of paid-in capital, Sprim  the number of primary shares 
sold in the offer, Spre the number of shares outstanding before the offer, and EVEO  the amount 
of overvaluation at the time of the equity offer. To illustrate Equation (7.2), a subsidiary that 
sells enough primary shares to double its size will capture 100% of its overvaluation, and this 
value changes with the number of primary shares that are offered in actuality. The true value 
of the firm after the offer Vpost
true  equals its pre-offer value plus the two parts of paid-in capital: 
(7.3)   Vpost
true = Vpretrue + SprimSpre
Vpre
true + Sprim
Spre
EVEO  
where Vpre
true  denotes the true value of the subsidiary before the offer. Existing shareholders’ 
claim after the offer Cpost
exist  has been diluted and amounts to 
(7.4)   Cpost
exist = Spre
Spre + Sprim
Vpost
true = Vpretrue + SprimSpre + Sprim
EVEO . 
The gain to existing shareholders from selling primary shares Mexist
prim  is given by the amount 
by which Cpost
exist  exceeds the value of their pre-offer claim: 
(7.5)   Mexist
prim = Cexistpost −Vpretrue = SprimSpre + Sprim
EVEO . 
It can be seen that an increase in the number of primary shares provokes two contrary effects. 
First, it will increase the amount of cash collected in the offer, as witnessed by its occurrence 
in the numerator of Equation (7.5). Second, it will cause greater dilution, as the denominator 
of the same equation increases linearly with Sprim . Consequently, the following marginal 
arguments apply: 
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The claim held by new shareholders Cpost
new  is given as 
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New shareholders’ loss by purchasing overvalued primary shares Mnew
prim  is the difference 
between the true value of Cpost
new  and what they have paid to obtain it:  
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The terms in the squared brackets can be interpreted as the loss suffered by new shareholders 
if they had bought 100% of the overvalued equity. It is composed of the difference between 
the true and the observed value of the asset before the offer, plus the new investors’ diluted 
claim on the excess paid-in capital, which is given by the third term in the squared brackets. 
Since new investors have only bought a portion equal to Sprim Spre  of the overvaluation, the 
term in the squared brackets is adjusted accordingly. It can easily be seen that Mnew
prim  must be 
negative, since Vpre
true  minus Vpre
obs is negative EVEO , and the second occurrence of the latter in 
the squared brackets is adjusted by a factor that is by definition smaller than one. 
Consequently, as true equity values are arrived at over time according to the above discussion 
on market efficiency, new shareholders will suffer a wealth reduction of Mnew
prim  by purchasing 
overvalued primary shares in an ECO. 
Finally, to underline the wealth transfer from new to existing shareholders Mexist = −Mnew  
(i.e., the fact that existing shareholders have expropriated new shareholders by M ), note that 
adding Equations (7.5) and (7.8) gives 
(7.9)   Mexist
prim + Mnewprim = Vposttrue −Vpretrue − SprimSpre
Vpre
obs. 
Substituting Vpost
true  with Equation (7.3) and rearranging, it can be shown that 
(7.10)   Mexist
prim + Mnewprim = SprimSpre
Vpre
true + EVEO −Vpreobs[ ]= 0  
since Vpre
true + EVEO , the true value and the overvaluation before the offer, add up to Vpreobs, the 
value associated to the subsidiary by misguided investors.  
7.4.3 The offer choice 
It is assumed that managers aim to maximize the benefit to existing shareholders191. As 
managers can choose to sell a nonnegative number of primary shares at a certain point in 
time, this can be expressed as 
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191  This assumption has been borrowed from e.g., Myers/Majluf (1984). 
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where t * relates to the discretion of the manager to time the offer, and Mexist
*  denotes a 
minimum threshold of benefit that needs to be met to conduct the offer192. To assess its 
benefit, Mexist  needs to be viewed in relation to the base over which it accrues. Accordingly, 
the price a manager can realize for each share or inversely, the fraction of ownership a 
manager needs to part with for a given amount of offer proceeds depends on EV%, the 
degree to which the equity in question is overvalued: 
(7.12)   EV% = V
obs −V true
V true
−1 = EV
V true
−1. 
It is assumed that information is asymmetrically distributed and that the manager, through 
inside position, knows V true  whereas investors only observe V obs193. Equation (7.11) denotes 
that the manager has the possibility to sell nonnegative quantities of shares. Choosing zero, 
i.e., doing nothing, will be advantageous if EV ∝ EV% < 0, while the sale of positive 
quantities of shares can solve above program if EV% is large. Consequently, the probability 
of an equity issue, prob(EO) increases in EV%: 
(7.13)   [ ] 0
%
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∂ . 
The ex-ante higher probability that an offer will occur if the equity is overvalued leads to the 
ex-post higher probability that the equity is overvalued if an offer has taken place194. 
Equation (7.11) further denotes that the manager has discretion over t, the timing of the offer, 
which represents the critical factor with regard to market timing. It is assumed that for a 
bounded period, there is a local maximum of EVmax  at time tmax . Choosing t  then follows the 
subordinate maximization 
(7.14)   ( ) ),0(~,min
*
σNEVEVEVE tEOmaxt −  
to minimize the portion of overvaluation not captured by the offer. It is further assumed that 
the manager needs to precommit, since activities such as obtaining board approval for the 
offer or its registration with the SEC require advance fixation of at least a window of time 
                                                 
192  This minimum threshold will depend on factors such as the presence of positive NPV projects or 
reputational concerns of selling overvalued equity. While details do not change the argument, it 
should be noted that EV > 0 does not automatically translate into an equity offer. 
193  Similar information asymmetry between investors and management has been used by Miller/Rock 
(1985) in a dividend/investment context (compare Equations (13) and (14) of their work).  
194  Rational discounting, as suggested by Myers/Majluf (1984), may still take place, but is 
outweighed by irrational elements. Specifically, investors may rationally discount an issue based 
on how they estimate its earnings outlook, but because these expectations are themselves 
erroneously high, EV > 0 holds despite discounting. 
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during which to conduct the offer195. The manager therefore faces uncertainty about EV on the 
day chosen for the offer and needs to make an estimate of the optimal day to conduct the 
offer, denoted as tECO
* . 
Because of the property of EV  expressed in Equation (7.1), the manager discriminates 
between timing the offer too early and timing it too late. Consequently, the offer will on 
average not be timed toward tmax , but tECO
* < tmax . The difference between tECO*  and tmax  can be 
interpreted as an insurance against timing the offer at unfavorable terms after tmax , and 
managers are willing to pay for this insurance in the form of foregone overvaluation. This 
payment represents money left on the table and depends on risk aversion: Less risk-averse 
managers are willing to take a higher gamble in trying to meet the highest point of 
overvaluation, which may increase their expected offer proceeds but subjects them to higher 
levels of volatility. Proportional to their risk aversion, managers are willing to forego 
potential offer proceeds to enjoy lower variance196. 
7.4.4 The ECO choice 
So far, excess valuation has been considered for the overall firm. To appreciate the effect in 
its relevance for ECOs, an extension to the business unit level is required197. Accordingly, it is 
assumed that the pre-ECO firm consists of two assets: nonsubsidiary assets with value Vpar  
and subsidiary assets with value Vsub . Each asset may separately be subject to excess 
valuation, the degrees of which are denoted EV% par  and EV%sub , respectively. As the assets 
are not (yet) individually traded, only their bundled valuation is observable by investors. The 
degree of overvaluation of the pre-ECO firm is a weighted average of the implied 
overvaluation of the two assets, given as 
(7.15)   EV% = α EV%sub + (1−α) EV%par  
(7.16)   α = Vsubobs Vparobs + Vsubobs( ). 
Weight α thus denotes the implied (unobservable) ratio of the market value of subsidiary 
assets to overall firm assets. Managers have a choice between offering equity in the 
consolidated entity (conducting an SEO) and offering equity in the subsidiary (conducting an 
ECO). Since the benefit to existing shareholders depends on the degree of overvaluation, the 
choice depends on the relative values of EV%, the degree of overvaluation of the 
consolidated entity, and EV%sub , the degree of overvaluation of subsidiary assets. As any 
                                                 
195  Empirical evidence suggests that this advance commitment may be substantial. Taking the ECO 
announcement as a minimum estimate, managers need to commit to conducting an ECO at least 
three to five months in advance. 
196  With their strict focus on market timing, the above arguments assume that advancing or deferring 
an offer has no consequences for NPV. While perhaps not a realistic assumption, its imposition 
brings simplicity to the argument while unlikely impairing its overall validity. 
197  This extension does not consider differences in the direct offer costs (by which an ECO is more 
costly than an SEO, as laid out in Chapter 1.2.2 on p. 4). 
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average of two values is always larger than a component when the respective other value is 
greater and weighting factors positive, EV%sub > EV% is equivalent to EV%sub > EV%par . 
Consequently, managers will conduct an ECO if the degree of overvaluation is larger for 
subsidiary assets than for nonsubsidiary assets, and opt for an SEO in the reverse case198. 
7.4.5 Excess valuation and abnormal return 
The practical link to the objective of explaining long-term ECO underperformance is provided 
by the relevance of EV  for the calculation of abnormal return. Starting with its influence on 
raw return, this effect is given as: 
(7.17)  Rt +1 = Vt +1
obs St +1 −Vtobs St
Vt
obs St
= Vt +1
true + EVt +1( ) St +1 − Vttrue + EVt( ) St
Vt
true + EVt( ) St  
where R denotes return, S  the number of shares outstanding, and the subscripts t  and t +1 
two consecutive points in time. Thus, if both the number of shares and true firm value do not 
change, EVt +1 > EVt  will be reflected by increases in return. Abnormal return ( AR) is 
calculated as the difference between return of a sample company and its respective 
benchmark. In a well-specified study of abnormal return, true firm value may fluctuate, but 
the benchmark accommodates these changes. Hence, all changes in EV  will be directly 
reflected in abnormal return: Increasing levels of EV  are captured as positive and decreasing 
levels as negative abnormal return. Put informally, in a well-specified return study, the 
influence of the benchmark takes all changes in V true  out of the equation, so if the number of 
shares are constant, abnormal return is directly attributable to changes excess valuation: 
(7.18)   AR = EVt +1 − EVt
Vt
obs . 
7.4.6 Pattern of abnormal ECO return under market timing 
Conditional on observing an ECO, two facts follow from the above with high probability: 
EV%sub > 0 and EV%sub > EV%par . Based on the relationship between AR and EV  
expressed by Equation (7.18), the long-term development of abnormal return after an ECO 
will be explored in the following. Subsidiary and parent company abnormal return are 
separately considered. 
                                                 
198  This admittedly simple insight bears complex implications if it is assumed that managers know 
EV  with uncertainty: If only subsidiary assets are overvalued, an SEO still yields market timing 
benefits, and a portion of overvaluation proportional to α will be captured. If only nonsubsidiary 
assets are overvalued, an ECO, on the other hand, does not yield any market timing benefits. If, 
however, the degree of overvaluation is higher for subsidiary assets, an ECO, in contrast to an 
SEO, does not dilute the benefits of overvaluation through the inclusion of less overvalued 
nonsubsidiary assets in the offer. Optimizing the ECO choice under uncertainty about EV  is 
likely not trivial. 
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7.4.6.1 Market timing and abnormal return of the subsidiary 
The tautology that excess valuation of subsidiary assets at the time of the offer tECO  may 
increase, be at its maximum, or decrease at the time of the ECO becomes relevant when it is 
recognized that these different states will occur with different probability. The first of the 
three possibilities (where excess valuation still increases when the ECO takes place) becomes 
more likely than the last alternative (where it decreases). To illustrate the effect on abnormal 
return, it is, counter assumption, supposed that overvaluation is symmetric around its 
maximum. In such a case, the following conditions for abnormal return apply: 
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where the subscripts ECO and k  refer to the time of the ECO and the end point of the 
measurement interval, respectively199. Allowing the more realistic assumption that return is 
not symmetrically, but rather asymmetrically distributed (see Equation (7.1)), Equation (7.19) 
can be transformed and extended as follows: 
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where A  denotes the advance with which the ECO is conducted, i.e., A = tmax − tECO , and β  
an indicator of symmetry that takes the value of one if the distribution of overvaluation over 
time is symmetric around its peak, a value between zero and one in the realistic scenario that 
the distribution is left-skewed, and a value larger than one if it is right-skewed200. 
Since tmax  is the external variable that changes by ECO, Equation (7.20) allows the insight 
that the direction of the influence of market timing on abnormal return after an ECO depends 
on three parameters: tk , β , and A . Regarding the first, the likelihood of measuring negative 
abnormal return of the subsidiary increases with tk , i.e., as event windows become larger. 
This variable is chosen by the researcher. Second, the likelihood of measuring negative 
abnormal return of the subsidiary is (ceteris – particularly the timing of the offer – paribus) 
inversely related to β, i.e., it increases as the development of overvaluation over time becomes 
more left-skewed. A faster fall-off relative to a slower build-up of excess valuation will 
increase the likelihood that EV  at the end of the event window is smaller than EV  when the 
ECO is conducted. This parameter reflects investors’ loss aversion. Third, and last, the 
likelihood of measuring negative abnormal return is also inversely related to A , the advance 
with which the transaction is conducted relative to the peak. In the case of long anticipation, 
                                                 
199  Subscripts par and sub have been dropped in this subchapter, which only considers the subsidiary. 
200  Measurement of β could build on Equation (7.1) for relevant intervals around peak overvaluation. 
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shorter event windows will exhibit positive abnormal return. If the advance becomes negative 
(the unrealistic scenario that the offer is conducted after peak overvaluation), abnormal return 
will be negative even for the shortest event windows. This parameter reflects managers’ risk 
aversion. 
In summary, expected market timing-induced abnormal return for an ECO subsidiary is 
positive before the offer, positive for a period thereafter, and negative for extended event 
windows. 
7.4.6.2 Market timing and abnormal return of the parent company 
Investors who have irrationally high expectations about the future performance of a business 
unit are willing to pay a premium for a claim on its residual value. Before the offer, such 
claims are only indirectly obtainable, i.e., investors need to purchase shares of the parent 
company, a bundle of the respective business unit and all other parts of the firm, to get 
exposure to the prospective ECO subsidiary. If EV%sub > 0, investors are willing to pay a 
premium for this bundle proportional to their irrationally high expectations for the overvalued 
business unit and α, the share of the latter in the overall firm. 
When the offer takes place, investors who seek exposure to the respective business unit are 
afforded with an alternative: Instead of obtaining exposure by buying shares of the entire 
firm, they can directly buy shares of the subsidiary201. Two consequences entail: First, new 
investors who seek exposure to subsidiary assets will forgo purchasing parent shares and buy 
subsidiary shares instead. This will lead to a reduction in demand for parent shares. Second, 
existing shareholders who have held parent shares solely for the purpose of gaining exposure 
to the prospective ECO subsidiary will realize that they can obtain more direct exposure to the 
subsidiary. They will begin to sell parent shares, thereby increasing the offer of parent shares, 
and use the proceeds from these sales to purchase subsidiary shares to equip themselves with 
direct exposure to their targeted assets. The combined effect of these two consequences, the 
reduced demand for parent shares from new investors on the one hand and the increased offer 
of parent shares from existing investors on the other, will lead to a reduction in the price of 
parent shares. 
The above, however, does not yet reflect the entire effect of an ECO on the price of a parent 
share. After the offer, the parent company usually retains very high exposure to the 
performance of the subsidiary. In the present sample, median parent ownership after the offer 
is 72%, consistent with the general finding from ECO research, which indicates that parents 
do not, in general, relinquish control of the subsidiary after the issue. Thus, the price of 
subsidiary shares, which likely still increases after the offer (see above), counterbalances the 
negative effect on the parent share price described above. Hence, the immediate post-offer 
effect will be indeterminate. Only after the subsidiary has reached peak overvaluation will a 
                                                 
201  The negative-stub studies by Lamont/Thaler (2003) and Schill/Zhou (2001) provide an illustrating 
empirical backdrop to this relationship, showing that investors may value direct exposure to their 
target assets more than if these are embedded in a group of companies. 
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clear picture of the development of parent excess valuation emerge: When the value of the 
subsidiary, and consequently the parent stake in it, will decrease, the two formerly contrary 
effects will work into the same direction and the price for parent shares will fall even faster. 
In an ECO, the parent company also has the option to sell secondary shares. In addition to 
benefits from retained shares, the parent can thus benefit from the sale of shares. These effects 
are of course inversely related: If in the extreme case, the parent company sells all its 
secondary shares, it is no longer entitled to any proceeds from the sale of primary shares. 
They key difference between these two options is given by the fact that proceeds from the sale 
of secondary shares, unlike those from primary shares, are not subject to dilution and thus 
entirely accrue to the parent company202. Its benefits from unloading a number of Ssec  
secondary shares amount to 
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By comparing Equations (7.5) and (7.21), it can be seen that unloading secondary shares is a 
dominant strategy for the parent company since selling a secondary share is always better than 
keeping a diluted share, which is accentuated by a comparison of the marginal relationships in 
Equations (7.6) and (7.22)203. The total benefit to the parent company204 is given as the sum of 
the benefits from the sale of primary and secondary shares as 
(7.23)   Mexist = SprimSpre +Sprim
+ Ssec
Spre
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ EVEO . 
With regard to abnormal return, the sale of secondary shares transforms some of the 
overvaluation of the shareholding in the subsidiary into cash and will thus “rationalize” 
previously irrational subsidiary prices, as elevated prices previously at risk of correction will 
be locked in as cash by the parent company. Selling secondary shares will thus reduce both 
the downward correction of the parent share price, as well as the upward influence from 
                                                 
202  This observation marks a fundamental departure from the conventional notion that the sale of 
primary versus secondary shares is value-irrelevant for the parent company (compare Chapter 
1.3.1.2 on p. 7). 
203  Such strategy, however, may not be feasible: It assumes that demand is highly elastic, i.e., 
increasing the number of offered shares has no or only a small influence on the price at which 
these can be sold. As an indication that this may be unrealistic, Asquith/Mullins (1986) observe a 
negative and significant relationship between the SEO announcement effect and the size of the 
offer. The authors interpret this finding as evidence for a downward-sloping demand curve for the 
equity in question. 
204  Equation (7.11), the objective function, can be adjusted for the sale of secondary shares without 
loss of generality.  
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increased overvaluation of holdings in the subsidiary, as a part of this holding is sold. If the 
offering is a true secondary offering, the parent share price immediately after the offer will be 
fully rational and no abnormal returns will be detectable. True secondary offerings, however, 
are rare and represent only two out of the 174 ECOs in the current sample. Secondary shares 
are offered more frequently in the form of mixed offerings, in which, as has been shown 
above, parents usually retain meaningful ownership stakes in the subsidiary. In the case of a 
mixed offering, all effects of an ECO on parent share price apply as discussed above, if only 
in milder form relative to the sale of secondary shares. 
Abnormal return of the parent company after an ECO is finally also dependent on EV% par  
since EV%sub > EV%par  does not imply EV% par = 0. Consequently, irrational investors may 
be willing to pay elevated prices for parent stock even after the ECO, and the negative effect 
of irrational investors who switch to the newly available subsidiary shares will be less severe 
than if EV% par = 0. Consequently, if overvaluation is not isolated to subsidiary assets, the 
post-ECO pattern of parent return is expected to become increasingly similar to that of the 
subsidiary. 
In summary, expected market timing-induced abnormal return for an ECO parent company is 
positive before the offer, indeterminate for a period thereafter, and negative for extended 
event windows. 
7.4.7 Graphical summary of ECO firm value under market timing 
To conclude the discussion of the abnormal return of market-timed ECOs, the above 
arguments are graphically summarized in two figures, first for the subsidiary and then for the 
parent company. 
7.4.7.1 Summary of effects for the subsidiary 
The graphic in Figure 20 presents a stylized overview of the relationship between subsidiary 
valuation and ECO timing, where a  denotes the anticipation with which an ECO is conducted 
relative to the maximum valuation at tmax , and which provides the security margin to the 
managers to ensure that the ECO is conducted when excess valuation is high. The ratio of b 
to c  reflects the degree of asymmetry in the distribution of overvaluation around its 
maximum205, and a , the security period, is assumed to increase in this ratio. The difference 
between Vmax  and VECO , denoted here as e , describes an amount that is proportional to the 
amount of money left on the table because of managers’ preference for erring on the safe side. 
The actual amount of money left on the table will equal e  multiplied by Sprim Spre , the ratio 
of the offer to the size of the pre-offer firm. Vmoney
post  reflects the part of the true post-money 
valuation that exceeds the pre-offer firm value Vtrue
pre  by the paid-in amount corresponding to 
                                                 
205  The ratio of b to c  is only an illustrative proxy of β , the measure of symmetry in Equation 
(7.20). Asymmetry of EV  is more precisely determined by the relative size of the area under the 
curve around the peak of overvaluation. 
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the fundamental value of the offer. Finally, Vtrue
post  combines all three aspects of Equation (7.3), 
namely the pre-offer valuation, the paid-in amount that corresponds to fundamentals, and a 
portion of the overvaluation locked in as cash. This last amount is given by the difference 
between Vtrue
post  and Vmoney
post , denoted in the graphic as d , and represents the benefit of market 
timing to the firm. As has been shown, this amount is split between existing and new 
shareholders and is proportional to the difference between V ECO  and Vtrue
pre , adjusted by 
Sprim Spre . Vmoney
post  will increase with the number of primary shares offered, while Vtrue
post  can 
increase beyond that in proportion to the degree of overvaluation when the ECO takes 
place206. 
Figure 20: ECO market timing and subsidiary value207 
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7.4.7.2 Summary of effects for the parent company 
The graphic in Figure 21 contains a stylized depiction of the influence of market timing on 
firm value of an ECO parent company. Before the offer takes place at tECO , the parent share 
                                                 
206  Linking these suggestions to an early related exposition, the hot-market scenario number two of 
Ibbotson/Jaffe (1975) (p. 1039), while developed in a different context, exhibits some similarity 
to Figure 20. 
207  Pre-offer subsidiary valuation is of course not directly observable. The illustration shows the 
hypothetical value of the prospective ECO subsidiary as it is still embedded in the group of 
companies of the parent firm. In addition, as a stylized depiction, Figure 20 does not explicitly 
show the regular money effect of primary shares on overall firm value at tECO (one-step increase). 
A classic event study will not detect fully-valued money effects since increases in firm value are 
offset by a commensurate increase in the number of outstanding shares. 
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price exhibits positive abnormal return, which is the result of the overvaluation of the 
prospective ECO subsidiary. This share price for the firm is a value-weighted average of the 
prices for subsidiary and nonsubsidiary assets, which are at this point, of course, not yet 
separately purchasable. Hence, if nonsubsidiary assets are fully valued, overvaluation for the 
firm a  at the offer date can be construed as an average of subsidiary overvaluation a + b , 
weighted by subsidiary market value, and zero, weighted by the market value of 
nonsubsidiary assets. Consequently, excess valuation for the parent company is an increasing 
function of the overvaluation of the subsidiary and its share α  in the overall firm. In the 
immediate post-offer period, the development of excess valuation for the parent company 
until the point of maximum subsidiary overvaluation (i.e., during period d) remains unclear 
(represented by the horizontal dashed line) because of the contrary effects discussed above. 
Figure 21: ECO market timing and parent company value 
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Only after subsidiary overvaluation has reached its peak at tmax  will the development of firm 
value be clear: As irrational investors have switched to the subsidiary, and as the value of 
parent’s stake in the subsidiary is decreasing, the value of the parent firm decreases. Finally, 
two effects result in a post-offer value of the parent firm Vtrue
post  that exceeds its former value 
Vtrue
pre : First, through the subsidiary shares it has retained, the parent firm indirectly participates 
in the benefits from the market timing of primary shares, while second, through the 
(secondary) shares it has unloaded, it directly captures additional benefits from market timing. 
The sum of these two amounts c  will equal a  in the case that the ECO constitutes a true 
secondary offer and be accordingly smaller otherwise. 
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7.4.8 Determinants of the severity of abnormal return 
The above exposition has presented a model of the effect of market timing on firms that 
undertake an ECO. In what follows, four factors that determine the strength of the influence 
of market timing on abnormal post-offer return are separately assessed: managerial factors, 
market factors, offer factors, and research design factors. 
7.4.8.1 Managerial factors 
Three managerial characteristics are relevant for the strength of abnormal long-term return 
under market timing: the degree of managers’ risk aversion, their ability to predict the timing 
of maximum overvaluation, and their flexibility to time the offer. All three determinants arise 
from the need to commit in advance to a date on which the offer will take place. If ECOs 
could be ad hoc conducted (e.g., as Rule 415-registered SEOs), uncertainty surrounding the 
development of excess valuation around the offer would be greatly reduced and managerial 
factors far less relevant. As ECOs generally require substantial preparation, however, 
managers are faced with high uncertainty, and how they deal with it will be reflected by 
abnormal return. 
With regard to the first factor, risk aversion, for event windows of reasonable length, the 
influence of market timing on the measurement of abnormal return of the subsidiary will 
decrease with managers’ risk aversion, since high risk aversion implies that the ECO is timed 
well in advance of the point of maximum overvaluation. Excess valuation will continue to 
build up before it begins to fall, leading to opposite effects that will – at least in part – cancel 
out if event windows are sufficiently long. Equally, the amount of money left on the table will 
increase with managers’ risk aversion, as well as the length of time after the offer for which 
the development of excess valuation of the parent cannot be a priori predicted. 
Second, the severity of the influence of market timing on abnormal return of the subsidiary 
will increase with the managers’ ability to predict in advance the point when the 
overvaluation reaches its maximum, since this will lead to ECOs that are timed closely toward 
the peak of overvaluation. The amount of money left on the table will decrease with 
forecasting ability. Furthermore, results of a study of parent share abnormal post-offer return 
will sooner turn negative if managers possess better forecasting skills. 
Third, the timing of the ECO will depend on the length of time with which the date of the 
offer needs to be set in advance, or, put differently, on the length of the period for which the 
manager must predict the development of overvaluation. A manager with poor forecasting 
skills may still time an ECO better than a skilled manager if the forecast horizon is short. 
Higher flexibility in timing the offer208 will likely render subsidiary event study results more 
negatively biased, as the ensuing decline in overvaluation will be more fully reflected by 
abnormal returns, and the amount of money left on the table will be smaller for shorter 
                                                 
208  As an example, higher flexibility could be provided through a qualified support team that 
succeeds in preparing an ECO in shorter time. 
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forecasting horizons209. As for improved forecasting skills, abnormal return of the parent 
company will start to decline sooner after the offer if flexibility is high. 
7.4.8.2 Market factors 
With regard to market determinants, abnormal return of the subsidiary under market timing 
can be expected to increase with the degree of asymmetry of excess valuation around its 
maximum value. This degree of asymmetry depends on the investor reaction (more 
specifically, their degree of loss aversion) once it becomes clear (to at least some of them) that 
the stock price in question exceeds its value. Higher degrees of asymmetry translate into 
sharper corrections of erroneously high valuation, so that long-term event study results will – 
all else equal – likely be more negatively biased. As all else is commonly not equal, an 
increase in the asymmetry of overvaluation around its peak likely leads to earlier timing of the 
offer, as risk-averse managers seek to insure themselves against the increased risk of 
conducting the offer at unfavorable terms, leaving the overall effect a priori unclear. With 
regard to the parent company, advancing an ECO prolongs the period during which the 
development of excess valuation remains unclear. 
A second and equally important market-related determinant of the effect of market timing on 
abnormal return relates to the information environment. High uncertainty provokes equal 
effects as poor forecasting skill or high risk aversion. Under higher uncertainty, abnormal 
return of the subsidiary therefore continues to increase for a longer post-ECO period before a 
reversal sets in. 
7.4.8.3 Offer factors 
The strength of abnormal return under market timing also depends on the size of the offer and 
the proportion of primary to secondary shares. The size of the offer determines how much of 
the overvaluation will be locked in as cash and thereby rationalized (by securing it from the 
risk of subsequent value correction). Larger amounts of capital thus locked in raise the value 
of the firms above the regular post-money valuation and subsequently lead to fewer negative 
abnormal returns in the long-term. The proportion of primary to secondary shares determines 
by whom this benefit will be captured, parent company or subsidiary. The more parent 
company or subsidiary claim of these benefits, the smaller the respective subsequent 
downward correction of their value, and the smaller (in absolute value) the associated 
abnormal return. 
With regard to parent company overvaluation from its shareholding in the overvalued 
subsidiary, its irrationally high price can be fully captured if the parent company sells all of its 
                                                 
209  Timing of an ECO is related to what could be seen as double uncertainty, since a manager needs 
to forecast the development of excess valuation for a first period up to the offer, and for a second 
period after the offer (i.e., the future for a point in the future). The first period is relevant to avoid 
potential losses, while the second period is relevant to reduce foregone gains. Shortening the 
advance with which the manager needs to pre-commit to the offer date will reduce uncertainty 
since the first period is shortened, while the second period is brought closer to the present. 
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secondary shares. The subsidiary can (theoretically) capture the full amount of the 
overvaluation (or fractions or multiples thereof) by selling as many new shares as old shares 
were outstanding before the offer (or accordingly fewer or more). The price for one subsidiary 
share, however, can never reach its true value by locking in overvaluation even if infinitely 
many primary shares were offered because the overvaluation of the existing shares, whose 
correction is inevitable, cannot be locked in by the subsidiary. 
In conclusion, assuming the realistic case of a primary offer or a mixed offer with a high 
number of primary shares, in which an overall small fraction of the subsidiary is sold, the 
expected pattern of abnormal returns is affected by offer factors only to a minor degree at its 
tail end, when cash locked in from overvaluation leads to increases in the long-term true value 
of parent firm and subsidiary. 
7.4.8.4 Research design factors 
Finally, with regard to research design characteristics, length of the measurement interval is 
critical. Since the long-term post-event measurement window starts, by definition, with the 
offer, only t , its end point, is the relevant parameter. Long post-ECO subsidiary event 
windows are particularly likely to report negative abnormal return if market timing is present, 
while the effect in short windows will likely be small or possibly even positive. Looking 
beyond isolated cases of under- or overvaluation, it is moreover possible that post-ECO 
abnormal return is strictly negative even if the event window includes periods when the 
company is undervalued. This follows from the possibility that corrections of excess 
valuations may “shoot too far” and continue beyond true firm value. Lastly, for even longer 
event windows, particularly if new confounding exogenous influences arise and firm 
valuation oscillates around its true value, the magnitude of abnormal return depends on the 
exact end point, with its expected value approaching −EV ECO . Abnormal return of the parent 
company will also be more robustly negative if post-ECO event windows are extended, as this 
increases the likelihood that periods after the peak of subsidiary overvaluation are included. 
7.4.9 Hypotheses on market timing 
To bridge the gap from the theoretical considerations above to an exploration of the negative 
long-term abnormal return suffered by firms in the present sample, a set of testable 
hypotheses is derived that can be practically applied. In the following, eight propositions are 
suggested. 
7.4.9.1 Objective and scope 
With regard to the objective of the present section, the question of the sufficiency of evidence 
needs to be addressed. The following hypotheses aim to cover the above theoretical 
exposition of market timing as exhaustively as possible with the data at hand. If the eight 
hypotheses are jointly confirmed on the present sample of ECOs, this is interpreted as 
sufficient evidence that market timing is present and constitutes a missing link to explain the 
underperformance of ECO firms. The fundamental question of the current section is binary: 
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Can market timing explain long-term ECO underperformance? Accordingly, a study of the 
determinants of the severity of the influence of market timing on abnormal return is regarded 
ancillary to the question if the current sample exhibits market timing characteristics at all. 
7.4.9.2 Hypotheses 
The null hypothesis to be tested states that the ECOs studied above are inspired by 
considerations of market timing. Accordingly, if rejected, the alternative hypothesis applies, 
which states that long-term abnormal return measurable after an ECO is unrelated to market 
timing. Based on the theoretical reflections above, the null hypothesis will by broken down 
into eight subordinate hypotheses, individually introduced in the following. 
The first hypothesis relates to pre-offer return. Only the share price for the consolidated entity 
is observable at this point. Under market timing, irrationally high expectations for subsidiary 
assets lead to a build-up of overvaluation, with the corresponding effect on abnormal return: 
 (H7-1) Pre-offer CAR is positive. 
The second hypothesis relates to the fact that the timing of the ECO relative to the point of 
peak overvaluation will vary across firms in the sample. Accordingly, the variance of per 
period abnormal return will initially be large for a sample constructed in event time, as 
abnormal return will still increase for some firms (e.g., for those with more risk-averse 
managers), while it will already decline for other firms. 
Figure 22: Market timing in a sample of ECOs 
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The stylized presentation in Figure 22 illustrates the phenomenon: The sample of firms that 
have conducted an ECO are aligned at tECO . Shortly after the transaction, per-period abnormal 
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return of firm A becomes negative, as the ECO has been timed very closely to the point of 
peak overvaluation. Since abnormal return for the remaining firms in the sample is still 
positive during those periods, the variance of abnormal return will be high. Only after some 
time, when firm C has reached maximum overvaluation, will the variance of per-period 
abnormal return across the sample become smaller. Minimal levels will be reached when per-
period abnormal return is zero for all firms in the sample, i.e., when CAR and BHAR do not 
change any longer. Therefore, the following hypothesis applies: 
(H7-2) The cross-sectional variance of per-period AR decreases over time. 
The next two hypotheses describe the expected development of cumulative abnormal return of 
the subsidiary after the offer. A note applies to the expected statistical significance of these 
values of sample-average CAR for market-timed ECOs: While the hypotheses below will 
offer an anticipation of its sign, its statistical significance remains unclear since cross-
sectional variance, due to the characteristics discussed in connection with Figure 22, may be 
too large to yield statistical significance under the assumptions of parametric test statistics. 
Even in the long-term, when subsidiary CAR is constant and negative for all firms in the 
sample, the variance of these values may be too large. Reliable expectations of the statistical 
significance of AR would only be feasible if ECOs were timed with equal advance relative to 
peak overvaluation. Regarding the sign of CAR, the following hypotheses apply: 
(H7-3) Post-offer subsidiary CAR is positive during short event windows. 
(H7-4) Post-offer subsidiary CAR is negative during long event windows. 
The fifth hypothesis describes the expected development of abnormal return for the parent 
company after the offer. As the effect during the period immediately after the offer is a priori 
unclear, the hypothesis predicts the pattern of abnormal return for a later point in time. For 
lack of knowledge about the interim period, it cannot be predicted that abnormal return for the 
parent firm will become negative, but it can be proposed that it will decrease when subsidiary 
abnormal return is negative (i.e., for long event window): 
(H7-5) Post-offer parent firm CAR decreases during long event windows. 
The sixth hypothesis reflects the fact that in an ECO, the degree of overvaluation is higher for 
subsidiary assets than for nonsubsidiary assets, as otherwise not an ECO but an SEO would be 
conducted. The correction of the subsidiary share price should therefore be greater than that of 
its parent company: 
(H7-6) Post-offer CAR is more positive for parent firms than for subsidiaries 
during long event windows. 
The next hypothesis tests the underlying assumption of that abnormal return is asymmetrically 
distributed around the point of maximum overvaluation and is formulated as: 
(H7-7) Abnormal subsidiary return decreases at a faster rate after its first post-
offer maximum than it has increased beforehand. 
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The eighth and last hypothesis expresses the proposition that market timing-inspired ECOs 
will rely on a greater portion of secondary shares. Parent companies are expected to unload a 
greater portion of their shares in an attempt to lock in levels of irrationally high prices and 
protect themselves against subsequent downturns in the market value of the subsidiary: 
(H7-8) ECOs with stronger other market timing characteristics also exhibit 
stronger reliance on secondary shares. 
An overview of the eight hypotheses is provided in Table 32. 
Table 32: Overview of market timing hypotheses 
  Market timing hypotheses
H7-1 Pre-offer CAR is positive.
H7-2 The cross-sectional variance of per-period post-offer AR decreases over time.
H7-3 Post-offer subsidiary CAR is positive during short event windows.
H7-4 Post-offer subsidiary CAR is negative during long event windows.
H7-5 Post-offer parent firm CAR decreases during long event windows.
H7-6 Post-offer CAR is more positive for parent firms than for subsidiaries during 
long event windows.
H7-7 Abnormal subsidiary return decreases at a faster rate after its first post-offer 
maximum than it has increased beforehand.
H7-8 ECOs with stronger other market timing characteristics also exhibit stronger 
reliance on secondary shares.
 
7.5 Empirical evidence 
In the following, the above hypotheses will be empirically reviewed on the present sample. 
Regarding document structure, this section does not contain a separate chapter on data and 
methodology since these aspects vary substantially by hypothesis. Instead, the respective 
approach will be expediently introduced when each proposition is separately considered. 
7.5.1 Run-up return 
The first hypothesis states that pre-offer abnormal return of market-timed ECOs is positive. 
Testing this proposition requires an extension of the long-term event study to periods before 
the offer to detect what will be referred to here as run-up return (to be terminologically 
consistent with the existing literature). As run-up return forms a methodological extension 
over the quantitative approaches introduced in the sections above, a brief review of their 
foundations is in order before results are presented. 
  
262 
7.5.1.1 Existing research on run-up return 
A detailed and systematic analysis of abnormal run-up return for firms that conduct an ECO 
has not yet been conducted. The closest inspection of ECO run-up return has been undertaken 
by Vijh (2002), who reports market-adjusted return for the two years before the 
announcement of an ECO. Vijh reports values of 14.9% (significant at the 1% level) and 4.6% 
(statistically insignificant) for the first and the second year before the announcement, 
respectively. Vijh (2002) provides these measures to show that the positive announcement 
returns for his sample are not the result of undervaluation – with which he implicitly 
acknowledges the possibility that the involved firms could be overvalued at the ECO 
announcement. Allen/McConnell (1998) also report run-up return for the year before the ECO 
announcement and find positive BHAR of 7.0%, compared to –4.6% for industry peers. The 
difference is robust at the 10% level. 
A number of contributions have analyzed abnormal run-up return for other events, which, for 
the lack of ECO studies on the topic, shall be succinctly introduced. Loughran/Ritter (1995) 
report that the buy-and-hold return for the 252 trading days before an SEO amounts to 72%. 
They can attribute about one half of this to market run-ups (i.e., expected return), while the 
other half is a result of the fact that the issuers outperform the market (i.e., abnormal return). 
The authors find that the situation reverses around the offer date, after which negative 
abnormal returns prevail. Mitchell/Stafford (2000) report similar findings, showing that run-
up BHAR for a large sample of seasoned equity issuers lies at 85%, based on reference 
portfolio-adjusted return. This result, however, can be traced to small firms only, and 
abnormal run-up return is wholly undetectable if the sample is value- instead of equally 
weighted. In the same publication, the authors also document positive run-up BHAR for 
acquiring firms and those that repurchase equity. 
Burch et al. (2004), in their study of the market timing of firm commitment versus rights 
offers for a historical sample, calculate 13-month run-up BHARs and CARs, adjusted for the 
return on a value-weighted index and matching firms, and find that both types of offering 
exhibit average run-up return of around 25%. They also find that firm commitment offers, 
more prone to suffer from market timing, exhibit significant negative post-offer abnormal 
returns, in contrast to rights offerings. The authors interpret the rise-and-fall pattern for firm 
commitment offers as evidence that these, unlike rights offers, have been subject to market 
timing. 
Lyon et al. (1999) consider pre-event return from a methodological perspective. The authors 
calculate six-month run-up return for 1,000 random samples and determine the long-term 
post-event abnormal return for deciles based on the rank of pre-event performance. They find 
that one-year test statistics for firms with high pre-event returns are positively biased, while 
longer-horizon test statistics are negatively biased. They interpret these findings as evidence 
for Jegadeesh/Titman (1993), who document return persistence for around one year. As Lyon 
et al. (1999) focus on the evaluation of various benchmarks and do not examine an actual 
(equity financing) event sample, however, the relevance for the present study remains limited 
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to a methodological aspect: Given return persistence, directionally consistent pre- and post-
event return is ceteris paribus more likely than return reversal around the event. 
7.5.1.2 Underperformance bias 
Straying briefly from the objective of testing the eight hypotheses, it deserves mention that 
the calculation of abnormal run-up return and its subsequent comparison to post-event 
abnormal return yields a handy benefit yet unconsidered: It can provide sufficient evidence of 
the absence (or necessary evidence of the existence) of a potential bias related to the fact that 
ECOs may be on average conducted by firms that systematically underperform chosen 
benchmarks. This would imply a selection of ECO firms by poor performance, and pre-offer 
share price declines would correctly reflect a deterioration of fundamental characteristics. If 
this is true, and poor-performing groups of companies tend to respond with an ECO, the 
negative long-term post-offer abnormal return documented in Section 5 could be nothing else 
than an extension of the same poor performance that has also triggered the ECO. 
Directionally consistent pre- and post-event abnormal returns are a necessary condition for 
such underperformance bias, while directionally different abnormal returns can be regarded as 
sufficient evidence that such bias does not apply. 
7.5.1.3 Data and methods 
The calculation of run-up return follows the approach outlined for the long-term post-ECO 
abnormal returns (see Chapter 5.4 on p. 112 for details on data and methodology). All four 
benchmark types will be applied: value-weighted reference portfolios, equal-weighted 
reference portfolios, matching firms, and a value-weighted market index. Both buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns will be calculated and validated with the 
same test statistics as above. Abnormal return will be calculated for each month of the three 
years before the offer. Thresholds for statistical significance are set equally tightly as outlined 
in Chapter 5.5.3 on p. 134 (i.e., all eight relevant significance tests need to attain p-values of 
0.05 or smaller). 
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Figure 23: Abnormal run-up return210 
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7.5.1.4 Results 
Figure 23 shows the run-up BHAR for the sample of 174 ECOs, and Table 33 shows BHAR, 
CAR, and the results from significance tests. Across all methodologies, BHAR is positive 
before the ECO. While other variants find statistical significance for much longer event 
windows, results from the value-weighted reference portfolio approach impose a ceiling to the 
overall robustness, exhibiting statistical significance for the seven months preceding the offer. 
This seven-month run-up of abnormal return toward the ECO spans from 20% (value-
weighted reference portfolio-adjusted return) to 31% (index-adjusted return). Regarding 
longer event windows, BHAR is generally positive for up to two years before the offer, albeit 
with mixed statistical significance. Still-longer event windows deliver less consistent results 
and indicate that, if anything, run-up return is largest for 24- to 28-month windows, before 
which abnormal return has generally declined. 
                                                 
210  To aid interpretation of this and following graphics that include pre-event windows, it should be 
noted that negative values of abnormal run-up return imply that abnormal return has increased 
until the offer because the time of the ECO has been set to zero abnormal return. This convention 
accounts for the fact that pre-event windows of different length and pre-event results based on 
different benchmarks are united in their end points (in contrast to post-event periods, which are 
joined at their starting points). 
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Table 33: Abnormal run-up return 
Month BHAR t CS-t CAR t
Panel A: Value-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted
-6 0.14 2.71 *** 2.40 ** 0.11 2.88 ***
-12 0.09 1.39 1.05 0.15 2.83 ***
-18 0.21 1.15 0.97 0.15 2.33 **
-24 0.35 0.90 0.81 0.16 2.47 **
-30 0.11 0.34 0.29 0.13 1.99 **
-36 -0.15 -0.65 -0.48 0.10 1.69 *
Panel B: Equal-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted
-6 0.22 4.01 *** 3.80 *** 0.18 4.42 ***
-12 0.26 3.78 *** 3.22 *** 0.26 4.40 ***
-18 0.40 2.20 ** 1.93 * 0.25 3.72 ***
-24 0.55 1.42 1.30 0.26 3.71 ***
-30 0.33 1.02 0.88 0.23 3.29 ***
-36 0.09 0.43 0.32 0.20 3.13 ***
Panel C: Matching firm-adjusted
-6 0.24 4.18 *** 3.90 *** 0.19 4.43 ***
-12 0.24 3.08 *** 2.38 ** 0.26 3.99 ***
-18 0.35 2.35 ** 1.48 0.26 3.42 ***
-24 0.66 1.88 * 1.54 0.29 3.63 ***
-30 0.50 1.83 * 1.32 0.26 3.37 ***
-36 0.28 1.50 0.95 0.24 3.15 ***
Panel D: Index-adjusted
-6 0.23 4.14 *** 4.03 *** 0.19 4.75 ***
-12 0.34 4.64 *** 4.50 *** 0.32 5.30 ***
-18 0.60 3.07 *** 3.02 *** 0.37 5.12 ***
-24 0.85 2.10 ** 2.04 ** 0.42 5.53 ***
-30 0.75 2.20 ** 2.11 ** 0.42 5.65 ***
-36 0.65 2.78 *** 2.64 *** 0.43 6.08 ***
 
Comparing the results obtained through BHAR to those from CAR, abnormal return remains 
comparable with regard to direction and order-of-magnitude. The main difference is given by 
the fact that CAR exhibits stronger statistical significance. This fact can be seen as a 
consequence of its design: Since CAR does not compound sub-period abnormal return, its 
variance will be lower than that of BHAR if abnormal return substantially deviates from zero. 
To illustrate, in the case of average positive abnormal return, the occurrence of a month with 
negative (percentage) return will cause a much larger swing if it is applied to a base that has 
grown through compounding, as is the case with BHAR. Consistent with this interpretation, 
CAR is more statistically robust than BHAR, particularly for longer event windows when the 
effect of compounding is large. Last of all, and equally consistent, CAR delivers abnormal 
return that is overall somewhat more conservative (i.e., closer to zero) than results obtained 
with BHAR. 
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In summary, empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that abnormal returns are positive 
during the pre-ECO period. The present pattern of run-up return corresponds well to the 
predictions expressed for ECOs whose offer is subject to market timing, and H7-1 is fully 
confirmed. 
7.5.2 Abnormal return of the subsidiary 
The second hypothesis states that the cross-sectional variance of per-period post-offer 
abnormal return decreases over time. Figure 24 provides a graphical presentation of this 
measure, clearing indicating – as visualized by the inserted regression line – that the variance 
declines over time from about 6% during the first six months after the offer to about 3% 
during the third post-offer year. The last 16 of the 36 post-offer months are furthermore 
characterized by substantially higher homoskedasticity, shown by the fact that the cross-
sectional variance of abnormal return over time does not fluctuate nearly as much as during 
the earlier period. The data therefore fully supports H7-2. 
Figure 24: Variance of per-period post-offer subsidiary abnormal return211 
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With regard to the effect of market timing on post-ECO abnormal return of the subsidiary, 
two propositions have been formulated. The first posits that abnormal return will increase in 
the immediate post-offer period, while the second predicts negative levels of abnormal return 
                                                 
211  A tabular presentation of the data underlying Figure 24 is provided in Table 43 on p. 306. 
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for extended event windows. Figure 25 on p. 268 (an extract of Figure 12 on p. 135) shows 
abnormal return of the subsidiary during the post-offer period. Abnormal return is largely 
consistent across the four types of benchmark adjustments and is close to zero for the four 
months following the offer. They then attain a peak of 8% to 12% around the seventh post-
offer month, which marks the start of a steady decline toward a statistically significant 
minimum of –17% (value-weighted reference portfolio) to –25% (matching firm) at 15 to 16 
months after the offer. 
To show that these results are consistent with the above propositions and thus support the 
argument that the negative long-term results are a consequence of market timing, results are 
first appreciated without consideration of statistical significance. Thus considered, the post-
offer peak can be seen as evidence for the first of the two hypotheses, and the [0 7] month 
window can hence be interpreted as the security period that risk-averse managers choose to 
lower the variance of expected returns212. The subsequent decline confirms the second of the 
two hypotheses. 
Considering statistical significance, the lack thereof in the immediate post-offer period should 
be expected based on the theoretical arguments. It has been shown that the exact timing of an 
ECO relative to peak valuation will depend on many more factors than asymmetry of 
valuation alone. Risk aversion, manager skill, and planning period all play their part. 
Therefore, peak overvaluation relative to the ECO will vary substantially across the 174 
ECOs in the sample, and as peaks of overvaluation are measured by abnormal returns that are 
first positive and then negative, on average, test statistics will not detect a robust difference 
from zero. What can be asserted with statistical soundness, however, is that the vast majority 
of ECOs will have passed peak overvaluation some 15 months after the offer, as witnessed by 
significant negative BHAR at that time. 
The lack of statistically significant positive abnormal returns immediately after the offer 
implies that some ECOs have been successfully timed very close to the peak of overvaluation, 
while the lack of statistically significant negative abnormal return until some 15 months later 
shows that other ECOs have been timed in much greater advance. The highly significant and 
positive abnormal run-up return provides additional important evidence for the advance with 
which managers seem to time an ECO. Would ECOs be timed toward the peak of 
overvaluation, instead of in advance, return in the immediate pre-offer period should exhibit 
lower statistical significance, as those firms for which the ECO is timed somewhat too late 
will reach the climax of their valuation during that period. A mixture of positive and negative 
abnormal return, as this would imply, would lead to test statistics that are less robust. 
Empirical evidence refutes this view and indicates that the ECO occurs, on average, before 
the peak of overvaluation. Overall, the hypothesized pattern that abnormal return of the 
                                                 
212  The predictions for abnormal subsidiary return under market timing are further supported by the 
results from the calendar-time analysis in Section 5: For three of four variants, subsidiary MMAR 
is positive for the [0 6] month calendar-time portfolio, while it is negative for all longer calendar-
time portfolios. 
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subsidiary first increases and then decreases is supported by evidence from the present 
sample, and H7-3 and H7-4 are supported. 
Figure 25: Abnormal subsidiary return 
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7.5.3 Abnormal return of the parent company 
Hypothesis H7-5 states that abnormal return of the parent company will be negative for 
extended event windows, specifically for periods after subsidiary overvaluation has reached 
its peak. The characteristics of abnormal return of the parent company after the offer have 
been discussed in Chapter 5.5 on p. 127 and hence the following commentary is kept brief. As 
documented by Figure 11 on p. 134, parent post-offer abnormal return is negative throughout 
and drives toward [0 36] month BHAR of around –20% in rather straight fashion. Its 
statistical significance varies by benchmark adjustment, but two observations apply 
universally: First, the period around the [0 36] month tail is statistically significant under all 
variants, and second, robustness increases over time. Taken together, this provides evidence 
that abnormal return for the parent company behaves as predicted by H7-5, which is hence 
confirmed. It has been argued above that the effect in the immediate post-offer period is a 
priori indeterminate, due to effects that work in contrary direction. The lack of statistical 
significance supports the hypothesized effects, while the insignificant underperformance in 
the medium-term suggests that the negative influence factors outweigh the benefits of retained 
(and appreciating) subsidiary shares. 
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7.5.4 Relative performance 
Hypothesis H7-6 states that abnormal long-term return will be more negative for the 
subsidiary than for the parent company. As shown in Figure 25, the subsidiary exhibits 
statistically significant abnormal return of around –16% after 15 to 16 months, while the 
parent company at that time exhibits average abnormal return of approximately –14%, which 
is statistically not robust (compare Figure 11 on p. 134). The relative magnitude of abnormal 
return, and more importantly the lack of statistical significance for the parent company 
indicate that abnormal return of the subsidiary is indeed more pronounced than parent 
company abnormal return at the relevant point in time, i.e., when the correction of subsidiary 
overvaluation has set in. For the purpose of detecting market timing in the present sample, 
H7-6 is also confirmed. 
Against the broader objective of this present section, finding an explanation for the long-term 
performance after an ECO, this hypothesis fulfills the objective only partially. While 
abnormal return of the subsidiary has been satisfactorily accounted for, there remains a 
residual underperformance of the parent company. Another year and a half after subsidiary 
valuation has reached its low-point, the situation has reversed: Abnormal return of the 
subsidiary is insignificantly negative at around –16%, while abnormal return of the parent 
company is robustly negative at –19% (compare Figure 11 on p. 134). While market timing 
likely accounts for some of the negative performance of the parent company, it is unlikely the 
cause for its entire underperformance. 
7.5.5 Asymmetry of abnormal return 
The sixth hypothesis states that excess subsidiary valuation is distributed asymmetrically 
around its peak. To review this proposition, subsidiary valuation needs to be inspected over 
time. This is insofar problematic as subsidiary parameters are not separately observable 
before the ECO. Based on the considerations from Chapter 7.4.4 on p. 248 that the degree of 
overvaluation is larger for subsidiary assets than for nonsubsidiary assets since otherwise not 
an ECO but an SEO would have been conducted, run-up return for the group of companies is 
used as a proxy. 
Figure 26 depicts a graphical combination of abnormal run-up return and post-offer abnormal 
return of the subsidiary. Regarding descriptive properties, the comments from Chapters 
7.5.1.4 on p. 264 and 7.5.2 on p. 266 apply. The results indicate that subsidiary overvaluation 
is indeed not symmetrical around its peak, but that managers place the offer in advance of the 
expected peak of overvaluation. The decline in abnormal return after its peak until its 
minimum some nine months later spans 24% (valued-weighted reference portfolio) to 32% 
(matching firm). Carrying these values from the peak into the past, it shows that it has taken 
15 and 14 months, respectively, for such build-up of abnormal return to develop – more than 
one and a half times as long as the subsequent decline, overall confirming H7-7. 
The lack of statistical significance during the first 15 post-offer months are, as discussed in 
Chapter 7.5.2 on p. 266, a result of the fact that subsidiaries reach peak valuation at different 
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post-offer points (since return asymmetry is not the only relevant parameter), such that the 
mixture of positive and negative BHAR renders test statistics insignificant. The lack of 
statistical significance, therefore, does not obstruct the conclusion that abnormal return is 
indeed asymmetric. On the contrary, the contrast of highly statistically significant BHAR in 
the immediate pre-ECO phase to statistically insignificant BHAR in the immediate post-ECO 
phase shows that no or only very few subsidiaries attain peak valuation before the offer, while 
the number of subsidiaries whose valuations peak (sometime) thereafter is substantial. 
Therefore, the strength of evidence of the effect (anticipation of the ECO), for which the 
asymmetry of abnormal return was seen as a cause, provides further evidence that the 
relationships are indeed as hypothesized. 
Figure 26: Parent pre- and subsidiary post-ECO performance 
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7.5.6 Unloading of secondary shares 
The eighth and last hypothesis builds on the realization that parent companies receive only a 
diluted share of the market timing benefits from the sale of primary shares. If market timing is 
the objective, the sale of secondary instead of primary shares will be advantageous from a 
parent vantage point, and ECOs that are so motivated should exhibit a higher portion of 
secondary shares. 
To test this proposition, for each parent firm, three-year post-ECO BHAR (adjusted by the 
return on a value-weighted reference portfolio) has been subtracted from its six-month pre-
ECO BHAR to arrive at the combined effect of initial run-up and subsequent decline in 
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abnormal return as a crude rise-and-fall indicator of potential market timing. The intervals for 
this measure have been chosen based on statistical significance and represent the event 
windows with the most robust abnormal returns. The sample has been sorted according to this 
indicator and the average percentage of primary versus secondary shares calculated separately 
for the top and bottom halves of the sample. Results indicate that, according to prediction, the 
average percentage of primary shares declines for those companies that are likely motivated 
by market timing, with an average of 86%, compared to an average of 91% for companies that 
exhibit weaker rise-and-fall characteristics. According to the hypothesis that the importance 
of secondary shares for market-timing inspired ECOs will be greater than for the other 
subgroup, the statistical significance of the one-tailed difference between the two groups has 
been calculated with a homoskedastic difference-in-means test, which indicates that the 
difference is robust at the 10% level. Hypothesis H7-8 is therefore equally supported by 
empirical evidence. 
7.5.7 Robustness checks 
The above results show that pre-ECO and post-ECO abnormal returns generally behave as 
predicted by the theoretical consideration of market timing. What remains an open question at 
this point is the within-sample consistency, i.e., if those firms whose pre-event abnormal 
returns are positive actually account for the negative post-ECO performance. A robustness 
check has been administered to address this question. 
Put plainly, this approach tests the premise of “what goes up, must come down”, or rather, 
since the outset has been to explain the negative post-ECO performance, “what goes down, 
must have gone up”. The following methodology has been applied. Similarly to the 
construction of the crude rise-and-fall indicator above, the statistically most robust periods 
have been extracted for each sample firm: six-month pre-ECO BHAR, and for the post-ECO 
period, 36-month BHAR for parent companies and an average of 15- and 16-month BHAR 
for subsidiaries. Methodology has been varied in that the average of abnormal return for the 
year preceding the ECO has been used instead of the six-month window, and parent post-offer 
abnormal return has been averaged for the third year, instead of using the 36-month window, 
and none of these variations has led to materially different results, with regard to both 
magnitude and statistical significance. 
Next, the sample has been sorted by parent post-ECO performance and split into two equal-
sized groups, while two additional subgroups of the entire sample were obtained by splitting 
the sample with regard to subsidiary post-offer performance. In a final step, the pre-offer 
performance of these subgroups has been analyzed with regard to magnitude and robustness 
of abnormal return. Again, methodology has been varied to ensure robust results, and the 
procedure has been replicated by splitting the sample not into two equal-sized groups, but into 
two groups where one contains all firms with positive (parent or subsidiary) post-offer 
performance and the other all firms with negative performance. As above, neither magnitude 
nor statistical significance has been noticeably affected. 
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Results are summarized in Table 34. Firms that exhibit negative long-term performance after 
the offer (both parent firms and subsidiaries) show evidence of highly statistically significant 
pre-offer run-ups in share prices, while the same is not the case for those firms with better 
post-ECO performance. 
Table 34: Abnormal run-up return by post-ECO performance 
Run-up BHAR t Run-up BHAR t
Parent 0.08 1.35 0.20 2.36 **
Subsidiary 0.11 1.64 0.17 2.15 **
Post-ECO BHAR negativePost-ECO BHAR positive
 
The fact that pre-ECO BHAR is also positive (and not statistically significant) for companies 
with strong post-ECO performance is not inconsistent with predictions. The theoretical 
considerations on market timing have led to the conclusion that ECOs are more likely if 
overvaluation is high. The flipside implies that they are less likely if undervaluation is high. 
As undervalued cases are therefore underrepresented in the sample, firms that exhibit positive 
post-offer abnormal return are not expected to exhibit inverse pre-offer characteristics. It is 
thus consistent with predictions that the pre-ECO return of those firms that do not exhibit 
poor post-offer performance is statistically insignificant. More still, if these ECOs are 
undertaken not by overvalued firms (the return pattern does not correspond) and not by 
undervalued firms (generally underrepresented in the sample), it can be assumed that they are 
undertaken by correctly valued firms. That results for this subgroup are not robust can be 
construed as an indication that those ECOs that are not inspired by market timing but 
undertaken for efficiency reasons are not associated with statistically significant long-term 
pre-event abnormal returns. 
7.6 Discussion 
All eight market timing hypotheses have been confirmed on the present sample. The 
overarching question of this section of whether market timing can explain the long-term ECO 
underperformance can therefore be answered in the affirmative. More precisely, overvaluation 
appears to constitute the missing link to understanding the seemingly incongruent short- and 
long-term effects of ECOs. Taking this omitted exogenous variable into account, a persuasive 
picture of ECO performance emerges: In the short-term, investors correctly anticipate the 
efficiency gains that these transactions engender. The long-term performance of ECOs, 
however, is not a consequence of the transaction proper, but the transaction is a consequence 
of what provokes the long-term performance. The following subchapters will more closely 
discuss the implications of this finding. After putting the present results into perspective by a 
comparison to the applicable existing literature, the remainder of this section contains an 
appreciation of the market timing implications for subsidiary and parent firm as well as a 
reflection on an unexplained residual of underperformance. 
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7.6.1 Comparison to existing research 
The study by Asquith/Mullins (1986) indicates that managers do not time equity offers to the 
point of maximum market valuation, which would provide them with the largest benefit from 
the issue. Instead, the authors detect a continuing rise in market return for over one year and 
increasing cumulative abnormal returns for up to about a half-year after the equity offer. This 
finding of return persistency is directly compatible with the predictions of the current model 
on ECO market timing. Furthermore, Loughran/Ritter (1995) report SEO run-up return that is 
remarkably consistent with the present findings. The authors document that about half of the 
run-up return of 72% is due to firm-specific (i.e., abnormal) factors, compared to the 
generally significant 12-month run-up results of around 24% (average of the four 
benchmarks) in the present work. This leads one to believe that the market timing 
characteristics between SEOs and ECOs are comparable, and that managers who aim to time 
an SEO equally tend to conduct such a transaction in advance of anticipated peaks of 
overvaluation. Further support for this proposition from the field of SEOs is given by Teoh et 
al. (1998), who document positive run-up return and persistence in return for several months 
(up to approximately one year) after the offer. 
In the context of ECOs, results of the present study are supported by findings from Vijh 
(1999), who shows that subsidiary performance is notably stronger during the first year 
(mostly positive) than during the second year (mostly negative), although lack of statistical 
significance in his results warrants caution. Junker (2005) documents a similar pattern of 
abnormal return for the subsidiary, which exhibits positive abnormal return for short and 
negative abnormal return for long event windows. Prezas et al. (2000) show that the 
performance of an ECO subsidiary exceeds that of control IPOs during the first six months, is 
commensurate after one year, and falls short of the benchmark after three years, which again 
accentuates the rise-and-fall predictions and overall findings from the present study. 
The above studies exhibit parallels to findings from the present section without explicitly 
considering the possibility that these phenomena may be caused by market timing. A study 
that does make clear reference to the market timing of ECOs is Powers (2003). While the 
author does not study run-up return, his contribution is a valuable source of information about 
the operating characteristics of ECO firms. Operating performance, Powers finds, peaks at the 
offer. Furthermore, the pattern of post-offer subsidiary return reported in Powers (2003) 
corresponds remarkably well to both the theoretical predictions and the empirical results of 
the present study. Powers reports statistically significant one-year abnormal returns of 7% to 
8% over a portfolio of control firms or a value-weighted index, which are subject to a steady 
decline in magnitude and statistical significance thereafter. 
The second ECO study that explicitly deals with market timing is Hand/Skantz (1999). The 
authors only consider market (as opposed to firm-specific) characteristics to document an 
increased probability that an ECO will be conducted when market valuation is high. The 
study by Hand/Skantz (1999) is therefore closely related to the work by Schultz (2003) on 
pseudo market timing, which, as shown above, is not pertinent to the arguments of this 
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section. The finding by Hand/Skantz (1999) is nonetheless relevant: If higher market 
valuation is interpreted as a higher probability that firms are overvalued, then such periods 
should offer more opportunities to exploit overvaluation through market timing than 
otherwise. What the results by Hand/Skantz reflects for the overall market may be precisely 
the consequence of what has been shown in the present section on a firm-specific level. 
Turning from research that has examined post-offer characteristics to the study of run-up 
return, theoretical predictions and empirical findings of this work are highly consistent with 
results by Vijh (2002), who shows that the run-up of market-adjusted return is positive and 
significant for the first year before the announcement of an ECO, but not for the second pre-
announcement year (i.e., for the [–2 –1] year). The order of magnitude reported by Vijh, 
approximately 15% for the year before the announcement, is comparable to the levels found 
in the present study, particularly for value-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted results. 
Burch et al. (2004), in their contrast of rights offerings with firm commitment offerings, find 
positive run-up return for both types of offers. Only firm commitment offers, however, exhibit 
significant post-offer underperformance. The authors conclude that the combination of pre-
event run-up return and a post-event deterioration for firm commitment offers indicates that 
these transactions have been timed-to-market, interpreting pre-event run-up return alone as a 
necessary but insufficient condition for market timing. Regarding evidence on ECO run-up 
return from other geographies, Kaserer/Ahlers (2000) document that ECO parent firms exhibit 
strong value increases during the 500 days before the transaction (27% at a t-value of 2.45). 
The detection of abnormal negative returns in longer-than-usual event study windows leads 
the authors to conclude that this decline may constitute an aspect of ECOs that has not yet 
been adequately examined in prior research. 
7.6.2 Implications of ECO market timing 
The evidence from this section indicates that ECOs in the present sample are subject to 
market timing. This conclusion is warranted by the confirmation of all eight hypotheses and is 
further corroborated by evidence from related research. With regard to the objective to assess 
the performance of ECOs, it needs to be determined how influential market timing is for the 
firms it affects. Related is the question of how much of the long-term post-ECO performance 
is attributable to market timing. The parent firm and the subsidiary appear to be differently 
affected by market timing, and the first two subchapters will therefore discuss these 
separately. A third subchapter will turn to the relevance of market timing for market 
efficiency. 
7.6.2.1 Market timing implications for the subsidiary 
All instances of statistically significant post-ECO abnormal return of the subsidiary are 
reconcilable with market timing arguments. Specifically the negative and significant 
abnormal returns about 15 months after the offer appear to reflect a subsequent correction of 
its initial overvaluation. As subsidiary return can thus be assumed to be commensurate with 
its benchmarks once market timing is taken into consideration, a comparison to general IPOs 
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allows two interpretations. Aggarwarl/Rivoli (1990), Ritter (1991), and Loughran/Ritter 
(1995) have shown that general IPOs underperform benchmarks. The first interpretation 
assumes that these general IPOs are not subject to market timing. Their greater reliance on 
external finance may rationalize such assumption, as IPOs, in contrast to ECOs, cannot 
benefit from the patronage of a larger parent firm (Wagner (2005)). If this assumption is 
correct, then the performance of an ECO is superior to that of an IPO, not unlike the unique 
position of the positive ECO announcement effect. If the above assumption is incorrect and 
IPOs are also subject to market timing, then the performance of ECOs and IPOs may be 
equivalent. The question which of the two cases is more likely is left open at this point, as the 
market timing of general IPOs does not fall within the scope of this study. 
Turning to a discussion of the economic relevance of market timing, the size of the 
redistribution is striking. Median subsidiary market capitalization amounts to USD 624 
million. A subsequent underperformance by 16% translates into a reduction in economic 
value of USD 100 million during the 15 months after an offer. Across the sample, subsidiary 
underperformance has thus accounted for a correction of market capitalization of over USD 
17 billion during the eight years of the study. The benefit from market timing is the excess 
price paid for new shares. Median net proceeds amount to USD 108 million. No secondary 
shares are offered in the median ECO. Subtracting this value from the USD 624 post-ECO 
subsidiary value, the (overvalued) pre-offer subsidiary value amounts to USD 516 million. 
The post-ECO observable correction of 16% translates into a USD 100 million / (USD 516 
million – USD 100 million) = 24% overvaluation of subsidiary assets before the offer. 
Median market timing benefits through primary shares therefore attain 24% of USD 108 
million, or USD 26 million per ECO. The parent company retains a median of 72% and 
consequently captures USD 19 million through the sale of overvalued primary shares, while 
the remaining USD 7 million represent the new shareholders’ claim on the USD 26 million 
that they have paid in excess over the fundamental value of the offer. 
7.6.2.2 Market timing implications for the parent company 
For the sake of coherence, this section begins with a review of parent benefits from market 
timing. The parent company captures, as shown above, USD 19 million as the diluted portion 
of benefits from overvalued primary shares. In addition to that, it benefits from unloading 
overvalued secondary shares. While the median portion of secondary shares is zero and it is 
not intended to mix the present calculation of medians with averages, a proxy for median 
secondary shares has been estimated by applying the ratio of median primary shares to its 
average to the average of secondary shares. This estimate amounts to USD 8 million per 
ECO, which represents additional market timing benefits of USD 2 million per parent 
company from the sale of secondary shares. The total estimate of USD 21 million per median 
parent company represents the overall market timing benefit that the managers who have 
timed the ECO have strived to maximize. It also represents the wealth transfer from new to 
existing shareholders, which corresponds to the statistically significant subsidiary BHAR of –
16% after the ECO. Through its much larger size, parent underperformance also provokes a 
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greater economic effect: Three-year BHAR of –19% translates into a change in median 
market capitalization of USD 468 million. 
It has been shown that the benefit to the parent company from market timing is larger for 
secondary shares than for (diluted) primary shares. That not more secondary shares have been 
sold can be interpreted as a consequence of investment schedule, i.e., of the fact that offer 
proceeds are more needed by high-growth subsidiaries with otherwise fewer opportunities to 
raise capital. Capturing offer proceeds to fuel these investments may be relatively more 
important for the subsidiary than avoidance of the dilution effect for the parent company. This 
argument also assumes that the number of shares that can be sold (at a reasonable price) is 
limited, as it would otherwise be likely that parent companies unloaded a larger number of 
secondary shares in addition to primary shares (compare Asquith/Mullins (1986)). 
With regard to the characteristics of economic value as touched upon in the first paragraph of 
this document, it must be underlined that market timing represents a zero-sum game. It is not 
a source of real economic value: The proceeds captured by one group (existing shareholders) 
are the costs to another (new shareholders). It can, quite the opposite, be argued that market 
timing engenders substantial negative welfare effects. On the conservative side, this effect 
may amount to the transactions costs required to undo prior trades. More realistically, the 
detriment of market timing is much higher: It undermines the trust that investors have in the 
respective company, and in the capital market more broadly, which encourages investors to 
impose a higher discount on future issues or transactions213. Consequences will be less than 
pleasant: higher cost of financing to the corporate sector, otherwise NPV-positive projects 
now forgone, and levels of welfare that fall short of what they could have been without 
market timing214. 
7.6.2.3 Market timing implications for market efficiency 
Managers have successfully timed the public offer of subsidiary equity. This finding deserves 
some appraisal in light of the fact that existing research has concluded that fund managers are 
generally not able to time the market (e.g., Fabozzi/Francis (1979), Veit/Cheney (1982), , 
Chang/Lewellen (1984)). The critical difference to the present study lies in the fact that the 
individuals who time an ECO are insiders, i.e., possessors of private information, whereas 
fund managers are outsiders who need to rely on public information (compare Chapter 4.3.1 
on p. 68 for market efficiency). The fact that managers can exploit private information once 
again confirms the conclusion that the capital market is at most semi-strong, since the 
neoclassical ideal of a strongly efficient capital market is irreconcilable with asymmetric 
information. 
                                                 
213  As a related example, La Porta et al. (1997c) show the capacity of trust in corporate settings. 
214  Grossman/Hart (1981) reach a similar verdict for (purely) acquisitional takeover bids, concluding 
that these merely redistribute wealth, reduce investments in the corporate sector, and are thus both 
socially and privately undesirable. 
  
277
In extension to the observations from the short-term analysis, the present results suggest that 
market efficiency is of the weak form. Subsidiary results have shown that these firms exhibit 
significant underperformance after about one year and a half, while parent firms exhibit 
underperformance for even longer event windows. This delay can be interpreted as an 
indication of the interval required for prices to deflect toward the level warranted by the 
earnings outlook. In the long-term, in contrast, all important information becomes public. This 
may occur when enough trades are executed to reveal privileged information, or at the latest 
when the subject of information (e.g., correction of overvaluation) comes into effect. Even 
private information will ultimately reveal itself; if it did not, it would not be relevant215. 
Such conclusion is not irreconcilable with the literature on market efficiency. Fama (1998) 
acknowledges the possibility of under- and overreaction in efficient markets as long as on 
average and over time these cancel out216. Results from this section have shown that the lapse 
of time required for individual firms to reach their long-run average may be substantial. 
Caution is of course needed when generalizing this finding: This study has only analyzed 
ECOs, and only those cases that have occurred between 1995 and 2002. It may be premature 
to conclude from these findings that the capital market in general is only weakly efficient. 
Rather, it is appropriate to conclude that the market may have been weakly efficient with 
regard to (at least some) ECOs covered by this research217. 
7.6.3 Residual anomaly 
The empirical finding of negative abnormal long-term returns for the parent company is 
consistent with the theoretical exposition on market timing. What remains nonetheless 
puzzling is the observation that parent underperformance is larger and more robust than 
predicted by market timing. This inconsistency is not resolved by resorting to the argument 
that not only subsidiary, but also nonsubsidiary assets could be overvalued. If their degree of 
overvaluation was greater than zero but smaller than that of subsidiary assets, subsidiary 
assets should still experience larger underperformance. For overvaluation of nonsubsidiary 
assets to outweigh the effect of subsidiary assets, their degree of overvaluation must be larger, 
but, as has been shown above, this constellation would encourage managers who aim to time 
an equity offer to conduct an SEO rather than an ECO. The fact that parent firms can benefit 
from overvaluation by selling secondary shares further accentuates the given discrepancy. 
                                                 
215  The ultimate revelation of private information is self-fulfilling prophecy: At its highest level of 
aggregation, private information – if relevant – presages that prices rise or fall, which is, once 
occurred, publicly observable. 
216  As the author puts it in support of market efficiency after his review of several market anomalies: 
“… consistent with the market efficiency hypothesis that the anomalies are chance results, 
apparent overreaction of stock prices to information is about as common as underreaction, and 
post-event continuation of pre-event abnormal returns is about as frequent as post-event reversal” 
(p. 283). 
217  The conclusion of weak-form market efficiency should not be regarded as final, as it will be 
further qualified by analyses in Section 8. 
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This incoherence represents a residual anomaly that has so far not been covered by the 
arguments in this document. This residual exists for the parent company only, as no 
statistically significant abnormal long-term returns are detectable for the subsidiary that 
cannot be explained by market timing. The order of magnitude of this residual anomaly is 
estimated at around 10%, roughly approximated as follows: The subsidiary exhibits 
underperformance of approximately –16% at 15 months after the offer. Granting some 
overvaluation of nonsubsidiary assets, the expected parent underperformance will lie between 
that value and zero. For lack of a better benchmark, if expected parent underperformance is 
assumed at half that value at –8% (i.e., the degree of overvaluation for nonsubsidiary assets is 
half that of subsidiary assets), then parent underperformance after three years attains 
approximately –11% (three-year BHAR of –19% less –8%). 
Some speculation about the roots of this residual anomaly may not be amiss, and the next five 
subchapters address this topic. It should be noted that the following thoughts on parent 
underperformance lack quantitative support and only intend to give a provisional overview of 
potential causes. 
7.6.3.1 Undervaluation 
First, it is thinkable that the residual anomaly reflects an excessive inclination by investors to 
sell stock. To illustrate the argument, it is assumed that the majority of irrational investors 
who have driven up the parent share price before the offer have, once the ECO has been 
consummated, abandoned the parent company and shifted their portfolios to subsidiary shares 
instead. As a result, parent share price is subject to rather swift correction, which explains 
parent underperformance in the medium-term. Thereafter, correct prices for the parent 
company prevail. As has been shown above, the correction of the subsidiary share price is 
expected to set in with some delay, and as this occurs, fickle investors may perceive the 
significant equity holding the parent has retained of the subsidiary under downward pressure. 
While parent shareholders generally hold their shares at rational prices, some may thus be 
irrationally inclined to reduce their reservation prices for parent stock to irrationally low 
levels. They are led to sell parent shares, thereby increasing supply and putting prices under 
pressure218. Such explanation is consistent with prospect theory, which builds on argument 
that investors are loss-averse. The ultimate valuation of the parent will be below its true value, 
and even larger (than here explored) event windows may exhibit a subsequent upward trend in 
abnormal return. What supports this view is the fact that abnormal return of the parent 
company does not become fully statistically significant until about three years after the offer, 
which indicates that this correction may indeed only set in when the value of the subsidiary 
holding is publicly corrected on the parent’s balance sheet, a process that is likely to take a 
while. 
                                                 
218  Similar arguments apply as above. An irrational increase in supply translates into a right-shift of 
the supply curve (as more investors are willing to sell at a given price level), and the new 
equilibrium price is lower in proportion to the inelasticity of demand. 
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7.6.3.2 Reputational effects 
Second, the long-term underperformance of ECO parent firms may be associated with 
reputational effects. This explanation follows Wagner (2005), who contends that ECOs are 
overly susceptible to reputational effects because in contrast to regular IPOs, the reputation of 
a much larger parent is also at stake. Reputational concerns may lead investors to impose a 
higher penalty on the parent company if an ECO is subject to market timing. Existing 
shareholders could interpret managers’ conduct to exploit new shareholders as a sign that they 
themselves are at risk of exploitation. Such scenario is reconcilable with arguments of 
asymmetric information, which propose that investors realize that informational opaqueness is 
higher than they have formerly believed and that the price of the parent firm therefore requires 
a higher discount. Long-term underperformance then reflects the deterioration of the parent 
firm’s reputation, or more illustratively, a meltdown of the reputational premium that the 
parent firm has formerly enjoyed. 
7.6.3.3 Efficiency effects 
A third possible avenue in the effort to explain the apparent inconsistency builds on the 
realistic argument that the true motivation for an ECO may be multifaceted. While market 
timing seems to be one determinant, the results from Section 6 indicate that ECOs are also 
robustly associated with efficiency effects. This restructuring characteristic sets an ECO apart 
from SEOs and therefore influences the decision of a manager between the two types of 
offering. The contrast between ECOs and SEO, which has been provided in the present 
section solely on the theoretical ground of market timing, thus needs to be revisited. From a 
perspective of market timing alone, it is advantageous to conduct an SEO if the degree of 
overvaluation is larger for nonsubsidiary assets, but the overall equation also includes 
efficiency gains. It is hence possible that managers may opt for an ECO even though the 
business unit is less overvalued than remaining assets. Consistent with the proposition of 
long-term efficient markets, the resulting share price correction is then more pronounced for 
the parent company than for the subsidiary. 
In addition, there is option value (e.g., under uncertainty) to conducting an ECO, which has 
been alluded to but not expanded on in the present work: An ECO always provides market 
timing benefits if the entire firm is overvalued, while an SEO does not provide market timing 
benefits if only subsidiary assets are overvalued. Revisiting the comparison of ECOs and 
SEOs based on this asymmetry and market timing, coupled with the existence of efficiency 
gains, may help better understand managers’ choice of equity financing. 
7.6.3.4 Pseudo market timing 
At first sight, it could be argued that the residual underperformance of the parent company 
may be the result of pseudo market timing (Schultz (2003)). As introduced in Chapter 7.2.3.1 
on p. 239, pseudo market timing leads to the detection of ex-post underperformance, which 
could occur in addition to real market timing to constitute the residual anomaly. This 
contention, however, is easy to rule out. Figure 27 shows that pseudo market timing leads to 
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negative abnormal return in event time but not in calendar time. The example assumes that an 
ECO may exhibit +10% or –10% abnormal return with equal probability (i.e., its ex-ante 
expected performance is zero). If ECOs on average perform well, their number is assumed to 
double in the next period, whereas it is cut in half if they perform poorly. In a simple two-
period scenario, 22 possibilities are equally likely (high/high, high/low, low/high, low/low; 
represented by their abridged form in the first column of Figure 27). It is furthermore assumed 
that ECOs are cross-sectionally dependent, and that two ECOs occur during the first period. 
Results show that three out of four nodes exhibit negative event-time abnormal return. At the 
same time, calendar-time portfolios do not weigh by-period abnormal return with the number 
of ECOs, and accordingly, ex-post performance of ECOs equals its ex-ante expected zero 
performance. 
Figure 27: Pseudo market timing and abnormal return 
Node ECOs AR  ECOs AR  
hi-hi 2 10% 4 10% 6*10%/6 = 10% 2*10%/2 = 10%
hi-lo 2 10% 4 -10%
(2*10%+
4*(-10%))/6 = -3.3%
(10%+
(-10%))/2 =  0%
lo-hi 2 -10% 1 10%
(2*(-10%)+
10%)/3 = -3.3%
((-10%)+
10%)/2 =  0%
lo-lo 2 -10% 1 -10% 3*(-10%)/3 = -10% 2*(-10%)/2 = -10%
Source: Based on Schultz (2003)
Event-time AR     Calendar-time AR
Period 1 Period 2
 
The present sample exhibits statistically robust negative abnormal calendar-time return (see 
Chapter 5.5 on p. 127). This, of course, is not yet sufficient evidence to rule out the possibility 
of pseudo market timing, since the negative calendar-time abnormal returns could be 
otherwise brought about. A comparison of calendar-time and event-time abnormal return, 
however, shows that these are largely equivalent (if calendar results are not even slightly 
larger than event-time results): Compounding or adding MMAR over 36 months leads to 
comparable levels of abnormal return as BHAR or CAR. As the example in Figure 27 shows, 
event-time abnormal return would need to be more negative if pseudo market timing applied – 
a proposition not supported by the current sample. Apparently, the assumption that managers 
are inclined to issue stock when other issues perform well does not reflect reality. 
7.6.3.5 Anticipated underperformance 
The calculation of run-up return, it has been argued, provides the tangential benefit of 
detecting systematic underperformance. The post-ECO abnormal long-term return found in 
Section 5 could be utterly unrelated to the ECO, not unlike the effect of overvaluation that has 
  
281
been studied in this section. Abnormal long-term post-ECO return would then not be a 
measure of the benefits of an ECO, but a description of more general characteristics of the 
firms in the sample. The pattern of run-up return indicates that such effect does not apply for 
the present sample: Using the same benchmarks, abnormal run-up return is significant and 
positive before the ECO and negative thereafter. 
While such probe has ruled out general underperformance as an explanation for long-term 
effects, it is possible (and plausible) that the residual gap is related to anticipated 
underperformance. In other words, an ECO is not conducted in response to negative 
performance, but in response to the expectation of future negative performance. This would 
imply that there exists an additional exogenous influence to the study of long-term post-ECO 
return that has not yet been considered. Such omission may not be wholly unrealistic: At the 
outset of this section, overvaluation has been suggested as an omitted exogenous variable for 
ECO performance in relatively ad hoc fashion. It is therefore plausible that there may be other 
exogenous factors that could fill the remaining gaps. 
In this regard, the study of anticipated underperformance could prove to be intriguingly 
complex: A long-term return study would need to control for precisely those aspects on the 
grounds of which managers form their expectations. Complex on the one hand, an endeavor 
into this direction may be highly rewarding on the other. If expected underperformance is 
indeed relevant, then it may not only explain the long-term underperformance of ECO parent 
firms, but also of firms that undertake any form of SEO. Anticipated underperformance may, 
in the end, represent a missing piece to the New Issues Puzzle. 
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8 Market condition 
8.1 Section introduction 
8.1.1 Relative overvaluation 
In the previous section, market timing has been discussed as a driver of long-term post-ECO 
abnormal return. Empirical evidence is consistent with theoretical reasoning and indicates that 
investors seem to have irrationally high expectations of the performance of the subsidiary, and 
that better-informed managers take advantage of this situation through the issue of overvalued 
subsidiary equity. The arguments as laid out in Section 7, however, may not yet comprise all 
there is to market timing. 
Market timing, understood in its broader sense as the transactional exploitation by managers 
of irrational sentiment, may come in many shapes. Managers may favorably time such items 
as the sale of an asset, the transfer of a key employee, or the finalization of long-term 
contracts to periods when the other party has irrational beliefs about its value. In the scheme 
of such definition, the overvaluation of a business unit is the smallest type of overvaluation 
that allows to capitalize gains through an offer of equity on a public capital market (where 
small refers to the size of the factor relative to the overall firm). It is therefore also the 
smallest overvaluation that allows an analysis based on public stock prices. 
Building on that logic, the terms of an ECO (most critically the price per share) will be 
favorable for managers if investors’ expectations are irrationally high for at least the business 
unit in question. Therefore, various conditions of overvaluation are construable: Subsidiary 
overvaluation could be stand-alone (as assumed in the previous section), embedded in an 
overvaluation of the entire firm, of the firm’s or segment’s industry, or it could be part of 
unrealistic expectations about the stock market as a whole. While the degree of overvaluation 
always hinges on the disparity between the fundamental value of an asset and the price that 
someone is willing to pay for it, the degree of overvaluation relative to other assets will – as 
shown below – become an issue that is empirically relevant. These effects of broader 
conditions, i.e., of industry and overall market valuation, shall be termed here as the effects of 
market condition. 
8.1.2 Benchmark distortion 
The finding of positive run-up return in the previous section indicates that managers exploit 
overvaluation that is specific to their firm. The degree to which managers also exploit 
overvaluation across the stock market as a whole (or at least of those segments that constitute 
the respective benchmarks) remains unclear because the degree to which the underlying 
benchmarks are themselves overvalued cannot be determined under the current research 
design. It has been a fundamental assumption that benchmark return constitutes a true 
measure of performance. Therefore, abnormal return is not a necessary corollary of market 
timing: Even if firm-specific valuation was benchmark commensurate, managers could reap 
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additional benefits from an ECO if a business unit was overvalued in accordance with its 
benchmarks. 
The present section aims to shed light onto the effect of market condition on abnormal ECO 
return. To avoid inflation of the scope of the present work by a disproportionate factor, the 
limitations should be clearly marked: It is not the objective of the present section to arrive at a 
specific measure of excess benchmark valuation. The question of whether the market as a 
whole is correctly valued – for more than the lack of appropriate reference markets – is left to 
others to inquire. The present section will instead focus on the question if the abnormal return 
surrounding an ECO is different in periods when benchmarks are likely overvalued relative to 
those periods when these are thought to be fully valued. Specifically, ECOs are likely to have 
benefited from the strong market returns during the hot-market period of 1998-2000, termed 
by some as the result of irrational exuberance219, and around this clear and generally-
accepted argument the present section unfolds. 
8.1.3 Section outline 
To detect differences in ECO performance across states of different market condition, the 
present section contains three chapters after this. In the first, the rationale, methodology, and 
scope of the present section are outlined (Chapter 8.2). The following presentation of the 
subsample results is grouped into subchapters on descriptive characteristics, the short-term 
and the long-term ECO effect, and market timing (Chapter 8.3). Finally, this section 
concludes with a discussion of its results (Chapter 8.4). 
8.2 Methodology 
The analysis of the influence of market condition proceeds by comparing the performance of 
subsamples of the original 174 ECOs. Accordingly, the same methods for the detection of 
abnormal return are applied as already introduced in previous sections of this document, albeit 
to ECOs that have occurred during different periods. Regarding all data and statistical 
methods, the comments from the respective earlier chapters therefore apply and are not 
reiterated. Four aspects, however, do merit brief discussion: The nature of the approach in this 
section, its motivation as it follows from methodological aspects of prior sections, the 
rationale for determining the exact point at which the sample is split, and finally the scope of 
this section more precisely. 
8.2.1 Nature of approach 
As the section outline indicates, this part does not contain a separate discussion of the 
theoretical underpinning of the influence of market conditions on the performance of ECOs. 
Two reasons lie behind this intentional omission. The first follows from the observation that 
                                                 
219  See e.g., the book by Shiller (2000), which is titled correspondingly. For further evidence of the 
role of investor sentiment, see e.g., Lowry (2003), who tests and confirms a corresponding 
hypothesis to explain the fluctuation of IPO volume over time. 
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the theoretical design of this study leaves little room for market condition. As the 
announcement effect measures immediate percentage changes in benchmark-adjusted equity 
value, it could be argued that it is irrelevant if the stock in question (or the industry, or the 
entire market) is over- or undervalued. And to the same point, the expected value of abnormal 
long-term return as an effect of market condition is zero, as all benchmarks are equally 
affected. Of course, this proposition could elaborately be couched in a null hypothesis to that 
effect, which could then be formally tested, but the second reason may justify a simpler 
course: That this section is intended as a robustness check of the results obtained so far, and 
as such does not require separate theoretical considerations. Nonetheless, this section’s 
summary discussion will of course discuss its results in light of the theoretical background 
presented earlier on. 
8.2.2 Inadequacy of existing provisions 
The objective of the present section is to detect potential influences of market condition on 
abnormal ECO return. But market conditions – it can be argued – have already been 
incorporated as control variables in the cross-sectional regression analysis of Section 6. 
Results of that analysis indicate that abnormal short- and long-term return is not associated 
with the number of IPOs or the performance of the market index during the year preceding the 
ECO. Yet, the further investigation of an influence of market condition may still be warranted 
because a revision of the cross-sectional approach in Section 6, used here to mirror the study 
by Junker (2005), casts doubt on the question if such influences can reliably be ruled. This 
skepticism roots in two arguments, one relating to the choice of control variables, and one 
regarding the cross-sectional approach in general. 
First, regarding variable choice, the intent of the respective control variables in the cross-
sectional regression analysis is to detect particular behavior of abnormal return during periods 
when market timing was especially likely, namely the periods of the exuberantly high bull 
market of the 1998-2000 period. However, the variable controlling for the number of IPOs is 
misspecified to attain this goal, as the years with the highest frequency of IPOs in the US (for 
the years of the present sample) were 1996, 1997, and 1995, in that order220. With regard to 
the control variables relating to the performance of the market index, a similar 
misspecification can be found: The strongest performance of the US market index was 
attained in 1995, and the second strongest in 1997. In summary, market timing in the form of 
overvaluation across the entire market – a consequence of investor sentiment and as such 
intuitively most probable during the 1998-2000 period – is unlikely to be detected by these 
variables. 
                                                 
220  A similar misspecification may also apply to an analysis of German ECOs, where two years 
clearly stick out with regard to the frequency of IPOs: 1999 with 164 IPOs and 2000 with 130 
IPOs, compared to an average of 21 IPOs in the remaining years. The resulting control variable, 
being based on the calendar year before the ECO, thus strongly controls for a particular influence 
of the years 2000, when the bull market drew to a close, and 2001, when it had already passed (as 
reflected by a total number of 21 IPOs in that year). The years 1998 and 1999 receive 
comparatively low weights. 
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Second, regarding the cross-sectional approach, its limitation for an analysis of the influence 
of different market conditions lies in the fact that it has primarily been set up to relate 
sophisticated measures of efficiency effects to select types of abnormal return. This leads to 
gaps in the way market conditions are controlled for since they are only included as an 
alternative robustness check, often exclusive of other control variables or absent in certain 
variants. To illustrate, different variables of market condition are individually tested for 36-
month BHAR. Other robustness checks use 24-month BHAR or 36-month CAR as the 
dependent variable – without controlling separately each time for all market condition 
variables. This approach may not capture all characteristics of abnormal return, as reflected by 
the analysis in Section 7 on market timing, which shows that long-term subsidiary BHAR 
reaches a statistically significant minimum at around 15 to 16 months after the offer, but not 
during other periods. Such effects will slip by when relying on 36-month BHAR as the 
standard left-hand regression variable. While it would be theoretically feasible to test all 
control variables individually for all event windows, such an approach would be unwieldy and 
likely ineffective. 
This section suggests a different approach to capturing potential influences of market 
condition, and the following subchapter outlines its design. While debatably on the lighter 
side of optimal sophistication, the present subsample analysis enjoys the advantage that 
market condition constitutes the key arrangement along which all calculations progress. 
8.2.3 Subsample design 
To account for the shortcomings outlined above, the sample is split into two roughly equal-
sized groups that reflect intuitive differences in investor sentiment. Such split of the sample 
into subsamples, as well as the choice of years, follows similar approaches in the ECO 
literature (e.g., Hogan/Olson (2004), Junker (2005)). The topic of different types of market 
condition has, in the context of hot issue markets, been studied by Ibbotson/Jaffe (1975) and 
Ritter (1984). In the present work, the first subsample consists of all ECOs outside of the hot-
market period of 1998-2000, i.e., it contains all ECOs for the years 1995-1997, 2001, and 
2002, while the other subsample contains only those firms that have conducted an ECO 
during the three hot-market years of 1998-2000. This split results in a subsample of 97 ECOs 
for the cold-market period and another subsample with 77 ECOs for the hot-market period221. 
Figure 28 presents a value-weighted CRSP index based on the performance of the three major 
US stock exchanges, NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq. The dotted box marks the period when the 
decision for those ECOs was likely taken whose offer occurred during the 1998-2000 period. 
Anticipation of four months has been chosen since ECOs are, on average, announced three to 
five months before the actual offer, and it can be assumed that when “the word is out”, the 
                                                 
221  As an insightful perspective, Pastor/Veronesi (2006) calculate the implied uncertainty of Nasdaq 
stocks during the late 1990s and argue that these stocks may not have been overvalued and that 
the elevated price levels may have adequately reflected the prevailing uncertainty during that 
period. The authors do however acknowledge the increase in volatility and support the general 
notion of differences in market condition.  
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decision to conduct the ECO is final. The ECO decision for the hot-market subsample falls 
into a period when the market has grown (somewhat) stronger than before, has been 
substantially more volatile with intermittent periods of dramatic run-ups, and has been 
followed by an equally salient decline, all indicating the differences in investor sentiment that 
this subsample intends to reflect. 
Figure 28: US stock market valuation and sample division 
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8.2.4 Scope of approach 
For the two subsamples thus determined, the present section will not replicate all analyses of 
prior sections, but only those in which an assessment of the influence of market condition is 
likely instructive. 
Therefore, descriptive characteristics as well as the short- and long-term performance will be 
examined for both subsamples. As documented by the results below, the short-term 
performance exhibits only differences in degree between the subsamples. Given this 
directional consistency of the announcement effect, the high explanatory power of the cross-
sectional analysis for the short-term ECO effect in Section 6, and findings from existing ECO 
research (e.g., Allen/McConnell (1998), Vijh (2002), Hulburt et al. (2002), and Junker 
(2005)), it is conjectured that the positive ECO announcement effect is consistently associated 
with efficiency gains. An efficiency analysis by subsample is therefore not carried out. Long-
term performance, as will be shown, exhibits not only differences in degree, but also 
differences in kind between the two subsamples. This difference necessitates a closer 
inspection of the main finding of Section 7, namely that market timing can explain the long-
term performance of the subsidiary and some of the long-term performance of the parent 
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company. A separate market timing analysis for the subsamples is therefore included in the 
chapters that follow. 
8.3 Subsample results 
This chapter portrays the subsample results, proceeding in the following order outlined above: 
descriptive characteristics, short- and long-term ECO performance, and the role of market 
timing. 
8.3.1 Descriptive characteristics 
Subsample descriptive characteristics are summarized in three tables. Aspects related to the 
size of the involved companies are provided in Table 35, while Table 36 contains a 
comparison of financial ratios. Both tables are based on subsample medians since these can be 
regarded as more representative in the presence of skew. Finally, Table 37 documents the 
industry composition of both subsamples. For the remainder of this document, columns 
labeled “cold” refer to ECOs that have taken place during the years 1995-1997, 2001, or 
2002, while columns labeled “hot” contain the data for ECOs that have occurred during the 
1998-2000 period. The column labeled diff-t contains the results of a homoskedastic 
difference-in-means t-test of the two subsamples. The indicators of statistical significance 
denote the same thresholds as elsewhere in this document. 
Table 35: Firm size (subsamples)222 
Parent Subsidiary
"cold" "hot" diff-t "cold" "hot" diff-t
Assets (USD million) 2,623 2,541 -1.15 318 268 -1.10
subsidiary as % of parent 12% 11%
Sales (USD million) 1,270 1,757 -0.42 201 132 0.27
subsidiary as % of parent 16% 8%
Market value (USD million) 1,989 2,922 1.96 * 478 975 0.93
subsidiary as % of parent 24% 33%
Book value (USD million) 804 802 -0.32 165 203 0.56
subsidiary as % of parent 20% 25%
       Medians
 
Subsample firm size. Subsample firm size is shown in Table 35, and two observations merit 
attention. First, subsidiaries are smaller for the hot-market subsample, as measured by both 
assets and sales. Due to a concurrent increase in median parent sales, the portion of parent 
                                                 
222  In this and the following table, the sign of the difference-in-means t-statistic is not always 
indicative of the direction of the reported difference in subsample medians since the test statistic 
is based on the difference of averages, which may be positive when the difference in medians is 
negative and vice versa. As such a pattern is related to the existence of outliers, it is mainly 
associated with small t-values, and reported differences in medians and averages are directionally 
consistent for all p < 0.05. 
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sales represented by the subsidiary falls to 8% during the hot-market subsample, compared to 
16% during all other years. Second, market value for both parent company and subsidiary is 
noticeably larger for the 1998-2000 period, which is unsurprising as it partially reflects the 
characteristic based on which the sample has been split. The increase in market value is not 
matched by an equal increase in book value, reflecting investors’ lofty expectations about the 
performance of parent company and subsidiary. 
Subsample financial ratios. Table 36 shows subsample financial ratios, to which four 
observations apply. First, subsidiaries during the hot-market period were significantly less 
profitable than those of the other subsample. With regard to EBITDA margin, subsidiaries 
during the cold-market period were aligned with their industry peers, while the median hot-
market subsidiary fell about 12% short of this mark. The lower profitability is also reflected 
by ROA, which at 1% lies slightly above the industry average for cold-market subsidiaries, 
whereas it lies at –4.5% for the other subsample. All differences in subsidiary profitability are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. A second observation concerns leverage, which is 
lower for both parent companies and subsidiaries during the hot-market period. Third, Tobin’s 
q is larger during the hot-market period for both parent firms and subsidiaries. This 
difference, however, is not robust to industry adjustments and therefore represents increases 
in market value that are real but commensurate with those of peer firms. Fourth and last, the 
same observation that applies to Tobin’s q can be made for the book-to-market ratio of parent 
firms and subsidiaries: It is larger for the hot-market period, but proportionately so to the 
development of other firms in the same industry. 
Table 36: Financial ratios (subsamples) 
Parent Subsidiary
"cold" "hot" diff-t "cold" "hot" diff-t
EBITDA margin (%) 14.4 14.0 0.50 15.7 7.5 -3.82 ***
industry-adjusted -0.1 0.0 0.70 0.6 -11.8 -3.69 ***
ROA (%) 10.6 11.2 1.11 12.2 4.4 -4.29 ***
industry-adjusted -0.1 -0.1 0.96 1.0 -4.5 -4.06 ***
Tobin's q 1.1 1.6 2.56 ** 1.7 2.5 2.38 **
industry-adjusted 0.0 0.0 0.59 0.3 0.2 1.71 *
Leverage (%) 68 62 -1.98 ** 43 27 -3.49 ***
industry-adjusted 31 26 1.12 4 -16 -0.96
CapEx-to-sales (%) 4.3 5.4 -0.01 4.5 10.0 1.95
industry-adjusted -0.7 0.0 -0.12 -0.8 1.3 2.34 *
Market-to-book ratio 2.1 3.8 3.43 *** 2.9 4.1 2.24 **
industry-adjusted -0.3 -0.3 0.60 -0.2 -0.2 0.19
       Medians
 
Subsample industry clustering. Table 37 shows the industry distribution of parent companies 
and subsidiaries for the two subsamples. The most salient differences occur with regard to the 
information and financial service sectors. Firms from the information industry represented a 
substantially larger share of both parent companies and subsidiaries of those ECOs that 
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occurred during the 1998-2000 period, increasing threefold for parent firms and two and a 
half fold for subsidiaries in relative frequency. About every third firm involved in an ECO 
during hot-market period originated from the information sector. The finance and insurance 
industry exhibits the offsetting effect, and its share in firms involved in an ECO fell from 
about 15% for the cold-market years to 3% for the 1998-2000 period. Shifts in other 
industries are minor in comparison relative to the ones just introduced and therefore not 
individually presented. In conclusion, the stronger representation of information firms during 
the 1998-2000 reflects the (information) technological developments that purportedly have 
inspired the differences in investor sentiment. 
Table 37: Industry sectors (subsamples) 
Industry sector (2-digit NAICS code) "cold" "hot" "cold" "hot"
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting
Mining 4% 1% 4%
Utilities 1% 4% 1% 5%
Construction 1%
Manufacturing 37% 31% 32% 26%
Wholesale Trade 7% 10% 5% 3%
Retail Trade 6% 8% 7% 8%
Transportation and Warehousing 6% 1% 6%
Information 10% 30% 14% 36%
Finance and Insurance 16% 3% 15% 3%
Real Estate, Rental, Leasing 1% 3% 5%
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 5% 8% 7% 5%
Waste Management and Remediation Services 2% 3% 1% 8%
Educational Services
Health Care and Social Assistance 2% 2%
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation
Accommodation and Food Services 1% 1% 1%
Other Services (except Public Administration)
Unclassifiable 1% 1%
       Parent      Subsidiary 
 
Subsample descriptive summary. During the hot-market period, parent companies have 
offered shares in smaller and significantly less-profitable subsidiaries. Parent firms are 
equally profitable and lower-leveraged, thus appearing less reliant on equity financing during 
the 1998-2000 period. The share of firms from the information industry has strongly 
increased, while financial service firms are underrepresented during the hot-market years. 
Differences in investor sentiment are reflected by substantially higher valuations of both 
parent companies and subsidiaries, as reflected by considerable higher Tobin’s q and book-to-
market ratios, which, however, have increased proportionally to industry peers. 
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8.3.2 Short-term ECO performance 
As documented in Section 4, short-term results are highly consistent across methodological 
variations. The present section will therefore only report subsample results that are based on 
an OLS estimate of the standard market model. Similarly, bootstrapped confidence intervals 
for the announcement effect are not presented223. 
The effect of market condition on the ECO announcement effect is presented in two tables. 
Table 38 compares the ECO announcement effect between the two subsamples for individual 
days, and Table 39 shows this information for windows of multiple days. The upper panels A 
show results for the cold-market period, which should be compared to panels B, which 
contain the results for the 1998-2000 period. Regarding other aspects of table structure and 
notation, the comments of Chapter 4.5.1 on p. 87 apply. 
Short-term results on event days. As documented in Table 38, both subsamples exhibit a 
statistically significant (p < 0.05) abnormal increase in share prices when an ECO is 
announced. On the actual announcement day, this effect amounts to average abnormal returns 
well in excess of 1% in both cases, and as such, the findings from the analysis of the full 
sample in Section 4 are confirmed. In spite of this overall conclusion for individual event 
days, there are several relevant differences between the subsamples. Most notably, abnormal 
return is larger for the hot-market subsample. This observation applies to each of the five days 
preceding the ECO announcement, to the announcement day, and to the day thereafter. At 
1.68%, abnormal return on the event day is more than 20% larger for the 1998-2000 period 
than for other years, and this difference doubles if precision-weighted abnormal return is 
considered instead of an arithmetic average of abnormal return. Focusing on the event date 
alone does not yet capture the entire effect. While the day before the announcement is 
comparable between the subsamples with abnormal return of around 0.8%, the hot-market 
subsample, in contrast to other years, exhibits strong positive abnormal return of about 1.3% 
two days before the ECO announcement, with statistical significance that even exceeds that of 
the announcement day (p < 0.01). Likewise, the hot-market subsample exhibits positive 
abnormal return of about 1% four days before the announcement, confirming the impression 
that the announcement effect was much more pronounced during the 1998-2000 period. 
Short-term results during event windows. Turning to a review of the short-term ECO 
performance during event windows of multiple days (Table 39), the positive announcement 
effect is once more confirmed for both subsamples. For both groups of ECOs, all pre-event 
windows exhibit positive abnormal return with statistical significance that generally exceeds 
10%, while abnormal return for post-event windows may be positive or negative and does not 
show signs of any statistical robustness. Here again, the larger size of this effect for the 1998-
2000 period is evident, as witnessed by cumulative abnormal return for the hot-market 
                                                 
223  As for the full sample, critical t-values based on the subsample bootstrap distributions have been 
found to be higher for tests that rely on time-series variance, while those of cross-sectional tests 
remain largely unchanged. The resulting reduction in statistical significance of the former does 
not, however, affect the interpretation of results. 
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subsample of 7.5% during the month before the offer, more than twice the amount of 3.1% 
documented for the remaining years. This difference becomes particularly manifest when the 
[–5 0] day window is compared, during which abnormal return for the hot-market subsample 
sums to 5.7%, compared to 1.8% for all other years. The disparity between the subsample is 
also underlined by much higher statistical significance of the pre-announcement windows 
during the hot-market years. In excess of 5% for all six analyzed windows during those years, 
the three longest event windows for the cold-market years are at most statistically significant 
at the 10% level. 
Graphical summary of results. Figure 29 summarizes the above effects graphically. The three 
graphs depict cumulative abnormal return over an OLS market model for the two months 
around the ECO announcement for (from top to bottom) the 1998-2000 subsample, the full 
sample as analyzed in Section 4, and the cold-market subsample. This figure illustrates the 
much more pronounced announcement effect of the 1998-2000 subsample, its higher 
volatility in abnormal return before the announcement, and the fact that positive abnormal 
return for the hot-market period stretches into the day after the actual announcement, in 
contrast to the cold-market subsample, which exhibits negative abnormal return during the 
immediate post-announcement period.  
Statistical robustness. From a methodological point of view, an observation concerns 
statistical significance. If viewed side-by-side with the full-sample results (Chapter 4.5.1 on p. 
87), significance levels are somewhat smaller for both subsamples. Even though each 
subsample represents a sizeable sample on its own (N = 77, 95), this reduction in t-values 
likely results from the fact that sample size has been roughly cut in half. While unproblematic 
in the present study, this reduction in test power highlights the inferential difficulty faced by 
other ECO studies that have relied on substantially smaller samples (compare Table 10 on p. 
66 for sample sizes of other short-term ECO studies and Table 20 on p. 108 for sample sizes 
of other long-term ECO studies). The fact that even those studies have documented ECO 
announcement return with high statistical significance once more underscores the robustness 
of this phenomenon. 
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Table 38: Abnormal short-term return (OLS; days; subsamples) 
Day AR PWAR ts-t std-ts-t cs-t std-cs-t pos:neg sign-Z
Panel A: Subsample "cold"
-5 -0.11% -0.06% -0.33 -0.31 -0.48 -0.38 44:51 -0.02
-4 0.06% 0.17% 0.17 0.84 0.22 0.77 43:52 -0.22
-3 -0.12% -0.27% -0.36 -1.36 -0.34 -1.34 40:55 -0.84
-2 -0.13% -0.10% -0.41 -0.50 -0.49 -0.47 40:55 -0.84
-1 0.78% 0.67% 2.38 3.41 1.81 1.71 46:49 0.39
** *** * *
  0 1.31% 0.95% 4.00 4.83 2.56 2.92 56:39 2.45
*** *** ** *** >> **
  1 -0.04% 0.03% -0.14 0.14 -0.15 0.11 48:47 0.81
  2 -0.20% 0.08% -0.63 0.39 -0.65 0.37 44:51 -0.02
  3 -0.14% -0.07% -0.42 -0.33 -0.45 -0.32 41:54 -0.64
  4 -0.46% -0.29% -1.41 -1.47 -1.75 -1.42 35:60 -1.87
< *
  5 0.13% -0.02% 0.39 -0.08 0.46 -0.08 45:50 0.19
Panel B: Subsample "hot"
-5 0.40% 0.34% 0.82 1.11 0.91 1.10 40:37 0.97
-4 0.97% 0.79% 1.98 2.57 2.02 2.37 47:30 2.57
** ** ** ** >> **
-3 0.56% 0.56% 1.15 1.83 1.01 1.37 40:37 0.97
*
-2 1.27% 0.97% 2.59 3.17 2.79 2.63 42:35 1.43
*** *** *** ***
-1 0.83% 0.40% 1.68 1.31 1.26 0.87 37:40 0.28
*
  0 1.68% 1.59% 3.42 5.18 2.38 2.56 46:31 2.34
*** *** ** ** >> **
  1 1.45% 0.68% 2.96 2.23 1.36 1.05 37:40 0.28
*** **
  2 -0.34% -0.07% -0.69 -0.23 -0.80 -0.19 35:42 -0.17
  3 -0.71% -0.42% -1.44 -1.37 -1.58 -1.22 33:44 -0.63
  4 -0.12% 0.07% -0.24 0.22 -0.32 0.24 39:38 0.74
  5 0.31% 0.68% 0.63 2.22 0.67 1.91 44:33 1.88
** > *  
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Table 39: Abnormal short-term return (OLS; windows; subsamples) 
Window CAR PWCAR ts-t std-ts-t cs-t std-cs-t pos:neg sign-Z
Panel A: Subsample "cold"
(-30,0) 3.05% 2.65% 1.68 2.29 1.79 2.51 53:42 1.83
* ** * ** > *
(-25,0) 2.78% 2.09% 1.67 1.98 1.63 2.21 53:42 1.83
* ** ** > *
(-20,0) 2.50% 2.21% 1.67 2.35 1.95 2.53 56:39 2.45
* ** * ** >> **
(-15,0) 3.32% 2.71% 2.54 3.35 2.60 3.20 58:37 2.86
** *** *** *** >>> ***
(-10,0) 2.15% 1.87% 1.98 2.80 1.87 2.52 55:40 2.25
** *** * ** >> **
(-5,0) 1.78% 1.36% 2.23 2.79 2.10 2.31 56:39 2.45
** *** ** ** >> **
(+1,+5) -0.72% -0.27% -0.98 -0.60 -1.16 -0.60 48:47 0.81
(+1,+10) -0.64% -0.27% -0.62 -0.43 -0.69 -0.43 50:45 1.22
(+1,+15) -1.03% -0.52% -0.82 -0.67 -1.08 -0.74 44:51 -0.02
(+1,+20) -0.16% 0.00% -0.11 0.01 -0.13 0.01 41:54 -0.64
(+1,+25) -0.38% -0.22% -0.23 -0.19 -0.27 -0.22 41:54 -0.64
(+1,+30) -0.07% 0.27% -0.04 0.26 -0.04 0.30 43:52 -0.22
Panel B: Subsample "hot"
(-30,0) 7.49% 6.35% 2.74 3.48 2.44 3.10 47:30 2.57
*** *** ** *** >> **
(-25,0) 7.14% 6.73% 2.85 4.06 2.55 3.38 53:24 3.94
*** *** ** *** >>> ***
(-20,0) 6.23% 5.00% 2.77 3.38 2.19 2.72 49:28 3.03
*** *** ** *** >>> ***
(-15,0) 4.72% 3.93% 2.40 3.05 2.01 2.46 48:29 2.80
** *** ** ** >>> ***
(-10,0) 5.06% 4.41% 3.11 4.21 2.75 3.28 51:26 3.48
*** *** *** *** >>> ***
(-5,0) 5.71% 4.66% 4.75 6.09 3.86 4.46 52:25 3.71
*** *** *** *** >>> ***
(+1,+5) 0.60% 0.94% 0.55 1.35 0.56 1.16 38:39 0.51
(+1,+10) -0.99% -0.53% -0.64 -0.53 -0.61 -0.45 35:42 -0.17
(+1,+15) -0.87% -0.35% -0.46 -0.29 -0.50 -0.28 35:42 -0.17
(+1,+20) -0.69% -0.19% -0.31 -0.16 -0.33 -0.14 32:45 -0.86
(+1,+25) 0.08% 0.54% 0.03 0.33 0.04 0.32 35:42 -0.17
(+1,+30) 1.18% 0.71% 0.44 0.38 0.50 0.34 42:35 1.43
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Figure 29: ECO announcement effect (subsamples) 
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8.3.3 Long-term ECO performance 
In contrast to the full-sample analyses in Section 5, only two variants of return adjustment are 
presented for the two subsamples, namely the value-weighted reference portfolio and the 
matching firm-adjusted alternatives. Results based on equal-weighted reference portfolio 
benchmarks are not separately presented because of the similarity these exhibit to value-
weighted reference portfolios, and index-adjusted return is not presented in this chapter 
because it has only been included as a crude robustness check in Section 5. Finally, only 
(event-time) BHAR and CAR will be presented for the subsamples because of the statistical 
significance of the Cowan/Sergeant (2001)-adjusted t-statistic and the fact that calendar-time 
MMAR has been largely equivalent to event-time measures of abnormal return224. 
Analogously to Chapter 5.5 on p. 127, the presentation of abnormal long-term return begins 
with a discussion of results in tabular format, before three graphics are presented to allow a 
direct comparison between different methods and to provide information about abnormal 
return during interim periods. 
                                                 
224  Due to its time-aggregate composition, the application of the calendar-time portfolio approach 
would furthermore run into interpretational difficulties for a comparison of results over time. 
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8.3.3.1 Tabular presentation 
Abnormal long-term return for the two subsamples is presented in two tables. Table 40 shows 
the sample return adjusted by the return on a value-weighted reference portfolio, while Table 
41 shows matching firm-adjusted sample return. Both tables are identically structured: To 
facilitate a comparison between the two subsamples, panels A in the upper part of the tables 
contain results for parent firms for both subsamples, panels B in the middle part both results 
for subsidiaries, and panels C on the bottom the return for a portfolio of the parent firm and its 
subsidiary. For all other details related to table structure and notation, the comments of 
Chapter 5.5.1 on p. 128 apply. 
Subsample parent firm long-term performance. Reviewing abnormal return for the parent 
company across both tables, it shows that the cold-market subsample exhibits average 
negative long-term performance, but that this finding is not robust in magnitude and not 
robust to methodological variations. Based on value-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted 
return, only BHAR is statistically significant at –19%, while CAR is less pronouncedly 
negative (at –11%) and not statistically significant for intervals other than at six months after 
the ECO. Based on matching firm-adjusted return, neither BHARs nor CARs are statistically 
significant, and abnormal return oscillates close to zero for most event windows, attaining –
9% BHAR (–8% CAR) after 36 months. This finding stands in contrast to the abnormal return 
of parent companies during the hot-market period, which exhibit underperformance that is 
markedly more pronounced and statistically more robust than for the cold-market subsample. 
If sample return is adjusted by value-weighted reference portfolios, abnormal return attains –
19% BHAR (–25% CAR) after three years. Three of the five event windows are statistically 
significant at p < 0.05. Matching firm-adjusted results indicate even more negative 
performance and attain BHAR of –36% and CAR of –37% after three years, both of which is 
statistically significant at p < 0.05. 
Subsample subsidiary long-term performance. The picture of subsidiary subsample return is 
not nearly as clear as that for parent companies. Not only is abnormal return of the subsidiary 
statistically insignificant throughout, but methodological variations also lead to different 
results. Value-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted return exhibits 36-month BHAR that is 
more negative for the cold-market subsample (–14% vs. –10%), whereas matching firm-
adjusted return shows BHAR that is more positive for this subsample (–8% vs. –28%). Low 
statistical significance indicates that this discrepancy is likely the result of a wider distribution 
of abnormal return and that little, if anything, can be said with certainty about the three-year 
abnormal return of the subsidiary. Focusing instead on those aspects that exhibit higher 
consistency, six-month subsidiary BHAR and CAR are slightly positive for the hot-market 
subsample, and one year after the offer, its abnormal return is statistically most robust (yet p > 
0.10) at markedly negative values (–18% to –43%, depending on methodology). Statistical 
significance falls sharply thereafter. 
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Table 40: Abnormal long-term return (reference portfolio; subsamples) 
Month BHAR t CS-t CAR t
Panel A1: Parent (value-weighted reference portfolio; subsample "cold")
6 -0.06 -2.17 ** -1.93 * -0.06 -2.00 **
12 -0.06 -1.33 -1.14 -0.04 -0.99
18 -0.10 -1.89 * -1.56 -0.08 -1.45
24 -0.14 -2.27 ** -1.86 * -0.08 -1.44
30 -0.16 -1.82 * -1.68 * -0.08 -1.10
36 -0.19 -1.74 * -1.62 -0.11 -1.21
Panel A2: Parent (value-weighted reference portfolio; subsample "hot")
6 -0.06 -1.26 -1.12 -0.07 -1.29
12 -0.14 -2.02 ** -1.93 * -0.16 -1.98 *
18 -0.18 -2.24 ** -2.11 ** -0.26 -2.49 **
24 -0.20 -2.40 ** -2.09 ** -0.26 -2.18 **
30 -0.19 -2.30 ** -2.02 ** -0.27 -2.21 **
36 -0.19 -2.25 ** -1.94 * -0.25 -2.05 **
Panel B1: Subsidiary (value-weighted reference portfolio; subsample "cold")
6 -0.04 -1.04 -0.98 -0.02 -0.46
12 -0.06 -1.01 -0.99 -0.04 -0.68
18 -0.10 -1.36 -1.34 -0.10 -1.31
24 -0.10 -1.16 -1.07 -0.04 -0.53
30 -0.11 -1.04 -0.90 -0.08 -0.92
36 -0.14 -1.28 -1.10 -0.07 -0.79
Panel B2: Subsidiary (value-weighted reference portfolio; subsample "hot")
6 0.09 0.65 0.77 0.03 0.29
12 -0.18 -1.19 -0.84 -0.19 -1.59
18 -0.07 -0.29 -0.17 -0.13 -1.03
24 -0.07 -0.21 -0.05 -0.12 -0.79
30 -0.07 -0.24 -0.10 -0.08 -0.47
36 -0.10 -0.46 -0.32 -0.11 -0.72
Panel C1: Portfolio (value-weighted reference portfolio; subsample "cold")
6 -0.03 -1.01 -0.90 -0.01 -0.51
12 -0.03 -0.67 -0.59 -0.01 -0.24
18 -0.09 -1.59 -1.37 -0.09 -1.51
24 -0.14 -2.26 ** -1.87 * -0.09 -1.40
30 -0.17 -2.08 ** -1.80 * -0.12 -1.57
36 -0.19 -2.07 ** -1.77 * -0.13 -1.59
Panel C2: Portfolio (value-weighted reference portfolio; subsample "hot")
6 0.04 0.36 0.48 -0.01 -0.13
12 -0.15 -1.74 * -1.50 -0.17 -1.83 *
18 -0.14 -0.98 -0.67 -0.24 -2.34 **
24 -0.13 -0.60 -0.35 -0.21 -1.82 *
30 -0.14 -0.78 -0.48 -0.22 -1.83 *
36 -0.18 -1.40 -0.87 -0.27 -2.32 **
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Table 41: Abnormal long-term return (matching firm; subsamples) 
Month BHAR t CS-t CAR t
Panel A1: Parent (matching firm; subsample "cold")
6 -0.02 -0.55 -0.49 -0.02 -0.60
12 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.05
18 -0.05 -0.68 -0.60 -0.02 -0.24
24 -0.08 -0.87 -0.80 -0.02 -0.24
30 -0.04 -0.35 -0.33 0.01 0.09
36 -0.09 -0.65 -0.64 -0.08 -0.76
Panel A2: Parent (matching firm; subsample "hot")
6 -0.11 -0.81 -0.83 -0.09 -0.97
12 -0.33 -1.18 -1.22 -0.22 -1.53
18 -0.37 -1.34 -1.41 -0.33 -1.87 *
24 -0.25 -1.62 -1.43 -0.33 -1.97 *
30 -0.33 -2.09 ** -2.08 ** -0.37 -2.29 **
36 -0.36 -2.34 ** -2.92 *** -0.37 -2.35 **
Panel B1: Subsidiary (matching firm; subsample "cold")
6 0.01 0.21 0.20 0.03 0.67
12 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.41
18 -0.09 -1.00 -1.01 -0.13 -1.43
24 -0.07 -0.64 -0.63 -0.06 -0.61
30 -0.04 -0.26 -0.26 -0.08 -0.71
36 -0.08 -0.54 -0.51 -0.06 -0.51
Panel B2: Subsidiary (matching firm; subsample "hot")
6 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.09
12 -0.43 -1.17 -1.19 -0.23 -1.23
18 -0.35 -1.04 -0.99 -0.23 -1.17
24 -0.32 -0.82 -0.71 -0.18 -0.88
30 -0.26 -0.77 -0.58 -0.13 -0.58
36 -0.28 -1.02 -0.81 -0.16 -0.72
Panel C1: Portfolio (matching firm; subsample "cold")
6 0.00 -0.08 -0.07 0.01 0.20
12 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.37
18 -0.11 -1.53 -1.38 -0.12 -1.83 *
24 -0.17 -1.94 * -1.78 * -0.14 -1.83 *
30 -0.17 -1.51 -1.42 -0.15 -1.77 *
36 -0.22 -1.75 * -1.62 -0.19 -1.93 *
Panel C2: Portfolio (matching firm; subsample "hot")
6 0.06 0.44 0.45 0.00 0.05
12 -0.23 -1.20 -1.24 -0.19 -1.48
18 -0.25 -1.29 -1.17 -0.32 -2.17 **
24 -0.21 -0.87 -0.72 -0.27 -1.75 *
30 -0.23 -1.10 -0.81 -0.29 -1.89 *
36 -0.29 -1.73 * -1.33 -0.35 -2.25 **
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Subsample portfolio long-term performance. Performance of a portfolio of parent company 
and subsidiary, presented in panels C of both tables, is inconclusive, which results from the 
fact that the relatively clear (negative) development of the parent firm is watered down by 
volatile abnormal return of the subsidiary. While CAR is significantly negative for longer hot-
market subsample event windows, BHAR is not, and both BHAR and CAR are only vaguely 
significant for the (equally negative) cold-market subsample. Some consistency can be found 
in the positive six-month BHAR for the hot-market subsample, after which a rapid decline in 
performance sets in, and the fact that after three years portfolio return is negative (at an 
average of –20% across all variants). 
Summing up across parent company and subsidiary, three-year abnormal return is negative 
for all subsamples under all modifications, but only the underperformance of the hot-market 
parent firms exhibits consistent statistical significance and robustness to methodological (i.e., 
benchmark) and computational (i.e., BHAR vs. CAR) variations. 
Figure 30: Abnormal long-term return of the parent company (subsamples) 
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8.3.3.2 Graphical presentation 
The long-term performance of the ECO subsamples is shown in three figures. Figure 30 
shows abnormal return for subsamples of the parent company, Figure 31 for subsamples of 
the subsidiary, and Figure 32 for subsamples of the portfolio of the two. Each figure displays 
four graphs, two for value-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted return (black lines) and two 
for matching firm-adjusted return (grey lines). The full lines show BHAR for the cold-market 
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subsample, while dotted lines show BHAR for ECOs from the 1998-2000 period. In contrast 
to the figures of Chapter 5.5.3 on p. 134, areas of statistical significance have not been shaded 
grey since the subsamples show statistically significant results at different times. Rather, 
statistical significance is documented in the tables of the preceding subchapter and will be 
highlighted in the verbal presentation that follows. 
Graphical presentation of parent firm results. Figure 30 shows subsample BHAR for parent 
companies. First, it can be seen that after about one and a half years, performance is negative 
under all variants. Second, the performance of ECOs from the 1998-2000 period generally 
lies below that of ECOs that have occurred in other years. The negative cold-market return 
based on value-weighted reference portfolio adjustment exhibits dispersed signs of statistical 
significance, as witnessed by three periods when the p-values for both the regular t-statistic 
and the Cowan/Sergeant t-statistic are smaller than 0.05 (at 4, 8, and 26 months after the 
offer). For the hot-market equivalent, on the other hand, there is evidence that abnormal return 
is robustly smaller than zero (15 periods with p < 0.05). Figure 30 shows that the negative 
development of the reference portfolio-adjusted performance for the hot- and cold-market 
subsamples runs almost in parallel, with the important difference that one is statistically 
significant (hot-market subsample), while the other is not (cold-market ECOs). This 
difference between the two subsamples is even more distinct if return adjustment is based on 
matching firms. Here, cold-market parent companies exhibit no statistically significant 
abnormal returns whatsoever, while for the hot-market subsample, all periods exhibit p-values 
below 0.05 after about two years. Overall, the graphical results and the review of details of 
statistical significance confirm the conclusion that abnormal return of the parent company is 
robustly negative for the hot-market subsample, but not for ECOs that have taken place 
during other years. 
Graphical presentation of subsidiary results. The long-term performance of subsample 
subsidiaries is shown in Figure 31. The first observation concerns volatility, which is 
substantially higher for the hot-market subsample. The performance of hot-market ECOs 
furthermore exhibits the peak of abnormal return at around seven months after the offer, 
followed by the sharp decline, as discussed in Chapter 7.5.2 on p. 266 across all ECOs. In 
comparison to the full sample, this peak stands out much higher at around 23%, but at p = 
0.28 it appears to be driven by a number of firms with particularly high values of abnormal 
return during that period. The following low-point, however, is statistically significant for the 
hot-market subsample, with p < 0.05 for both tests under the reference portfolio variant and p 
< 0.10 if matching firms are applied (although abnormal return based on matching firms is 
substantially more negative than that based on reference portfolios). Abnormal return of the 
subsidiary for the hot-market subsample is inconclusive for longer event windows. Regarding 
the cold-market subsample, subsidiary performance oscillates at or slightly below that of its 
benchmarks, and there is no indication that this difference is statistically meaningful. 
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Figure 31: Abnormal long-term return of the subsidiary (subsamples) 
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Graphical presentation of portfolio results. Finally, the combination of parent firm and 
subsidiary performance is graphically presented in Figure 32. Results for the hot-market 
subsample indicate, again, much higher volatility of abnormal return, basically depicting the 
pattern of subsidiary subsample abnormal return as previously discussed. The cold-market 
subsample shows a more steady decline toward the recurring value of –20% BHAR after 36 
months. Statistical significance is overall low. Portfolio BHAR based on reference portfolio 
benchmarks for the cold-market subsample is significant at p-values of 0.10 for about half of 
all event windows, particularly so for longer periods, but this does not hold if matching firms 
are used as benchmark. The one feature that does stick out with statistical significance is the 
performance low-point at around 15 to 16 months after the offer for the hot-market 
subsamples, which clearly reflects the well-defined subsidiary performance at this point. For 
other periods, results of the hot-market portfolio analysis are not statistically robust. 
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Figure 32: Abnormal long-term return of the parent/subsidiary portfolio (subsamples) 
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8.3.4 Market timing 
To test the argument that abnormal long-term return after an ECO is the result of market 
timing, the exposition in the previous section has included a list of eight hypotheses that 
should hold in the presence of market timing (compare Chapter 7.4.9.2 on p. 259 for an 
overview). While empirical evidence from the full sample has been consistent with those 
propositions, differences in long-term subsample performance should also mirror differences 
in market timing characteristics. To this end, the most fundamental hypotheses from the 
previous section will be here reviewed for the two subsamples. Not included are subsample 
tests of the asymmetry of abnormal return (H7-7) and of the sale of secondary shares (H7-8), 
as these are ancillary to the more fundamental hypotheses of abnormal return. A subsample 
review of the first two hypotheses on abnormal run-up return requires additional computations 
and is therefore presented in a separate subchapter, whereas the review of the remaining 
hypotheses on abnormal post-ECO return (H7-3 to H7-6) builds on earlier findings from this 
section and is jointly arranged in a second subchapter. 
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Table 42: Abnormal run-up return (subsamples) 
Month BHAR t CS-t CAR t
Panel A1: Value-weighted reference portfolio; subsample "cold"
-6 0.03 0.77 0.65 0.03 0.99
-12 0.05 0.78 0.64 0.05 1.05
-18 0.06 0.76 0.59 0.05 0.77
-24 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.56
-30 -0.08 -0.93 -0.72 0.01 0.22
-36 -0.13 -1.22 -0.93 -0.02 -0.25
Panel A2: Value-weighted reference portfolio; subsample "hot"
-6 0.29 2.65 *** 2.38 ** 0.21 2.75 ***
-12 0.15 1.15 0.87 0.27 2.73 ***
-18 0.40 0.99 0.86 0.28 2.30 **
-24 0.79 0.92 0.83 0.33 2.58 **
-30 0.35 0.48 0.41 0.28 2.19 **
-36 -0.16 -0.33 -0.25 0.25 2.21 **
Panel B1: Matching firm; subsample "cold"
-6 0.09 2.42 ** 1.81 * 0.08 2.41 **
-12 0.11 1.36 0.97 0.12 1.91 *
-18 0.15 1.26 0.98 0.13 1.69 *
-24 0.08 0.60 0.57 0.08 0.99
-30 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.06 0.70
-36 -0.16 -0.72 -0.69 0.02 0.26
Panel B2: Matching firm; subsample "hot"
-6 0.43 3.65 *** 3.53 *** 0.32 3.86 ***
-12 0.41 2.85 *** 2.34 ** 0.43 3.58 ***
-18 0.61 2.01 ** 1.23 0.43 3.01 ***
-24 1.39 1.81 * 1.46 0.55 3.86 ***
-30 1.13 1.95 * 1.37 0.51 3.84 ***
-36 0.83 2.67 *** 1.39 0.51 4.28 ***
 
8.3.4.1 Subsample run-up return and cross-sectional post-offer variance 
As documented in Table 42, the difference between parent run-up return for the two 
subsamples is striking. For the [–6 0] month window, the hot-market subsample run-up return 
lies at 29% over value-weighted reference portfolio benchmarks and at 43% over matching 
firms, compared to 3% and 9% respectively for the cold-market subsample. Comparison of 
statistical significance emphasizes this discrepancy, as hot-market abnormal run-up return is 
not only substantially higher, but also of much higher statistical significance, with p-values 
smaller than 0.01 for simple t-statistics of BHAR and CAR, and a p-value smaller than 0.05 
for the Cowan/Sergeant (2001) test. The statistical significance of cold-market run-up return, 
in contrast, is not robust to methodological variations, as both BHAR and CAR based on 
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reference portfolios mostly exhibit t-values smaller than one across all event windows. The 
difference in abnormal run-up return between the two subsamples increases for larger event 
windows. Matching firm-adjusted return attains run-up values in excess of 100% for longer 
windows (i.e., net of benchmark effects, the market capitalization of the sample firm has more 
than doubled), exhibiting still some statistical validity (p < 0.10), while reference portfolio-
adjusted return attains (insignificant) run-up levels of 79%. The cold-market subsample, in 
contrast, shows abnormal run-up return that is even negative for longer pre-ECO event 
windows. 
Figure 33: Abnormal run-up return (subsamples) 
-200%
-150%
-100%
-50%
0%
50%
100%
36 32 28 24 20 16 04812
Months before ECO
BHAR (time of ECO set to zero)
matching firm "hot"
matching firm "cold"
value-weighted "hot"
value-weighted "cold"
 
This finding is graphically depicted in Figure 33. The difference between the two subsamples 
is immediately visible, as the development of the ECOs during the cold-market years is 
virtually eclipsed by the abnormal returns of the hot-market subsample. The large scale of the 
ordinate axis, chosen to encapsulate run-up return for all variants, conceals the pattern of 
cold-market abnormal return, which is negative for about the third pre-offer year and only 
slightly positive thereafter. Following the requirement for statistical significance outlined in 
Chapter 5.5.3 (p. 134), cold-market run-up return is statistically not significant. Hot-market 
run-up return, however, is statistically significant per above definition for the seven months 
before the offer (bar the [–2 0] month window) at average BHAR of 52%. In summary, these 
findings fully confirm the first market timing hypothesis of positive abnormal run-up return 
(H7-1) for the hot-market subsample, but not for ECOs that took place during other years. 
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Figure 34: Variance of per-period post-offer subsidiary abnormal return (subsamples) 
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Figure 34 shows the subsample split for cross-sectional variance of per-period post-offer 
abnormal return of the subsidiary, where abnormal return is assessed against the return on a 
value-weighted portfolio of reference firms. It can be seen that the cold-market years exhibit 
constant and low levels of variance at around 2%, while the remaining hot-market years 
exhibit decreasing levels of variance, which attains around 11% during the immediate post-
offer period and decreases over time to levels comparable to those of the cold-market 
subsample. Also, the last 16 of the first 36 post-offer months are characterized by greater 
homoskedasticity of abnormal return for the hot-market subsample, compared to earlier 
months, i.e., the cross-sectional variance of per-period abnormal return is subject to lower 
levels of time-series variance. With regard to hypothesis H7-2, the entire effect of market 
timing can therefore be traced to the hot-market subsample, while the null hypothesis that 
these transactions are inspired by market timing needs to be rejected for the cold-market cases 
as the applicable hypothesis is not confirmed. 
A tabular summary of the data is provided in Table 43, showing details for the full sample 
(second column), the cold-market period (third column), and the hot-market years (fourth 
column). Due to the granularity of the depicted data, the fact that abnormal return is more 
heteroskedastic during the first half of the studied period is not as clearly discernable as in the 
graphical presentation, while the data clearly indicates that the cross-sectional variance is 
consistently higher for the hot-market subsample during the first 24 months after an ECO. 
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Table 43: Cross-sectional variance of per-period post-offer subsidiary abnormal return 
Month full "cold" "hot"
Panel A: Reference portfolio-adjusted
6 0.052 0.041 0.066
12 0.046 0.037 0.053
18 0.047 0.020 0.080
24 0.035 0.016 0.060
30 0.024 0.022 0.026
36 0.021 0.020 0.023
Panel B: Matching firm-adjusted
6 0.076 0.068 0.087
12 0.061 0.045 0.078
18 0.068 0.034 0.078
24 0.045 0.031 0.064
30 0.038 0.029 0.050
36 0.027 0.027 0.027
 
8.3.4.2 Other market timing hypotheses 
The remaining applicable hypotheses from Chapter 7.4.9.2 on p. 259 (H7-3 through H7-6) do 
not require additional computation, but can be reviewed against the outcome of the subsample 
analysis on abnormal long-term post-ECO return. 
The third and fourth hypotheses (H7-3, H7-4) concern the rise-and-fall pattern of abnormal 
return of the subsidiary, which is detectable for subsidiaries of hot-market ECOs only. To 
visualize this pattern, Figure 35 shows the subsample equivalent to Figure 26 on p. 270, 
which consists of a combination of parent pre- and subsidiary post-ECO performance to 
proxy the development of subsidiary valuation. It is instantly visible that the hot-market 
subsidiaries exhibit increasing levels of abnormal return (statistically highly robust before the 
offer), an ephemeral peak at around a half-year after the offer, during which average abnormal 
return is larger than 20%, and a subsequent sharp decline with a low-point around 15 months 
after the ECO (which is again statistically robust). The cold-market subsidiaries, in contrast, 
exhibit none of these features, as underlined by the lack of statistical robustness of their 
results, indicating that these subsidiaries do not perform materially different than their 
benchmarks. 
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Figure 35: Parent pre- and subsidiary post-ECO performance (subsamples) 
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Figure 35 shows that the hot-market subsidiaries largely exhibit the same pattern of abnormal 
return as the full sample, and therefore, the same arguments apply to the asymmetry of 
abnormal return as laid out in Chapter 7.5.5 on p. 269, confirming this phenomenon. No 
abnormal performance, and hence no asymmetry of abnormal performance, is detectable for 
the subsample comprised of cold-market ECO subsidiaries. Finally, regarding the two 
remaining hypotheses on parent performance (H7-5, H7-6), Figure 30 on p. 299 shows that 
abnormal return of the parent company is robustly negative after the peak of subsidiary 
overvaluation only for the hot-market subsample, as proposed by H7-5. Regarding the relative 
negative performance of subsidiary and parent firm, as posited by H7-6, the same 
commentary applies as in Chapter 7.5.4 on p. 269, but only for the hot-market subsample: For 
event windows up to 16 months (i.e., up to the statistically significant low-point of subsidiary 
performance), the hypothesis is confirmed, while parent companies exhibit continued 
underperformance after that. Abnormal post-offer return for the cold-market subsample is 
small and insignificant, and H7-5 and H7-6 are therefore rejected for cold-market ECOs225. 
                                                 
225  Difference-in-means t-tests have been administered to corroborate the finding of different market 
timing characteristics between the two subsamples, and results have been found to support above 
findings. For the [-6 0] month pre-offer window, BHAR over a value-weighted reference portfolio 
is different for the two subsamples at p = 0.01. For the [0 16] month post-offer underperformance, 
the difference is less pronounced at p = 0.14, however, based on matching firms, the hypothesis 
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8.4 Discussion 
The sample of 174 ECOs has been split into two subsamples, one comprising all ECOs of the 
hot-market period, and the other all ECOs that have occurred during other years. Analyses on 
these subsamples have indicated that ECO performance has differed over time. The following 
subchapters will discuss the various facets of this finding. 
8.4.1 Descriptive characteristics 
The most notable observation of the separate descriptive statistics concerns the fact that 
parent companies appear less cash-constrained during the hot-market period: Profitability is 
not markedly different between the two subsamples, while leverage is significantly lower 
during the 1998-2000 period. This fact hints at the possibility that ECOs during the hot-
market years are differently motivated. Instead of collecting cash to finance projects that 
would otherwise be foregone, it could be that cash is collected because investors were more 
readily willing to part with it. This presumption is accentuated by the fact that subsidiaries 
were smaller and significantly less profitable during the hot-market period, conveying the 
impression that they have not been allowed to mature as long within the parent company as 
otherwise. Even if this may represent a somewhat courageous interpretation of the descriptive 
differences between the two subsamples, at the highest level of conclusion, descriptive 
evidence indicates that differences between the two subsamples do exist and that a study of 
differences in ECO performance is therefore warranted. 
8.4.2 Announcement effect 
The short-term subsample analysis confirms the announcement effect. Had either of the 
subsamples been subject to an isolated study, the positive reaction to an ECO announcement 
would have been detected with high statistical certainty in all cases. In addition to this 
confirmatory result, magnitude of the announcement effect differs substantially between 
subsamples: Investors have reacted much more strongly to ECO announcements during the 
1998-2000 period. From a realistic point of view, it is unlikely that ECOs during the 1998-
2000 period have created twice the efficiency gains (or more) than ECOs at other times, 
which suggests that investors have reacted more vehemently to comparable signals during the 
hot-market period. 
This finding stands in contrast to the initial expectation that market condition is unlikely to 
affect abnormal return since benchmarks are equally overvalued. The finding of higher 
abnormal return during the hot-market years suggests that investors react over-proportionally 
to the ECO announcement. If investors expected a certain dollar value of improvements, say 
through efficiency gains, from the ECO, then the announcement reaction should be smaller in 
hot-market years than in cold-market years since it is applied to overvalued equity. If this 
dollar value of gains were overvalued in proportion to the sample firm, then the 
                                                                                                                                                        
that the subsamples originate from the population is rejected at p = 0.08. Based on matching 
firms, the difference in abnormal run-up return is highly significant at p = 0.003. 
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announcement effect would be commensurate with cold-market ECOs. Since the 
announcement effect is clearly stronger during the hot-market years, the degree of 
overvaluation for the expected ECO gains must be higher than the degree of overvaluation for 
the overall firm. 
Noteworthy is the similitude of the cold-market results to findings from other ECO 
announcement studies. Schipper/Smith (1986) report abnormal return of 1.83% for the [–4 0] 
day window, compared to cold-market results of 1.78% for the [–5 0] day window. Slovin et 
al. (1995) report abnormal return of 1.23% for the [0 1] day window, compared to 1.27% 
during the same window for the cold-market subsample. Michaely/Shaw (1995) document 
1.20% for the event day, compared to cold-market abnormal return of 1.31%. 
Allen/McConnell (1998) report an average of 1.96%, Vijh (2002) 1.94%, and Hulburt et al. 
(2002) 1.92% for the [–1 1] day window, compared to abnormal return of 2.05% for the 
present cold-market sample. This stands in contrast to the hot-market subsample, which 
exhibits abnormal return of 3.96% during the [–1 1] day window, all of which indicates that 
the cold-market levels of the announcement effect may constitute a basic figure from which 
ECOs during the 1998-2000 period have formed an exception. 
An additional remark concerns the detection of abnormal return before the actual event date. 
These pre-announcement returns are somewhat higher and above all more volatile for the hot-
market subsample. Following the logic above (compare Chapter 4.6.3 on p. 101) that a pre-
event reaction is the result of information (i.e., an assessment of the probability that the ECO 
will occur) and willingness to act on this information, it appears plausible that this 
phenomenon is caused by increased willingness to act, rather than by leakage of more 
information. The supposition that more information has principally not leaked to the market 
but that investor attitude has changed is based on the high volatility of abnormal return during 
the two weeks preceding the last week before the offer. Were these abnormal pre-
announcement returns indeed the result of more information, then the higher certainty of the 
forthcoming event should lead to a more steady and not a more volatile run-up of abnormal 
return. This investor behavior during the hot-market years suggests the presence of noise-
trader phenomena. Such interpretation is consistent with the arguments and findings by 
Hand/Skantz (1998b), who suggest that some of the positive ECO announcement returns are 
induced by noise trader demand226. In light of the present evidence, the phenomenon 
described by Hand/Skantz may not be a general characteristic of abnormal ECO return, as the 
authors suggest, but can largely be traced to the 1998-2000 period. 
8.4.3 Long-term underperformance 
The insight from the subsample analysis of the long-term ECO effect is even more 
enlightening than the strong differences found for the announcement effect. While for the 
                                                 
226  The concept of noise trading has been introduced by De Long et al. (1990) and describes the 
phenomenon that traders with erroneous stochastic beliefs induce risk to the price of an asset and 
may cause arbitrage failure even in the absence of fundamental risk. 
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latter, the subsamples exhibit directionally consistent results with differences in degree, long-
term performance of the ECO subsamples exhibits differences in kind: Parent 
underperformance – the main result of Section 5 – is caused by the hot-market ECOs. Long-
term performance of the other 97 of the 174 ECOs is less negative and above all not robust to 
methodological variations. While reference portfolio-adjusted return shows statistical 
significance for this underperformance, this finding is less pronounced when Cowan/Sergeant 
cross-sectional dependence adjusted t-statistics are used instead of simple-t. Still more 
convincingly, this finding is not robust to using BHAR instead of CAR, and matching firm-
adjusted parent BHAR is statistically insignificant throughout. Against the backdrop of 
overstated significance levels for the reference portfolio-adjusted results because of positive 
skew (see Chapter 5.6.1 on p. 138), and coupled with the fact that the subsample split may 
represent an imperfect partition (see discussion below in this chapter), the evidence is hardly 
sufficient to reject the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return for the cold-market 
subsample227. This finding constitutes an important qualification for the overall objective of 
this study: While average post-ECO parent underperformance is real, it is chiefly attributable 
to hot-market ECOs. 
This finding confirms earlier research. Junker (2005), in his subsample analysis of the 
performance of German ECOs, also reports negative abnormal long-term return for both 
subsamples. Consistent with the results of this section, the negative performance of the cold-
market subsample is not robust if return is adjusted by that of matching firm, as only one of 
five reported test statistics indicates significance in excess of 5% for the [0 36] month event 
window, whereas all other reported event windows do not exhibit signs of statistical 
robustness. While differences between the two subsamples in Junker (2005) are not as 
pronounced as in the present study, findings appear directionally consistent. That the 
differences between the two subsamples are not as pronounced for the German sample as for 
US ECOs, but rather exhibit some market timing characteristics during the cold-market years 
as well, can be seen as evidence for lower overall efficiency of the German capital market 
relative to the US capital market. This supposition is consistent with literature that compares 
the financial systems across these two geographies (see Section 9 for details on geographic 
aspects). 
Subsidiary results also exhibit important differences. The pattern observable for the full 
sample appears – once again – to be largely caused by those ECOs that took place during the 
1998-2000 period. Particularly the performance peak about a half-year after the offer and the 
statistically significant low-point a year thereafter are utterly undetectable for subsidiaries of 
cold-market ECOs. The fact that, during the hot-market period, sample firms were overvalued 
even relative to (presumably) already overvalued benchmarks can also be interpreted as a 
                                                 
227  Subsample results reflect the presence of positive skew precisely as predicted by Barber/Lyon 
(1997): Matching firm instead of portfolio adjustment and the use of CAR over BHAR have been 
suggested by these authors as provision for positive BHAR skew, and any statistical significance 
of the value-weighted reference portfolio BHAR for the cold-market subsample results disappears 
under these two variants. 
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result of the shift in the industry mix. As Table 37 on p. 290 shows, the information sector is 
strongly overrepresented in the hot-market subsample. It can be argued that particularly this 
type of companies was highly overvalued, since the strong market returns during that period 
have frequently been brought into connection with assumed changes to fundamental 
characteristics because of novel information technologies. 
8.4.4 Market timing 
The evidence that cold-market ECOs do not exhibit long-term abnormal performance 
outweighs the evidence that they do. If the cold-market subsample does not exhibit long-term 
underperformance, then it should not exhibit the market timing characteristics previously 
presented, either. Empirical evidence confirms this prediction: All market timing hypotheses 
have been confirmed for the hot-market subsample and rejected for the cold-market ECOs. 
This leads to the observation that more firm-specific overvaluation must have been exploited 
during the hot-market period than at other times. This observation, however, is not intuitive: 
Why should an increase in overall overvaluation lead to an increase in firm-specific market 
timing? As mentioned in the introduction to this section, if benchmarks are equally 
overvalued, no abnormal return should be detectable. This phenomenon can be explained by 
the intuition that the market is not uniformly overvalued. Some firms are more overvalued 
than others, and some may even be undervalued. Managers, in search for opportunities to time 
the market, are not concerned whether the overvaluation of their equity is firm-specific, but 
relevant is only its general degree of overvaluation. In light of Equation (7.13), which states 
that the probability that an equity offer is conducted increases with overvaluation, the 
probability of an offer will be relatively higher for those firms that are more overvalued than 
others228. When managers are inclined to exploit market timing opportunities when these 
arise, then a heterogeneously overvalued market will also induce firm-specific market timing 
characteristics229. 
Firm-specific market timing of ECOs then rests on two crucial preconditions: irrational 
overvaluation and managers’ eagerness to sell overvalued equity. Without the former, try as 
                                                 
228  Relative underperformance because of market timing may even come into effect if the market is 
not on average overvalued, but if excess valuation is subject to increased volatility. Reviewing 
Figure 28 on p. 287 on stock market performance, the most striking difference between the hot- 
and cold-market phases may not be levels of return, but the increase in its volatility. Since it is 
highly unlikely that this volatility correctly reflects the volatility of underlying company 
fundamentals, it is safe to infer that over- and undervaluation have become more frequent, even if 
the market has been on average fully valued. Such volatility suffices as precondition for the sale 
of overvalued equity in ECOs, and benchmark-adjusted long-term underperformance of ECO 
firms will invariably ensue. 
229  Hand/Skantz (1999) document that ECOs are clustered around periods of high market valuation. 
If during such periods the probability is also elevated that firms are on average overvalued, then 
ECOs should exhibit the market timing characteristics demonstrated in this study. In critical 
appraisal of their study, the finding by Hand/Skantz (1999) that ECOs are timed to peaks of 
market return represents neither sufficient nor necessary evidence that overvalued equity has been 
sold. What their finding nonetheless does represent is a consequence that is likely to occur when 
ECOs are subject to market timing. 
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one might, managers could not sell overvalued equity because such opportunities do not exist. 
Without the latter, the performance of ECOs would on average rise and fall with benchmarks. 
Managers would sell overvalued equity in an ECO, but investing in an ECO would give or 
take as much as investing in other securities. But it is reasonable to assume that managers will 
exploit market timing opportunities when they arise, and lapses in investor rationality open 
the door to such behavior. Consequently, firms with above-average overvaluation have a 
higher probability of conducting an ECO, and the expected benchmark-adjusted long-term 
performance of ECO firms declines230. 
The ensuing underperformance is not an innate trait of the ECO, but rather a reflection of pre-
offer overvaluation. Post-offer abnormal return mirrors the excess overvaluation of more 
overvalued firms relative to somewhat overvalued peers, and may therefore be seen as only 
the tip of the iceberg of the broader phenomenon of (firm-unspecific, general) market timing. 
To measure this broader aspect, the correction of benchmark overvaluation would need to be 
added to the results of this study. On the one hand, it may appear unsatisfactory that the 
present methodology does not reveal more about general market timing, while on the other 
hand, this study pursues a different objective. ECOs have been susceptible to market timing 
during the hot-market period, and further probing into the overvaluation phenomenon will 
constitute the subject for a study on market efficiency rather than for a study of ECOs. 
At the same time, the implications of this study for market efficiency should be discussed 
insofar possible under the current approach, and the following subchapter will turn to that 
topic. 
8.4.5 Market efficiency 
The former presumption of only weakly-efficient capital markets (see Chapter 7.6.2.3 on p. 
276) needs to be revisited. If cold-market conditions present the base scenario, then the long-
term ECO underperformance may not in general be foreseeable with public information, 
providing evidence of semi-strong market efficiency during the cold-market period. The 
public information that an ECO has been conducted has borne relevance for a superior trading 
rule only during the hot-market period. The relevance of such information, however, is 
severely limited by the difficulty to assess if current market conditions are hot or cold. This 
provides support for the proposition of informationally semi-strongly efficient capital 
markets. This point is underscored by the inconclusive long-term results of most other ECO 
studies. All evidence from the present study (including announcement effect and long-term 
performance) equally leads to the conclusion that markets are efficient in the semi-strong 
form. Prices, as put by Fama, correctly reflect all public information: On the one hand, private 
information is not reflected (or no market timing would have been detectable), while on the 
other, the prompt reaction to the ECO announcement and the proportionate long-term 
                                                 
230  In her study of managerial timing, Webb (1999) comes to similar conclusions and notes that 
some, but not all IPOs have likely been timed around peaks in stock performance. 
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performance indicate that public information does not constitute a basis for superior trading 
rules. 
It appears that poor investor rationality has caused the dip in market efficiency and afforded 
managers with the (readily-embraced) opportunity to exploit equity overvaluation through an 
ECO during the 1998-2000 period. The short-term results reflect this proposition: The hot-
market subsample exhibits significant positive abnormal return after the actual announcement 
day, and its pre-announcement run-up is substantially more pronounced. That the cold-market 
announcement returns are highly consistent with readings from other studies is additional 
evidence that the cold-market period represents a normal state and that the 1998-2000 period 
has been characterized by exceptional investor sentiment and resultant decreases in market 
efficiency231. 
8.4.6 Concluding remarks 
Two thoughts conclude this discussion. First, market timing in an overvalued market may 
take several forms, of which ECOs represent but one. SEOs and IPOs can benefit alike. An 
interesting insight may be derived from revisiting the argument of Chapter 7.4.4 on p. 248 
that an ECO is chosen if the overvaluation of subsidiary assets is larger than the overvaluation 
of nonsubsidiary assets. As sample descriptive statistics show, the information sector is 
strongly overrepresented during the hot-market period, which may indicate that firms from a 
specific sector or industry have been particularly susceptible to overvaluation. If such 
operations have been embedded in parent companies, then this selective overvaluation relative 
to other parts of the firm will have made ECOs more attractive than regular SEOs. Data on 
equity offers tentatively supports this supposition: The hot-market ECOs represent 44% of the 
174 ECOs that have taken place during the eight years of the study. SEOs for those three 
years amount to only 32% of all SEOs that have taken place during the same eight years: 
ECOs are relatively more frequent during the hot-market period than SEOs. While many more 
effects may play into this difference in ECO and SEO frequency, this comparison conveys 
supplementary support that the relationships of ECOs, SEOs, and market timing are as 
hypothesized in Section 7. 
A second thought relates to the accuracy of the results from this subsample analysis. It has 
been mentioned in the introduction to this section that the chosen approach is rough, as it 
relies on a split of the sample on subjective ground. This partition is unlikely perfect, and the 
unambiguousness of its results should be appreciated in light of this probable imprecision. If 
an approach as crude as a simple sample split delivers such distinctive results, then the clarity 
with which the true characteristics of ECOs under normal conditions differ from those under 
exceptional conditions will likely be even more pronounced. 
                                                 
231  A detailed discussion of intricacies of rationality is not within the scope of this document. Yet for 
the strength of indication, it should be noted that lapses in rationality during the hot-market period 
could realistically have followed from the representativeness heuristic (Barberis et al. (1998)): 
Investors may have overweighed the probability of strong earnings through innovative 
breakthroughs, due to the strength of the signal, relative to its actual probability. 
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To paint an overall picture, full-sample results represent the average performance of ECOs of 
the 1995-2002 period, but they do not reveal the expected normal performance of these 
transactions. Two aspects characterize this base performance of ECOs: the cold-market 
announcement effect of 2-3%, and statistically insignificant long-term underperformance of 
parent company and subsidiary. ECOs during the 1998-2000 period have been subject to 
market timing, which accounts for three effects: that the reactions to their announcement 
increased threefold, that subsidiaries underperformed their benchmarks after one and a half 
years, and that the long-term parent underperformance attained statistical significance. 
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9 Geographic concurrence 
9.1 Section introduction 
9.1.1 Objective of the international comparison 
The previous sections have presented and evaluated a sample of 174 ECOs that have taken 
place on US stock exchanges between 1995 and 2002. However conscientious this evaluation 
has been carried out, caution must be applied in attempts to generalize its findings. One 
dimension along which results may not be representative is time. While the focus on recent 
years and a separate analysis of the hot-market period may be a valuable complement to 
existing studies, one should bear in mind that results are based only on eight of many more 
years during which ECOs have occurred. Therefore, the discussion of results has been careful 
to consider the findings from other ECO studies to account for this limitation. 
This section deals with a second aspect of the question if the findings of this study can be 
generalized, as it explores the extent to which geographic disparity can be held accountable 
for variations in ECO performance. In the terminology of cross-cultural research, the present 
section aims to identify the emic aspects of the results in order to assess more universally the 
attributes and performance of ECOs232. In the recent past, interest in such international 
comparisons has sharply risen, not least in response to the increasing internationalization of 
the economic environment. For example, Samiee/Athanassiou (1998) find that, of all 
international strategy studies published in key scholarly journals between 1982 and 1993, two 
thirds have been completed during the last five years and only one third during the seven 
years before that233. Despite this surge, research on the international aspects of equity 
offerings and divisive restructuring is sparse, and the studies by Veld/Veld-Merkoulova 
(2004) on European spin-offs and Fucks (2003) on European ECOs are rare exceptions. This 
section therefore pursues two objectives: To provide a geographical robustness check of the 
current results, and to advance the emergent field of international comparative research on 
equity offers. 
9.1.2 Scope of the international comparison 
As robustness check, this section is supplementary to earlier parts of this document. If one 
was to conduct the evaluation of ECOs under the foremost consideration of international 
characteristics, it would be worthwhile to assemble a cross-national sample and to subject this 
sample to difference-in-means t-tests and cross-sectional, multivariate examinations, using 
                                                 
232  Cross-cultural psychology uses etic and emic to refer to the universal and the culture-specific, 
respectively. It has borrowed these terms from linguistics: Phonetic characteristics relate to the 
universe of sounds that allow expression of any sound in any language, while phonemic 
characteristics denote the sounds of a particular language (Hofstede (1980) p. 41). 
233  Samiee/Athanassiou (1998) focus their survey on top-tier, peer-reviewed journals that publish 
studies on international strategic management. The appendix to their publication contains an 
insightful overview of identified studies and methodological details. 
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operationalized differences across a number of geographies as main or moderating right-hand 
variables. Without substantially altering the scope of the present work, such an approach is 
regrettably unworkable. Rather than across one aggregated sample, results are compared 
across separate sets of ECO firms instead: This section resorts to the work by Junker (2005), 
who has studied 55 German ECOs, to obtain an international benchmark against which the 
present findings can be projected. 
To that end, the following approach has been chosen. First, descriptive characteristics and 
ECO performance are compared between the two samples. As will be shown, this comparison 
leads to the conclusion that ECOs are more similar than different across the two geographies 
and that such high-level review does not allow a thorough review of geographic aspects. In a 
second step, therefore, a reverse course is assumed: The most prominent differences between 
the two countries are presented, which are used to articulate four high-level propositions of 
differences. The samples are then turned to again in order to assess if these propositions are 
supported by empirical evidence related to ECOs. 
It could be argued that such expedition bends the objective of the present section. If a side-by-
side comparison of the German and US samples does not deliver evidence of differences, then 
that should suffice as robustness check. On the other hand, the suggested course of 
examination delivers two advantages. First, a simple side-by-side comparison may not 
represent the level of detail required to unearth country-specific aspects: If results are similar, 
their determinants all but need to be. And second, the suggested approach contributes to the 
internal comparative research on equity offerings. By changing the perspective from an 
explanation of ECO differences through country-specific features to the search of emic 
features in ECO characteristics, some may be learned about the role of geographic aspects in 
financial research. Where the former takes no harm while the latter can but benefit, the 
present approach, en lieu of more sophisticated quantitative analyses, appears acceptable. And 
as such, it may provide a basis for future work that affords this topic the full consideration it 
deserves. 
9.1.3 Section outline 
This section contains five chapters after this. The first contains a side-by-side comparison of 
the present study to Junker (2005) with regard to sample descriptive statistics and ECO 
performance (Chapter 9.2). To prepare a more targeted geographic comparison, a review of 
the key differences of the financial systems of Germany and the US follows (Chapter 9.3), 
which is supplemented by a review of the origins of diversity (Chapter 9.4). After that, this 
and the German study are reviewed for evidence of country-specific aspects (Chapter 9.5), 
before the section concludes with a discussion of its findings (Chapter 9.6). 
9.2 Comparison of results between the US and Germany 
As mentioned in the introduction above, the results from the present study are contrasted with 
findings from German research on ECOs to provide an international benchmark. To this end, 
the most comprehensive study on German ECOs to date has been chosen, Junker (2005), who 
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analyzes the announcement effect, the long-term returns, and efficiency effects as potential 
determinants for a set of 55 ECOs over an 18-year period. This comparison can build on the 
advantage of similar approaches and methodologies: The announcement effect for both this 
and the German sample has been captured over an OLS market model with a pre-event 
estimation period, long-term returns are represented by BHAR over the return on value-
weighted reference portfolios. Furthermore, the cross-sectional efficiency examinations 
analyze effects of focus/investment efficiency, information asymmetry/disclosure, incentive 
compensation, and blockholder control. It is hence germane, so to speak, that methodological 
differences can thus be excluded as a systematic cause of difference between the two studies. 
Variations are expected to root in the different periods spanned by the samples (1984-2001 vs. 
1995-2002), which may need to be taken into consideration when the results are reviewed, 
and in the different geographies from which the samples originate. This latter variation is 
fully intentional and represents the rationale for this comparison234. 
9.2.1 Offer details 
A comparison of the offer details between the German and US samples is contained in Table 
44235. The median US ECO is larger than its German counterpart by more than one half, less 
ownership is generally sold (28% in the US compared to 34% in Germany), and these 
transactions are more severely underpriced in the US (4% in Germany relative to 11% in the 
US). The lapse between ECO announcement and consummation is longer by about one half in 
Germany, and German ECOs are characterized by a larger portion of secondary shares sold in 
the offer. 
Table 44: International comparison of ECO offer details 
             Medians US Germany
Gross offer volume, including over-allotment (USD million) 118 72
Parent ownership pre-ECO 100% 97%
Parent ownership post-ECO 72% 63%
Free-float post-ECO (held by owners of <5% of all shares) 22% 33%
Waiting time between announcement and offer (days) 92 136
Listing day return 11% 4%
Proportion of primary shares 100% 80%
Sources: Junker (2005) and Wagner (2005) for German data  
                                                 
234  Compare also the review of descriptive elements in Chapter 2.4 on p. 34, relative to which the 
present comparison is geared more strongly toward international aspects. 
235  German values are taken from Junker (2005), with the exception of waiting time, which – for lack 
of other availability – is taken from Wagner (2005). 
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9.2.2 Descriptive characteristics 
Table 45 shows a comparison of firm size between the present sample and Junker (2005)236. 
Apart from sales, measured by which German ECO parents are larger than their US 
counterparts, ECO parent companies are larger in the US. The same applies to ECO 
subsidiaries, where the difference in sales is minor between the two samples. The largest 
difference occurs with regard to the market value of both parent companies and subsidiaries, 
which is reflected by the higher book-to-market ratio of US firms (see Table 46 below). The 
parent/subsidiary ratio is equal for the two samples with regard to assets as well as book 
value, while German subsidiaries represent a smaller fraction of their parent sales but a larger 
fraction of parent market capitalization than US subsidiaries of their respective parent firms. 
Table 45: International comparison of the size of ECO firms 
US Germany US Germany
Assets (USD million) 2,541 1,669 290 178
subsidiary as % of parent 11% 11%
Sales (USD million) 1,674 3,109 154 159
subsidiary as % of parent 9% 5%
Market value (USD million) 2,464 698 624 265
subsidiary as % of parent 25% 38%
Book value (USD million) 803 421 195 99
subsidiary as % of parent 24% 23%
Source: Junker (2005) for German data
Medians
        Parent          Subsidiary
 
Table 46 shows a comparison of financial ratios between the two studies. Neither German nor 
US ECO parent firms or subsidiaries exceed benchmark profitability values, and German 
parent firms are less profitable than their US counterparts, while US subsidiaries are less 
profitable than their German counterparts. Tobin’s q is commensurate with industry peers for 
German and US parent firms, while it exceeds benchmarks for their subsidiaries. Industry-
adjusted leverage is unavailable for the German sample, but based on absolute levels, there is 
some indication that leverage is high for German ECO firms as well, and that German 
subsidiaries exhibit higher leverage than those of the US sample. Based on the ratio of capital 
expenditures to sales, ECO firms appear to underinvest in both countries, particularly so 
German parent firms. Finally, the absolute book-to-market ratios are higher for US 
companies, while industry-adjusted values are unavailable for the German ECOs. 
                                                 
236  Euro values reported by Junker (2005) have been converted to USD with the interbank offer rate 
of 12/31/2002, the last day of the present sample period (0.95 Euro per USD). 
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Table 46: International comparison of the financial ratios of ECO firms 
US Germany US Germany
EBITDA margin (%) 14.3 10.6 12.9 11.5
industry-adjusted 0.0 -1.6 -1.5 -0.6
ROA (%) 10.9 9.6 10.7 13.8
industry-adjusted -0.1 -1.0 -0.7 -0.2
Tobin's q 1.3 1.3 1.8 3.4
industry-adjusted 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.7
Leverage (%) 65 74 38 73
industry-adjusted 29 n/a -3 n/a
CapEx-to-sales (%) 4.8 4.5 6.4 7.8
industry-adjusted -0.4 -2.8 -0.3 -0.5
Market-to-book ratio 2.7 2.1 3.3 3.2
industry-adjusted -0.3 n/a -0.2 n/a
Source: Junker (2005) for German data
Medians
        Parent          Subsidiary
 
9.2.3 ECO performance 
Turning to an assessment of relative performance, Table 47 shows the performance of ECOs 
in international comparison. Panel A contains a comparison of the ECO announcement return. 
The announcement of an ECO is associated with a positive stock market reaction in both 
countries. While this reaction is comparable for shorter event windows, the [–30 0] day 
windows return exhibits abnormal return that is more than twice as strong for the German 
sample. Panels B and C show the results of the long-term analysis for value-weighted 
reference portfolio-adjusted return and matching firm-adjusted return, respectively. Abnormal 
return for the parent company is negative throughout and slightly more so in Germany, while 
abnormal long-term return for the subsidiary is identical under the reference portfolio 
approach and inconsistent if matching firms are used as benchmark: German subsidiaries 
exhibit positive abnormal return of 2% under this variant, while US subsidiaries attain BHAR 
of –17%237. 
Contents of Panel D report the explanatory power of cross-sectional regression analyses with 
ECO performance as dependent variable and efficiency-related explanatory variables. 
Findings are highly consistent across geographies: Efficiency gains can explain the ECO 
announcement effect outstandingly well, and R-squared for the German sample exceeds the 
                                                 
237  Regarding statistical validity, the announcement effect of the German sample is equally robust as 
findings from the US. German long-term results indicate high robustness for parent firm results 
and none for subsidiaries. If the sample is split into hot- and cold-market subsamples, abnormal 
long-term return of German parent firms is no longer fully robust to using CAR instead of BHAR 
and to using matching firms instead of reference portfolios as benchmark. The difference between 
subsample significance is, however, not as pronounced as for the present sample of US ECOs. 
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already high value of 68% of the US sample by an additional seven percentage points. Both 
parent company and subsidiary long-term return do not appear related to efficiency gains, 
neither in Germany, nor in the US: Elevated levels of R-squared are in each case related to 
findings that run counter to the hypothesized relationships. Further details of the cross-
sectional regression analysis (i.e., individual explanatory variables) are not compared side-by-
side at this point. Their role will instead be examined in more targeted fashion when 
differences of ECO performance are reviewed in light of existing differences between the two 
countries (see Chapter 9.5 on p. 339). 
Table 47: International comparison of ECO performance 
US Germany
Panel A: Announcement return  (over OLS market model)
Announcement day 1.47% 1.26%
[-5 0] day event window 3.54% 3.01%
[-30 0] day event window 5.03% 11.09%
Panel B: Long-term performance (over value-weighted reference portfolio)
[0 36] month BHAR parent company -19% -27%
[0 36] month BHAR subsididary -12% -12%
Panel C: Long-term performance  (over matching firm)
[0 36] month BHAR parent company -21% -26%
[0 36] month BHAR subsididary -17% 2%
Panel D: Adjusted R-squared  (of efficiency-related explanatory variables)
Dependent variable: announcement effect 68% 75%
Dependent variable: long-term parent performance 18% 29% A
Dependent variable: long-term subsidiary performance 33% A 1%
A Predominantly counter hypothesis  Source: Junker (2005) for German data      
9.2.4 Significance of geographic differences and further approach 
At high aggregation, the above comparison between US and German ECOs shows that their 
performance is largely comparable despite differences in the descriptive characteristics of 
firms that undertake these transactions and despite differences in the average characteristics of 
the offer. As the sample presentation in Section 2, the above comparison nevertheless 
represents descriptive exercise as it lacks a framework that explains the origins of difference. 
It is therefore impossible to assess if these differences are the result of chance or of country-
specific factors, and little is learned about the characteristics of ECOs in general. 
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To mitigate this shortcoming, a framework is provided in the following subchapters against 
which these differences can be put into perspective. This framework consists of a review of 
the most salient differences between the financial systems of the US and Germany, as well as 
of the origins of this diversity. Throughout this exposition, relevant insights will be captured 
in four propositions, which are reviewed on the two ECO samples in a subsequent chapter. 
While such a procedure may not lead to an exhaustive review of all differences between the 
two samples, it leads to a review that is tightly connected to differences between the financial 
systems of the two geographies. The following exposition starts with a presentation of the 
phenomena of diversity before it turns to its origins. 
9.3 Phenomena of diversity 
The diversity of economic systems across countries has invited a range of categorizations. To 
provide just several examples, Amable (2000) defines four social systems of innovation and 
production, which range from a market-based to a social-democratic variant, with the US 
falling into the former and Germany into a middle-of-the-road European integration/public 
alternative. Hall/Soskice (2001) characterize Germany and the US as coordinated and liberal 
market economies, respectively. The publication’s introductory vignette represents the latter 
as a balance of institutional players, which is set apart by a high degree of monitoring, while 
the former is essentially described in terms of the lack of coordinated features. Still other 
approaches characterize the German and US governance systems as insider and outsider 
systems, respectively (compare e.g., Hackethal et al. (2005)). 
The above-mentioned distinctions are broad and apply to general economic phenomena. With 
regard to financial systems, an alternative division has been offered that is arguably more 
applicable in the present context: that the US and Germany are characterized by market-based 
and bank-based financial systems, respectively (e.g., Edwards/Fischer (1994), O'Sullivan 
(2000), Streeck/Yamamura (2001), Chakraborty/Ray (2006))238. To provide an international 
background against which the performance of ECOs can be assessed, the following 
subchapters contain a review of the financial systems in Germany and the US, broadly 
following the delineation that the former is more bank-based while the other is more market-
based239. The first subchapter discusses the validity of the suggested separation for the two 
                                                 
238  As an example, O'Sullivan (2000) notes that the “… alignment of the interests of strategic 
managers of US public corporations with the demands of the stock market is now typically 
regarded as a defining feature of the market-oriented US system of corporate governance” (p. 70). 
Also see Schmidt/Tyrell (1997) for a comparison of financial systems. 
239  Many of the institutional differences between the two countries (e.g., the role of vocational 
training, codetermination, or the two-tiered board structure in Germany) are of no or little 
consequence for the present discussion and therefore not included in the present review. For an 
appraisal of institutional features in an international context, the books by Charkham (1995) and 
Hall/Soskice (2001) are suggested for further reading. Also, the following is a review of features 
rather than an evaluation of the different financial systems. Rajan/Zingales (1998), Levine (2002), 
and Chakraborty/Ray (2006) conclude that the level of financial development, rather than a 
specific economic system, explains differences in economic growth across countries. 
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countries here reviewed, while the following four subchapters address aspects that are more 
specific. 
9.3.1 Bank- versus market-based financial systems 
Empirical evidence supports the suggestion that banks are relatively more important in 
Germany than in the US. La Porta et al. (1997b) show that the ratio of debt to GNP lies at 
1.12 in Germany, compared to 0.81 in the US, while the ratio of stock market capitalization to 
GNP lies at 0.13 in Germany, compared to 0.58 in the US. These findings are confirmed by 
Demirgüç-Kunt/Levine (1999), who report that bank assets represent 121% of GDP in 
Germany, compared to 73% in the US, and that the ratio of bank deposits240 to market 
capitalization lies at 5.01 in Germany, compared to 0.91 in the US. On the other hand, 
Demirgüç-Kunt/Levine document that the stock market capitalization represents only 24% of 
GDP in Germany, compared to 80% in the US. This disparity not only holds for 
capitalization, but also for total trading volume, which attains 28% of GDP in Germany, 
compared to 62% in the US. Allen/Gale (2000), in their in-depth book on the merits of 
different financial systems, show that the difference between market-based and bank-based 
financial systems is also reflected by the difference in the structure of household savings. 
While 45% of US household assets are invested in equity, this figures only attains 13% in 
Germany241. 
The higher importance of banks is interestingly not consistently reflected by higher leverage: 
Rajan/Zingales (1995) observe that the distribution of debt and equity is similar across a 
number of developed countries. On the one hand, the authors find that total liabilities, as a 
percentage of total liabilities and shareholders equity, is lowest for the UK, Canada, and the 
US (at 58%, 60%, and 66%, respectively), and highest for Germany (at 72%). On the other 
hand, closer examination of various measures of leverage such as debt or non-equity liabilities 
to total or net assets or capital indicates that this result may be spurious, as other ratios do not 
reveal significant differences between countries in the sample. The authors do however not 
construe this finding as evidence against the greater influence of banks in the countries that 
are commonly viewed as bank-based. Rather, the authors speculate that the costs of excessive 
bank debts may pose a universal upper limit on the degree of leverage across countries. The 
authors analyze the ratio of bank loans and stock market capitalization to GDP and find 
unambiguous evidence that the influence of banks is indeed stronger in Germany, Japan, 
France, and Italy relative to the US, confirming the findings of the above studies242. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Franks/Mayer (2001) conclude that the different systems lead to similar levels of corporate 
control. Tadesse (2002) also contains a discussion on the topic. 
240  In this context, bank deposits are defined as domestic assets of deposit money at banks. 
241  Jürgens et al. (2000) report this figure for Germany in 1998 at 15%. The authors attribute its low 
value to bank dominance. 
242  Inconsistent findings with regard to leverage may also have been induced by differences in 
accounting systems: In conservative and creditor-friendly spirit, German firms had been allowed 
to report the true historic cost of land and buildings even if these had appreciated, which led to 
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9.3.2 Regulatory impositions and their effect on banks 
German banks are mostly universal banks that offer a host of services, particularly those 
pertaining to both the commercial and investment banking realm (Edwards/Fischer (1994)). 
This stands in contrast to the situation in the US, where the Banking Act of 1933, commonly 
referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act and enacted in the wake of the Great Depression, has 
required banks to separate their commercial banking from investment banking activities243. 
The power of US banks is further curtailed by the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 
which restricts the control of bank holding companies over firms that are unrelated to banking 
(Charkham (1995), Roe (1996)). 
The mandatory divorce of investment banking from commercial banking services has 
required US firms to maintain relationships with several banks at a time, whereas the absence 
of such imposition has fostered exclusive relationships between banks and firms in Germany. 
The German term Hausbank is frequently applied to denote the role of a bank in Germany, 
which relates to a bank-of-choice that maintains an established relationship with a firm to 
which it supplies a complete range of financial services. 
Besides the loose notion of trust, the benefits of such relationships are often related to the 
existence of fixed costs of monitoring and control, which a bank can more easily handle if it 
concentrates its efforts on a smaller number of clients. Accordingly, it has been argued that 
the German system provides banks with economies of scale and scope: 
“The potential efficiency of the monopolistic supply to a firm of external funds and other 
financial services can be understood as arising from the ability to economise on 
information-gathering costs, from the economics of scope in universal banking, and from 
the potential to economise on the costs of negotiation between lenders in circumstances 
when the firm is bankrupt” (Edwards/Fischer (1994) p. 46). 
As an example, as the sole provider of debt capital to a firm, a Hausbank can more easily 
monitor all outstanding debt of a company and is thus in a better position to assess the risk of 
insolvency. These benefits are assumed to translate into financing improvements, as banks 
can equip their clients with lower-cost external capital. Furthermore, Hausbank relationships 
may help to avoid the transaction costs faced by banks to acquire new clients, as well as the 
transaction costs faced by firms to find new financial partners. It has been argued that German 
banks may be more committed to assisting their clients in the case of financial distress or 
bankruptcy, attempting to bail them out rather than to endorse liquidation (Edwards/Fischer 
(1994)). 
                                                                                                                                                        
equity positions that were frequently substantially understated. This procedure stood in contrast to 
the US accounting rules, which required reporting at current values (Perlitz (1995)). 
243  Targeted deregulation of US banks during recent years (e.g., the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) has 
largely undone the impositions of the Glass-Steagal Act. In adopting a historical view for 
explaining differences between the German and US ECO samples, however, recent developments 
are not the focus of this study. 
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The practical validity of these arguments is ambiguous. Evidence of positive effects of 
exclusive bank relationships is provided by Cable (1985), who formally tests their association 
with firm profitability. For a sample of large German firms, he finds that the degree of bank 
involvement is positively correlated with financial performance, and that this effect is due to a 
reduction in information asymmetry from bank representation on company boards and to 
increased market power through bank support. At the same time, it needs to be noted that 
Cable’s study relies on data that substantially predates its publication and that it is based on a 
limited sample of large firms only244. On the other hand, Edwards/Fischer (1994) contend that 
the importance of the Hausbank system is overrated (also compare Gedajlovic/Shapiro 
(1998)). The authors do not find evidence that German firms conduct their financial affairs 
with one bank only. They refer to findings that, in the late 1970s, two thirds of a sample of 
large German corporations maintained relationships with more than ten banks. On a 
theoretical level, they argue that the idea of a Hausbank system requires banks to be risk-
neutral since they do not diversify across a wide range of clients – a characteristic generally 
not seen typical for banks. Finally, Edwards/Fischer (1994) deliver case studies evidence that 
Hausbanken are not able to elicit a premium from their supposedly exclusive client 
partnerships, are not able to detect distress better than other banks, and do not exhibit 
tendency to help bankrupt clients survive245. 
9.3.3 Corporate influence and market structure of banks 
The above observations have shown that, relative to markets for equity, banks are more 
prevalent in Germany than in the US. With regard to their influence, two differences between 
the two countries deserve attention: proxy voting rights and concentration of the banking 
market. 
Regarding the first, German banks control the voting rights of shareholders whose securities 
they hold in custody. Specifically, at shareholder meetings, banks are entitled to cast proxy 
votes on behalf of the shareholders who have deposited their shares with the bank. This 
affords them with vast control over the composition of the supervisory board of the firms 
whose shareholders they represent, allowing banks to endorse the election of nominees who 
are likely to act in their interests and who are, in many cases, bank representatives246. The 
total voting power of banks, comprised of rights through their own share ownership and the 
particularly through the proxy votes entrusted to them, has historically been stable at 55-60% 
of the nominal value of all shares of large German public corporations (Edwards/Fischer 
(1994), Edwards/Nibler (2000)). 
                                                 
244  An alternative formal (non-international) treatment of the role of financial intermediaries and the 
effect of blockholding is presented by Diamond (1984). 
245  Edwards/Fischer (1994) surmise that the high number of secured loans in Germany (over 80%) 
lead banks to assume a more standoffish position, since such loans limit their vulnerability in the 
case of liquidation. 
246  This right is subject to restriction: Investors are required to expressly grant banks the right to vote 
on their behalf, and banks have to inform investors of the way in which they intend to vote on the 
matters laid out in the agenda for the shareholder meeting (Franks/Mayer (2001)). 
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Regarding the structure of the banking market, Barth et al. (1997) show that, in the US, this 
market exhibits the lowest degree of centralization of all countries in their sample, which in 
general exhibits substantial concentration: In twelve of the 19 countries in their sample, the 
three largest banks account for more than 50% of total bank assets. In this regard, Germany is 
no exception, whose banking market has historically been dominated by three major banks247. 
Coupled with the few restrictions of bank shareholdings and the additional influence through 
proxy votes, this concentration of the banking market leads to a tight-knit network of public 
corporations with banks as important and powerful common shareholders. In the US, in 
contrast, more stringent regulation (e.g., the Bank Holding Company Act), the absence of 
proxy voting rights, and higher fragmentation lead to a situation where, individually or 
collectively, banks have less influence than in Germany (also compare Vitols (2005) or, for a 
recent US-only perspective, Santos/Rumble (2006)). 
To summarize the preceding subchapters, the market for debt is relatively more important in 
the German financial system than in the US, where, in turn, the market for equity assumes a 
central role. For the purpose for the later review of the ECO samples for evidence of these 
differences, this observation is expressed to the effect that public equity markets are more 
developed in the US than in Germany: 
(H9-1) Public equity markets are more developed in the US than in Germany.  
9.3.4 Blockholding and cross-shareholding as market phenomena 
US stock markets are frequently seen as the closest realization of the dispersed ownership 
paradigm laid out in Berle/Means (1932)248. Notwithstanding the contention that ownership 
fragmentation is not as universal as commonly assumed (La Porta et al. (1999a), Coffee 
(2002)), shareholder concentration is unambiguously higher in Germany than in the US. La 
Porta et al. (1998) show that the median ownership by the three largest shareholders is 12% in 
the US, compared to 50% in Germany. Prowse (1995) reports similar findings, showing that 
mean shareholder concentration of large nonfinancial corporations, measured by the five 
largest shareholders, lies at 42% in Germany, compared to only 25% in the US. La Porta et al. 
(1999a) show the difference in control of the 20 largest firms (by stock market capitalization) 
across a sample of countries. The authors find that, for a control threshold of 20%, 80% of 
firms in the US sample are widely held, compared to only 50% in Germany. This gap widens 
if 10% control is considered: 80% of the sample of US firms are widely held at that threshold, 
compared to only 35% for the German sample. Analyzing mid-sized firms instead of the 
                                                 
247  Hackethal et al. (2003), however, notes that bank influence in Germany may be on the decrease. 
248  As a historical source, Means (1930) provides an instructive overview of the origins of dispersed 
ownership in the US. Growth of public stockholding was particularly strong in the post-World 
War I period, when many Liberty Bonds, originally issued to finance war expenditures, were 
subsequently captured by Wall Street through the sale of preferred stocks. A graphical depiction 
of the dispersion of stockholdings is provided on p. 581 of Means (1930), which shows the 
structural reversal between 1916 and 1927. The percent of stocks held by the 25,000 largest 
incomes was initially higher, and ultimately lower than that owned by those below the 100,000 
largest incomes. 
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largest firms once more widens this divergence: For a control threshold of 20%, 90% of 
sample firms are widely held in the US and only 10% in Germany. These findings are 
consistent with earlier research: Iber (1985) documents that, in 1983, 65.5% of all German 
AGs (i.e., German stock corporations) had a shareholder who owned at least half of the voting 
shares. This figure rises to 88.4% for AGs with a shareholder who owns at least 25% (also 
compare Köke (2001) and Gorton/Schmidt (2000) for a German and Faccio/Lang (2002) and 
Goergen/Rennebood (2003) for a European perspective)249. 
Beyond ownership concentration, there is also evidence of higher crossholding in Germany. 
La Porta et al. (1999a) assume cross-shareholding if a firm owns shares in its controlling 
shareholder and find that 20% of shares in the 20 largest firms are cross-held in Germany, 
compared to none of the 20 largest firms in the US. This practice results in a tight web of 
crossholdings that connects most of the top tier public German companies. Adams (1999) 
documents the same phenomenon, which he refers to as hidden group structures and which 
allow their participants (and particularly banks and insurance companies) to wield substantial 
power250. Franks/Mayer (2001) are unable to confirm the widespread existence of such cross-
shareholdings, but contend that low disclosure statutes may leave many such effects 
undetected. A related phenomenon that the authors do detect with frequency among German 
firms is the prevalence of pyramid structures. The authors count 33 such pyramids at a control 
threshold of 10% ownership. 
The incidence of blockholding corresponds to the premium it elicits. Dyck/Zingales (2004), in 
their analysis of the value of blockholding across different countries, find that the block 
premium is 1% for the US, compared to 10% for Germany. These results appear robust: They 
are based on 17 transactions in Germany, 82% of which exhibited a positive block premium, 
and on 46 transactions in the US, only 59% of which exhibited a positive block premium – 
much closer at the 50% which would indicate that block discounts are as likely as block 
premiums. The study by Edwards/Weichenrieder (2004), presented in Chapter 6.3.5 on p. 
164, also documents that blocks of shares are traded at a premium in Germany. It has been 
argued that the relatively higher benefit of blockholding in Germany is a consequence of 
(relatively speaking) poor protection of minority shareholders (La Porta et al. (1997b), La 
Porta et al. (2002b), Roe (2002))251. Based on this exposition of the relative role of 
                                                 
249  As an ancillary, the examination of government ownership of banks by La Porta et al. (2002a) 
shows that blockholder ownership has a political dimension in Germany: While the government 
had no ownership of banks in the US in 1995, the German government is a major blockowner in 
German banks. While government ownership of more than one third (36.4%) hints at monitoring 
possibilities of the government, this also underlines the power of banks in Germany, which may 
potentially benefit from government influence and informational advantages. 
250  An insightful graphical illustration is provided by on page 107 of Adams (1999). 
251  While the first two studies referenced above rely on legal explanations (see Chapter 9.4.1 on p. 
328), Roe argues mainly politically: The firm, Roe (1996) contends, “… cannot be understood as 
solely an economic, transaction-cost-reducing organization. It must not only be effective 
economically, but fit politically” (p. 285f). Social democracies, such as in Germany, “press 
managers to defect from loyalty to shareholders” (Roe (2002) p. 113), and blockholder ownership 
develops as compensational mechanism. Evidence is also provided by Boehmer (2000) that 
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blockholder ownership in Germany and the US, the following assertion is captured for later 
review in the context of ECOs: 
(H9-2) Blockholder ownership is more beneficial in Germany than in the US. 
9.3.5 Transparency and disclosure quality on markets 
Transparency in corporate affairs and capital markets is largely a question of regulatory 
impositions and their enforcement. La Porta et al. (1998) show that German accounting 
standards have historically been lower than those in the US. The authors construct an index 
that reflects the quality of accounting, based on the inclusion or omission of various items. 
The US attains a value of 78, considerably better than Germany at a value of 62. Similar 
evidence is provided in La Porta et al. (2006) in their analysis of the effect of regulative 
factors in financial markets. 
Several laws have been passed in Germany over the past 15 years that share the objective to 
enhance transparency and which are analyzed in the legal survey by Becht/Boehmer 
(1998)252. The first law regulates the trading of shares (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz – WpHG) 
and has been passed in 1994 as German transposition of European Union transparency 
directives. One important feature of the WpHG is the requirement for publicly traded AGs to 
disclose any shareholder who owns more than 5% of shares. The second law regards control 
and transparency (Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich – 
KonTraG), which has been passed in 1998. It contains mandates regarding items such as the 
frequency with which supervisory boards are required to convene (increased from two per 
year to four) and imposes limits on the number of supervisory board mandates that may be 
held by an individual. Becht/Boehmer (1998) argue that regulatory changes have largely gone 
without their intended increases in transparency. The formation of groups of companies that 
include intermediate layers of less regulated legal forms is seen as a major impediment. 
The prevalence of blockholder ownership in Germany can be seen as an alternative institution 
to compensate for the lower quality of public information. Such concentrated monitoring, 
facilitated through the fact that blockholders, such as banks, frequently hold seats on the 
supervisory boards of the companies in which they own shares, leads to a situation where 
investors rely more heavily on insider information253. In conclusion, it can therefore be said 
                                                                                                                                                        
majority control is not associated with maximization of shareholder value. Blockholder control 
and cross-shareholdings also have far-reaching consequences for the market of corporate control 
(Charkham (1995), Allen/Gale (2000)). As these institutions make it considerably more difficult 
for a raider to acquire the required number of shares to gain control, Germany and the US differ 
with regard to the prevalence of different mechanisms for the exertion of external control on a 
corporation: Hostile takeovers are more widespread in the US, whereas the proxy system and 
friendly mergers generally prevail on German capital markets (Roe (1996), Franks/Mayer (1998), 
O'Sullivan (2000)). 
252  Tables 3 and 4 in the appendix of Becht/Boehmer (1998) contain an insightful overview of the 
items subject to disclosure requirement in Germany. 
253  Roe (2003) argues that codetermination may hamper the dissemination of information. The 
Works Constitutions Act of 1952 grants employees substantial representation on the supervisory 
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that the German corporate system has historically been less transparent than that of the US, 
and that recent efforts to foster greater transparency have only gone so far. It is unlikely that 
these efforts have matched, let alone surpassed US levels of disclosure quality and 
transparency. Based on the higher quality of public information and the lack of alternative 
monitoring institutions such as blockholder ownership or cross-shareholdings in the US, the 
following proposition is captured for later review: 
(H9-3) Investors rely more heavily on public information in the US than in 
Germany. 
9.4 Origins of diversity 
The previous chapters have shown that the economic systems between the US and Germany 
vary in important aspects. The study of the determinants of these differences has since 
become an integral part of international comparative economic research, tapping into a field 
replete with potential topics and interdisciplinary possibilities. Yet the search for a definitive 
cause of diversity is treacherous, as any result, once identified, is invariably challenged 
because it may itself only be the result of a more fundamental cause254. In an effort to avoid 
this slippery slope, the present section presents two alternative explanations why economic 
systems may differ. These two approaches are based on legal factors on the one hand and on 
national culture on the other, and jointly perhaps constitute the most prominent explanations 
of diversity, each widely endorsed by the existing literature255. 
9.4.1 Legal determinants 
9.4.1.1 Existing research on legal determinants 
The Anglo-American judicial system is based on common law, by which laws are formulated 
when required, whereas the civil (Romano-Germanic) system relies on a codified framework 
of law, which encompasses an entirety of required regulations. In common law, the 
development of the regulatory framework often takes place through court rulings with 
precedent status, while civil law environments require central jurisdictional effort (La Porta et 
al. (1998)). Scholars who explain economic differences with legal characteristics generally 
apply these counterpoints of common and civil law systems and build their argument on the 
                                                                                                                                                        
board. This, Roe argues, may lead managers to leave the board less informed if the informing of 
labor has adverse consequences for management. 
254  To provide just one example, Manow (2001) sets out to explain differences between market 
economies through the development of the welfare state. It is more likely than not, however, that 
the shape of the welfare state is itself just a phenomenon – just like the financial system – of a 
more fundamental national characteristic. 
255  Historical-institutional explanations possibly present a third alternative approach. They are most 
frequently based on the Timing of Industrialization thesis (e.g., Lazonick/O'Sullivan (1996)), 
which argues that only banks could provide capital to new ventures in countries where 
industrialization started late, as internal funds and external equity financing were inadequate. 
Vitols (2001), however, shows that the role of banks in the Timing of Industrialization thesis is 
overstated. 
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greater flexibility that common law affords to its courts: That the absence of a universal codex 
renders many statutes incomplete is seen as an advantage since it permits greater flexibility in 
the interpretation of law and superior adoption to changing conditions (Beck/Demirgüç-Kunt 
(2003), Ergungor (2004))256. Djankov et al. (2003) provide tangible evidence of this 
supposition: The authors study the efforts required to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent 
and to collect a bounced check across 109 countries and find that the procedural formalism of 
dispute resolution is systematically lower in countries with common law than in those with 
civil law. It has been argued that such environment affords minority shareholders with greater 
protection and thus fosters the development of equity markets and dispersed stockholding (La 
Porta et al. (1998)). 
An important series of contributions to this law and finance field of research follows the 
publication by La Porta et al. (1997b), who show that the size of capital markets (and hence 
the reliance of firms on external financing) strongly depends on the quality of the legal 
environment257. For a sample of 49 countries, the authors study the characteristics of the 
capital market in light of the legal rules and their enforcement in each country. Specifically, 
they focus on a combination of the Law and Order Indicator258, the degree of anti-director 
rights, one-share-one-vote rules, and creditor rights. With regard to Germany (civil law) and 
the US (common law), the authors find that stock market capitalization per GDP and the 
number of both domestic firms and IPOs per population is substantially higher in the US than 
in Germany259, while results indicate that in Germany, reliance on debt is more prevalent. 
Shleifer/Wolfenzon (2002) build on these findings to develop a model of the going-public 
decision of an entrepreneur under poor legal protection of outside shareholders. 
In a subsequent publication on law and finance based on the same data, La Porta et al. (1998) 
provide a somewhat broader historical background and show more specifically the laws that 
govern investor protection. They summarize their findings along legal rules (greater 
shareholder protection in civil law countries) and their enforcement (greatest in countries of 
German civil law). Furthermore, they find adaptive mechanisms in countries with poor 
investor protection that partly provide remedy for this shortcoming (e.g., blockholder control). 
The importance of investor protection becomes particularly evident when it is viewed against 
the backdrop of the results by La Porta et al. (1999a), which shows that the classic 
Berle/Means widely-held corporation is far more infrequent than commonly thought, and is 
mainly found among the largest corporation in the richest countries. In other parts of the 
                                                 
256  The approach to explain financial markets on the ground of legal systems is sometimes presented 
as a special case of the financial services view, which focuses on the role of banks and markets in 
the provision of financial support in bank- or market-based systems (Levine (2002) p. 423). 
257  In a variant of the law and finance approach, La Porta et al. (1999b) also study the quality of 
government with respect to legal origin. 
258  The Law and Order Indicator is a commercial index of experts’ evaluations of the efficiency of 
the state in enforcing property rights in each country, published in the International Country Risk 
Guide. It lies at 6 – its maximum value – for the US, and at 5.5 for Germany (as reported by 
Demirgüç-Kunt/Maksimovic (1998)). 
259  For a comparison of the German and US IPO markets, see Ritter (2003a). 
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world, and among smaller companies, controlling shareholders are the norm rather than an 
exception, making the risk of minority shareholder expropriation particularly acute. 
La Porta et al. (1997b) focus on the size of external financing, whereas Ergungor (2004) uses 
legal indicators to explain the difference between market-based and bank-based economic 
systems. He specifically focuses on the interpretive power of the common law system to 
improve the protection of shareholders. Demirgüç-Kunt/Levine (1999) confirm this finding 
and note  
“… that countries with a Common Law tradition, strong protection for shareholder rights, 
good accounting standards, low levels of corruption and no explicit deposit insurance 
tend to be more market-based” (p. 37). 
In summary, proponents of the legal view contend that the characteristics of a capital market 
in a country follow from the type of law, and that common law countries tend to provide 
greater shareholder protection. In turn, civil law countries have developed alternative 
institutions to compensate for lower shareholder protection, such as shareholder concentration 
or higher reliance on debt capital. 
9.4.1.2 Critique of the legal approach 
Two main points of critique can be voiced against the proposition that legal attributes 
determine the diversity of financial systems across geographies. The first relates to the 
causality between law and finance: While these two are correlated, it cannot be ruled out with 
certainty that an exogenous factor concurrently influences both phenomena260. The second 
point of critique is similar and refers to the level at which the arguments take place. Even if 
causality between legal systems and capital market characteristics were proven, it remains 
unclear if legal features lie at the root of geographic economic diversity. While the detection 
of such root cause may arguably not have been the objective of the string of publications 
referenced above, an explanatory gap nevertheless remains. In parallel research, La Porta et 
al. (1997c) study the role of trust in organizations and find that trust promotes cooperation, 
and that the degree of trust varies across countries. As such, trust could possibly be another 
factor that underlies the shape of the legal system. Then again, it could equally be argued that 
trust is a consequence of the legal system. It is not the task of this work to conjecture into this 
direction, but the example again shows that much may still be learned about both causality 
and root cause of geographic economic variation261. 
                                                 
260  As La Porta et al. (1997b) self-critically ask in their conclusion, “… are poor laws just a proxy for 
an environment that is hostile to institutional development, including that of capital markets?” (p. 
1149). 
261  In an additional point of critique, Coffee (2002) argues that an exclusive focus on legal 
determinants may underestimate political aspects. The author contends that the bank-based 
corporate system that dominated Europe until recently has persisted because it granted stronger 
state control. Empirical evidence by La Porta et al. (2002a) supplements this view, as the 
government constitutes a major shareholder in German but not in US banks (also compare 
Rajan/Zingales (2003)). 
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With regard to the subsequent review of US and German ECOs, propositions that follow from 
this legal view are included in the second proposition on blockholder control, which builds on 
the notion that blockholder ownership has developed as an alternative institution to 
compensate for relatively poor protection of minority shareholders and the resultant risk of 
expropriation. 
9.4.2 Cultural determinants 
9.4.2.1 Existing research on cultural determinants 
Beyond legal-based explanations, aspects of culture have been used to explain the business-
related differences that can be observed between various countries. Studies on the effects of 
cultural differences have most widely embraced the research by Hofstede, and given its 
overwhelming popularity and the paucity of alternative approaches that come close in weight 
(Bradley et al. (2006), Sivakumar/Nakata (2001)), the following discussion of cultural 
influence factors is based on Hofstede’s research262. 
Hofstede defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the 
members of one human group from another” (Hofstede (1980) p. 25) and argues that 
differences in economic aspects result from cultural differences between countries. From the 
focus on various countries, as opposed to continents or regions, the term national culture 
originates, which is frequently applied in this context. The generalization entailed in this 
approach is substantial, and inference from such ecological (aggregate) correlations to 
individual behavior is treacherous and should generally be avoided263. 
Hofstede’s research is based on data from two questionnaire-based survey rounds among 
employees of IBM (disguised as ”Hermes” in his original publication). The first survey round 
was conducted between 1968 and 1969 and was followed by a second round from 1971 to 
1973. His original analysis had included 40 countries and appeared in his seminal (1980) 
book, while he expanded this list to include 50 countries and three regions in a subsequent 
publication (Hofstede (1983)). Particularly, this included countries in Latin America, East 
Asia, Africa, and the Arab world, where data was more sparse, but the author found results 
overall highly consistent with the prior round264. Hofstede’s approach centers on the 
comparison of scores between comparable sub-groups of respondents across the countries, so-
called matched respondents, represented by employees in comparable positions. After 
ensuring that sub-groups were sufficiently populated and using least-expected-error 
                                                 
262  As an example, Sivakumar/Nakata (2001) note that Hofstede’s Culture’s Consequences has been 
cited 7.5 times as often as Hall’s Beyond Culture, a rival theory. A promising but as yet 
undeveloped cultural approach to explain origins of diversity has been suggested by 
Stulz/Williamson (2003), who contend that a country’s principal religion serves as a better 
predictor of creditor rights than alternative (e.g., legal) variables.  
263  See Hofstede (1980) p. 29 and the references therein for details on ecological inference. 
264  The extension is based on the same underlying data, but uses less-stringent requirements for the 
minimum number of respondents, therefore allowing the inclusion of additional countries. Despite 
the different approach, results for the original 40 countries remained largely unaffected. 
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extrapolation techniques for missing data points, Hofstede compared matched responses 
across countries to rank countries on dimensions of cultural significance. 
Hofstede distinguishes four dimensions that are universally present in each culture, albeit to 
differing degrees of pronouncement. The first is individualism, which is contrasted with 
collectivism and which describes a state of high interpersonal connectedness in which 
individuals are part of a tightly knit social framework. The second dimension is uncertainty 
avoidance and relates to the degree to which members of a culture experience discomfort with 
ambiguity and the unknown. The third is termed masculinity, which is contrasted with 
femininity and which describes the preference for achievement and the degree to which 
aggression is an accepted means to that end. Masculinity encompasses traits such as heroism 
and focus on material success, whereas feminism relates to personal relationships, modesty, 
and caring for the weak. The fourth and last dimension is power distance, which measures the 
degree to which a society accepts that power, as well as wealth and other endowments, are 
distributed unequally among its members265. 
Hofstede’s cultural scores have been used as direct or moderating factors in explaining 
business-related differences between countries, be it differences in behavior (e.g., 
management style) or differences in the institutional environment (e.g., financial system). For 
the present study, the latter is of particular interest since it helps better understand the 
differences between the capital markets of the US and Germany. Uncertainty avoidance is 
particularly relevant to understand differences of financial systems across countries. It is 
based on a combination of three empirical indicators, namely stress, employment stability, 
and rule orientation. 
An example for its application is given by Kwok/Tadesse (2006), who use uncertainty 
avoidance as a determinant of the characteristics of financial systems. The authors argue that 
higher uncertainty avoidance is associated with a more-developed bank-based financial 
system, whereas countries that score lower on uncertainty avoidance have adopted more 
market-based financial systems. They base their argument on the contention that bank-based 
systems are marked by higher return predictability, less direct competition among investors, 
and reduced personal accountability for wrong decisions. For a cross-section of 41 countries, 
Kwok/Tadesse (2006) find empirical evidence that supports their proposition, even after 
controlling for differences in the legal environment. The authors succeed to explain 
differences in financial systems through differences in national culture, and hence deliver an 
alternative explanation why banks may be so much more central in the German financial 
system than in the US. 
                                                 
265  Power distance and individualism are correlated. They are nonetheless maintained as separate 
dimensions because they represent different issues (inequality vs. lack of integration between 
members of a society), and because these factors are themselves correlated (in different 
directions) with country wealth, an external factor. The correlation between power distance and 
individualism disappears if national wealth is introduced as a control variable. 
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Figure 36 contains a comparison of Hofstede’s four dimensions between Germany and the 
US. With regard to uncertainty avoidance, Germany attains a score of 65, corresponding to 
rank 20, while respondents in the US appear pronouncedly more comfortable with ambiguity 
with a mean score of 46, corresponding to rank 31 and thus falling about a quarter of the scale 
of ranks more onto the less uncertainty-avoiding side than German respondents. The second 
characteristic by which the two countries clearly diverge is individualism, which is notably 
more pronounced in the US, which in fact ranks highest of all countries included in the data. 
Figure 36: Hofstede-based characteristics of national culture (Germany versus US)266 
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9.4.2.2 Critique of the national culture approach 
That Hofstede’s work has been embraced by many researchers on international business 
studies can in part be explained with its high research utility. It provides exceptional breadth 
of data, making use of over 116,000 questionnaires in 20 languages, across two survey 
rounds, and with results for 50 countries (Hofstede (1983)). Moreover, the conceptualization 
of subsequent studies can benefit from the clear definition of culture that Hofstede provides 
(see above), the transparent treatment of the survey data267 and its appealing aggregation into 
                                                 
266  Calculation of the index scores varies by dimension and depends on the underlying questions (for 
illustrative purpose e.g., Power Distance score = 135 – 25 * [mean score of question #1] + [% 
answer A or B in question #2] – [% answer C in question #3] (compare Hofstede (1980) p. 103). 
For interpretational purposes, higher values generally denote stronger phenomena. 
267  Hofstede’s 1980 book contains an entire chapter on the collection and treatment of the data. 
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the four main dimensions. And finally, though not least, it is practical to adopt a framework 
that has been used so extensively in academic studies throughout the past 25 years. 
Sivakumar/Nakata (2001) summarize the vast popularity of Hofstede’s research. For the 1981 
to 1998 time span, they find 134 articles that are based on Hofstede’s work. Bradley et al. 
(2006), in a more recent collection of articles in their “25th anniversary” review of Culture’s 
Consequences (i.e., Hofstede’s 1980 book), count 180 studies that rely on Hofstede’s cultural 
values framework, over 80% of which use culture as a main effect. Sivakumar/Nakata (2001) 
furthermore report a marked increase in its popularity in the more recent past. Of all doctoral 
studies incorporating Hofstede’s approach, 70% have appeared during the five years before 
the study by Sivakumar/Nakata (2001), and the remaining 30% during the 14 still earlier 
years. With reference to the Social Science Citations Index, the authors note that Hofstede’s 
1980 book has been cited 1,101 times. The study by Chandy/Williams (1994) equally reflects 
the rising popularity of Hofstede’s research for subsequent studies. In an analysis of articles 
published in the Journal of International Business Studies between 1984 and 1993, they find 
that, after adjustment for self-citations, Hofstede was the 21st most-often cited author between 
1984 and 1988 and the third most-often cited author between 1989 and 1993 (p. 724)268.  
At the same time, the advantages of relying on Hofstede’s findings come accompanied by 
limitations embedded in the underlying data. First, in the framework provided by Hofstede, 
cultural differences only relate to country-wide characteristics and do not reflect further 
differences between the various groups within those countries. Consequently, what emerges 
as national culture always only reflects the mean scores across all respondents. It does not 
allow inference about the homogeneity of a population, which is particularly acute for 
countries where the scores are applied to a large number of inhabitants (e.g., US). This adds 
substantial risk to studies that aim to explain individual behavior across countries with 
insufficiently large samples or across few countries. As put by Cavusgil/Das (1997): 
“Inter-cultural comparisons become meaningful only when the differences are large, 
relatively and absolutely speaking, when compared to within-culture effect size” (p. 91). 
As Sivakumar/Nakata (2001) further caution, Hofstede’s results may have been called upon 
too readily to account for social differences, focusing on single dimensions of his four-
dimensional framework and neglecting the question of whether the characteristics of two 
countries are sufficiently diverse to account for the observed behavior even if countries fall on 
according sides in a ranked comparison. To reiterate an example from the above study, high 
and low individualism may be brought forward to account for the higher frequency of 
participatory management in Mexico as opposed to the US, but researchers may overlook 
issues such as whether this particular type of management is due to other factors (e.g., power 
                                                 
268  A detailed overview of studies including Hofstede’s work is contained in Bradley et al. (2006). 
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distance), or if the difference between individualism between the two countries is at all large 
enough to account for the different types of behavior269. 
As a more general critique on cross-cultural research, there has been debate whether national 
culture can be captured quantitatively at all, and if so, whether its complexity can be reduced 
to four dimensions (Sivakumar/Nakata (2001)). Moreover, cultural values may not be stable 
over time. Change may be particularly likely as external forces, such as rapid technological 
advancement or increasing internationalization of product, labor, and capital markets, come 
into play and may cause cultural characteristics to diverge from Hofstede’s original findings, 
especially as some of the countries in his data set no longer exist in their original form (e.g., 
West Germany or Yugoslavia). Hofstede himself acknowledges this possibility and dedicates 
a chapter of his 1980 book to the differences found between the two separate survey rounds. 
He finds that certain phenomena are indeed subject to so-called Zeitgeist effects (e.g., a 
general decrease of desired power-distance over time). If such differences have been 
discernable between the two survey rounds, which have been separated by a matter of years, 
adequate skepticism should be applied for more recent research that relies on Hofstede’s data, 
as this differential has now grown to a matter of decades. 
To evaluate any results based on Hofstede’s findings, one has to bear in mind that the 
underlying data has been collected from employees of one company only. While this may 
have an influence that ensures consistency across countries due to the survey environment and 
consistent grouping across professions, uneasiness because of potential bias and caution to 
generalize across an entire nation may be equally justified. And finally, one ought not forget 
that Hofstede’s classic book - the fundament for so many subsequent studies (despite a second 
edition in 2001) - has recently attained the age of one quarter of a century, and the 
experiments that it relies on further predate the book by approximately ten years270. 
An overview of the literature concerned with the methodological problems in cross-cultural 
research is contained in Cavusgil/Das (1997), who examine existing studies with regard to 
errors of definition (specification), errors of estimation (framing, selection, measurement, and 
sampling), and errors of explanation (causal inference and universality assumption)271. Given 
                                                 
269  Bradley et al. (2006) accentuate the point by noting that “Hofstede-inspired research is 
fragmented, redundant, and overly reliant on certain levels of analysis and direction of effects” (p. 
313). 
270  An alternative recent and prominent suggestion to operationalize culture has been made by Phelps 
(2006), who uses data from the World Values Surveys (WVS), a worldwide survey on political 
and socio-cultural topics, to define four dimensions of culture. The first encompasses incentives, 
engagement, and capabilities, the second loyalty and altruism as opposed to opportunism and 
egoism, the third individualism, pluralism, and tolerance, and the fourth initiative and activity vs. 
passivity. As noted above, however, WVS data has not been as widely used for this purpose as the 
data collected by Hofstede. 
271  Since cross-cultural factors do not enter the analysis in the present study as quantitative variables, 
the discussion of errors in existing research is not expanded upon. It shall suffice to conclude that 
errors in studies embracing Hofstede’s data are not infrequent and that this should be reflected in 
the interpretation of their results. 
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the issues outlined above, the results of studies that conduct cross-cultural research based on 
Hofstede’s findings should be read with caution. 
To condense the discussion of cultural differences between Germany and the US for the 
present purpose, the difference in the Hofstede uncertainty avoidance score is translated into 
differences in risk aversion. While risk aversion is an attribute that could apply broadly to all 
participants on financial markets, the proposition is here expressed solely with regard to 
managers because, in this document, risk aversion has only been specifically discussed for the 
behavior to time an ECO: 
(H9-4) Managers are more risk-averse in Germany than in the US.  
9.4.3 Dynamic perspective of diversity 
The previous chapters have sketched the differences between the economic systems in 
Germany and the US as well as their potential determinants. The underlying assumption, 
implicitly and naturally, was that these two systems do differ, and that their differences are 
relevant enough both in quality and in extent to not only warrant but also require their 
scrutiny to arrive at a full picture of ECOs across these geographies. Being a discussion of 
differences and their origins, the perspective in the previous chapters has been retrospective 
and static: Differences, once in effect, prevail. But particularly in light of recent 
developments, many researchers have called this static view into question and suggested a 
dynamic perspective that considers the ways in which diversity changes over time. 
As an example that such changes can be material, Rajan/Zingales (2003), in a historical study 
of financial markets for various geographies, show that the development of capital markets 
are in constant flux. For some geographies, the authors even arrive at the bold conclusion that 
their financial systems were in many ways more developed in 1913 than in 1980. 
Rajan/Zingales further show how, in the early period, development in countries with civil law 
origin was not lower than in those with common law, which provides, if not an antithesis, at 
least an interesting historical supplement to the study on Law and Finance by La Porta et al. 
(1998), and which shows how drastically national economic systems can change relative to 
each other. In recent years, a lively academic discussion has emerged that aims to assess the 
direction into which the governance systems of individual countries are currently heading. 
9.4.3.1 Arguments for convergence 
Two opposite positions characterize this discussion, namely convergence and persistence of 
diversity. Coffee (2002) formulates convergences as follows: 
“… as markets globalize and corporations having very different governance systems are 
compelled to compete head-to-head, both in labour and capital markets, a Darwinian 
struggle becomes inevitable, out of which the most efficient form should emerge 
dominant” (p. 83). 
Hansmann/Kraakman (2004) formulate the strong position of convergence: “The triumph of 
the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation over its principal competitors is now 
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assured” (p. 67). To arrive at this intrepid assertion, the authors argue that three forces lead to 
a situation where the large shareholder-value-oriented public enterprise emerges as the 
winner: the failure of alternative models, the competitive pressure of internationalization, and 
the influence of interest groups. The authors discuss three alternative stakeholder-oriented 
models that they anticipate will disappear: the manager-oriented model (e.g., the US model 
during the 1950s and 1960s), the labor-oriented model (e.g., German codetermination), and 
the state-oriented model (e.g., Japan and France). With regard to the labor-oriented 
codetermination model, for example, Hansmann/Kraakman argue that the workforce is too 
heterogeneous in its interests to allow effective direct participation in the governance of firms, 
and recommend contractual devices as a more suitable representation of workers’ interests, 
with direct governance geared toward the shareholders272.  
Charny (2004), while overall cautious to assume that convergence is likely, argues that groups 
that are generally interested in efficient governance may also be sufficiently effective to affect 
change. He further studies the specific institutions that could assist such a process and argues 
that supra-national or global interest groups, such as the European Union or the World Bank, 
might play an important role. Charny’s research belongs to the emergent field of international 
comparative research referred to as the study of comparative corporate governance273. In their 
publication, Rubach/Sebora (1998) more closely present this field and take a stance to argue 
for emerging convergence (also compare Mayers (1998), Bühner et al. (1998), Guillen (2000), 
Denis/McConnell (2003), O'Sullivan (2003), and Schneper/Guillen (2004) for international 
aspects of corporate governance). 
9.4.3.2 Arguments for persistence of diversity 
Convergence critics argue that incumbent structures and switching costs make the emergence 
of a standard model unlikely. Persistence, they argue, will prevail due to the differences that 
countries have had in the past – a line of argument frequently denoted as path dependence 
(e.g., Whitley (1998)). Bebchuk/Roe (2004) reason in such way, showing that diversity 
persists if the cost of removing an old system and building a new one is greater than the 
benefit of the new system. The authors present two forms of path dependence: structure-
driven (“initial ownership structures directly influence subsequent ownership structures” (p. 
77)) and rule-driven (“differences in […] rules among countries might be sufficient to 
produce substantial differences in ownership patterns” (p. 78)). Sunk costs, network 
externalities between firms, endowment effects, and rent-seeking by incumbent controllers 
(e.g., managers, blockholders, labor) would lead to persistent divergence even if a more 
efficient system existed. Furthermore, a positive feedback loop of control may prevail: If 
                                                 
272  As Gordon/Roe (2004) astutely argue, the economic forces that are held to bring the labor-
oriented model to its demise remain unclear in Hansmann/Kraakman’s article: External 
contractual arrangements will, just as internal direct employee participation, come at a cost. 
Consequently, both models could be equally competitive. Also on the topic, Jackson (2005) 
provides a detailed exposition on the dynamic effects of labor management. 
273  General overviews of corporate governance are contained in the surveys by Shleifer/Vishny 
(1997b), Daily et al. (2003), and Becht et al. (2003). 
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structures yield control to a certain group of constituents, it is likely that the country has rules 
that favor this group. Convergence, then, will at least be much slower than efficiency 
considerations alone would predict (also compare Charkham (1992) for an early view or 
Schmidt et al. (2002) for a European perspective). 
One theme generally found throughout the arguments by convergence critics is the 
complementarity between existing governance structures and existing institutions (Whitley 
(1998), Amable (2000), Schmidt/Spindler (2004), Charny (2004)). As an example, market-
driven governance and minority shareholder protection can be seen as complementary 
features. Different systems – each on its own – represent efficient fits between 
complementary parts, and inducing changes might be particularly difficult if this change is 
small rather than large because of the required process of abandoning a local maximum of 
efficiency. Such myopic decision making is likely when agents face pressure to adjust, and it 
may explain why sometimes change is more effectively brought about as radical, seaside 
adjustment rather than gradual adoption. Figure 37 presents an illustration of this 
complementarity between an (asking) governance system and the (supplying) institutional 
environment274. 
Figure 37: Complementarity of corporate governance and institutions  
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274  As an example of an application of the discussed relationships, Aguilera/Jackson (2003) develop 
a model that relates aspects of corporate governance with the institutional surround and may be 
applied to explain relevant differences between countries. 
Sup ly  
  
339
9.4.3.3 Arguments for hybrid forms of adjustment 
Fiss/Zajac (2004) critically test the proposition of convergence and study the (non-)adoption 
of shareholder value orientation among German firms. The authors introduce an extension 
over existing research by suggesting that the espousal and implementation of such orientation 
may be decoupled (e.g., by paying lip service). Their regression-based research leads to the 
conclusion that German firms frequently espouse but rarely implement shareholder value 
orientation. Fiss/Zajac (2004) show that the degree to which such orientation is implemented 
depends on the influence of major shareholder groups, as well as on the presence of key 
actors who reduce the likelihood of decoupling. 
An interesting view is presented by Gilson (2004), who differentiates between different types 
of convergence: functional convergence (institutions formally persist but adjust their 
function), formal convergence (institutions change with or without convergence of their 
function), and contractual convergence (contracts compensate the lack of institutional 
flexibility to affect functional change and the lack of political flexibility to affect formal 
change). What makes this view particularly interesting is the fact that systems might 
functionally, but not formally converge. As different institutions may fulfill the same 
function, this could lead to a situation of persistent diversity on the outside, but converged 
function on the inside. The author refers to empirical studies that confirm his view, looking 
e.g., at the tenure of senior management in the US, Germany, and Japan. Despite of (formally) 
different governance systems, tenure is (in function) similarly sensitive to poor performance, 
indicating that different systems or institutions can lead to functionally identical results. 
Therefore, Gilson reckons that persistence and diversity may take place at the same time: 
some functional, and some formal275. 
Summing up, the academic literature does not provide a clear answer to the question of 
whether governance systems will converge. As a cautious conclusion, it may be fair to assume 
that such a process, while argued by many to be already well under way, will be slow and 
likely not arrive at full (functional and formal) convergence276. 
9.5 Empirical evidence 
In order to make the above exposition of the differences between the US and Germany 
testable in the present context, the above discussion has been condensed to four propositions, 
which are reviewed against the findings from the ECO research of the present study and 
Junker (2005) in the following subchapters. These propositions relate to the relative 
development of the markets for debt and equity, the role of public information, the benefits of 
blockholding, and risk aversion. Table 48 presents a summary. 
                                                 
275  This conclusion is anticipated by an earlier publication: Schmidt/Tyrell (1997) document 
functional performance despite substantial differences in corporate governance across countries. 
276  For an additional (German) perspective with similarly cautious conclusions, see Hackethal et al. 
(2003) or Hackethal et al. (2005). 
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Table 48: Pertinent differences between German and US financial systems 
(H9-1) Public equity markets are more developed in the US than in Germany.
Rationale
- Stronger reliance of US households on equity markets (Allen/Gale (2000))
- Bank assets higher fraction of GDP in Germany (Demirg¨-Kunt/Levine (1999))
(H9-2) Blockholder ownership is more beneficial in Germany than in the US.
Rationale
- Better protection of minority shareholder rights in the US (La Porta et al. (1997))
- Evidence of blockholder premium only in Germany (Dyck/Zingales (2004))
(H9-3) Investors rely more heavily on public information in the US than in Germany.
Rationale
- German cross-holding system entails insider information  (La Porta et al. (1999))
- Informational advantages to German Hausbank  (Cable (1985))
- Accounting standards better developed in the US  (La Porta et al. (1998))
(H9-4) Managers are more risk-averse in Germany than in the US.
Rationale
- Uncertainty avoidance index higher in Germany (Hofstede (1980))
- Evidence of empirical relevance of uncertainty avoidance index (Kwok/Tadesse (2006))
 
9.5.1 Capital market development 
The first proposition states (H9-1) that the market for equity is more developed in the US than 
in Germany. At least two consequences follow from this for the discussion of ECOs: First, US 
companies will sooner consider an equity issue than German firms since the higher 
development of the market for this type of financing implies lower costs and better terms of 
the issue, while German firms will rather consider a debt issue (or, more realistically, an 
extension of their lines of credit). Second, the higher development of the (equity) capital 
market implies that this market is more efficient in the US than in Germany. 
With regard to the first consequence, German ECO parent firms are less profitable than their 
US counterparts, both with regard to EBITDA margin and ROA, and both in absolute values 
and relative to their industry peers. Furthermore, German ECO parents are more highly 
leveraged than those in the US (compare Table 46 on p. 319). These observations suggest 
that, while the pecking order of financing sources may be similar in the two countries, 
German firms are able to sustain longer on other sources of capital before they conduct an 
equity issue. There may certainly be more factors that play into these differences than 
discussed here, and present observations should not be taken as proof but rather as an 
indication that profitability and leverage differences of ECO parent companies are related to 
characteristics of the capital markets in the respective country. 
üc  ( 9)) 
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With regard to the second consequence (higher market efficiency in the US), as shown in 
Chapter 4.3.1 on p. 68, the informational efficiency of capital markets is represented by their 
ability to correctly reflect all relevant information (Fama (1970)). This characteristic is most 
directly discernable from the share price reaction to the announcement of news. Figure 38 
shows a comparison of the ECO announcement effect between the two countries. It can be 
seen that this effect is more than twice as strong for the German sample than for US ECOs. A 
large and steady increase in abnormal return begins for the German sample around 18 days 
before the actual announcement, preceded by some variability and followed by a slight 
decline right after the announcement and elevated variance for longer post-announcement 
periods. The US sample exhibits a steady increase about one week before the actual 
announcement, equally preceded by elevated variability of abnormal return. The day after the 
actual announcement exhibits positive abnormal return, and abnormal return is close to zero 
for periods after that. 
Figure 38: International comparison of the ECO announcement effect 
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It could be taken as a sign of higher market efficiency that the German sample does not 
exhibit positive abnormal return on the day after the ECO announcement277. At the same time, 
                                                 
277  Abnormal return on the day after the announcement amounts to 0.63% for the US sample. As 
Figure 29 on p. 295 shows, this effect is entirely attributable to the 1998-2000 subsample, while 
the reaction to cold-market ECOs is highly efficient. For cold-market ECOs, all abnormal 
announcement return materializes during the [-1 0] day event window. 
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the German sample exhibits higher variance of abnormal return during the three weeks after 
the announcement. Rather than focus on statistically insignificant post-event characteristics, it 
will hence be more insightful to focus on the statistically significant pre-event features, which 
are provided in Figure 39 in a standardized comparison of announcement return between 
German and US ECO278. Standardization accounts for the fact that efficiency gains may 
generally be stronger for the German sample, e.g., because prevailing inefficiencies are higher 
in that country and ECOs thus represent a larger overall opportunity. 
Figure 39: International comparison of the standardized ECO announcement effect 
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Figure 39 demonstrates that abnormal return for both samples is close to zero for the first half 
of the month before the announcement. The insight from Figure 38 is now directly 
comparable between the samples: Abnormal return for the German sample begins to climb 
about 18 days before the actual announcement, whereas abnormal return for the US sample, 
while increasing somewhat in volatility, does not begin with its steady climb until about six 
days before the offer. At that point, it still lies at around 20% of the overall effect, while the 
German sample has already attained more than 70% of its overall abnormal return. As Figure 
39 unequivocally shows, the second half of the month before the offer exhibits a wide gap 
between the development of abnormal return for the two samples. The fact that a larger 
portion of the overall 30-day abnormal return materializes earlier for the German sample can 
                                                 
278  CAR of the [-30 0] day window has been set to 100% for each sample. 
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be seen as an indication for higher market efficiency in the US. A gradual increase in 
abnormal return represents a situation where information in the market is not fully reflected 
by prices, and this is more pronouncedly the case for the German sample than for US 
ECOs279. 
In summary, both pieces of available evidence – the descriptive characteristics of the sample 
and the reaction of the capital market to an ECO announcement – are consistent with the first 
hypothesis H9-1, which proposes that public equity markets are more developed in the US 
than in Germany. 
9.5.2 Transparency and blockholder benefits 
The second proposition H9-2 states that blockholder ownership is more beneficial in Germany 
than in the US, while the third H9-3 posits that US investors rely more heavily on public 
information than their German colleagues. The testing of both propositions requires a review 
of details from the cross-sectional regression analyses that examine the efficiency effect of an 
ECO. Figure 40 on p. 344 contains such comparison, showing the contribution of each 
efficiency dimension tested in the cross-sectional regression analyses of the US and German 
ECO samples. The approach follows Figure 18 on p. 189, and only results from the short-term 
regressions are compared since long-term regressions do not exhibit high explanatory power, 
for both the US and the German sample280. 
The comparison indicates that despite some differences in degree, the influence of Focus & 
investment efficiency and Incentive compensation & alignment are broadly comparable across 
the German and the US samples with only minor differences in degree. The other two 
dimensions, in contrast, exhibit substantial differences in kind: Information asymmetry & 
disclosure contributes about 30% of the explanatory power in the US, while its influence is 
next to absent for the German sample (if even slightly negative), while Blockholder control 
contributes more than half of the explanatory power in Germany, but none in the US. 
Figure 40 admittedly represents a crude comparison of crude statistics, but is fully defensible 
after closer inspection of the detailed regression results. As witnessed by regression model 
A17 (see Table 28 on p. 190), the coefficient for the decrease in information asymmetry 
(ASYM2_delta) exhibits an exceptionally high t-statistics of 8.29, which compares to 
                                                 
279  It should be noted that this is not the only possible interpretation. Alternatively, it could be argued 
that the gradual increase in abnormal return merely reflects the propensity of US managers to 
handle the announcement of an ECO more efficiently (i.e., avoid leakage of information) – which 
could also be seen as evidence that equity markets are more developed in the US. An 
interpretation to the effect that German investors are inclined to act on less-perfect information is 
ruled out on the ground of stronger uncertainty avoidance. The chosen interpretation builds on the 
argument that drifts in abnormal return always represent situations where information is not fully 
reflected by prices, and that informationally more-efficient capital markets are therefore 
characterized by fewer and/or shorter gradual adjustments. 
280  Focus & investment efficiency is represented by variable INVEFF, Information asymmetry & 
disclosure by ASYM, the variables ALIGN and INFL are jointly included under Incentive 
compensation & alignment, and Blockholder control is represented by variable OWNPAR. 
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coefficients of corresponding variables for the German sample that carry signs counter to the 
hypothesized relationship in each regression variant281. Additionally, in none of the 27 short-
term regression models tested in Section 6 does the coefficient of the blockholder control 
variable OWNPAR attain statistical significance. For the German sample, in contrast, it is 
statistically significant at the 10% level for each regression variant, and in excess of the 1% 
threshold for about half of these. 
It can therefore be concluded that the propositions on the benefits of disclosure and 
blockholder control (H9-2, H9-3) are both supported by empirical evidence. Reductions in 
information asymmetry are clearly associated with higher announcement returns in the US, 
but not so for the German sample. Regarding the benefits of blockholder control, this appears 
to be robustly valued in Germany, while it is utterly unrelated to the announcement effect in 
the US, providing evidence of neither advantages nor disadvantages. 
Figure 40: International comparison of the contribution by ECO value lever 
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9.5.3 Risk aversion 
The fourth and last proposition (H9-4) states that managers are more risk-averse in Germany 
than in the US. The topic of risk aversion has entered the present evaluation of ECOs with 
regard to market timing: It has been argued that more risk-averse managers – willing to pay 
for lower variance of return – will choose a longer security period to reduce the risk of 
conducting an ECO during unfavorable conditions after the peak of overvaluation. The 
                                                 
281  The corresponding variables used by Junker (2005) are ASYM and TRANSP, whose coefficients 
vary in statistical significance, but whose signs run consistently counter to hypothesis. 
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advance with which an ECO is conducted relative to the peak of overvaluation hence 
increases with the risk aversion of the responsible manager. Reiterating Equation (7.20) 
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this implies that A = text − tECO  increases for managers who are more risk-averse. 
Consequently, all else in Equation (9.1) equal, the first of the three scenarios becomes more 
likely, i.e., some event windows with end date tk  that have previously exhibited negative 
abnormal return now exhibit positive abnormal return. Abnormal return of the subsidiary is 
expected to be positive for longer post-ECO event windows if managers are more risk-averse. 
Figure 41: International comparison of the abnormal long-term subsidiary return 
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Figure 41 depicts the difference in the hot-market (1998-2000) subsidiary BHAR between the 
present and the German sample of Junker (2005)282. The first aspect that strikes the eye is the 
pronounced rise-and-fall phenomenon for the German sample. The German sample exhibits 
this pattern in much greater magnitude than the US sample. Abnormal return sharply 
increases to almost 80% during the immediate post-offer period and remains at elevated levels 
                                                 
282  Only the hot-market subsamples are compared since market timing has been undetectable for 
other years in the US sample. 
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until around 10 months post-ECO. At that point, a steady decline sets in, which gradually tails 
off during the ensuing two years. Abnormal return becomes negative after about 20 months 
after the offer, compared to eight months in the US. 
This leads to two conclusions. First, like their US counterparts, German ECOs that have taken 
place during the hot-market period exhibit signs of market timing. Second, the amount of 
money left on the table is substantially larger for German ECOs. This can be interpreted as 
evidence for the increased willingness of German managers to pay for a reduction in the 
variance of expected ECO proceeds. Overall, this evidence confirms hypothesis H9-4 that the 
exact timing of an ECO that is timed-to-market depends on the risk aversion of the involved 
managers283. 
9.6 Discussion 
9.6.1 Import of geographic differences 
Results of the more detailed expositions in the section notwithstanding, the main theme of the 
international comparison of results is unmistakable: The performance of ECOs, when 
comparing Germany and the US, is more similar than different. Announcement returns are 
robust, positive, and associated with efficiency gains, whereas long-term results are negative, 
of mixed statistical significance, and unrelated to efficiency gains. 
This finding stands in some contrast to the differences in descriptive attributes found between 
firms that conduct an ECO in the two countries. It is likely that these reflect general 
differences between the US and Germany, rather than aspects related to ECOs. For example, 
by most measures, firms that conduct an ECO in the US tend to be larger than firms in 
Germany. This may reflect general size characteristics of firms that are listed on the stock 
exchanges in these countries. Descriptive attributes may thus only be relevant if they are 
related to differences in performance. Also, several descriptive measures point into the same 
direction: low profitability, high leverage, and at least industry-commensurate investment 
opportunities. This supports the conclusion that both in Germany and in the US, firms that 
undertake an ECO have exhausted other sources of capital along the pecking order. 
One characteristic that does stand out is the much larger total announcement effect of ECOs 
in Germany compared to the US. As Figure 38 on p. 341 shows, investors react to the 
announcement of an ECO in Germany more than twice as vehemently as investors in the US 
do. Coupled with the insight from Section 6 that the announcement effect is robustly 
associated with the prevalence of inefficiencies before the ECO and with the realization of 
efficiency gains after the offer, this observation could be interpreted to the point that either 
                                                 
283  Basing the discussion solely on uncertainty avoidance assumes that other factors relevant for the 
pattern of abnormal return of the subsidiary (e.g., information environment and forecasting skill) 
are not affected by geographical differences. Results could otherwise be interpreted to the effect 
that uncertainty about the development of abnormal return is lower in the US and/or manager 
forecasting skill higher. 
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greater inefficiencies exist in German firms that undertake an ECO, or that German managers 
are able to extract more efficiency gains from otherwise equally inefficient firms. Based on 
arguments of plausibility, the first scenario appears more likely than the latter, and the 
findings of this section could thus indicate that firms that announce an ECO in Germany are 
less efficiently organized than those in the US. This conjecture remains at this point, of 
course, quantitatively unproven, and future efforts may set out to ascertain its validity, or if 
the observed differences rather relate to behavioral differences in investor reaction or to other 
characteristics of the respective firms. 
Performance differences between the two samples are otherwise subtler and have only been 
detected after a review of country-specific characteristics. The hypothesized relationships 
have been confirmed: First, US equity markets appear more developed than those in 
Germany. Second, German managers exhibit greater risk aversion than their US colleagues. 
Third, blockholder control is more highly valued in Germany than in the US, and fourth, 
increases in transparency are more highly valued in the US. That transparency increases are 
even negatively related to the announcement effect for the German sample could be seen as 
evidence that existing shareholders compensate the erosion of their informational insider 
advantage with a higher discount. Overall, that these differences in ECO performance so 
clearly reflect differences between the two countries shows that country-specific attributes 
represent a viable basis for international studies on restructuring and equity financing. 
9.6.2 Comparison to existing research 
While the entire present section represents in itself a comparison to existing research, it is 
fitting to review the current results against the findings by Fucks (2003), who has studied 
ECOs in a European context and makes explicit reference to legal origin. The author 
documents that the ECO announcement return is about 2.5 times as large in common law 
countries than in civil law countries (compare Chapter 1.4.1 on p. 10). This result is striking 
as it directly contradicts the present finding, where the [-30 0] day abnormal return is more 
than twice as large for the German sample than for the current set of US ECOs. 
Several reasons may lie at the root of this disparity. First, the comparison documented by 
Fucks (2003) pertains to the [-1 1] day event window. A review of the present data reveals 
that announcement-day abnormal return is indeed also greater for the US sample than for 
German ECOs, even if not nearly at the multiple reported by Fucks. The differential between 
the two groups in Fucks’ study is likely to narrow as longer pre-event windows are considered 
(e.g., to account for lower informational efficiency of less-developed capital markets in civil 
law countries). While data reported by the author tentatively points to such reversal, 
adequately long pre-announcement windows are unfortunately not included in the publication. 
Another observation that calls for caution about Fucks’ results is the disparity between his 
common law results and prior US research, since the 4.2% abnormal return reported for the [-
1 1] day window grossly exceeds the results reported by most US ECO studies (compare 
Table 10 on p. 66). These results suggest that Fucks’ generalization of ECO performance to 
origins of law may be premature, and his results may rather reflect the characteristics of ECOs 
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in the UK, the only common law country in his sample. Lastly, the divergent findings may be 
attributable to differences in sample size: Where Fucks (2003) bases his calculations on 23 
ECOs in the UK, the sample size in the smaller of the two studies reviewed in this section is 
still more than twice as large (55 ECOs studied by Junker (2005)). 
9.6.3 Significance of the origins of diversity 
The hypotheses in this section have been formulated based on insight from two separate 
schools of international comparative research: the legal view and the school of national 
cultures. The fact that these hypotheses have been jointly confirmed shows that these different 
approaches to the same topic can be regarded as complementary, rather than competing, as 
each serves to uncover a part of the difference of economic systems. In the context of the 
current work, this allows inferences onto more fundamental aspects than those that are readily 
observable. For example, the confirmation that equity markets appear more developed in the 
US than in Germany offers the conclusion that minority shareholder rights are better protected 
in the US. 
What remains an open question at this point (and which to answer ECOs may not constitute 
the most fitting subject) is the degree to which these conceptually different factors are related. 
For example, given higher uncertainty avoidance in Germany, investors may prefer the 
relatively protected contracts of debt rather than the residual prospects of equity. In other 
words, existing research of the legal variant abstracts from difference in risk aversion and 
argues that it is the difference in the protection of minority shareholder rights that causes the 
emergence of a bank-based or a market-based system. In a broader perspective, it could be 
argued that these legal differences, while real and measurable, may be relatively unimportant 
relative to differences in risk preferences. The legal system, just as the characteristics of the 
capital markets, may merely represent a consequence of these individual attributes. The 
pursuit of these questions falls, once again, out of the scope of the present work, but it may 
represent a worthwhile subject for future research. To consider more broadly the possibilities 
for future research that follow from this work, the next (and last) section contains a discussion 
of the implications of the research presented in this document up to this point. 
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10 Conclusions and implications 
10.1 Summary 
Besides definitional footing and a review of existing research, Section 1 has most importantly 
introduced the overall objective of the present work: to evaluate the performance of ECOs. 
Section 2 has presented the sample used to attain this objective. Its descriptive contribution 
has confirmed the economic importance of ECOs and provided indication that ECOs are 
conducted by firms with need for cash. Section 3 has introduced the theoretical grounds on 
which the analyses rest, presenting agency theory as unifying theoretical framework. While an 
ECO is expected to affect the agency costs of the involved companies, the direction into 
which these materialize, let alone their magnitude, is a priori unknown. An empirical analysis 
was warranted. 
In Section 4, an event study of the ECO announcement has delivered robustly positive results 
of about 4%. Analyses in Section 5, however, have called this finding into doubt: In the long-
term, ECO parent companies underperform various benchmarks by about 20%. In a 
hypothesis-driven approach, efficiency effects have been reviewed for their explanatory 
power of ECO performance in Section 6. Results have shown that improvements in 
investment efficiency and heightened transparency explain the positive short-term results 
remarkably well, whereas the determinants of long-term ECO underperformance have 
remained puzzling. In Section 7, an exogenous influence has been considered to close this 
gap. Based on theoretical arguments, sample characteristics allow the conclusion that the 
long-term underperformance of ECO firms results from manager behavior to time the equity 
offer to periods of irrationally high share prices. 
The relevance of market condition has been tested in Section 8. Market timing can 
unambiguously be traced to the hot-market period of 1998-2000, when poor investor 
rationality has likely spawned its proliferation. Finally, Section 9 has put the results of the 
present work into international perspective by contrasting the findings to prior work from 
Germany. While country-specific idiosyncrasies of ECOs are detectable, their performance is 
largely similar across the two geographies. 
Do ECOs create economic value? – This work has set out with the presumption that they do. 
The positive announcement effect has confirmed this proposition, and cross-sectional 
analyses have shown why this is so: ECOs engender efficiency gains. While the detection of 
long-term underperformance has called this positive judgment into question, closer inspection 
has revealed that this underperformance is not an innate trait of the ECO but its likely 
companion if investor rationality is poor. Overall, this research accentuates the positive 
verdict on ECOs. 
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10.2 Fulfillment of objectives 
In Chapter 1.5 on p. 16, the overall objective of this work has been split into five subordinate 
objectives, the satisfaction of which is individually reviewed in the following. En passant, this 
review provides a more detailed summary of the current findings. 
Immediate ECO performance. An event study of ECO announcements delivers unequivocal 
evidence of positive stock market reactions. The economic value represented by these 
reactions (about USD 120 million for the median ECO) is testament to the claim that ECOs 
are well-received by investors. Certainly not all ECOs elicit positive price changes, but 
inferential statistics allow the conclusion that the average reaction to an ECO is positive. A 
second part of this first objective has called for a validation of methodological refinements. 
The application of GARCH and SUR confirms findings from other techniques and earlier 
studies: Based on any approach, research leads to identical conclusions. A third part of this 
first objective has aimed to assess the stability of the positive announcement effect. Evidence 
from this most recent ECO sample suggests that the announcement effect is consistent over 
time and that its magnitude is comparable to earlier samples. The 1998-2000 period, however, 
has represented a phase of curious market conditions during which announcement returns 
have tripled. 
Durability of ECO performance. Examination of the durability of ECO performance is based 
on the three years after an ECO. At face value, ECO announcement returns seem fleeting, as 
return on a parent firm and subsidiary portfolio lags benchmarks by about 20%. Further 
probing, however, shows that the affected stocks would likely also have underperformed if no 
ECO had taken place, as ECOs have been used by managers to capitalize on overvalued stock 
prices. Underperformance is therefore not innately associated with an ECO, but with the 
circumstances under which they are likely to occur. Lifting the deceptive veil of market 
timing, which can be traced to the unusual market conditions of 1998-2000, nothing remains 
to suggest with statistical significance that positive ECO announcement returns do not endure. 
This finding explains the ambiguous long-term results of earlier ECO studies, a clarification 
of which has represented a research gap taken on by this work: Previous work has not reached 
agreement on long-term abnormal ECO returns because there are none to detect. As a 
derivative byproduct, the examination of the durability of ECO performance has delivered a 
categorization of possible combinations of short- and long-term market reactions. 
Relative ECO performance. The third objective has demanded a relative assessment of the 
performance of ECO parent company and subsidiary. Abnormal long-term return has been 
found statistically significant for neither the parent firm nor the subsidiary if ECOs from the 
1998-2000 period are excluded. A consideration of results regardless of statistical significance 
shows that the parent company always performs worse than the subsidiary. For the purpose of 
the present objective, it can therefore be noted that the long-term performances of parent firm 
and subsidiary are identical and benchmark-commensurate under strict statistics, while both 
firms exhibit insignificant residual underperformance, not unlike firms that conduct general 
IPOs or SEOs. 
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Determinants of ECO performance. The positive announcement effect of an ECO is most 
robustly related to improvements in investment efficiency and transparency brought about by 
the transaction, as well as to the introduction of inventive compensation. ECOs that are highly 
leveraged elicit less-positive stock market reactions. A part of this objective has been to 
assess the applicability of Junker’s agency cost framework, which has proven suitable to 
detect the determinants of ECO performance above and to rule out efficiency effects as a 
cause for long-term underperformance. It has allowed the condensation of various efficiency 
aspects that have so far only been studied disjointedly by earlier ECO research. 
Geographic elements of ECO performance. Comparison of current findings to results from 
German ECO research underscores the consistency of the positive announcement effect and 
its association with efficiency gains. Magnitudinal differences hint at different levels of 
inefficiency in Germany, where the announcement effect is about twice as strong as in the 
US. Individual aspects of efficiency gains as well as attributes of market efficiency and 
manager personality reflect systematic differences between the two countries, which convey a 
more intricate understanding of ECOs without altering the overall assessment of their 
performance. 
10.3 Theoretical implications 
The remainder of this document turns to the implications of this research. These implications 
depend on the agenda of the respective constituent, and the following discussion therefore 
reflects two views: one theoretical, relating to the academic and intellectual utility of this 
work (this chapter), and one practical, relating to its economic utility (Chapter 10.4 on p. 
359). 
10.3.1 ECO performance 
If this was not the case before, then the general question about the short-term (announcement) 
performance of an ECO can now be laid to rest with assuredness of methodological 
robustness and temporal consistency. ECO research may thus direct its attention to more 
complex second-generation aspects of ECO performance, which are reviewed in the 
following. 
10.3.1.1 Abnormal return during the immediate pre-announcement period 
The first of these more complex aspects of ECO performance is the detection of positive 
abnormal return during the two weeks before the announcement of an ECO. Such returns 
have been found in the present as well as in prior studies and represent an anomaly that is to 
date not well-understood. It has been argued in this document that these abnormal returns 
represent anticipation and are a function of two aspects: information (e.g., leakage of 
information or reading of environmental factors) and investors’ willingness to act on 
imperfect information (Chapter 4.6.3 on p. 101). This segregation of effects allows an 
explanation of the fact that pre-announcement return has been more pronounced during the 
1998-2000 period: The leakage of information into the market has remained unchanged, but 
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investors’ predisposition to trade on imperfect information has increased. This interpretation 
has not been formally tested. While non-zero pre-announcement returns thus represent a gap 
that future research may address, the presented duality of effects suggests how this gap may 
be closed. For its investor-centered view, its implementation will likely benefit from 
behavioral approaches that help to explain how investors’ inclination to trade changes under 
different market conditions. This research could benefit from not being confined to a study of 
ECOs alone. An examination of abnormal return during the immediate pre-announcement 
period is perhaps also instructive for the announcement of other corporate events, such as 
SEOs, spin-offs, stock splits, or convertible debt calls. 
In Section 9, a different angle to this phenomenon has been offered, arguing that differences 
in abnormal return during the immediate pre-announcement phase may also be a result of 
differences in market efficiency. The announcement effects of several corporate events have 
now been so well documented by the literature – ECOs not least of all – that they may form 
the basis for extensions over longer time periods or across multiple geographies to assess the 
propensity of capital markets to truly reflect relevant information. In this regard, the current 
international comparison of market efficiency represents no more than a feeble start (feeble 
inasmuch as market efficiency has only been an ancillary aspect of this study), and future 
research may pick up on this point. 
Evidence and suggestions from this work may therefore be combined into a model of pre-
announcement returns that rests on three fundamental notions: that these abnormal returns 
decrease with the ability to keep an intent concealed (a managerial aspect), increase with 
investors’ inclination to trade on imperfect information (a behavioral aspect), and increase 
with the inability of the capital market to instantaneously reflect relevant information (a 
market efficiency aspect). These propositions could be formalized and tested on 
announcement effects at different times, to different types of corporate events, and across 
different geographies to advance the understanding of all three parameters. 
10.3.1.2 Variations in the strength of announcement effect 
Besides the accumulation of abnormal return during the immediate pre-announcement period, 
the current study has also detected variations in the strength of the announcement effect, 
which has almost tripled during the 1998-2000 period. It has been shown that such a 
phenomenon is only possible if the expected (efficiency) gains from an ECO are overvalued 
at a higher degree than the firm itself, and behavioral approaches – unexplored in this work – 
may help to elucidate this phenomenon. A stepping stone may be provided by Barberis/Thaler 
(2003), who present overoptimism as a concept to study irrational behavior. The combination 
of behavioral techniques to the study of announcement effects may mutually benefit the 
understanding of behavioral aspects and the study of the announcement effects of corporate 
events. 
Another facet of this question is the much larger overall announcement effect of an ECO in 
Germany (say, during the month before the actual announcement, irrespective of the pattern 
of build-up). The present study has left the case with the allusion that stronger inefficiencies 
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may prevail in Germany and that an ECO therefore elicits a larger positive response. While 
probable on realistic ground (e.g., because of stronger political influences in German public 
companies), the formal testing of this assertion represents a current research gap. A test of the 
question whether the inference from higher announcement effects in Germany on the 
prevalence of higher inefficiencies in that country is permissible could set out with a 
comparison of descriptive aspects. It may be too far a stretch to compare the descriptive 
statistics of explanatory variables of the present study to those from Junker (2005), as even 
slight variability in operationalization (as is the case) or in the time periods covered by the 
samples (as also the case) induces substantial risk of error. Further probing into this direction 
will likely be instructive. 
10.3.1.3 Underperformance 
The third and last second-generation aspect of ECO performance is the statistically 
insignificant long-term underperformance of parent company and subsidiary, which remains 
valid even after signaling effects, efficiency effects, and market timing have been considered. 
Cold-market firms exhibit some, if statistically weak, evidence of underperformance in the 
order of 10%. Statistical hardliners will (rightfully) not reject the null hypothesis of zero 
abnormal long-term returns after an ECO, but it cannot be neglected that t-values are elevated, 
even if at p-values larger than 0.10. In a similar line of argument, not all of the abnormal 
long-term returns during the 1998-2000 period are attributable to market timing, and the net 
residual anomaly, insignificant as it may statistically be, persists and is similar in magnitude 
to the underperformance of cold-market ECOs. 
The dual (financing and restructuring) character of ECOs has been repeatedly alluded to 
throughout this work, and it may indeed represent the key to understanding the insignificant 
long-term underperformance of ECO parent firms and subsidiaries: General IPOs and SEOs 
consistently underperform respective benchmarks, and consequently the restructuring 
component of an ECO may keep the long-term performance of parent company and 
subsidiary afloat, without which ECOs would perform in similar fashion as firms that conduct 
IPOs or SEOs. In other words, counterbalancing effects prevail: The financing component of 
ECOs’ dual character is associated with a negative long-term performance, whereas their 
restructuring component engenders positive effects. Jointly, this leads to negative, but 
insignificant abnormal returns. 
This supposition represents a bridge between the findings by Ritter (1991) and 
Loughran/Ritter (1995) on the negative effects of IPOs and SEOs (financing), on the one 
hand, and by Cusatis et al. (1993) and Desai/Jain (1999) on the positive effects of spin-offs 
(restructuring) on the other (compare Figure 14 on p. 140). The casting of this bridge does of 
course not reveal much about the determinants of long-term underperformance, but it reveals 
much of the dual character of ECOs. Future research may build on this insight to study these 
effects on a combined SEO, IPO, ECO, and spin-off sample. The objective of such endeavor 
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could entail more than a mere validation of the effects here suggested, as it may represent a 
new take on the New Issues Puzzle that has been puzzling researchers for over a decade284. 
Such analysis could build on ideas offered in Section 7.6.3.5 of this work, such as anticipated 
underperformance. To translate these ideas into tractable analysis, it may be fruitful to follow 
techniques such as those applied by Villalonga (2004b), who studies the diversification 
discount by matching benchmarks not on size, book-to-market, or similar attributes, but by 
likelihood to diversify. Matched against firms with equal propensity to diversify (but have not 
diversified), Villalonga documents that what has previously been detected as a diversification 
discount is no longer statistically robust. Not diversification may cause poor performance, but 
vice versa. Since such poor performance that has caused firms to diversify is not present in 
ordinary benchmarks (matched on conventional attributes), spurious evidence of a 
diversification discount can be detected. A similar relationship may exist for ECOs – or for 
equity offers more broadly – which may explain the residual underperformance. 
The challenge then is to arrive at a measure for the probability that an ECO is conducted. 
Sample descriptive characteristics provide a hint into which direction future research might 
venture. For example, it may be a worthwhile endeavor to match the parent firms of ECOs to 
other firms that also exhibit substantially higher leverage and lower profitability than their 
industry peers. At this point, however, the study of the insignificant residual 
underperformance of ECO parent companies and subsidiaries can be handed down to the 
general stream of research on the long-term underperformance of firms that conduct an SEO 
or IPO; it may prove more insightful to start such research on these broader types of equity 
issues, as it affords the researcher with the advantages of lower complexity and larger sample 
size. 
10.3.2 Determinants of ECO performance 
Only the short-term analyses in this work have delivered evidence of true ECO performance, 
as the variability induced by market timing is not a result of the ECO but would have 
materialized regardless, and because long-term performance is otherwise statistically not 
robust. Similarly to the discussion of the theoretical implications of ECO performance above, 
several aspects of its determinants deserve individual highlighting with regard to their 
implications for future research. 
10.3.2.1 Integrated approach 
The first theoretical aspect with bearing for future research relates to the application of an 
integrated theoretical approach to the study of US ECOs. Following the ECO agency cost 
map suggested by Junker (2005), about two thirds of the announcement effect has been 
explained through changes in agency costs. This represents the second successful application 
                                                 
284  The assertion that the New Issues Puzzle has not been (fully) solved is warranted despite research 
that has narrowed the gap (e.g., Eckbo et al. (2000)). Ritter/Welch (2002) remark the persistence 
of this phenomenon, even if it may not be robust over time. 
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of this framework to a study of ECOs, and it may thus be warranted to consider its application 
to further samples of other ECOs or even related transactions such as spin-offs. 
Such an approach would naturally need to continue the improvements of the original agency 
cost map. This study has decoupled focus and investment efficiency on theoretical grounds, 
has enhanced the operationalization of various variables, and has solidified the regression 
procedure by extending the set of control variables. Future studies could further improve the 
operationalization of variables, as one of the great pities of the regression analyses in the 
present work has been the harsh curtailment of sample size through unavailability of data for 
some firms in the sample. In this context, the present study is a poignant testament to the 
detriment of diagonally missing data items: Even if only a small number of entries are 
missing for individual data items across all sample firms, the combination of explanatory 
variables leads to an exponential exacerbation of the problem. Future research may find a way 
to circumvent this difficulty and thus assess if the current curtailment has induced bias. 
10.3.2.2 Methodological refinements 
Another theoretical aspect of the determinants of ECO performance relates to refinement 
possibilities. One issue that could be addressed with refined techniques is the explanatory gap 
of around 30% in the current short-term regression models (compare Chapter 6.6.1.3 on p. 
225 for suggestions). Insight from such exercise would however remain incremental over the 
present findings and thus be little stimulating. As an alternative and perhaps more intriguing 
idea, a consolidated ECO sample across several geographies could be constructed. This data 
set would allow the introduction of country variables into the agency cost framework and 
could thus combine the works of Sections 6 and 9 of this document to arrive at new levels of 
insight. Similarly, industry variables could be included to determine if the relationships are 
consistent across industries, or if the strong representation of the technology and information 
section in the ECO sample overshadows subtly different effects in other industries. 
A last suggestion concerns the robustness of the agency cost relationships over time. In the 
present work, a detailed subsample analysis of agency costs has not been conducted since 
subsample analysis of the announcement effect has provided no indication of directionally 
inconsistent results at different times. Accordingly, it has been argued that the determinants of 
this performance have not been materially affected. This, of course, is an unproven claim that 
future research may put to the test. From a practical research side, this would entail the 
inclusion of temporal variables into the regression analyses, be it as a 1/0 dummy variable or 
in a more sophisticated manner. 
10.3.2.3 Resolution of endogeneity 
Refinements to the study of the determinants of ECO performance could also help address the 
formidable issue of endogeneity. On this topic, this work leaves two main questions 
unanswered: Is the decision to conduct an ECO endogenously determined? And second, if so, 
what does this decision depend on? Empirical evidence from this work tentatively suggests 
that the answers are “yes” and “prevailing inefficiencies”, respectively, but further research is 
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required to answer with certainty. In this respect, it could help to ask what managers react to 
in their ECO decision. ECOs do not just happen, but require an active decision by 
management and the board. If endogeneity is present, then there need to be observable 
circumstances that make an ECO more beneficial (and more likely) for some firms than for 
others. Advanced statistical techniques (such as the two-stage method suggested by Heckman 
(1979) or instrumental variables, as applied by Himmelberg et al. (1999)), may help to assess 
the severity of endogeneity. 
10.3.3 Market timing 
The topic of market timing has not been included in the formulation of the original objectives 
of this study, but has rather been staggered upon accidentally in connection with the long-
term return anomaly of firms that conduct an ECO. Far less studied than other attributes of 
ECOs, timing aspects entail a host of theoretical implications and deliver an overabundance of 
possibilities for further research. 
10.3.3.1 Interpretation of existing results 
The first implication of the present findings concerns the revision of several (long-term) 
studies of ECOs that have mistakenly interpreted the (under- or over-)performance of ECO 
firms as a characteristic of the ECO proper, unaware of the fact that these firms would have 
exhibited poor performance even if the ECO had not been conducted. While other studies 
have generally been cautious to make such inference, as e.g., Junker (2005), who places 
market timing outside of the scope of his work but expressly notes that it may represent an 
additional influence, the focus of these works impart the suggestion that ECOs are associated 
with (significant) non-zero abnormal long-term returns (also e.g., Michaely/Shaw (1995), 
Miles/Woolridge (1999), or Madura/Nixon (2002)). The substantial contributions of these 
studies notwithstanding, their results should be read with this study’s market timing effects in 
mind. 
10.3.3.2 Model of ECO market timing 
The second implication for further research concerns the composition of what has been 
introduced as a model of ECO market timing above. Its formulation in the present work has 
strictly followed the quest for determinants of long-term post-ECO performance. Therefore, it 
may not have attained a notable degree of refinement. Future research could take up on this 
point to express the relationships between market timing, ECO, and abnormal return in a more 
effective (and possibly more parsimonious) manner. Questions to guide such effort could 
relate to factors that influence the decision to undertake an ECO: What do managers know 
that investors do not? Which financial measures, which market dynamics do they base their 
expectations on? 
This effort likely needs to assume a more psychological stance on market timing. So far, it has 
conveniently been argued that investors exhibit bounded rationality and that, in consequence, 
stock prices deflect from true values. Much may still be learned about the nature of 
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rationality: How is it bounded? Why have investment decisions apparently been poorer during 
one period than during another? The application of more recent advances of behavioral 
finance could represent a valuable extension to the study of the market timing of ECOs. 
10.3.3.3 Empirical testing of ECO market timing 
The third implication relates to the empirical testing of a model of market timing. In the 
present work, the key question has been simple and binary: Can market timing explain the 
long-term performance characteristics of ECO firms? Based on a set of hypotheses, this 
question has been answered in the affirmative, and future research may now turn to the more 
complex empirical issues of ECO market timing. Just as different ECOs exhibit different 
degrees of efficiency gains, different ECOs are most certainly affected by market timing to 
different degrees. The subsample analysis in Section 8 of this work has provided first 
indications that this is indeed the case. Besides an enhancement of the understanding of 
market timing and ECOs (or the motivation to conduct equity issues more broadly), such 
refined measurement bears the advantage that the economic importance of the phenomenon 
could be more precisely assessed. This, in turn, would be of undeniable practical relevance to 
regulatory bodies that consider this topic (see discussion below). 
Not surprisingly, a first suggestion is the study of market timing in a cross-sectional 
regression model. While hypothesis development could start from the hypotheses outlined in 
this work, the specification of adequate variables represents a more intricate issue. For 
example, regarding dependent variables, BHAR of specific long-term event windows has 
been used thus far. This approach may be too crude since the effect of market timing on 
abnormal return varies greatly by firm. Using averages over extended periods will be of little 
help, as it makes the approach susceptible to exogenous influences. Regarding explanatory 
variables, such a model needs to control for manager risk aversion, uncertainty, and manager 
forecasting skill and would thus require novel variable operationalization in some cases. 
The market timing characteristics of ECOs can also be generalized to other forms of equity 
offerings. Managers who consider a general IPO or SEO may benefit from such practice alike, 
and market timing could thus be used as the common denominator upon which the choice of 
managers between these different options could be evaluated (most prominently the choice 
between ECOs and SEOs). 
10.3.3.4 Normative implications of market timing 
A topic so far neglected in this study are the normative aspects of market timing. While 
normative arguments are part of the practical implications of this research (see below), it falls 
into the realm of research to provide the analytic footing and quantification for an educated 
(public) discussion of market timing. In its effort to deliver unprejudiced insight, research 
may be in a unique position to devise a remedy to the ill effects of market timing: If self-
interested corporate managers (ab-)use overvaluation in equity offers, they cannot be expected 
to sponsor efforts to study and potentially contain this practice. 
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The above suggestions describe potential avenues for future research that can help provide 
such basis. At the same time, the objectives of these efforts may more clearly articulate the 
effect that market timing constitutes a Pareto-inferior zero-sum game, which redistributes 
wealth from new to existing shareholders and leads to additional trading in order to undo prior 
transactions. While the discussion in Section 7 has attempted a rough estimation of the 
economic relevance of this redistribution, no efforts have been undertaken to quantify the 
actual damage inflicted by market timing, i.e., the costs of additional transaction and the loss 
of trust. It could be a noble goal of future research to determine the reduction in the cost of 
capital to the corporate sector if market timing was not feasible. Such research may start with 
a more detailed examination of the extent to which market timing is a relevant phenomenon 
during regular cold-market years, as market timing has been found to be sensitive to the 
corrosion of investor rationality. 
10.3.4 International comparison 
After ECO performance, its determinants, and market timing, the international comparison of 
this work is the fourth and last aspect with theoretical implications. On one side, the 
international comparative component in this work has not gone as far as research by Fucks 
(2003), Bühner (2004), or Veld/Veld-Merkoulova (2004): Opposed to those studies, the 
present work does not contain one sample collected across multiple countries, but relies on a 
comparison to a very similar study from another country. On the other side, the noteworthy 
extension over prior international ECO or spin-off research lies in the express consideration 
of legal and cultural determinants. Other related research has predominantly focused on the 
differences of ECO performance between countries without appreciating their legal or cultural 
backgrounds. 
This constellation bears the substantial opportunity for future research to combine the best of 
both approaches. Equity issue event samples (e.g., ECOs, SEOs, or IPOs) could be collected 
across a number of countries, ideally with different legal and cultural heritage, and its 
characteristics analyzed against the backdrop of findings from international comparative 
research. The compilation of a cross-national sample further allows an approach from which 
the present study has been barred: a regression analysis that extends the inclusion of agency-
related variables by a consideration of legal and/or cultural aspects as explanatory variables of 
performance. Topics that such research may address include a discussion of the most 
appropriate theoretical framework, e.g., legal or cultural determinants. The explanatory power 
of these approaches should be directly discernable from the quality of the empirical research. 
Also, by compiling a sample that extends in time, such research could address the question of 
convergence or persistence in diversity. A reading of convergence could be taken from the 
descriptive features of explanatory variables, which may become more similar across 
countries over time, as well as from the regression results, which should reflect less sensitivity 
to country-specific idiosyncrasies if economic and governance systems are indeed 
converging. 
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10.4 Practical implications 
The second part of this discussion concerns practical considerations, denoting the economic 
implications of the present evaluation of ECOs. This topic is reviewed from the point of view 
of three different parties: managers, investors, and third parties. 
10.4.1 Implications for managers 
As internal constituents, managers of an ECO are faced with three central questions: whether 
to conduct an ECO, when to conduct it, and how to conduct it. Each question is separately 
considered. 
10.4.1.1 To conduct or not to conduct an ECO 
The question faced by managers whether to conduct an ECO is not as binary as it seems, since 
it unfolds into three subordinate questions: whether to engage in divisive restructuring, 
whether to conduct an equity issue, or whether to conduct both. The answers to these 
questions imply if the firm should consider a spin-off (or an asset sale), an SEO, or an ECO. 
With regard to divisive restructuring, it has been argued that the present analysis may be 
subject to endogeneity. In their decision whether or not to conduct an ECO, managers need to 
keep this in mind and should be aware that the positive response to such a transaction may 
remain elusive if prevailing efficiencies are high. Managers should also bear in mind that high 
leverage is associated with a negative reaction of the stock market to the ECO. In some cases, 
this may lead to a Catch-22, since managers may be unable to decrease leverage without an 
ECO, but may not be in a position to conduct a favorable ECO without reducing leverage. 
High leverage is of course only a symptom of a more fundamental condition that leads to the 
cautious investor response, and several types of risk related to leverage have been identified 
(e.g., bankruptcy risk or incentive risk, see Chapter 3.2.4 on p. 51). It may therefore be 
possible for managers to escape from the no-win situation by implementing risk-reducing 
means before proceeding with the ECO. If it is impossible to reduce the financial risk of 
leverage, operational and market risks could be reduced to lessen the variability of expected 
return. 
The question whether to conduct an equity offer is connected to two questions: If cash is 
needed to finance positive NPV projects, and if these funds are available from other sources. 
Where the first part of this qualification is relatively straightforward to determine (either there 
are positive NPV projects or not), the second depends on the degree to which alternative 
(cheaper) sources of capital along the pecking order (such as internally generated funds or 
debt) have been exhausted. 
It is a valid question whether an ECO unequivocally dominates SEOs and spin-offs. If 
financing is the primary objective, an ECO may bring the added benefit of efficiency gains, 
and of paid-in capital if restructuring is the primary objective. Control does not need to be 
parted with, as the parent company may (and in fact regularly does) retain majority control 
over the subsidiary. It is, however, unlikely that an ECO always represents such superior 
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choice, not only because prevailing inefficiencies may be low, but also because restructuring 
is not always beneficial from a strategic or company-cultural perspective. Additionally, paid-
in capital may have negative effects if it increases the internal capital market without the 
existence of adequate investment opportunities. Not least of all, an ECO is also likely more 
costly than SEOs or spin-offs alone, as reflected by the median cost of the offering of USD 10 
million. Managers need to be aware of the benefits and detriments of all three options, and 
should only opt for an ECO under two conditions: First, the ECO must be a realistic remedy 
to prevailing inefficiencies, and second, positive NPV projects must exist in which proceeds 
can be put to use. In the case that only one of these conditions is met, managers should 
consider a spin-off or an SEO, respectively, or abstain from divisive restructuring and equity 
offering altogether if none of these conditions is met. 
Managers should further consider the near-finality of the restructuring component of an ECO. 
While reacquisitions occur, these are far less frequent than subsequent full divestitures 
through a spin-off and may come accompanied by undesired side effects. If the share price at 
the point of reacquisition is substantially higher than at the offer, this side effect is represented 
by the additional cost of the reverse transaction. If the share price is substantially lower than 
at the offer, the reacquisition may lead to substantial losses in the trust of investors, as 
investors are likely to charge that they have been misled by the company in their decision to 
purchase high-priced equity. The cost of expected litigation is only a part of the total cost of 
this scenario, the full effect of which includes the increase in the cost of capital from the 
premium demanded by investors in future debt or equity issues. 
10.4.1.2 Timing of an ECO 
If the decision to conduct an ECO has been made, the question of the ideal time for the offer 
should follow as a secondary step. This order is fundamental: The decision to conduct an 
ECO should precede the question when to conduct it, or restated, ideal timing should not lead 
to an ECO that would otherwise not have been conducted. While the practical implications of 
an ECO’s timing may be as simple as that, there are negative externalities from the timing of 
other ECOs that deserve mention in this context. 
As amply alluded to earlier, market timing undercuts investor trust. Managers of an ECO do, 
however, have two signaling options to protect themselves against these negative effects. 
First, they may signal that they are not timing an ECO by purchasing a meaningful portion of 
the offer (following an idea by Burch et al. (2004)). Leland/Pyle (1977) have already 
suggested such arrangement as an enhancement to venture funding in general285. For 
managers’ commitment to be credible, it is necessary that the portion they purchase represent 
a significant share of their wealth. As information about manager wealth is usually not 
                                                 
285  Leland/Pyle (1977) show that signaling can reduce agency costs: An entrepreneur, possessing 
superior information about a project, may signal its quality to potential investors by investing a 
higher portion of his own money or by retaining a higher portion of equity than optimal for his or 
her private diversification. This constellation follows the notion expressed by Spence (1973) that 
signaling must be costly to be credible. 
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publicly obtainable, income could be taken as a proxy for wealth, which is directly observable 
from annual reports. Also, regular performance-based pay in the form of stock options is not 
as effective in this regard as managers’ exposure to common stock because the instrument in 
place needs to be sensitive to negative performance, whereas executive stock options are 
generally sensitive to positive performance. 
Second, managers could signal expectation of strong future subsidiary performance by 
reducing the amount of secondary shares that they unload in the transaction. Thereby, the 
parent company would retain its full exposure to potential downturns in subsidiary prices after 
the offer. It has been shown that ECOs are frequently followed by a later full divestiture 
(usually through a spin-off). Regression analyses in Section 6 have shown that this divestiture 
is associated with positive performance of the subsidiary. Therefore, it is suggested to retain a 
significant portion immediately after the offer to signal commitment to the issue, and then to 
divest the remaining ownership through a spin-off at a sufficiently distant point in time (e.g., 
after three years, when the signaling role of retained secondary shares has been fulfilled). 
10.4.1.3 Structuring of an ECO 
Research on ECOs unambiguously suggests that these transactions have the potential to create 
efficiencies. But ECOs are no magic bullet, either, and correct structuring is prerequisite to 
unlock their potential. The most basic aspect relates to the location of the divide. To answer 
this question, managers could start by reviewing the operational characteristics of candidate 
business segments, as the to-be-separated parts should not exhibit high levels of synergy286. 
While the theoretical part of this work has argued for the irrelevance of synergies since “two 
companies could achieve no less and no more than two divisions of the same company” 
(Rajan et al. (2000) p. 49) under costless contracting, real-world contracting is costly alas, and 
this needs to be taken into consideration in this discussion of practical implications. Synergies 
may not be an impediment to an ECO per se, as the parent company can retain control over 
the subsidiary. Full subsequent divestiture, however, which is frequent (Klein et al. (1991)), 
may not be recommendable in such a situation, and synergistic benefits need to be weighed 
against the detriment of continued control that has been documented in the regression 
analyses. 
The topic of continued control leads to the second practical implication of this work for the 
structuring of an ECO: If any hypothesis has been confirmed with certainty in the long-term 
(parent company or subsidiary) regression models, then it is the proposition that a subsequent 
relinquishment of control by the parent company is positively associated with share 
performance. Managers should keep this in mind and devise a long-term plan of the 
transaction that includes the possibility of a later spin-offs or sell-off. A third topic relates to 
incentive compensation, and the recommendation is straightforward: A well-managed (i.e., 
well-controlled) stock-based compensation scheme should be implemented for subsidiary 
                                                 
286  For an overview of the effect of synergies in an ECO, see Langenbach (2001) p. 299f. 
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management, as it has been shown that its introduction is closely associated with the positive 
announcement effect. 
Managers also need to consider country-specific aspects. In Germany, blockholder ownership 
of the parent after the offer represents benefit, while this is not the case in the US. ECOs in 
the US, in turn, can benefit particularly from increases in transparency. As a specific 
recommendation for ECOs in Germany, managers should consider retention of a significant 
stake in the subsidiary immediately after the offer (Junker (2005)), whereas US ECOs allow 
to sell a larger portion of the subsidiary and thus to increase total proceeds from the offer. 
Equally, transparency-enhancing measures such as additional analyst calls or voluntary public 
disclosure will likely improve the performance of ECOs in the US, whereas German ECOs 
likely profit most from information-sharing activities with inside constituents such as majority 
owners, the supervisory board, and banks. 
10.4.1.4 Lessons beyond ECOs 
The findings of this study are also relevant for managers who do not consider an ECO. The 
relative importance of the different dimensions of efficiency is particularly insightful. It can 
be seen that increases in investment efficiency have been most highly valued by the capital 
market, followed by reductions in asymmetric information. While this may, of course, be a 
reflection of the inefficiencies of firms that undertake an ECO, the general sensitivity of the 
share price to these factors is noteworthy and leads to the belief that these improvements 
could also represent a benefit to firms that restructure otherwise. As a related observation, it is 
somewhat surprising that the implementation of incentive compensation after an ECO – 
positively related as it is with the announcement effect – does not exhibit a stronger 
association with the creation of value relative to other value levers. This does likely not imply 
that stock-based compensation is less valued by the market, but it can be interpreted as a 
“hygiene” factor instead that only strikes the investors’ eye if absent. This observation is 
underlined by the fact that almost all subsidiaries have implemented such schemes after the 
offer. 
Another observation from which managers may benefit more broadly is the comparison 
between Germany and the US. Managers who are active in one or both of these geographies 
should be aware of the paramount importance of disclosure and public information in the US 
and of the role of blockholder ownership in Germany. The first could pertain to managers of 
German corporations who consider an issue on a US stock exchange, while the latter may be 
relevant for US managers who consider the acquisition of or the merger with a German public 
firm and thus find themselves in the role of blockholder. Their monitoring role in this position 
should not be underestimated and may require more active involvement than in the US. 
10.4.2 Implications for investors 
As one of the two external constituents here discussed, investors are those who part with their 
cash in the expectation of due return. The following discusses if investors can use an ECO to 
capitalize gains, be it in the short-term or with more lasting investment decisions. 
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10.4.2.1 Capitalizing on ECO announcements 
This study has confirmed the observation that ECOs are the only form of equity financing that 
elicits a positive share price reaction to its announcement. Theoretically, it is therefore 
possible that investors can capitalize on this insight287. The practical feasibility of such trading 
strategy is less clear: If one does not belong to the charmed circle of investors to whom 
information about the impending announced has leaked beforehand, the capitalization on the 
ECO announcement becomes a matter of speed. As shown by studies on related events, the 
market impounds the news so quickly that it is not sufficient to act on the same day as the 
news are released, perhaps not even in the same hour, as adjustments occur in a matter of 
minutes. Considerations of speed aside, while it may still be a worthwhile trading strategy to 
hoard, at its flicker on the ticker, as many shares as possible of any company that announces 
an ECO, such events are perhaps too few and far-between, as well as still too volatile to 
justify the cost of such strategy. After all, 70 out of 172 ECOs in the sample have not 
exhibited positive announcement returns, which hints at the outlay required for such strategy 
to become profitable. Weighing the opportunity cost of capital against the risk of such 
strategy, it does likely not constitute a recommendable trading strategy to try to capitalize on 
the capital market reaction to ECO announcements. 
10.4.2.2 Long-term investment in ECO firms 
This work has been careful to untie the effect of market timing from the proper effect of an 
ECO, and it has shown that it cannot be claimed with certainty that ECOs lead to long-term 
underperformance. This insight may be unexciting for investors, who are little concerned with 
whether the long-term underperformance of a firm stems from an ECO, from something else, 
or something at all – their first and foremost interest lies on the overall performance of a 
stock. Investors may take the detection of long-term underperformance as sufficient reason to 
sell the respective stocks short in order to capitalize on this market anomaly. 
In this regard, ECO firms are no different from other firms that engage in equity financing: 
Parent firms perform similar as firms that undertake an SEO, and subsidiaries as those that 
conduct an IPO. The detection of long-term underperformance dates back at least a decade 
longer than the parallel insight for ECOs, and what remains puzzling is the fact that this 
phenomenon is so persistent. In contrast to other anomalies, which have vanished after they 
have been published, the underperformance of SEOs, IPOs, and ECOs has endured. As such 
anomalies become publicly known, arbitrageurs are expected to exploit these opportunities 
until they disappear, as has been the case with a number of anomalies after their publication 
(Schwert (2003)). That this has not been the case with equity offerings in general, and ECOs 
in particular, may indicate that arbitrage opportunities still exist. 
The practical validity of this statement is less clear, and the lack of statistical robustness of 
these effects may indicate why these disparities have not been eliminated through appropriate 
                                                 
287  Similarly, investors could possibly capitalize on SEO announcements by shorting stock. 
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trading strategies: If caution has above been expressed against the statistically highly robust 
announcement returns as a basis for a trading strategy, then still greater caution should prevail 
for the even less-robust long-term ECO returns. This view is further underlined by several 
academic studies that have offered computational pitfalls as explanation for these abnormal 
long-term returns (e.g., Eckbo et al. (2000)). In the end, the implication from this work for 
investors may be unspectacular: While related to efficiency gains in the short-term, the long-
term performance of firms that conduct an ECO depends as much on company fundamentals 
as it does for other firms. It is doubtful that an ECO represents a relevant signal of this 
fundamental value, and arbitrage opportunities are not likely to exist. 
10.4.3 Implications for third party constituents 
Third party is a broad designation for the second external constituent, and if it bears 
resemblance to an all other category, this is not unintended: If market timing engenders 
negative externalities to the economy at large, it has general public repercussions. Yet, even if 
the public is concerned, it may be advisable not to react, and the first relevant question 
therefore becomes whether or not action against market timing should be taken. If this has 
been answered affirmatively, a second question regards how to go about it. The following 
subchapters are grouped around these two questions. 
10.4.3.1 Case for action 
A first case against action to contain market timing is given by the fact that the magnitude of 
its detriment remains at this point unknown. As action is costly, the cost-benefit relation of 
curbing market timing cannot be established. The magnitude of the wealth transfer 
engendered by market timing, roughly estimated at UDS 20 million per median ECO, 
however, hints at a case for action, particularly because not only ECOs but also equity 
offerings more broadly are affected by this phenomenon. The second, more sweeping 
contention builds on the argument that the market takes care of itself: Efforts to improve 
managers’ commitment to abstain from market timing may be futile or even detrimental. 
Proponents of this view could build on the notion of sainthood, when managers who refrain 
from market timing could benefit from superior reputation (personally and for future equity 
issues of their firms) and thus induce other managers to follow suit. 
But markets can fail, and the market timing of ECOs is a good example for this. As a classic 
prisoners’ dilemma, market timing represents a suboptimal Nash equilibrium: All parties 
would (probably) profit if nobody engaged in it, but since individual defection leads to a 
positive payoff, such a situation does not represent a stable equilibrium. While generally 
sympathetic to the argument that the market leads to welfare-maximizing solutions, targeted 
involvement may therefore be necessary or at least helpful to alleviate the negative effects of 
market timing. 
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10.4.3.2 Method of involvement 
As has been shown, the absence of either of two preconditions suffices to avert market timing: 
momentary lapses of investor rationality and managers’ keenness to sell overvalued equity. 
As it is unlikely that the latter precondition can be eradicated, and since regulatory decree will 
invariably run into the same problem of asymmetrical information as faced by investors, the 
focus of this discussion will be on the promotion of investor rationality. Two boundaries of 
investor rationality have been introduced above, namely the collection of information and the 
evaluation of information, and enhancing either could lessen irrationality and exuberance. 
Effective as these routes may be, information collection is likely the more efficient path to 
take action since information be provided by a controllable number of public corporations, 
whereas improvements to its evaluation would need to start with a much larger and highly 
dispersed group of individual investors (or their agents, of course). 
Primordial for the conferral of information to investors is transparency (or disclosure and 
transparency, if one understands the first as the release of information and the second as a 
condition for its dissemination), and much rests on managers to create such transparency. 
Rather than by amendment of existing accounting rules or well-developed disclosure 
requirements, the enhancement of transparency could be attained by piggybacking on more 
recent endeavors to promote fair conduct of corporate governance. As an example, 
Jesover/Kirkpatrick (2005) discuss the OECD principles of corporate governance, which 
include the equitable treatment of shareholders as one of six key areas. Another area discusses 
the role of disclosure and transparency (the creation of which – redundantly – may be nothing 
else than the equitable treatment of shareholders)288. Adequate disclosure of the value of the 
subsidiary before an ECO would fall under these principles and thus could, perhaps couched 
in a broader section on equity financing in general, be expressly included in the principles’ 
communication. 
With regard to the formulation of more prescriptive solutions, it is doubtful that these will 
outdo the market solution. These may, after all, even lead to more negative consequences: 
Loughran et al. (1994) argue that the government should not react to market timing with 
efforts pertaining to manager behavior because market timing constitutes a supply response to 
shifts in investor demand. If this demand is not met, the situation could exacerbate as 
investors are willing to pay even higher prices for the securities they seek289. Overall, the 
recommendation of this research to the third party, government and non-governmental 
organizations alike, remains therefore limited to the creation of transparency. 
                                                 
288  Cromme (2005) discusses the German corporate governance code, which equally presents the 
creation of transparency as a central pillar and which could form the basis to promote the creation 
of disclosure and transparency for equity offers in Germany. 
289  The sale of the offer at lower (fair) values may alternatively be suggested to mitigate the negative 
(redistribution) effects of market timing. As (ECO) offers are mostly sold on a firm commitment 
basis, this would effectively lead to a redistribution of wealth to the underwriters, or if these resell 
at low values, to early investors. It would thus not solve the long-term effects for investors in 
general. 
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10.5 Concluding remark 
This work has opened with a comment on the delicacy of economic value. It has been shown 
that the separation of a subsidiary from its former parent via an ECO represents an 
opportunity to create such value, as the value of two firms may indeed exceed its former total. 
Yet this value does not magically surface. It follows from applying the right tool (an ECO) in 
the right situation (to prevailing inefficiencies) in appropriate (operational) fashion. ECOs are 
no panacea, but a powerful instrument for managers to realize efficiency gains and fuel 
profitable investment opportunities. That shareholders can benefit from an ECO is testament 
to – but not a source of – the economic potential of these transactions. Subject to transparency 
and sensibly applied, ECOs are likely to remain what they are: a catalyst of efficiency and 
growth for managers, a source of value for investors, and an intriguing subject for researchers 
of finance. 
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